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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Through an analysis of the Iraq’s engineered genocides against Kurds during the 
years of Saddam Hussein’s regime, this work aimed to reveal the weakness of 
the current political and social situation in Iraq. The purpose was to offer an 
overview of the dangers posed by the current difficult coexistence between the 
Federal Government in Baghdad and the Kurdish Regional Government in Erbil. 
The birth of a new political system after the fall of Saddam's regime meant that 
every institutional power had to be built from scratch in a political and social 
reality new to most Iraqis. This process of renovation, already witnessed in 
Europe after World War II, in particular in Italy and Germany, implied the writing 
of a new constitution and of a new set of legal frames with the purpose to give 
the country a strong and reliable democratic base.  
 
In the case of Iraqi Kurds, who suffered discrimination, death and, ultimately 
genocide, it is important to revisit their recent past in order to feel they are an 
integral part of the new country born after the last Gulf War in 2003. Despite the 
international interest in the Kurdish case, Kurdish people did not have the 
opportunity to see the ones responsible of the crimes committed against them 
brought to international justice, as happened in the past in the case of Rwanda 
and Bosnia.  
 
The execution of Saddam Hussein in 2006 meant that the charges against him 
and his commanders related to the Kurdish case were not discussed in court 
preventing Kurdish people not only from obtaining the justice they were entitled to 
but, most importantly, from gaining access to the truth about the massacres and 
human rights abuses carried out by Saddam's regime between 1963 and 2003. 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
My profound gratitude goes to Exeter University for providing me with a great 
environment for research and writing. 
I am most grateful to Professor Gareth Stansfield for taking a keen interest in this 
thesis and for his generous support, encouragement and advice. No amount of 
words can describe how much I appreciated his supervision, support and 
guidance. I would like to thank my second supervisor Professor Jonathan 
Githens-Mazer for his invaluable supervision and advice. They are the best 
supervision team any one could ask for. Their immense support, patience and 
generous advice cannot be quantified.  
I would like to thank everyone who granted my request for interviews. In 
particular I would like to thank the victims of genocides who allowed me to share 
their pain and sorrow. In addition, I would like to thank the principal judges and 
investigators of the Iraqi High Tribunal Raouf Rashid Abduul Rahman, 
Mohammed Uraibi and Asso Sofi. With them I would like to thank General Saad 
Ubaid and many others who provided me with valuable primary sources for this 
investigation. My ever lasting thanks to Maria Rita Corticelli for the generous time 
she offered for editing and proofreading this thesis, in addition to her accurate 
advice. 
All my love goes to my wife (Syof Ihsan) and three daughters Tara, Yara and 
Talia for their support and constant encouragement through the period of the 
research. 
Also to be acknowledged are my friends and brothers, whose support and 
encouragement meant so much to me every step of the way, particularly Anwar, 
Ahmad, Nazar, Ali, Azad, Nawzad, Salar, Nijyar Shamdeen, Abdulkarin 
Shamdeen and Moayad Haji Mohammed. 
 
  
4 
 
Contents 
List of illustrations ......................................................................... 8 
List of Abbreviations ................................................................... 10 
Introduction .................................................................................. 13 
Literature review ............................................................................................................................... 22 
Secondary Sources ............................................................................................................................ 23 
Methodology ................................................................................ 31 
Chapter 2 ...................................................................................... 40 
The Concept of Genocide ................................................................................................................. 40 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 40 
The Origin of Genocide and the Process of Naming .......................................... 40 
The Phenomena of Genocide........................................................................................ 43 
Application of the Convention ...................................................................................... 51 
The Iraqi High Criminal Court....................................................................................................... 65 
Alternatives to the Legal Definition ............................................................................ 68 
Techniques of Genocide ................................................................................................. 70 
Stages of genocide ............................................................................................................ 74 
History of genocide in Iraq ............................................................................................. 78 
Chapter Three .............................................................................. 82 
Kurds in Iraq from Creation to Genocide .................................................................................. 82 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 82 
The Origin of the Kurdish Question ........................................................................... 82 
The Kurds and the Treaty of Sèvres .......................................................................... 84 
The Formation of the Iraqi State and the Reaction of the Kurds ................... 85 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish National Movement .......................... 89 
The Iraqi Ba'ath regime and the Kurdish question .............................................. 93 
The Kurds and the Iraq - Iran War (1980-1988) ...................................................... 97 
The Gulf War and the establishment of the Kurdish Regional 
Government ........................................................................................................................ 102 
Chapter Four .............................................................................. 105 
Arabization as Ethnic Cleansing ................................................................................................. 105 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 105 
Ethnic Cleansing in Iraq ................................................................................................ 111 
Kirkuk Province ................................................................................................................ 111 
Changes in Administrative units and internal borders .................................... 113 
Demographic Changes .................................................................................................. 115 
Kirkuk after 2003 .............................................................................................................. 120 
State of the negotiation with Baghdad ................................................................... 120 
Peace for the Future? ..................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter Five ............................................................................... 127 
The Faylee Kurds (Genocide concept approval) .................................................................. 127 
5 
 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 127 
Faylee Kurds historical background ....................................................................... 130 
Citizenship Laws and Deportation ............................................................................ 133 
IHT decision ........................................................................................................................ 145 
Application of the Eight Stages of Genocide framework ............................... 148 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 152 
Chapter Six ................................................................................. 156 
Barzani Kurds Genocide (Blueprint of Genocide) ............................................................... 156 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 156 
Setting up the Crime Scene ......................................................................................... 161 
Who are Barzani Kurds? ............................................................................................... 167 
Forced Relocation and Displacement prior to the Ba’ath Regime ............. 171 
Forced Relocation ............................................................................................................ 172 
Forced Displacement due to the Closeness to the Border (1975-1978) ...................... 174 
First Stage ........................................................................................................................... 174 
Second Stage ..................................................................................................................... 174 
Forced displacement due to the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) .......................................... 175 
First Stage ........................................................................................................................... 178 
Second Stage ..................................................................................................................... 179 
Mining Barzan Area ........................................................................................................................ 180 
Concentration Camps ..................................................................................................................... 181 
Genocide ............................................................................................................................................. 183 
First stage ............................................................................................................................ 184 
Second Stage ..................................................................................................................... 184 
Third Stage .......................................................................................................................... 185 
Fourth Stage ....................................................................................................................... 186 
Fifth Stage ........................................................................................................................... 186 
Sixth Stage .......................................................................................................................... 186 
Court Decision .................................................................................................................................. 188 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 189 
Photos from Barzanis’ mass graves ........................................................................ 191 
Chapter Seven ............................................................................ 196 
Anfal Campaign (State Engineered National Project) ........................................................ 196 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 196 
Background to Anfal Campaign ................................................................................ 197 
The State Crime of Al-Anfal ......................................................................................... 200 
Premeditated Crime ........................................................................................................ 203 
The Anfal Campaign Plan and Implementation Phases .................................. 204 
The Eight Phases of Anfal .............................................................................................................. 206 
First Anfal (21 February 1988 – 18 March 1988) .................................................. 206 
Second Anfal (22 March – 2 April 1988) ................................................................. 207 
Third Anfal ........................................................................................................................... 208 
Fourth Anfal ........................................................................................................................ 210 
Anfal five, six and seven ............................................................................................... 210 
Eighth Anfal ........................................................................................................................ 211 
6 
 
The Prosecution of Detainees ..................................................................................................... 214 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 215 
Chapter 8 .................................................................................... 223 
Genocide and Chemical Weapon (Halabja): The Birth and Development of the Iraqi 
Chemical Weapons .......................................................................................................................... 223 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 223 
Chemical weapons in Iraq ............................................................................................ 227 
The Development of the Iraqi Chemical Weapons............................................. 229 
The organized use of Iraqi Chemical Weapon ..................................................... 231 
International Ban on the Use of the Chemical Weapons ................................ 234 
International Ban Compliance .................................................................................... 235 
The International Element ............................................................................................ 242 
Eye Witnesses ................................................................................................................... 246 
The Ruling of the Court ................................................................................................. 252 
The defendants’ testimonies ....................................................................................... 253 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 254 
Chapter Nine .............................................................................. 255 
Recommendations for Prevention of Genocide in Iraq ................................... 255 
Victims ................................................................................................................................................. 256 
Create a Law on Missing Persons ............................................................................ 260 
Technical Recommendations ..................................................................................... 261 
Revision and Standardization of Field Activities and Examinations ......... 261 
Standardization of Protocols, DNA Testing Kits, Population 
Databases, and Development/validation Across DNA Laboratories ......... 262 
Improvement of the DNA Laboratory throughout by Revision of 
Process Flow...................................................................................................................... 263 
Perpetrators ...................................................................................................................................... 264 
Bystanders ......................................................................................................................................... 268 
The future from Kurdistan ........................................................................................................... 275 
Conclusion ................................................................................. 279 
Appendixes for Chapter 2 ......................................................... 285 
Appendix No (1) Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court ................................ 285 
Appendix No. (3) RCC  Decree no. 244. .................................................................. 318 
Appendixes Chapter 3 ............................................................... 320 
Appendix No (1) Articles from the Treaty of Sèèvres ....................................... 320 
Appendix No (2) Peace Agreement of 11 March 1970 ...................................... 322 
Appendixes Chapter 5 ............................................................... 327 
Appendix no. (1). A. Iraqi Council of Ministers Resolution no. 426 of 
2010 ........................................................................................................................................ 327 
Appendix no.(1) B. Resolutions No (6)of  2012 from the Presidency of 
Iraq .......................................................................................................................................... 328 
Appendix no. (2) Telegram No. 10492 of 18 October 1987 ............................. 329 
7 
 
Appendix No.(3) Memo no. 4248 of 5th Februrary 1986 .................................... 331 
Appendix No (4) RCC Decree no. 666 of 7 May 1980 ........................................ 333 
Appendix No (5) Sadoon Shaker Mehmoud Verdict. ........................................ 335 
Appendix No. (6) Mizban Khodr Hadi Verdict ...................................................... 339 
Appendix No. (7) Aziz Saleh Hassan.Verdict ....................................................... 342 
Appendix Chapter 6 ................................................................... 347 
Appendix no. (1) Document 84 ................................................................................... 347 
Appendix no. (2) Document No.2651 dated 24 August 1987 ......................... 356 
Appendix No. (3) Document 3428 , dated  29 March 1989 .............................. 359 
Appendix no.(4) Memo of 29 March 1989 from Deputy Director for 
political affairs. .................................................................................................................. 362 
Appendix no. (5) Memo from Deputy Director for political affairs at 
General security office, date 29 March 1989 Signed by Security Major 
Yasin Asat ........................................................................................................................... 365 
Appendix no.(6) Memo from the Director of the 3th Branch,date 19 
July 1990. ............................................................................................................................. 368 
Appendixes Chapter 7 Appendix No. (1)  RCC Degree No. 160370 
Appendix No (2) Memo No 4008, dated 26 June 1987, regarding 
dealing with Kurdish Areas in general (Genocide Policy ............................... 373 
Appendix no. (3) ............................................................................................................... 376 
List of accused people for Anfal Case from IHT. ............................................... 376 
Appendix Chapter 8 ................................................................... 407 
Appendix no. (1) Memo 7371 ....................................................................................... 407 
Appendix no.2 memo no. 2405 of 22 March 1988 .............................................. 412 
Bibliography ............................................................................... 417 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
List of illustrations      
FIGURE 1. MAP NO. (1) DISTRIBUTION OF KURDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SOURCE: AUTHOR ............. 11 
FIGURE 2 MAP NO. (2) IRAQI GOVERNORATES. SOURCE: KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT. ... 12 
FIGURE 3 CHRONOLOGY AND SCALE OF THE CRIMES. ............................................................................................ 15 
FIGURE 4. MAP NO. (3)  KURDISH MASS GRAVES IN IRAQ. SOURCE: AUTH ................................................... 39 
FIGURE 5 COPY OF THE MEDAL RECEIVED BY THE RESEARCHER ANCESTRY FROM POPE PIO 
XI IN 1924 BASED ON THE FAMILY ATTITUDE ON PROTECTING ARMENIANS. ............................ 81 
FIGURE 6 MAP NO. 4 DIRECTIONS OF ARABIZATION FROM CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN IRAQ TO 
KURDISTAN. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................... 108 
FIGURE 7 MAP NO. (5) ARABIZATION TOWARDS KURDISTAN BEFORE 1991. SOURCE: AUTHOR. . 109 
FIGURE 8 MAP NO. (7) DISPUTE AREAS BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND ERBIL UNTIL DECEMBER 2013.
 ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 124 
FIGURE 9 .MAP NO. (8) KIRKUK IN 1957 BEFORE ARABIZATION, THE SIZE WAS 18,220 SQUARE KM. 
SOURCE: AUTHOR. ......................................................................................................................................................... 125 
FIGURE 10 MAP NO. (9) KIRKUK IN 1997 AFTER ARABIZATION. ITS SIZE DECREASED TO 8,931 
SQUARE KM. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................. 125 
FIGURE 11 MAP NO. (10) KIRKUK IN 2003. ITS TOTAL AREA IS NOW 10,170 SQUARE KM. SOURCE: 
AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 126 
FIGURE 12 MAP NO. (11) FAYLEE KURDS POPULATION’S DISTRIBUTION. ................................................ 132 
FIGURE 13 MAP NO. (12)  FAYLEE KURD’S CONCENTRATION CAMPS DURING THEIR 
DISPLACEMENT. SOURCE: AUTHOR ..................................................................................................................... 140 
FIGURE 14 MAP NO.(13) FAYLEE KURDS AREAS INSIDE IRAQ. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ................................ 155 
FIGURE 15 MAP NO. (14) FORCED DISPLACEMENT OF BARZANI KURDS (1975 –1978- 1982). ....... 177 
FIGURE 16 MAP NO. (15) FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND GENOCIDE OF BARZANI KURDS (1975-
1980- 1983) SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................. 187 
FIGURE 17 BARZANI KURD BLINDFOLDED HEAD AT BUSAYA  1 MASS GRAVE 2005. SOURCE: 
AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 191 
FIGURE 18 .BARZANI KURD BLINDFOLDED HEAD AT BUSAYA  2 NOVEMBER 2013.SOURCE:  
AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 191 
FIGURE 19 BARZANI ID AND IRAQI NOTES AND COINS. FROM BUSAYA 1 2005. SOURCE: AUTHOR.
 ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 192 
FIGURE 20 WATCH AND WEDDING RING BUSAYA 1 2005. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ........................................ 192 
FIGURE 21 PIECE OF KORAN FOR PRAYERS FROM BUSAYA  1 MASS GRAVE FOR BARZANI KURDS. 
SOURCE: AUTHOR. ......................................................................................................................................................... 193 
FIGURE 22 DAMAGED HEAD OF BARZANI KURDS FROM BUSAYA 2 MASS GRAVES, NOVEMBER 
2013. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................ 193 
FIGURE 23 THE RESEARCHER AT BARZANI KURDS MASS GRAVE BUSAYA 1, JULY 2005. SOURCE: 
AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 194 
FIGURE 24 RESEARCHER AT BARZANI MASS GRAVE BUSAYA 2, JULY – NOVEMBER 2013. SOURCE: 
AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 194 
FIGURE 25 THE RESEARCHER CLEANING HUMAN REMAINS IN BUSAYA 2 MASS GRAVE. NOVEMBER 
2013. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................................................................................................................................ 195 
FIGURE 26 THE RESEARCHER IS PREPARING THE REMAINS OF A BARZANI KURD FROM BUSAYA 2 
MASS GRAVE (NOVEMBER 2013).SOURCE: AUTHOR. .................................................................................. 195 
FIGURE 27 MAP NO. (16)  8 STAGES OF ANFAL. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................................................... 205 
FIGURE 28 MAP NO. (17) ANFAL CAMPAIGN STAGE 1. SOURCE: AUTHOR.................................................. 207 
FIGURE 29 MAP NO. (18) ANFAL CAMPAIGN STAGE 2. SOURCE AUTHOR. .................................................. 208 
FIGURE 30 MAP NO. (19) ANFAL CAMPAIGN STAGE 3. SOURCE AUTHOR. .................................................. 209 
FIGURE 31 MAP NO. (20) ANFAL CAMPAIGN STAGE 4. SOURCE: AUTHOR.................................................. 210 
9 
 
FIGURE 32 FIGURE 30. MAP NO. (21) ANFAL CAMPAIGN STAGES 5, 6 AND 7. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ........ 211 
FIGURE 33 MAP NO. (22) ANFAL CAMPAIGN STAGE 8. SOURCE: AUTHOR.................................................. 212 
FIGURE 34 THE RESEARCHER AT HATRA 1 MASS GRAVE OF ANFAL VICTIMS. SOURCE: AUTHOR.218 
FIGURE 35 IN HATRA 1 MASS GRAVE OF ANFAL VICTIMS, THE RESEARCHER FIND OUT A 
PREGNANT LADY WITH 7 MONTHS BABY. SOURCE: JOHN TAMPLE. ................................................... 218 
FIGURE 36 THE RESEARCHER DURING HIS FIELDWORK ON ANFAL CASE IN THE SOUTH OF IRAQ 
AUGUST 2007 SOURCE: AUTHOR. .......................................................................................................................... 219 
FIGURE 37 HATRA 1 MASS GRAVE BEFORE THE EXHUMATION. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............................ 219 
FIGURE 38 BLIND FOLDED ANFAL VICTIM AT HATRA 2 MASS GRAVE. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ............... 220 
FIGURE 39 THE RESEARCHER DURING HIS FIELDWORK ON ANFAL CASE MASS GRAVES NEAR 
DIWANIYA IN THE SOUTH OF IRAQ, MARCH 2010. SOURCE: AUTHOR. .............................................. 220 
FIGURE 40 REMAINS OF WOMAN PREGNANT WITH SEVEN MONTHS BABY FOUND AT HATRA 1. 
SOURCE: MRS. SINJE. .................................................................................................................................................... 221 
FIGURE 41 REMAINS OF A CHILD KILLED IN HATRA. SOURCE: AUTHOR. ................................................... 221 
FIGURE 42 THE RESEARCHER INSIDE NIGRAT AL SALMAN PRISON FOLLOWING THE STORIES OF 
FAYLEE KURDS GENOCIDE. SOURCE: AUTHOR. .............................................................................................. 221 
FIGURE 43 SAMPLES  OF DEATH CERTIFICATES REGARDING ANFAL VICTIMS FOUND BY THE 
RESERCHER IN NIGRAT AL SALMAN DATED 1988. SOURCE: AUTHOR. .............................................. 222 
  
10 
 
List of Abbreviations  
 
ADM Assyrian Democratic Movement 
BTWC International Convention on the use of Biological and 
Toxin Weapons 
CPPCG United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
FIG Federal Iraqi Government 
HRW Human Right Watch 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICMP International Commission on Missing Persons 
ICP Iraqi Communist Party 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. 
ID Iraqi Diners 
IHCC Iraqi High Criminal Court 
IHT Iraqi High Tribunal 
IPC Iraq Petroleum Company 
IST Iraqi Special Tribunal 
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party 
KPDP Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party 
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government 
IMOHR Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights 
MRND Mouvement Republican National pour la Democratie et 
le Development (National Republican Movement for 
Democracy and Development) 
PASOK Kurdish Socialist Party 
PUK  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
RCC Revolutionary Command Counsel 
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front 
SPKI Socialist Party of Kurdistan-Iraq 
STR Short Tenden Repeats are genetic markers that may 
be used to identify a DNA sequence 
TAL Transitional Administrative Law 
UNAMI United Nation Assistance Mission for Iraq 
UNSC United Nation Security Council 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map No. (1) Distribution of Kurds in the Middle East. Source: Author 
 
12 
 
 
Figure 2 Map No. (2) Iraqi Governorates. Source: Kurdistan Regional Government. 
 
 
13 
 
Introduction 
 
The idea of this thesis originated from a combination of personal and collective 
experiences lived since September 2001 in Iraq by the Kurds. The defeat of 
Saddam Hussein changed the history of Iraq and of its multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural groups that shared its destiny. For the Kurdish people living in Iraq, this 
change represented an opportunity to look back at their dramatic recent past and 
to finally gain national and international recognition. However, as for any other 
country that lived the dramatic experience of a long dictatorship, along with the 
experience of discrimination and genocide, Kurdish people are still struggling to 
get the recognition they deserve.  
 The birth of a new political system after the fall of Saddam's regime meant 
that every institutional power had to be built from scratch in a political and social 
reality new to most Iraqis. This process of renovation, already witnessed in 
Europe after World War II, in particular in Italy and Germany, implied the writing 
of a new constitution and of a new set of legal frames with the purpose to give 
the country a strong and reliable democratic base.  
 Despite the apparent international interest in the Kurdish case, the people 
of Kurdistan did not have the opportunity to see those responsible for the crimes 
committed against them, brought to international justice as happened in the case 
of Rwanda and Bosnia. The execution of Saddam Hussein in 2006 meant that 
the charges against him and his commanders related to the Kurdish case were 
not widely published or discussed in court preventing Kurdish people not only 
from obtaining the justice they were entitled to but, most importantly, from 
gaining access to the truth about the massacres and human rights abuses 
14 
 
carried out by Saddam Hussain's regime. Since the creation of the State of Iraq 
the Kurds suffered many atrocities committed by the Iraqi state in different 
different historical moments (mandate, monarchy, and republic) with the purpose 
of oppressing their demands. The researcher chose the cases analysed in this 
work because they were the first ones to be recognised as genocides and ethnic 
cleansing by the Iraqi state judicial system. Therefore this research aims to: 
1- Illustrate the details of the crimes committed by the Iraqi government 
against the Kurds. In particular, this study will focus on five different crimes: 
Arabization, forced deportation of Faylee Kurds, the detention and 
disappearance of 8,000 males belonging to the Barzanis tribe, the Anfal 
campaign and the using lethal gas in Halabja. For each crime the study will 
focus, based on evidence gathered during the fieldwork, on how this evidence 
has been used in court in order to legally recognise these events as genocide 
and ethnic cleansing.  
2- Analyse the legal implications of crimes committed by the Ba'ath regime 
within the current international law in order to establish the administrative and 
personal responsibilities of the government of Saddam Hussein. 
3- Define the thinking and political ideology that lead to commit such crimes. 
4- Offer Iraqis working in the legal profession and human rights area a legal 
framework as well as the knowledge of the specific case of genocides and 
human right abuses in Iraq.  
5- Offer a series of helpful recommendations that might contribute to the 
current difficult process of reconciliation and nation building in Ira as well as 
prevention of future genocides. 
15 
 
The premise on which this thesis was built is that all the atrocities committed 
were actually part of a carefully engineered project by saddam Hussein’s regime. 
Each chapter will show how the plan became a national project that took place in 
different chronological sequences between 1963 and 1991. The escalation of 
violence is evident from the comparison among the crimes: the Arabization and 
the persecution against the Faylee Kurds took place over many decades, while in 
all other crimes, from the abduction of the Barzanis to Anfal and Halabja the 
strategies implemented by the state show a consistent change in the timescale in 
which they were carried out. The Barzanis were abducted and killed in the space 
of a month and their case constituted to be a blueprint that led the state to 
increase the level of violence culminating with the attacks of Anfal and Halabja. 
The following chart shows how in time the state increased its skills, scope and 
atrocities in committing these crimes. 
           
              
                                                                      1988 
                                                                                 1987-1988   
                                                            1983 
                                     1970-1988   
     
                                         Faylees      Barzanis          Anfal             Halabja 
                                                        Arabization as Ethnic Cleansing 
 
            (1963)_______________________________________(1991) 
  
 
Figure 3 Chronology and scale of the crimes. 
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 This analysis will be based on first-hand experience of the researcher as 
minister of Human Rights for the Kurdish Regional Government between 2001 
and 2005, and on his current role in the same government as Minister of Extra 
Regional Affairs. Part of his role was to find out the truth about the massacres 
that took place during the Iraq-Iran war as well as the mass deportation suffered 
by the Kurdish population during those years and the process of forced 
Arabization carried out by the Ba'ath regime during that period. This included an 
investigation aimed at discovering the locations of the mass graves on different 
territories. 1  In addition, this investigation had the purpose to gather official 
documents exchanged between the different governmental powers involved in 
the process. As it will be explained in more depth in the methodology section, 
these documents will reveal details unknown until now as well as individual and 
institutional responsibilities. In order to give a comprehensive idea of the scale of 
human rights breaches perpetrated by Saddam's government in the decade 
considered, this study is based mostly on the fieldwork carried out by the 
researcher and on the original documents that he managed to gather during 
almost twenty years of research. In particular it will focus on five crimes, which 
was aimed at the ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish population in Iraq. All these 
crimes will be analysed according to the categories set by the International 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted 
by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 
1948. For this purpose, and in order to lead the reader through the different 
crimes scenes, the researcher will focus in particular on the 1) forced deportation 
                                                          
1. See Chapter 8 for the locations of Kurdish mass graves in Iraq. 
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of the Faylee Kurds and the arabization process.2 2) the Anfal campaign and the 
use of chemical weapons with an emphasis on Halajba,3 3) the Barzani4 case 
with the massacre and disappearance of 8,000 male members of the same tribe. 
The researcher will provide information about the geographical locations where 
the crimes took place including the sites of the mass graves used by the regime, 
as well as official, previousely undisclosed documentation to support the 
conclusions.  
 This study is relevant both at local and international level. Its publication 
will contribute, one hopes, to the formation of a political leadership trained and 
educated so to avoid the temptation of dictatorship with the unavoidable 
repetitions of the crimes committed by the previous governments.  
 At the international level, this research aims to gain international 
recognition for the prevention of such crimes in the future. By determining the 
criminal responsibility of the single institutions of state in the genocide, this study 
offers a political frame for the shaping of a much needed social coherence for 
Iraq in its present statehood, and it also constitutes one of the basis for the new 
democratic federal system. 
Chapter 2 will analyse the concept of genocide starting from its 
simultaneous appearance in the international language and legal system. It will 
then analyse the difficulties encountered by the international criminal justice due 
                                                          
2  .The study deals with the forced deportation of Faylee Kurds from their original areas 
(Khanakeen, Jalao Laa, Al-Saadia, Mendeli, Zurbatya, Badra) and other areas of Iraq like 
Baghdad, Al-Kut, Al-Imara, Najaf, Karbala as well as other central and southern cities where they 
used to live in before and after the establishment of the Iraqi State. 
3.  Halabja is part of the Governorate/province of Sulaimanyah and belongs administratively to 
Iraqi Kurdistan. It is about 12-15 kilometres from the Iranian Borders and 225 kilometres from 
Baghdad. 
4. The Barzani is a federation of tribes from and around the Village of Barzan – centre of the 
religious school of the Sheiks (clerics) descendants of the Amdia Princess. Barzan is one of the 
most numerous Kurdish tribes in Iraqi Kurdistan, they live in the town of Barzan –Governorate of 
Erbil- an area previously inhabited by the followers of the Nakhshabandi’s School which with its 
Sufi message attracted many different tribes which coexisted with the Barzani.  
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to the ambiguity of its earlier definitions focusing on the analysis and on the 
concepts of purpose and intent and in the importance that these two elements 
had in the specific cases of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Through a study of the 
investigations and the trials carried out by the International Criminal Tribunal of 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), and of the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), this study aims to demonstrate that 
the international community has failed in recognising genocide in the case of the 
Kurdish people massacred in Iraq. 
Chapter 3 offers an overview of the Kurdistan question in from the twentieth 
to the twenty first century with a particular emphasis on the influence that foreign 
powers had on its self-determination. Following the analysis of the Treaty of 
Sèvres and the Treaty of Lausanne which constituted the basis for the 
geographical division of the Kurdish population amongest four different countries, 
it will give special attention to the historical events starting in 1963 to the seize of 
power by the Ba'ath regime in 1968 which led to Saddam Hussein’s era and the 
atrocities against the Kurds. In addition, through an analysis of the expectations 
raised by the new, still unstable Iraq and the role played by the most numerous 
minorities in the country, this chapter will show how the past organization of the 
Kurdish Regional Government could eventually lead the way to a true federal, 
democratic country.  
Chapter 4 offers a detailed analysis complete with graphs and maps of the 
Arabization process carried out by the Ba'ath regime since 1968. Focusing on the 
province of Kirkuk, it is evident from the statistics provided that this process had 
very detrimental effects on the Kurdish population forced to relocate in different 
areas with great damage to their culture and traditions. The documentation 
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shows how the authorities encouraged this migration with the use of force and by 
dividing entire families and tribes. The chapter shows how this sensitive area still 
poses a threat to the process of democratization of Iraq.  
Chapter 5 analyses the mass deportation of Faylee Kurds during Saddam's 
regime and the gradual changes of citizenship laws that led to starting from the 
1970s. This chapter is based mainly on the documentation collected by the 
researcher during his fieldwork since little or no literature has dealt specifically 
with this case. The chapter analyses the ideological basis in support of the 
genocide crimes that took place in the following three decades. Since 1979, 
when Saddam came into power, the Iraqi state committed genocide crimes not 
only against Faylee Kurds, but also against any minority looking for recognition 
within the country. The documents provided show without any doubt that the 
attacks against them were the first concentrated and calculated mass killing 
carried out by the Ba’ath Regime. The killing of 10,000 men and the removal of 
up to 100,000 members of the Iraqi Kurdish Faylee community, paved the way 
for genocide on a larger, more sophisticated scale. For this reason, the 
researcher will refer to the expulsion of the Faylee Kurds as “concept approval”, 
because on that occasion, the regime and the state apparatus under its 
boundless control began to accept the concept of mass killing, indiscriminate 
assassination and kidnapping.   
Chapter 6 will show the genocide against the Barzanis led by the regime. 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century until 1991, the Barzani Kurds have 
been victims of approximately 46 campaigns of collective forced displacement 
inside and outside Kurdistan. Because Barzani Kurds have always played a 
leadership role in Iraqi Kurdistan history, and even during Ottoman rule, they 
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have been targeted and persecuted for over a century. This chapter will analyse 
the massacre of the Barzanis and how it represented an escalation in the policy 
of violence and repression against the Kurds. Through his fieldwork the 
researcher was able to gather a substantial body of evidence to sustain the 
perpetration of genocide against the Kurdish population and Barzani in particular 
between 1975 and 1991. Their systematic forced displacement, their 
imprisonment in concentration camps until the disappearance of 8,000 men 
belonging to the Barzani tribe has been documented thanks to the discovery of 
undisclosed documents and their mass graves. Forensic evidence will be 
presented along with a detailed, original map of the mass graves recently 
discovered and photos from the fieldwork. At this regard, the researcher will 
demonstrate that this case was the blueprint of genocide against Kurds and that 
it was the more advanced and sophisticated case of killing against Kurds before 
Anfal. 
Chapter 7 will present the Anfal campaign and the use of chemical weapons 
against Kurdish population during the Iran-Iraq war. The chapter will show how, 
in contrast with the previous cases, the regime involved in this massive operation 
all officers in chain of command of the army authorizing the indiscriminate use of 
internationally banned chemical weapons. Unfortunately in this case it was very 
difficult to find clear evidence that could lead to the arrest of a single individuals 
who can be directly accountable. Due to the military nature of the attacks, the IHT 
was presented with a great amount of evidence that linked directly the higher 
ranking officers of the army with the crimes committed therefore establishing a 
direct link between the ongoing war and genocide. In addition and due to the high 
level of organization and the involvement of different divisions of the Iraqi army, 
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more than four hundred people were charged in relations to these crimes. The 
conclusion of this chapter will explain how the IHT, lacking an outreach program, 
was not able to communicate the result of the trail outside the walls of the court. 
This left the international community, the Iraqis and most Kurds without any 
knowledge of the IHT judgement. In addition, the execution of Saddam Hussein 
condemned for the Dujail trial, left the IHT without one of the main defendants 
and the opportunity to make to trial more transparent. 
Chapter 8 deals with the events of Halabja. It will not rely on the information 
already given by other sources but it will focus mainly on how chemical weapons, 
as instruments of war, have been used in order to commit genocide against 
Kurdish people establishing a direct link between chemical weapons and 
genocide. All this in order to demonstrate to the international community that the 
use of banned chemical weapons against a civil population cannot be ignored 
and has to be punished in order to prevent history from repeating itself. The 
chapter will focus on the development of the production of chemical weapons in 
the country and how this instrument has become a deadly weapon to use against 
its own citizens. As in the previous case of Anfal, the level of organization 
displayed in the use of chemical weapons campaign shows very clearly the intent 
and the moral responsibility of all the chain of command of the country.  
Based on the entire investigation, Chapter 9 offers a series of 
recommendation that should, if applied, lead to a healing and reconciliation 
process. It will also suggest recommendations for the victims, in particular how 
both the Iraqi Federal Government and the Kurdish Regional Government should 
approach their concerns. It will also deal with the perpetrators of the crimes 
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committed and those who supported them implicitly by proposing the appropriate 
legal as well as political and social measures to deal with them. 
All chapters offer an evaluation of the legal outcomes of the trials along with 
recommendation for a peaceful coexistence between the Federal Government 
and the Kurdish Regional Government. 
The final chapter will summarise the research and its outcome and will offer 
further recommendations for policy makers working for the future of Iraq and the 
Kurdistan Region. 
Literature review 
In order to carry out this study, the researcher had to consult both primary and 
secondary multidisciplinary sources as well as interviews with experts and 
politicians. Legal resources were also indispensable in order to offer a more 
comprehensive view of the Kurdish genocide under Saddam Hussein's regime in 
a wider legal and international context.  
 The researcher has collected a large amount of primary sources, many of 
which will be made public for the first time in the course of this thesis. 
Fortunately, for the purposes of this research, the Ba’athist regime recorded and 
documented every decision made and implemented by all branches and levels of 
Government. Unlike other acts of genocide and crimes against humanity, the 
Ba’athists did not attempt to conceal any of their discriminatory or criminal 
policies, but rather left a paper trail detailing precisely who was responsible for 
the implementation of each distinct decree. These documents were collected by 
the researcher in preparation for the prosecution of the perpetrators and the 
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crimes they committed. These acts will be described in detail in the course of this 
thesis.   
 The researcher has also conducted interviews with survivors of the 
Ba’athist policies and the widows of the Barzani men killed in the 1980s. These 
interviews have provided details regarding the policies of capture, forced 
deportation, forced relocation and killings.  
Secondary Sources 
The secondary literature has been split into three groups, all of which have 
guided the researcher with his thesis. The first section includes general literature 
concerning the history and politics of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. The second 
section includes material on genocide more generally, and legal texts have been 
included in this review. The volume of scholarship available is significant, and the 
work of the two ad hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
have served to intensify academic interest on more recent genocide studies. 
Finally, a much more modest amount of literature focused on the fate of the Iraqi 
Kurds under the Ba’ath regime has been relied on. Although this material is 
limited, it nevertheless marks an important start in recognizing and documenting 
the atrocities that affected so many Iraqi Kurds between 1968 and 1991.  
During his research the author made references to the decisions of the 
Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT). However, reference to the Court’s decision should not 
necessarily reflect the researcher’s endorsement and should certainly not reflect 
an adoption of the legal reasoning contained in the written judgments. Whilst the 
Court symbolizes an important milestone towards an official recognition of the 
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atrocities suffered by Iraq’s Kurds, the decision has not led to international 
recognition of state-led crimes.  
 It was necessary, in order to organise the project to consult the literature 
produced in the last few years on the topic of genocide. This involved the 
contributions by various scholars. In particular that of Raphael Lemkin which has 
been particularly useful because it helped to introduce the history of genocide 
from the historical and legal point of view. In his article entitled 'Acts Constituting 
a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of 
Nations' Lemkin meant to offer additional clarifications to the Special Report 
presented to the 5th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law held in Madrid 
between the 14th and 20th October 1933. In this article, Lemkin proposed the 
international recognition of 'acts of barbarity' which cause offence to all nations 
and that have to be treated at the international level by an international court of 
justice. In his article he also pointed out to the Nations the need for the 
intervention of the international community in case of a clear breach of human 
rights in individual countries. At this point, the word genocide, as well as the need 
for its definition was not a reality and the international community was still unable 
to understand the need for its prevention. It was only after World War II and the 
tragedy of the Holocaust that the international community, following Lemkin's 
contributions and based on the analysis that the scholar published in 1944 
entitled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of 
Government, Proposals for Redress, accepted his recommendations and in 1948 
the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide finally produced a definition for genocide in Article II.  
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 This definition, which came to us basically unchanged, has been the focal 
point of a debate that went on for the last seventy years. Due to its ambiguity, the 
literature on the subject is very extensive and it would be difficult to quote every 
study in depth. However, it is important to mention that the general trend, due to 
the ambiguity of the definition proposed by the Commission, favoured a legal 
approach leaving aside the social and political consequences of genocide. In 
addition, the introduction of the term genocide sparked a new historical debate on 
its cultural and social consequences in history. For example, Phillip Spencer in 
Genocide Since 1945 offers an estimate of how many victims can be attributed to 
genocide since it was accepted by the Convention in 1948. Spencer’s figures 
suggest that with the addition of the intentional killing of Fur, Masalit, and 
Zaghawa civilians in Darfur, it is possible that genocides have persisted since 
1948 with no more than a five years lapse between any two campaigns. On the 
same trend, Christopher Powell in his book Barbaric Civilisation – A Critical 
Sociology of Genocide denounces that it is exactly in the twentieth century, after 
the recognition of genocide, that it reached the highest levels of efficiency and 
frequency.  
 For the purpose of this study, these contributions are fundamental but they 
do not offer a complete framework in order to advocate the case of Kurdish 
genocide during the Saddam Hussein's regime. For this purpose, the reading of 
Adam Jones' Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2006), offers a wider 
opportunity for analysing the case in question. Adam Jones approaches the 
theme of genocide from a different perspective. Without neglecting the cultural 
and social approach, at the same time admitting that he is sitting on the 
shoulders of giants, Adam Jones proposes a new way to see the social issues 
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rising from genocide. He mentions Frank Chalk and Kurt Johassohn's History 
and Sociology of Genocide and Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and 
Critical Views by Samuel Totten et al. as well as basic contributions to the study 
of genocide such as Genocide by Kuper among others. However, Jones' 
approach differs from the others because of the inter-disciplinarity of his work, 
drawing from psychology, sociology, anthropology and political studies with a 
particular focus on international relations. It is this new, more comprehensive way 
to see the various facets of genocide that makes it the more valuable basis for 
the present study. In addition, Jones applying this approach to different case 
studies occurred in very different cultural and social settings, offers the 
researcher a flexible set of references for the specific Kurdish case. Another 
reason for considering Jones as a main point of reference for this work is his 
understanding of the emotional impact and personal involvement that people who 
immersed them into the investigation of genocide experience. In particular, the 
anthropological approach favours the use of sources and the active participation 
of the researcher through a fieldwork. In this particular investigation, the 
researcher in his position as minister of Human Rights for the Kurdish Regional 
Government had privileged access to witnesses and a series of documentations 
that could be gathered only through his physical presence where the genocide 
took place.  
 In a study of this kind, it was extremely important to analyse the historical 
background that led to the formation of Iraq in 1921 and to analyse the history of 
the Kurdish presence in the country. The reading of Gareth Stansfield's Iraqi 
Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (2003) constituted a 
text of reference in order to understand the history of Kurdish political 
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organization in particular the birth of the KDP and PUK and their influence in 
Kurdish politics.  
 The main point of Stansfield's analysis, written shortly after the invasion of 
Iraq by the coalition led by the United States is the identification, in Kurdish case, 
of the existence of a political structure, the only one in a country that experienced 
dissolution of every political institution. The Kurdish Regional Government, 
because its semi autonomous status, became an example of political 
coexistence.  
 David McDowall’s study A Modern History of the Kurds was championed 
as the first comprehensive account of the history of the Kurds now living between 
Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The author detailed the experiences of the Kurds 
from the eighteenth century under Ottoman Rule up until thir recent 
developments taking place in the four countries. Considerable emphasis was 
deliberately placed on the period between 1918 and 1925 where McDowall 
argues Kurds lost their single greatest opportunity for statehood following the 
collapse of the Ottoman and Qajar empires. According to McDowall, the missed 
opportunity in the post-Ottoman years prevented Kurdish populations in the 
newly created states of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria from establishing any 
meaningful autonomy or control over lands considered by Kurds to be ‘Kurdistan’ 
up until today. In reference to Iraq, McDowall argues that inter-tribal 
disagreements within Iraqi Kurdistan frustrated British attempts at resolving the 
issue of Kurdistan from the outset. Although all agreed that Turkish authority 
should not return to Iraqi Kurdistan, there existed staunch disagreements as to 
how British assistance may be delivered, if via Baghdad or a distant, yet less 
influential, London. British-Kurdish relations were promptly strained by the 
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consequences of an insufficient British military presence on the Kurds that 
offered to support them. For McDowall, however, the functioning of a British-
administered Kurdistan seemed inherently troubled from the start. According to 
the author, the "fundamental conflict between institutionalized government on the 
one hand, in which officials were appointed on merit and owed their loyalty to an 
abstract idea – the state, the administration, the Crown or whatever – and, on the 
other hand, the highly personalized form of government based on patronage still 
existing in the religious and tribal strata of Kurdish society" meant any leader that 
sought to represent all Kurds would be crippled by the competing political ideals. 
The researcher has considered these challenging beginnings as they developed 
over the century. Whilst Kurds have been criticized for their lack of clear vision or 
ideology for the future of Kurdistan in Iraq's early years, it is certain that Kurds 
were united by one idea: that Arabs should not rule Kurdistan. In this regard, the 
promises made by Britain and France to the Kurds in 1918 for a complete and 
final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, 
and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive 
their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous 
populations" grew further from reality. Whilst Kurds sought British protection in 
the early twentieth century, they by no means relinquished their drive for 
autonomy. Clearly, the Kurds were to be betrayed by the British and outrage 
soon spread among Iraqi Kurds when Britain negotiated with Baghdad, trading 
independence for rent-free military bases in the country, and ultimately supported 
Iraq's entry into the League of Nations on October 3rd 1932.  
 Gregory H. Stanton, President of Genocide Watch, offers another 
fundamental theoretical contribution to this study. In his writings he has argued 
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for some time that genocide develops in eight, non-linear, stages: classification; 
symbolization; dehumanization; organization; polarization; preparation; 
extermination; and denial.5 What has come to be commonly referred to as ‘The 
Eight Stages of Genocide’ was first presented as a Briefing Paper to the US 
State Department in 1998. According to Stanton, all eight stages identified by his 
work continue to occur throughout a genocide campaign, and prompt recognition 
of one or more stages of genocide can be an effective preventative tool. Much of 
Stanton’s work since drafting the eight stages framework has included the 
analysing of former and current genocide processes through the lens of this 
framework. Stanton’s contribution to genocide studies has been significant. His 
collation of numerical data on a global scale, and up-to-date record keeping and 
monitoring of genocidal movements provide an invaluable research tool. The 
researcher has relied on the framework heavily, and indeed it has been adopted 
as the framework in which the thesis is presented. In this regard, Stanton’s work 
serves to punctuate each detail or record of events arising during the Ba’athist 
rule with a reference point common to all genocide campaigns.  
 Following the interdisciplinary approach suggested by Jones, the 
researcher had to rely on a varied set of literatures in order to carry out his study. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the aims of this thesis was to present a comparative 
legal framework that analysed the ambiguities of the definition of Genocide stated 
by the Convention based on Lemkin's suggestions as well as the different 
interpretations in which this definition has been applied since 1948, and in 
particular the reading of the first two statutes produced by the Convention when 
establishing the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
                                                          
5
.  Further elaboration of the ‘eight stages of genocide’ is provided in Chapter 2.  
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Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The reference to the legal literature is important 
because, even if the focus of this research is to show the sociological and 
historical background of the Kurdish case for genocide, its legal recognition is 
necessary in order to propose ways to prevent these same events to repeat 
themselves. In addition, the comparative approach that arises from the analysis 
of the only two cases in which the Commission has intervened is important in 
order to set a serious of precedents towards the Kurdish case. The analysis of 
the legal documentation regarding first the two statutes, and later the outcomes 
of the trials, were fundamental in order to analyse the specific, local reality in 
which the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT) was born and had to operate. As will be 
analysed in the following chapters, this tribunal, established in 2003 in a moment 
of difficult relationship with the international community due to the civil war and to 
the US military presence in the country, failed to give Kurdish people their 
opportunity to make their case.  
 As it will explained more in detail in Chapter 2, the Ba'ath regime carried 
out a systematic plan of ethnic and cultural cleansing towards Kurds in Iraq, 
however, after Saddam Hussein's fall, these crimes have not been investigated in 
depth. Of course, there is a vast literature on the subject, for example, Michael 
Kelly, the former chief investigative judge for the Iraqi High Tribunal, in his book 
Ghosts of Halabja (2008) offers an analysis of a very specific crime, the chemical 
gassing of a Kurdish village in Northern Iraq in 1988. The researcher’s approach 
differs from Kellys because it does not limit itself to a mere recount of the events 
as they were presented in the tribunal. Following Adam Jones’s approach he, on 
the contrary, focused on the consequences that these events had on the Kurdish 
population and on the way they currently perceive their relationship with the Iraqi 
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Arab population and with the institutions which represent them starting from 
2003. 
 William Schabas in Genocide in International Law, The Crime of Crimes 
(2000) offers a pertinent overview of the application of the genocide convention in 
international law. The text was used primarily as a reference guide in particular 
for Chapter 2 where the legal elements of the crime of genocide are discussed. 
Schabas' compilation of jurisprudence is presented in a manner accessible to 
lawyers and non-lawyers alike and is thus an excellent reference for readers 
seeking to understand the extent of Ba’athist liability by comparison to the most 
notable international criminal prosecutions heard by the ICTR and the ICTY. 
 
 Methodology 
As already mentioned, the five crimes analysed in this thesis needed a 
multidisciplinary approach in the methodology because of their different nature 
and circumstances in which they took place. In addition, the different legal 
outcomes of the trials against the perpetrators of each single crime had a 
different long lasting impact on Kurdish population and on the relationship 
between the current Iraqi Federal Government and the Kurdish Regional 
Government, therefore all of them required a different methodological approach 
in terms of the gathering of the material in order to build up the cases against the 
defendants. As already mentioned at the beginning, each of the crime treated in 
this thesis constitutes a state planned strategy towards the ethnic cleansing of 
Kurdish people in the country. A plan carried out with a constant increase in the 
scale of the atrocities and that culminated in mass murder. 
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 The first crime analysed is Arabization. This is particularly interesting 
because it has been carried out during a considerable number of years, between 
1963 and 2003, and it constitutes the beginning of all the other crimes committed 
against the Kurds. It aimed to change the demography of the areas originately 
inhabited by Kurds by systematically destroying all their cultural and social 
background.  
 The second crime considered is the forced deportation of Faylee Kurds. In 
order to reconstruct the events that led to this mass deportation, the researcher 
had to rely on two main sources of information. The first one was the 
recompilation of Iraqi documentation gathered after 1991. The researcher 
accessed these sources mainly through Kurdish intelligence in the opposition 
groups. The second is the information provided by the victims through the Faylee 
Cultural Centre in Erbil. As it will be analysed later in detail; it is important to note 
that in order to carry out this massive deportation, the regime relied on judgemnts 
issued by the legal system. All the orders were given prior the publications of 
decrees that authorized the deportation and the confiscations of Faylee Kurds’ 
properties.  
 The next crimes investigated in the thesis are the relocation and mass 
murder of 8,000 men from the Barzani tribe; the Anfal campaign and the events 
that took place in Halabja. Despite the differences, which will be analysed later, in 
all three cases the investigation required a more multidisciplinary approach that 
involved not only the recompilation of official documents and interviews with 
witnesses, but also an intense forensic investigation once the mass graves have 
been identified. The forensic evidence contributed strongly to the building up of 
the cases against the perpetrators. The methodology applied by the researcher, 
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trained in forensic investigation, included a study of the reasons why mass 
graves could be found all over Iraq. The researcher found out that before these 
atrocities were committed, Iraqis did not have any collective memory of mass 
graves and that their existence has to be attributed to the unlimited powers 
enjoyed by the Iraqi security and intelligence services.  
 Bearing these factors in mind, the researcher had to come forward with a 
classification of mass graves that included all the different modus operandi 
followed in each crime starting from the description of each mass grave and how 
to recognise it. The mass graves were catalogued according to criteria which 
included the number of victims, the time in which the crime was committed, the 
agencies responsible and the information gathered on site from witnesses who 
escaped the genocide, local people, occasional witnesses, and members of the 
armed forces or of the security agencies. In addition, some information about the 
existence and the locations of some mass graves had been gathered before the 
fall of Saddam Hussein by members of the intelligence of the Kurdish opposition 
groups as well as by members of the Ba’athist party. 
Sites of mass graves until November 2013. 
 
Source: Author 
The location and distribution of the mass graves constituted a very good source 
of information and, for the purpose of this study, they have been catalogued into 
       Sites                Open Sites    Graves                 Remain 
         By                    
Suggestion 
     By  
   Opening 
    Confirmed         Not            Not                            
Confirmed 
      145          56                     62  
             Total: 118 
   120      18                             9 
              Total: 27 
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three groups: the ones found in the gardens and graveyards of military camps or 
security agencies, the ones found in the countryside and the ones located deep 
in the desert. The researcher has worked mainly on the first and third categories.  
 In order to gather evidence for the Barzanis’ case the researcher had to 
investigate the existence of mass graves in remote deserted areas. Without a 
nearby area where the team of scientists could be based, the main challenge 
was to provide infrastructure, including sufficient water supply, sanitation, food 
and shelter, working areas transportation and storage facilities for the remains 
and equipments. Security and safety is paramount, and does not only apply for 
the investigators, but also for the gravesite and the human remains. Sometimes 
the investigators will attract the attention of the local population and provoke 
curiosity or even hostility. It is paramount to undertake a mass grave investigation 
with sufficient professional security on the site on a reliable 24/7 basis. A mass 
grave, whatever its location, is a crime scene and as such the evidence needs to 
be protected from unauthorized access. The investigation leader must at all times 
ensure the integrity of the chain of custody and limit the access to the grave to 
authorized personnel only. However, the interest of the public and the media 
should be taken into account and controlled with an effective information policy: 
e.g. the relevant media outlets could be contacted and informed prior to the 
investigation. And agreement should make that the media have exclusive access 
for one day towards the end of the excavation. The public should be included and 
their concerns should be taken very seriously. The investigators could invite the 
public at the beginning and the end of the investigation to a religious service to 
honour the victims. Depending on the demands of the population, a regular public 
press release could be considered. Secrecy and depriving the public access to 
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information on the investigation is counterproductive and not in line with a policy 
of transparency and impartiality when dealing with missing persons. The public 
has the right to be informed.  
In 2005 in the Busaya district, about 240 km from Samawa, a mass grave 
with 513 bodies was found.They were mostly male wearing typical Barzani Kurds 
cloths. Another mass grave has been found in November 2013 in Busaya (Long.: 
45 58 11.07  Lat.: 29 50 30.17) where another 93 bodies of males (aged between 
9-80 years old) wearing Barzani cloths were found. This discovery was made 
after the disclosure of a very important document reproduced in the appendix at 
the end of Chapter 6. In it the authority mentioned that the Barzanis were 
executed in the area of Busaya, a remote district belonging to Al Salman near the 
Saudi – Kuwaiti Border. Busaya has a size of about 24,532 square km, is 
surrounded by the Distric of Zubair from the east, Sok Al shyukh district from the 
north, Samawa district from the northwest, from the west by Al Salman district, 
from the south by the Saudi Arabia and from southeast by Kuwait. The total size 
of Samawa governorate is 51,740 square km, which means that the size of 
Busaya is about 47,5% of the Muthana size 5.6% of the total size of Iraq 
(435,052 square km). Because of the size of the province, it has been very 
difficult to look for mass graves without the support of the local authorities. The 
expedition in Busaya lasted three months from January to April 2005. The 
research involved meeting local people, shepherds, nomads as well as any 
official who worked for the government in the area. Unfortunately, due to the 
mistrust of the locals, initially it was very difficult to find the graves. Only four 
months later the researcher was informed by some locals about the location of 
possible mass graves and he was finally able to find some of them containing 
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Barzani Kurds killed by Iraqis during the 1983 genocide campaign.  
The team was able to exhume 513 corpses from Busaya 1 mass grave. 
After recovering some personal belongings and identified some of the victims 
with the help of the families, the researcher was able to return them back to 
Kurdistan and give them proper and respectable burials. One of the interesting 
aspects of this discovery was to find that the men had been killed in groups and 
with automatic weapons; this could be deduced from the number of bullets on 
their corpses. In addition, the depth of their graves was no more than 1.5 meters; 
this means that they were buried very quickly after their death. During the 
investigation we found out that they were held prisoners at AbuJad and Al Laaya 
concentration camps, about 40 km away from the mass graves. The researcher 
travelled back to the area in November 2013, and in that occasion he managed 
to discover another mass grave named Busaya 2.  
 The researcher has also carried out forensic investigation, on site, for the 
Anfal case uncovering the mass graves later named Hatra 1 and Hatra 2. The 
outcomes of his investigations were then used by IHT to build up the case 
against the perpetrators. In contrast with the mass graves of Busaya, these were 
located in less remote areas but were very deep, around 3.5 metres. This shows 
the extreme secrecy in which this crime was committed and the intent to conceal 
any possible evidence. Hatra 1 contained 123 remains: 25 adult women, 8 
infants, and 90 children, all of them had been executed. Hatra 2 contained the 
remains of 46 men.  
 Another mass grave, named Muthana 2, containing around 500 remains 
was found in Dhabiya at (N 30 40 18.97 E 44 57 38.86) in Muthana Governorate, 
suburb of Samawa City, towards Nigrat Al Salman, 8 km on the road between 
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Smawa and Al Salman in the heart of desert. According to some witnesses, the 
victims were killed in 1988. During the excavation, the team was able to find 114 
remains: 2 males, 27 females and 85 children, 28 of them were between 3-7 
years old, all of them from the Anfal campaign. This information was presented 
by Mr. Kovin Tramble6 and used by the IHT during the trial.  
 In the area of Nigrat Al Salman, nearly 300 meters on the right on the road 
from Salman Prison at (N 30 30 31 .45 E 44 39 27.29), the team found another 
mass grave containing between 300 and 350 remains. According to the police 
Sergeant Khalaf Abdul Aaall Al Jabouri who worked there, all of them were 
imprisoned and died of torture. At the Al salama Health Centre the researcher 
was able to find 94 original death certificates of Kurds from the area of 
Sulaimaniya who died during Anfal. The doctor confirmed that they issued these 
certificates without seeing the dead body, an operation that the authorities carried 
out in order to cover their crimes.  
Also related to Anfal, in the area of Al Hatra, near Mosul the team found 
another 2 mass graves after interviewing an ex Iraqi military officer named 
Colonel Salim Mahmoud. After the excavation 123 remains were found all of 
them killed by a single bullet in the head:  they were 25 males, 98 children almost 
all them were under 13 years old. That mass grave was very deep, around 3.5 
metres to testify the efforts made by the authorities to deny eventual discovery 
and accusations to compromise any investigation. In the grave the researcher 
found the body of a woman with her 6-7 month child (see photos in the appendix 
to Chapter 7). Hatra 2 is the name of the second mass grave found in the same 
area. In there the team found 64 remains all of them were Kurdish men randomly 
                                                          
6. Pages 618 -622 of the court decision regarding the Anfal case by IHT on 24/6/2007. 
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shot by Kalashnikovs. 
 A skeleton in a grave cannot tell by itself if the individual was black or 
white, a combatant or a civilian a Christian or a Muslim, a Sunni or a Shi’a, a 
Kurd or an Arab. Hence, the missing persons issue bears great potential of 
political abuse, propaganda while deepening the breaches between religious or 
ethnic groups. Ultimately, it only brings more grief and suffering for the families of 
the disappeared, especially if the victims went missing during a civil war scenario. 
The truth is always the first victim of war therefore; it was paramount to apply 
impartiality and transparency during all the phases of the exhumation.  
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Figure 4. Map No. (3)  Kurdish mass graves in Iraq. Source: Author.
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Chapter 2 
The Concept of Genocide 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the concept of genocide starting from its first 
simultaneous appearance in the international literature and legal system. It will 
then analyse the difficulties encountered by the international criminal justice due 
to the ambiguity of its first definitions. It will focus on the analysis, definition of 
purpose and intent and on the importance that these two elements had in the 
specific cases of Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Through a study of the investigations 
and the trials carried out by the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Iraqi 
High Tribunal (IHT), this study aims to demonstrate that the international 
community has failed in recognising genocide in the case of the Kurdish people 
massacred in Iraq. 
The Origin of Genocide and the Process of Naming  
It was on 9 December 1948, after World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust 
that the international community was urged to name this crime as genocide. Until 
then it had remained without a name. A legal definition was found in 1948 by 
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (CPPCG) (hereinafter ‘the Convention’). In Article II of the Convention, 
genocide is defined as any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy 
in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group: 
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Killing members of the group. 
Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part. 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.1 
This definition was confirmed without erasure or modification by the Security 
Council in drafting the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and 
by the State Parties to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court.2 No state has ever advocated that genocide is not a crime. The definition 
contained in Article II is considered to be binding international law, a universal 
(interdict) that permeates the mask of the state sovereignty. 
 In 1933, Raphael Lemkin, a jurist and scholar of international law wrote a 
paper entitled 'Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as 
Offences Against the Law of Nations', this article was meant to offer additional 
clarifications to the Special Report presented to the 5th Conference for the 
Unification of Penal Law held in Madrid between the 14th and 20th October 1933.3 
In it he focuses on the crime of barbarity as a crime against international law. At 
the time, the idea that the international law could override single states internal 
                                                          
1.  Article 2 of CPPCG. 
2.  See Article 4 of the Statute of the ICTY, Article 2 of the Statute of the ICTR, Article 6 of the 
Rome Statute. The same definition was adopted by the Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, 
Article 11. See Appendix No.1 of this chapter for the complete Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal 
Court of 18 October 2005. 
3. Raphael Lemkin, Key Writings of Raphael Lemkin on Genocide Available at: http:// 
www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin.online [Accessed 22 March, 2013]. 
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jurisdiction was completely new. This innovative proposal was based on a few 
episodes that anticipated the tragedy of World War II and the Holocaust, in 
particular the Semel massacre that took place in August 1933 where hundreds of 
Assyrians civilians were killed indiscriminately in Iraq. 4  Lemkin's article, 
stimulated by these events, proposed the international recognition of 'acts of 
barbarity' and 'acts of vandalism'. According to Lemkin the first ones were acts 
that: 
Taken as a whole, all the acts of this character constitute an 
offence against the law of nations which we will call by the 
name "barbarity". Taken separately all these acts are 
punishable in the respective codes; considered together, 
however, they should constitute offences against the law of 
nations by reason of their common feature which is to 
endanger both the existence of the collectivity concerned and 
the entire social order'.5  
 
Acts of Vandalism are, on the other hand, crimes against the culture and works of 
art and can be considered as: 
 
An attack targeting a collectivity can also take the form of systematic 
and organized destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the 
unique genius and achievement of a collectivity are revealed in fields 
of science, arts and literature. The contribution of any particular 
collectivity to world culture as a whole, forms the wealth of all of 
humanity, even while exhibiting unique characteristics.6  
 
                                                          
4. Just a year later, in The Assyrian Tragedy, published by Annemasse in 1934 describes what 
happened: "The Assyrian population of the village of Semel was indiscriminately massacred; men 
women, and children alike. In one room alone, 81 Assyrians from Baz were barbarously 
massacred. Priests were tortured and their bodies mutilated. Girls and women were raped and 
made to March naked before the Iraqi Army Chief of the Staff Brigade General Bakir Sedqi. Holy 
books were used as fuel for burning girls. Children were run over by military cars. Pregnant 
women were bayonetted. Children were flung in the air and pierced on to the points of bayonets. 
In Dohuk 600 Assyrians were killed." (The Assyrian Tragedy, pp. 53-54). 
5 . Raphael Lemkin, Key Writings of Raphael Lemkin on Genocide by PreventGenocide.org 
Available at: http:// www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin.online selection of Lemkin’s core work on 
genocide [Accessed 22 March, 2013]. 
6.  Ibid. 
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Both these crimes, according to Lemkin, have to be considered transnational and 
an offence against the law of nations because they threatened the stability and 
the heritage of all humanity. At the end of his analysis, Lemkin proposed a project 
of legislative texts divided into seven articles containing the starting point for a 
future international legislation on Human Rights. For the moment, in 1933, the 
law of nations was not prepared to accept or implement his propositions. 
 It was only in 1943, when the extent of the horrors of the Holocaust were 
fully known, and World War II was going through its last, tragic, epilogue, that 
Lemkin first coined the term genocide. He referred to the Plato’s use of Greek 
word (génos) for a “race” or “tribe”, and then he added the Latin-cide, which 
means “killed” or “act” of killing, as in homicide or suicide. Later on, in 1944, 
Lemkin wrote his most important book titled Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.7 In it 
included an extensive legal analysis of German rule in countries occupied by 
Nazi Germany during World War II. Later, in 1945, this study constituted one of 
the legal bases of the Nuremberg trials. Lemkin worked hard to persuade a 
number of countries to sponsor the resolution for a genocide convention treaty, 
and with the help and support of the newly formed United Nations, the resolution 
was placed before the General Assembly for consideration and approved in 
1948.  
 
The Phenomena of Genocide 
“The word is new, the crime is ancient”.8 
                                                          
7. Raphael Lemkin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 
Washington, D.C., 1944. 
8. Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, Penguin Books, 1981, p.11. 
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The dramatic experience of World War II and the atrocities committed against an 
ethnic minority, and in particular against Jews, sparked a reflection about the 
idea of genocide in human history.  Whilst international recognition and 
acceptance of the crime of genocide only came about with the adoption of the 
Convention, it is argued that the acts of targeting and killing identifiable groups 
within societies are an age-old practice. Accounts of mass killings and the 
destruction of peoples and their communities were recorded in the Bible, in 
Greek and Roman tragedies, throughout antiquity, and during the Crusades in 
the Middle Ages.9 By the 12th century, Genghis Khan had set about conquering 
Eurasia killing as many as 30 million people along the way. Whilst it is outside the 
scope of this thesis to recount historical instances of genocide, the fact that 
genocide has, and continues to stain human history, demonstrates the ease with 
which genocidal ideology is formulated, supported, and implemented, with or 
without a Genocide Convention. This section will discuss what is termed ‘the 
phenomena of genocide’, identifying the alarming frequency with which genocide 
campaigns occur, and discussing certain characteristics common to most 
campaigns. In the aftermath of World War II, the international community was 
compelled to adopt a legal definition of genocide and proclaimed that the 
atrocities committed by Nazi Germany would never be allowed to occur again. 
On 9 December 1948, the newly established United Nations adopted the 
Convention extending universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of both 
‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ acts of genocide.10 However, the events of the 20th 
century swiftly discredited the United Nations’ commitment to “never again”. 
                                                          
9. For a concise summary, see Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, 
Penguin Books, 1981, pp.11-18. 
10. The following day, 10 December 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights.  
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Instead, horrifying and frequent genocidal campaigns, targeting and killing groups 
protected by the Convention, were seen over and over again, across a number of 
continents and cultures. Phillip Spencer in Genocide Since 1945 (which 
published on 2012) estimates that at least 9 million people have been killed as a 
result of genocide since the Convention was adopted in 1948, and this figure 
could be as high as 13.5 million.11 Relying on Spencer’s figures with the addition 
of the intentional killing of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa civilians in Darfur, it is 
possible that genocides have persisted since 1948 with no more than a five years 
lapse between any two campaigns.12 Eloquently, yet disturbingly, summarised by 
Christopher Powell in his book Barbaric Civilisation – A Critical Sociology of 
Genocide, “the era in which genocide was made criminal for the first time is also 
the era in which it achieved effects of scale, efficiency and frequency that stun 
the imagination.13 
Genocides almost always occur in the context of, or immediately following, 
violent political instability. As Adam Jones points out in Genocide: A 
Comprehensive Introduction all three of the 20th century’s most well-known 
genocides – that of the Armenians in Turkey, the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, 
and the Tutsi in Rwanda – have occurred in the context of violent civil and/or 
                                                          
11. These figures exclude Marsh Arabs killed in Iraq during 1992 where the number of victims is 
unknown. See Philip Spencer’s Genocide since 1945 Routledge, 2012, p.19. See also G. 
Stanton’s ‘Building an Anti-Genocide Regime’ in Totten, S. (ed.) The Prevention and Intervention 
of Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review 6th ed. Rutgers, 2008, p. 281. 
12. According to Philip Spencer, there is disagreement as to whether the atrocities committed in 
Darfur constitute genocide (see International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564, 18 September 2004, and also the Second Warrant of Arrest of 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir confirming an indictment for genocide, ICC-02/05-01/09-95, 7 
December 2010). 
13. Powell, C, Barbaric Civilisation – A Critical Sociology of Genocide, Montreal, McGill-Queens 
University Press, 2011, p. 72. 
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international warfare. 14  When armed violence moves from being legitimate 
warfare to genocide can often be difficult to identify. Most agree, however, that 
the presence of war is the single biggest aide to genocide.15 Jones explains that 
the collective struggle and sacrifices of communities during times of war nurture 
intra-communal bonds and exacerbate fear and distrust of the ‘enemy’.16 In such 
circumstances, genocide campaigns that would usually be rejected by the 
collective conscience may be tolerated, or even actively encouraged, as hatred is 
only a small step from the dangerous mixture of fear and distrust:  
Psychological and social inhibitions diminish, often to be 
replaced by blood lust…Fear fuels hatred of the one allegedly 
responsible for the fear, and dependence on the authority that 
pledges deliverance from the threat…Societies grow more 
receptive to state vigilance and violence, as well as to 
suspensions of legal and constitutional safeguards.17 
Such circumstances must be particularly so during civil wars or internal conflicts 
where a large proportion of the local populations are intimately connected to the 
pain and passion of armed warfare. It is a common but truthful saying that 
“nothing unites people like a common enemy”. Disparate groups of society come 
together during times of war, allowing the gap between “us” and “them” to be 
exaggerated.18 The forging of common identities, both of the threatened, and 
threatening groups is made easy. As this thesis argues, this process of 
identification is a crucial element on the road to genocide. Understanding the 
‘phenomena of genocide’ involves consideration of the transnational security 
threats that spread so ferociously before, during, and after a genocide takes 
                                                          
14. Jones, A. Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.) Routledge, 2006, p. 81. 
15. Ibid., p.81. 
16. Ibid., p. 82. 
17. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
18. Ibid., p. 84. 
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place. In doing so, it makes it even harder to comprehend how a strong, credible, 
international mechanism for the identification, prevention, and intervention of and 
during genocide remains so far from reach. 
 Traditionally, acts of genocide have been considered by nation states to 
be tragedies, but not security threats. This perception dangerously neglects the 
transnational characteristics of genocide campaigns, and ignores the clear ‘spill 
over’ of security threats.  Although most genocides now occur in the context of 
civil, or internal wars, the movement of security threats across borders is 
profound. Before and during genocide the exodus of refugees to neighbouring 
states typically occurs at an alarming rate, providing tense and often 
unsustainable conditions for the host state. Refugee camps often provide a 
venue for the preparation of reprisal attacks, and the organisation and arming of 
exiled groups present clear security issues for the host state. 19  Further, 
absorption of the refugee population by the host or a third state is a significant 
and costly burden.  
 The United States has recently acknowledged that their traditional 
perspective on genocide has been misguided. On 8 December 2008 the 
Genocide Prevention Taskforce, co-chaired by former Secretary of State, 
Madeline K. Albright, and former Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, 
released Preventing Genocide: a blueprint for policymakers recommending steps 
the US government could take to prevent genocide.20 According to the report, the 
recognition of genocide as a threat to US security, and indeed international 
peace and security, was long overdue. In support of their position, the report 
                                                          
19 . See for example Medecins Sans Frontiers, ‘Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: 
Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill’, Special Report, 20 July 1995, available at: 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org.  
20. Full Report available at www.ushmm.org.  
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drafters’ referred to the widespread instability that followed genocide campaigns, 
where exiled populations in refugee camps present vulnerable breeding grounds 
for extremist views and terrorist recruitment. 21  Furthermore, the report linked 
contexts of instability with drug, arms, and human trafficking.22 
 Why then, has the international community tolerated ineffective genocide 
prevention measures? Some may assume that the problems of genocide are 
problems of “the other”; genocide does not occur in my backyard and it is a 
distant or foreign problem I cannot understand or influence. But over the course 
of the 20th century, instances of mass killings and genocide have occurred in 
almost all of the world’s geopolitical regions as the following examples show:  
 Australia. By the early 1920s British colonists in Australia had reduced the 
native Aboriginal population from an estimated 750,000 to just 31,000 in 
approximately 100 years.23 More brutal, however, was the program of forced 
relocation of Aboriginal children from their biological parents to white Australian 
(British settler) families during the 19th and 20th century in a deliberate effort to 
exclude Aboriginal children from their native culture, language and customs. The 
policy was recognised as genocide following an in-depth report by the Australian 
Human Rights Commission in 1997.24  
 Africa. At the turn of the 19th century, German colonial forces were 
directed to brutally annihilate the “revolting tribes” of the Hereros and Namas in 
                                                          
21 . Genocide Prevention Taskforce, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for Policy-makers, 
December, 2008. 
22. Ibid. 
23.  A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.) Routledge, 2006, p. 119. 
24 . Australian Human Rights Commission ‘Bringing them Home: A National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Children from their Families’ 1997, available on 
www.humanrights.gov.au.  
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what is present day Namibia25. Records suggest that up to 15,000 Hereros and 
2,200 Namas were incarcerated in camps resulting in a loss of approximately 
7,700 people26. Later (1994) in the same century, Hutus killed approximately 
800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in Rwanda in just over 100 days. Armed with 
machetes and loaded on the rhetoric of the distinctly genocidal ruling party (the 
MRND; Mouvement républicain national pour la démocratie et le 
développement), the Interahamwe set up road blocks throughout the country 
killing, raping, and beating Tutsi civilians that tried to cross through. Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus sought refuge in churches and schools later the sites of fatal 
massacres. The scale of atrocities that occurred in Rwanda between April and 
July 1994 ultimately led the international community to establish an international 
criminal tribunal (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) in order to try 
the perpetrators according to international law. 
 The Middle East. World War I was on Turkey’s doorsteps and the Allied 
Forces were preparing to mount their naval campaign in the Dardanelles, Turkish 
Army attacked the Armenian population labelled as traitors and supporters of the 
Russian enemy. 27  The first stage of what is now accepted by all nations 
excluding Turkey as the Armenian Genocide, targeted men capable of fighting 
against their Turkish counterparts. By July 1915, up to 200,000 men had been 
murdered.28 The remaining population were transferred to the Deir el-Zor desert 
in Syria in a calculated effort to ensure the death of tens of thousands of civilians 
                                                          
25.  J.Bridgan, The Revolt of the Heros, New York, Berkley, 1981, pp.111-12. 
26.  B. Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and 
Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, in European Historical 
Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3, 2005, p. 43. 
27.   A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.) Routledge, 2006, p. 155. 
28.  M. Mann, the Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge University 
Press, 2005, p.148. 
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along the way.29 As a final measure, some Kurdish tribesmen and the chetes 
(groups of violent prisoners responsible for killing Aegean Greeks) were released 
and set about killing the remaining Armenians.30  
 Europe. The most well-known genocide – the Holocaust – requires little 
factual expansion. Under the direction of Adolf Hitler, between 5 and 7 million 
Jews in Nazi occupied Europe were killed during World War II (1939-1945).  
 North East Asia. Shortly after the end of World War II, Chinese and ethnic 
Tibetans found themselves victim to Mao Tse-tung’s communist regime. Between 
1949 and 1987, an approximate 35 million Chinese citizens were killed at the 
hands of the Communist Party of China under Mao Tse-tung. Capitalists, 
intellectuals, and Christians were particularly targeted, although relatively modest 
landowners were also among the victims.31 Prominent scholar and analyst of 
state-led mass killing, Rudolph J. Rummel, estimates that approximately 375,000 
of the 35 million killed were victims of genocide.32 The overall figure of 35 million 
more than doubles if the 45 million deaths caused by famine between 1958 and 
1962 during Mao’s ‘Great Leap Forward’ policy were included.33  
 South East Asia. Between 1975 and 1978 Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, led 
by Pol Pot, killed an estimated 1.7 to 1.9 million Cambodians, ethnic Vietnamese, 
                                                          
29. A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed) Routledge, 2006, p. 157. 
30. Many resources mentioned that some Kurdish tribesmen were involved in Armenians genocide 
but at the same time they have neglected the Kurdish involvement of protecting the majority of 
Armenians who crossed the border to Iraqi Kurdistan after World War I. For example the 
researcher’s family helped the majority of the Armenians until his ancestry Mohammed Agha 
received the knighthood of Pius IX Order from Pope Pius XI in 1924 reproduced in this thesis. 
This is Papal award for merits in defence of the faith and sometimes it is also awarded to no-
Catholics. 
31. A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed) Routledge, 2006, pp. 205. 
32. R. J. Rummel, ‘Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder’ in Journal of Peace Research, vol. 31, no. 
1, 1994, pp.1-10, p.3. Also see, Rummel, R.J., Research Genocide and Mass Murder, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii, 1993. 
33. F. Dikotter, ‘Mao’s Great Leap to Famine’ in The New York Times 15 December 2010.  
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Chinese and Muslim Chams. 34  The regime targeted the wealthy and the 
educated, and also refused to tolerate those Cambodians considered traitors of 
the revolution.35 
 
Application of the Convention 
The word ‘genocide’ shakes the conscience evoking shocking images of mass 
destruction and human suffering. The crime of genocide involves a scale and 
magnitude of victims, perpetrators, and atrocities that exceeds that of all other 
crimes. It is rightly referred to as the ‘crime of all crimes’.36 The acceptance of a 
legal definition of genocide with the adoption of the 1948 Convention has not, 
however, necessarily transcribed into a seamless application of the law. Rather, 
the experiences of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals – the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have demonstrated the difficulty judges, lawyers, 
and legal commentators have in interpreting and applying the definition of 
genocide. Central to most debates is how to interpret the defining feature of 
genocide: ‘specific intent’. The following section will briefly outline the background 
to the establishment of tribunals and the legal elements of the crime of genocide, 
including a discussion of some of the pertinent arguments surrounding the 
‘specific intent’. The experience of the Iraqi High Tribunal will also be considered 
with particular reference to the ‘Anfal Case’ concerning the prosecution of five 
former Ministers in Saddam Hussein’s government during the genocide of the 
Kurds. It is noted that this thesis does not set out to analyse the Kurdish 
                                                          
34. A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.) Routledge, 2006, pp. 289-293.   
35. Ibid., p. 289. 
36. Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR-97-23-S (4 September 1998) Trial Judgement and Sentence 
paragraph 16. 
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experience through a legal prospective or through the 1948 Convention. Indeed, 
the successful prosecution of the ‘master minds’ of the Anfal campaign has not 
been completed. In attempting to provide a more comprehensive account of the 
fate of the Kurds under Saddam’s regime, however, it has been considered 
necessary to provide some background to international criminal jurisprudence 
and evaluate how the law has influenced genocide scholarship. 
 Whilst the phenomena of genocide appeared to be widely discussed by 
international lawyers and within the newly established United Nations during the 
1940s, it was not until the early 1990s that the Genocide Convention was re-
considered. In 1993, following the widespread violence that occurred within the 
former Yugoslavia, the UN appointed a Commission of experts to investigate 
alleged acts of genocide and war crimes in the region. Ultimately, it was this 
assignment that reignited discussion on the law of genocide and the 1948 
Convention.  
 The Commission produced two Interim Reports dated 9 February 1993 
and 5 October 1993, and a Final Report dated 27 May 1994.  Following the First 
Interim Report of the Commission of Experts, Security Council Resolution 827 
established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on 25 
May 1993. The ad hoc Tribunal was granted jurisdiction over the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia from 1991 onwards to try individuals responsible for serious 
breaches of international humanitarian law, violations of the laws and customs of 
war, genocide and crimes against humanity that had taken place with the 
collapse of communist structures in the region.37 
                                                          
37. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
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 The Commission’s Final Report presented an important preliminary 
evaluation of the evidence of events that occurred within the former Yugoslavia, 
and an assessment of the international legal regimes that could govern 
prosecutions of those most responsible for the atrocities. According to the 
Commission, genocide did not require the extermination of an entire group, 
rather, the words “in whole or in part” were used to ensure genocide did not only 
involve killing every member of a protected group.38  The Commission referred to 
the targeting of a group’s leadership (political, religious, academic, administrative 
or intellectual leaders) as offering “a strong indication of genocide regardless of 
the actual numbers killed.” 39  The Commission went on to advocate for a 
contextual analysis when determining whether or not genocide had occurred:40 
 
The character of the attack on the leadership must be viewed 
in the context of the fate or what happened to the rest of the 
group. If a group has its leadership exterminated, and at the 
same time or in the wake of that, has a relatively large 
number of the members of the group killed or subjected to 
other heinous acts, for example deported on a large scale or 
forced to flee, the cluster of violations ought to be considered 
in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the 
Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose... Thus, the 
intent to destroy the fabric of a society through the 
extermination of its leadership, when accompanied by other 
acts of elimination of a segment of society, can also be 
deemed genocide. 
 
When considering the legal requirement that the victims of genocide must belong 
to a protected group (national, ethnic, racial or religious), the Commission 
adopted a broad interpretation of the Convention. Where a genocidal campaign is 
launched against a number of protected groups the Commission considered that 
                                                          
38 .  Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992) S1994/674, 27 May 1994, Part I. 
39.     Ibid.  
40.     Ibid. 
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it might be appropriate to view all of the victim groups as a larger singular 
identity. In that regard, the analysis would turn to the actions of the perpetrating 
government or entity against groups that do not belong to the perpetrating state 
or entity. This ‘one against all’ carries a striking resemblance to Saddam’s 
Arabization programme where his rhetoric promoted an Iraqi Arab versus all non-
Iraqi Arab national propaganda. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, however, 
has conclusively rejected such a broad interpretation of the targeted group and it 
remains incumbent on the Prosecution to prove the elements of genocide in 
relation to each distinct target group.41 
 Finally, in reference to intent to commit genocide, the Commission 
determined that intent to destroy a group in whole or in part requires actions to be 
directed at a group’s collective identity or capacity rather than against a number 
of individuals.42 The Commission accepted that intent will often be inferred from a 
number of “sufficient facts”, and in some cases evidence of a perpetrator’s 
conduct may be used to infer that they were “aware of the consequences of his 
or her conduct, which goes to the establishment of intent, but not necessarily 
motive”.43 
 Within 11 months of the establishment of the ICTY, civil war broke out in 
Rwanda with the shooting down of a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal 
Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi on 6 April 1994. The 
events that followed the assassination of President Habyarimana left between 
500,000 and 1,000,000 ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutu slaughtered by an 
                                                          
41. Prosecutor v Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgement AC, 22 March 2006, paragraphs 20-28. 
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid.  
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organised, machete wielding youth wing of the MRND government; 44  the 
Interahamwe. Similar to the procedure that led to the establishment of the ICTY, 
the Security Council requested the Secretary General to appoint a Commission 
of Experts to investigate the events that occurred in Rwanda prior to the 
establishment of the ad hoc Tribunal by Resolution 935 dated 1 July 1994.45 In its 
final report dated 9 December 1994, the Commission concluded that there 
existed overwhelming evidence that Hutu elements committed genocide against 
ethnic Tutsi in a concerted, planned and methodical fashion.46 Furthermore, the 
Commission concluded that evidence did exist of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and international humanitarian law by both sides (Hutu elements 
under the direction of the MRND government and the Tutsi led Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF).47  
 On 8 November 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 955 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The Tribunal was 
granted jurisdiction for crimes committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 
January and 31 December 1994 and, specifically, for the prosecution of 
individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the 
Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law.48 In its final report, the 
Commission of experts discussed issues relating to specific intent that they 
foresaw as raising issues for the ad hoc Tribunal. First, the Commission 
                                                          
44. MRND is the French acronym for Mouvement Républicain National pour la démocratie et le 
Développement, or in English, the National Republican Movement for Democracy and 
Development. 
45. Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 1 July 1994.  
46. Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 935, 1994 
(S/1994/1405). 
47. Ibid.  
48 .  Statute of the ICTR, annexed to Security Council Resolution 955, 8 November 1994 
(S/RES/955 (1994) Articles 2, 3 and 4. 
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questioned whether the Tribunal could find that an accused held the necessary 
specific intent where the evidence suggested he or she only intended to destroy 
part of the national, ethnic, religious or racial group. Second, the Commission 
questioned how the Tribunal would distinguish between murder or mass murder, 
and genocide; again a question of special intent. Whilst the Commission of 
Experts appointed to investigate breaches of international law in the former 
Yugoslavia commented on their interpretation of the law of genocide, the 
Commission of Experts appointed to investigate the atrocities in Rwanda did no 
more than raise potential issues. However, it was to be the ICTR that delivered 
the first judgement on the law of genocide when it convicted Jean Paul Akayesu 
on 2 September 1998.49 Before this judgement is discussed, it is necessary to 
outline the physical elements of genocide; the actus reus. 
Actus Reus  
The five acts listed in subparagraph (a) of Article II of the 1948 Convention 
constitute the physical elements of the crime of genocide: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
Where one of more of the above-listed acts is committed with the requisite intent 
– against a protected group – a finding of genocide may be made. The actus reus 
                                                          
49. Jean-Paul Akayesu was the mayor of Taba during the Rwandan Genocide. He was convicted 
of genocide and direct and public incitement to commit genocide, along with crimes against 
humanity. See part 7 of the Trial Chamber Judgement: Prosecutor v Akaayesu ICTR-96-4-T.  
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may be completed by positive commission or omission of one of the above listed 
acts. The actus reus of ‘killing’ involves proof that at least one person, from the 
target group of the genocide campaign, was killed as the result of the 
perpetrator’s unlawful actions or those of his or her subordinate.50 International 
jurisprudence has held that a body does not need to be recovered in order to 
prove that a death has occurred, but the fact that death has occurred can be 
inferred.51  
 Actions that constitute “serious bodily or mental harm” were not listed in 
the Convention and their definition has largely emerged from the jurisprudence of 
the ICTR and the ICTY. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber held that serious bodily or 
mental harm includes – but is not limited to – “acts of torture, be they bodily or 
mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution.”52 In Kayishema the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTR defined serious bodily or mental harm as “harm that 
seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any serious injury to 
the external, internal organs or senses.”53 At the ICTY, the Trial Chamber in 
Stakic interpreted the act as meaning, inter alia “acts of torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined 
with beatings, threats of death, and harm that damages health or causes 
disfigurement or injury. The harm inflicted need not be permanent or 
immediate”.54 The Elements of Crimes document created by the International 
Criminal Court references acts of  torture, rape, sexual violence and inhuman or 
                                                          
50. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) p.179 citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 
September 1998, paragraph 588. 
51. Ibid., p.180. 
52. Prosecutor v. Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-96-4-T), Judgment, 2 September 1998, paragraph. 
503. 
53. Prosecutor v. Kayishema et. al., paragraph. 109. 
54. Prosecutor v. Stakic´ (Case No. IT-97-24-T), Judgment, 31 July 2003, para. 516. 
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degrading treatment.55 Again, the list was specifically non exhaustive. For the 
actus reus of inflicting serious bodily or mental harm to be made out, the 
Prosecution must prove that one or more victims – from the targeted group – 
suffered physical or mental harm. It is not required that the acts of violence 
actually destroy the targeted group in whole or in part.56 
 Actions that deliberately inflict conditions of life calculated to bring about 
physical destruction include “subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, 
systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services 
below minimum requirements.”57 The Prosecution is not required to prove that 
the actions of the perpetrator caused the destruction of the targeted group in 
fact, 58  but must demonstrate that deliberate actions were taken that could 
themselves affect the physical destruction of the group.59 
 The fourth way in which genocide may be committed is by imposing 
measures intended to prevent the births of children of the targeted group (Article 
II (d) of the Convention). The Trial Chamber of the ICTR in Akayesu discussed 
acts that would constitute genocide under this limb: “For purposes of interpreting 
Article 2(2) (d) of the Statute [and Article II (d) of the Convention, the Chamber 
holds that the measures intended to prevent births within the group, should be 
considered as sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, 
                                                          
55.  International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff5dd7d2.html 2011) 
56. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.187. 
57.  Prosecutor v Akayesu paragraph 505. 
58.  William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p.192. 
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separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages.” 60  Professor William 
Schabas provides some important comparisons between limbs (c) and (d) in his 
comprehensive book ‘Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes’: 
In contrast with paragraph (c), paragraph (d) does not 
require that the measures to restrict births be ‘calculated’ to 
bring about the destruction of the group in whole or in part, 
only that they be intended to prevent births within the group. 
Such measures can be merely ancillary to a genocidal plan 
or programme, as it was, for example in the case of the 
Nazis.61 
 
Finally, the forced transfer of children from the targeted group to another group 
makes up the final physical element or action within the crime of genocide. This 
limb has received relatively little jurisprudential attention, indicating its 
comparative infrequency against other more prominent acts of genocide. The 
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes document discussed the 
parameter of forcible transfer as not being restricted solely to physical force, but 
including “threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such 
person or persons or another person, by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment”.62  
Mens Rea 
In his book Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Adam Jones carries out a 
thorough analysis of different social and political definitions of genocide, 
identifying common elements and prerequisites for a finding of genocide. 
Astutely, Jones concludes that the majority of scholars and legal theorists agree 
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that intent defines genocide63, but what defines intent? This is a question that 
continues to be debated, and perhaps will be for some time. Proving the ‘crime of 
crimes’ necessitates a convincing finding of an accused’s intent to carry out the 
most horrendous and destructive crime. The following section will present an 
overview of how mens rea or ‘specific intent’ has been interpreted and applied 
within the parameters of international criminal law, and some of the popular 
criticisms of the approach that has been adopted.  
 Hugo Adam Bedau, who was the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of 
Philosophy at Tufts University (1966-1999), offered one of the earliest 
interpretations of the Genocide Convention’s specific intent requirement, in his 
article “Genocide in Vietnam?”64 In trying to determine whether the United States 
was guilty of genocide during the Vietnam War, Bedau first attempted to discern 
the meaning of genocide as put forth by the Genocide Convention. According to 
his essay, genocide can be divided into two parts: (1) the actus reus which 
includes the genocidal acts as enumerated in (a)-(e) of Article II; and (2) the 
necessary genocidal intent.65 In Bedau's view, one could only be found guilty of 
genocide if the perpetrator had committed one of the enumerated acts and had 
the specific intent to destroy the national, racial, ethnic or religious group as such, 
in whole or in part he says:  
It is not enough to kill persons belonging to a different race or 
religion, but these murders must be committed as part of a 
plan to destroy the given group […] Where such specific 
intent is lacking there is no genocide.66  
 
                                                          
63.  A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (2nd ed.) Routledge, 2006, p. 37. 
64. H. A. Bedau, ‘Genocide in Vietnam’, Boston University Law Review, 1973, pp. 574-622. 
65. Ibid., p. 580. 
66 . Testimony of the deputy Legal advisor to the US State Department, in 1970 Genocide 
Hearings 44.  
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In a 1991 report, the International Law Commission explained that the prohibited 
acts must be “volitional … general intent to commit one of the acts … and 
general knowledge of the consequences of such acts on immediate victims in not 
enough”.67 Thus, the actor must have knowledge of the ultimate objective of the 
massive criminal conduct,68 such that the actor’s purpose is the destruction of a 
nation, racial, ethnic or religious group, i.e. one’s action must be carried out with 
purpose. 
 More recently, the definition of ‘specific intent’ to commit genocide has 
been tested and applied in the two ad hoc Tribunals, the ICTR and the ICTY (and 
by the Iraqi High Criminal Court IHCC). The jurisprudence of the three Tribunals 
has placed a firm emphasis on the requirement that the prosecution establishes 
that each accused held a ‘specific intent’ to destroy a protected group in whole or 
in part. Knowledge of a higher plan or policy to cause such destruction – without 
evidence of the defendants’ own intent as to the destruction of a group – has 
failed to secure convictions for genocide. Within legal commentary, a division has 
developed between those that support the Tribunal’s ‘purpose–based’ inquiry, 
from those advocating for a ‘knowledge-based’ approach, where an accused may 
be found guilty of genocide based on his/her knowledge of the effect of 
overarching plan or policy, but where they lack personal genocidal purpose.69  
 The adopted purpose-based approach looks directly to the words of the 
1948 Convention and the common law concept of dolus specialis.70 The inquiry 
                                                          
67. Ibid. 
68. Robinson, Nehemiah, The Genocide Convention: A Commentary, 63, New York: Institute of 
Jewish Affairs, 1960. 
69. A prominent campaigner for this approach is Alexander Greenwalt’s ‘Rethinking Genocidal 
Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Approach’ in number 99 Columbia Law Review, 2259, 
1999. 
70. William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, pp. 256-260. 
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seeks proof that an accused carried out one or more of the prohibited acts with 
the intent that in doing so, the targeted group would be destroyed in whole or in 
part. Put differently, the specific interpretation asks whether an accused held the 
aim of precluding the survival of the targeted group as a distinct, identifiable unit. 
The International Law Commission (ILC), in commenting on its Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, stated, in this regard:71 
 
The prohibited acts enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (c) are 
by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts 
which an individual could not usually commit without knowing 
that certain consequences were likely to result.  
These are not the type of acts that would normally occur by 
accident or even as a result of mere negligence. However, a 
general intent to commit one of the enumerated acts combined 
with a general awareness of the probable consequences of 
such an act with respect to the immediate victim or victims is 
not sufficient for the crime of genocide. The definition of this 
crime requires a specific intent with respect to the overall 
consequences of the prohibited acts. 
 
Because – as a general rule – genocidaires do not go about documenting their 
guilt, proof of specific intent is often deduced or inferred from circumstantial 
evidence. This is not to be misunderstood as a dampening of the legal 
requirement as to intent. The ICTR has ensured that reliance on circumstantial 
evidence in proving intent is made only when no other reasonable explanation 
exists.72 Facts deemed relevant to a finding of intent based on circumstantial 
evidence include “the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts 
systematically directed against the same target group, the scale of atrocities 
                                                          
71. ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session’, 6 May-
26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, 88, p.87. 
72. Nahimana et al. v. Prosecutor (Case No. ICTR-99-52-A) Appeals Chamber Judgment, 28 
November 2007, paragraph 524. 
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committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership of 
a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts”.73 
 Whilst the existence of a plan or policy to commit genocide is not a legal 
element of the crime found in the 1948 Convention, it has nevertheless found 
itself to be crucial to a successful genocide conviction. Indeed, Professor William 
Schabas has noted that no court has ever rendered a genocide conviction in the 
absence of evidence of a plan.74 This is in large part due to the fact that it seems 
impossible that genocide – a crime characterised by atrocities on a massive 
scale – could be committed without a plan. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
Trial Chambers of the ad hoc Tribunals typically consider the existence of an 
organised plan or policy and evaluate the accused’s intent based on his or her 
knowledge of, and subscription to the plan.75 
 In contrast to the purpose-based approach, the knowledge-based 
approach directs its inquiry not to the goal or aim of an individual accused, but to 
whether or not an accused had knowledge of the overarching plan or policy when 
they committed one of the prohibited acts listed in subparagraphs (a) to (e).76 
Alexander Greenwalt is a known advocate of the knowledge-based approach. In 
a comprehensive article ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent’, Greenwalt proposes an 
alternative to the purpose-based approach: 
In cases where a perpetrator is otherwise liable for a genocidal 
act, the requirement of genocidal intent should be satisfied if the 
perpetrator acted in furtherance of a campaign targeting members 
of a protected group and knew that the goal or manifest effect of 
                                                          
73.  Prosecutor v Jelisic (IT-95-10-A) Trial Chamber Judgment, 5 July 2001, paragraph 47. 
74.  William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crimes of Crimes, Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, p. 267. 
75.  Ibid., p. 247. 
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the campaign was the destruction of the group in whole or in 
part.77 
 
In support of this approach, Greenwalt refers to the overall purpose of the 
Genocide Convention as contained in its preamble: to prevent the permanent 
losses to humanity caused by genocide. Rather than focusing on what may have 
led a perpetrator to commit acts of genocide, Greenwalt suggests that a 
knowledge-based approach emphasises the destructive result of genocide, 
offering a more objective standard of liability.78 For Greenwalt, the mens rea 
element of the crime would be met where a perpetrator selects members of a 
protected group on the basis of their group identity, and has knowledge of the 
destructive consequences of their actions on the survival of that group.79 
 However, this proposal has been criticised for its potential to blur the line 
between genocide and crimes against humanity. David Phillips argues that 
broadening the scope of intent to include what he refers to as a ‘results-based’ 
analysis will run the risk of including certain crimes against humanity within the 
ambit of genocide.80 To be guilty of a crime against humanity, a perpetrator must 
commit one of the eleven prohibited acts as part of a widespread of systematic 
attack against a civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.81 According to 
this school of thought, the wording of the genocide definition “with intent to 
destroy in whole or in part” demands a much higher threshold than “with 
knowledge of the attack”.   
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The Iraqi High Criminal Court 
Although Kurdish genocide is not an internationally accepted and discussed 
event like the genocide against the Jews during the Holocaust, or against the 
Tutsi in Rwanda, the prominent perpetrators of the Anfal campaign, the genocide 
of Faylee Kurds, the genocide of the Barzani Kurds, and the Halabja chemical 
attack, have not avoided prosecution. On 10 December 2003, the Iraqi Interim 
Governing Council adopted the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal IST (later re-
named the Iraqi High Criminal Court IHCC). Described as an “internationalised 
domestic court”, the Court was provided with jurisdiction to try Iraqi citizens and 
residents for alleged acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
serious violations of the laws of war, and violations of stipulated Iraqi laws.82 The 
temporal jurisdiction of the Court covered the period of Ba’ath rule 17 July 1968 – 
1 May 2003 when President George W. Bush announced that major combat 
operations in Iraq had ceased.83 
 The Statute establishing the Court provided that it would be guided by the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC, and foreign expertise 
(particularly from the US) played a significant role in the training and appointment 
of judges, prosecutors and defence counsels.84 However, the Court retained its 
former internal structure with the inclusion of the jurisdiction for crimes 
established in the 1958 Iraqi Criminal Code (including the crime of wastage of 
natural resources and the squandering of public assets), this in addition, due to 
its location in Baghdad.85  
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 The first trial conducted by the Iraqi High Criminal Court was the Dujail trial 
where the Prosecution alleged that Saddam Hussein, and seven co-accused, 
were guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes for the “widespread and 
systematic attacks” on residents of Dujail following the attempted assassination 
of Saddam Hussein in the Salahaddin region – Dujail subdistrict in 1982.86 The 
prosecution alleged that, between 1982 and 1985, up to 800 civilians were 
forcibly detained, tortured, and transferred to different internment facilities as part 
of official retaliations for the assassination attempt. 87  Over 100 men were 
executed in 1985. 88   On 5 November 2006, The Court convicted Saddam 
Hussein and his seven co-accused (three former Senior Government Officials, 
and four former Ba’ath party members) for crimes against humanity in the form of 
torture, forced deportation, imprisonment, wilful killing, and other criminal acts.89  
 Prior to the Tribunal’s first judgement in the Dujail case, the second major 
trial to take place before the Court – the Anfal trial – commenced on 21 August 
2006. The prosecution alleged that Saddam Hussein, his cousin, Ali Hassan-al-
Majid, and five co-accused involved in the Anfal campaign; planned, authorised, 
and implemented a series of large scale attacks against Kurdish population in 
northern Iraq in 1988 causing the death of 182,000 Kurds through the deliberate 
and repetitive use of chemical weapons, the forced displacement of thousands of 
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civilians, and the destruction of Kurdish villages and infrastructure.90 The Court 
convicted seven high Iraq officials including Saddam Hussein on the 24th June 
2007. The Cassation Chamber confirmed the convictions on 4 September 2007 
although the first bill of indictment was released for 424 accused Iraqis.91 
 The Dujail case and the Anfal trial raised concern within the international 
community. The Court’s written judgement has been described by one prominent 
commentator as “frequently unclear in its logic, rambling in its analysis, 
disorganised, and occasionally lacking discussion of the elements of some of the 
crimes”.92 However, despite their limited experience in dealing with this kind of 
complex trials, the overwhelming task of the Court’s judges and Counsels has 
been fairly acknowledged.93  
 It is outside of the scope of this thesis to discuss the achievements and 
shortcomings of the Iraqi High Criminal Court in any detail. The author, instead, 
sets out to present an account of what occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan under the 
Ba’ath rule. The significance of the trials to this research is the fact that they 
represented the first official Iraqi forum in which all aspects of the campaigns 
were heard together in a genuine effort to record the horrifying events that took 
place in Iraqi Kurdistan during the Ba’ath rule under Saddam Hussein.94  
 The Court found that Saddam Hussein’s trusted cousin, Ali Hassan al-
Majid (known as ‘Chemical Ali’), was the “absolute leader of the northern area” 
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during the Anfal campaign. 95  He was convicted of genocide as a principal 
perpetrator on the basis of his membership and participation in a joint criminal 
enterprise with Saddam Hussein and others.96 Unfortunately, the Court dropped 
the case against Saddam Hussein after he was executed in December 2006. The 
Court nevertheless found that Ali Hassan al-Majid was criminally responsible for 
ordering others to commit genocide.97 
 Ali Hassan al-Majid was held to be criminally responsible for three acts or 
underlying crimes of genocide: killing members of the Kurdish ethnic group; 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the Kurdish ethnic group; 
and deliberately inflicting on the Kurdish ethnic group living conditions calculated 
to bring about their physical destruction in whole or in part.98 Although the Trial 
Chamber’s Judgement has been criticised for its lack of clarity and coherence, 
Jennifer Trahan, who established that the convictions appeared well founded, 
carried out a comprehensive review of the Chamber’s factual findings but without 
challenging the validity of the convictions based on the lack of fairness of the 
court.  
Alternatives to the Legal Definition 
In his Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Adam Jones, following a new, 
comparative approach to genocide studies, states:  
I see genocide as inseparable from the broad thrust of history, both 
ancient and modern – indeed, it is among history's defining features, 
overlapping a range of central historical processes: war, imperialism, 
state-building, class struggle. I perceive it as intimately linked to key 
institutions, in which states or broadly political authorities, are often 
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but not always principal actors: forced labor, military conscription, 
incarceration, and female infanticide.99 
 
Adam's approach is innovative because it overcomes what he considers a more 
conservative approach in the 1980's and 1990's proposed by researchers such 
as Leo Kuper's Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twenty Century (1981) or, more 
recently, The History and Sociology of Genocide by Frank Chalk and Kurt 
Jonahsson (1990). 
 One of the advantages of Jones' innovative approach is that, by 
comparing different cases, he broadens the definition of genocide and in doing 
so, he points out the ambiguities inherent to the original ones approved by the 
UN in 1948. In his book he offers an overview of the definitions of genocide 
proposed by different researchers from Peter Drost in 1959 to Steven Katz in 
1994.100  It is not a purpose of this study to analyse its evolution through modern 
history, but it is evident that Jones' approach means a breakthrough in the field 
for its inclusion and discussion on the validity of the definition approved in 1948 in 
the light of the new dramatic events of the last few decades since the 1970's. It is 
evident, and this is a point that will be adopted by this study, that Jones favours a 
more sociological approach to the topic of genocide focusing on the 
consequences that the act has on the population and on the different strategies 
of genocide. 
 One of the fundamental differences taken by sociologists, political 
scientists and other ‘non-legal’ scholars of genocide is the expansion of groups 
that may be victims of genocide. Whilst the 1948 Convention limits the victims of 
genocide to ethnic, national, religious or racial groups, contemporary scholars 
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advocate for a significant widening of groups that may suffer genocide. 101 
Notably, Jones adopts a modified version of Steven T. Katz’s 1994 definition of 
genocide: “[Genocide is] the actualisation of the intent, however successfully 
carried out to murder [in whole or in part] any national, ethnic, racial, religious, 
political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the 
perpetrator, by whatever means.”102 
 Definitions of genocide outside of the 1948 Convention also depart from 
the distinct acts of genocide enumerated in subparagraph II of the Convention 
(discussed as the actus reus above). Rather than limit the ‘strategies of genocide’ 
to only those acts listed in the Convention, genocide scholars have favoured a 
definition arguably more reflective of Lemkin’s initial work: 
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the 
immediate destruction of a nation, except where accomplished by 
mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to 
signify a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, 
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives 
of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social 
institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion and 
the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of 
personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the 
individuals belonging to such groups.103 
 
Techniques of Genocide 
Raphael Lemkin (1945) wrote in the article presented to the United Nations that 
there are many techniques used in torturing and committing genocide against a 
national, racial, ethnic or religious group. He put forward the following techniques 
and applied them directly to the experience of Nazi Germany:   
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1) Political: The Political cohesion of the conquered countries was intended 
to be weakened by dividing them into more or less self-contained and 
hermetically enclosed zones, as in the four zones of France, the ten zones of 
Yugoslavia, the five zones of Greece by partitioning their territories to create 
puppet states such as Croatia and Slovakia; and by detaching territory for 
incorporation in the Greater Reich, as was done with western Poland, Alsace-
Lorraine, Luxembourg, and Slovenia. Artificial boundaries were created to 
prevent communication and mutual assistance by the national groups involved. 
2) Social: The social structure of a nation is vital to its national development. 
Therefore the German occupant endeavoured to bring about changes that 
weakened national spiritual resources. The focal point of this attack had been the 
intelligentsia, because this group provided leadership. In Poland and Slovenia the 
intellectuals and the clergy were to a large extent either murdered or removed for 
forced labour in Germany. Intellectuals and those resistant of all occupied 
countries were marked for execution. Even among the blood-related Dutch some 
23,000 were killed, the greater number of them being leading members of their 
communities. 
3) Culture: The Germans sought to obliterate every reminder of former 
cultural patterns. In the incorporated areas, the local language, place names, 
German inscriptions supplanted personal names, public signs and inscriptions. 
German was to be the language of the courts, of the schools, of the government 
and of the street. In Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg, French was not even 
permitted as a language to be studied in primary schools. The function of the 
schools was to preserve and strengthen Nazism. Attendance at a German school 
was compulsory through the primary grades and three years of secondary 
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school. The same techniques had applied to Kurds by Iraqi regime in all over 
Kurdistan before 1991. 
4) Religious: Wherever religion represented a vital influence in the national 
life, the spiritual power of the Church was undermined by various means. In 
Luxembourg law against criticism protected children over 14 if they should 
renounce their religious affiliations for membership in Nazi youth organizations. In 
the puppet state of Croatia an independent, but German-dominated, Orthodox 
Church was created for Serbs in order to destroy forever the spiritual ties with the 
Patriarch at Belgrade. With the special violence and thoroughness reserved for 
Poles and Jews, Polish church property was pillaged and despoiled and the 
clergy subjected to constant persecution.   
5) Moral: Hand in hand with the undermining of religious influence went 
devices for the moral debasement of national groups. Pornographic publications 
and movies were foisted upon the Poles. Alcohol was kept cheap although food 
became increasingly dear, and peasants were legally bound to accept spirits for 
agricultural produce. Although under Polish law gambling houses had been 
prohibited, German authorities not only permitted them to come into existence 
but relaxed the otherwise severe curfew law. 
6) Economic: The genocide purpose of destroying or degrading the 
economic foundations of national groups was to lower the standards of living and 
to sharpen the struggle for existence that no energies might remain for a cultural 
or national life. Jews were immediately deprived of the elemental means of 
existence by expropriation and by forbidding them the right to work. Polish 
property in western Poland was incorporated confiscated and Poles denied 
licenses to practice trades or handicrafts, thus reserving trade to the Germans. 
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7) Biological: The genocide policy was far-sighted as well as immediate in 
its objectives. On the one hand an increase in the birth rate, legitimate or 
illegitimate, was encouraged within Germany and among the Volksdeutsche in 
the occupied countries. Subsidies were offered for children born from German 
military men and women of related blood such as Dutch and Norwegian. On the 
other hand, every means to decrease the birth rate among "racial inferiors" was 
used. Millions of war prisoners and forced labourers from all the conquered 
countries of Europe were kept from contacting their wives. 
8) Physical: The most direct and drastic of the techniques of genocide was 
murder. It may have been slow and indirect murder by mass starvation or the 
swift but no less scientific murder by mass extermination in gas chambers, 
wholesale execution or exposure to disease and exhaustion. Food rations all 
territory under German domination were established on racial principles, ranging 
in 1943 from 93 per cent of its pre-war diet for the German inhabitants to 20 per 
cent of its pre-war diet for the Jewish population. A carefully graduated scale 
allowed protein rations of 97 per cent to German, 95 per cent to the Dutch, 71 per 
cent to the French, 38 per cent to the Greeks and 20 per cent to the Jews. 
These categories constitute a starting point for an analysis of the different 
ways in which Kurdish people have been victims of genocide from a social and 
political point of view. Using the findings of his fieldwork along with secondary 
sources, the researcher intended to apply these same categories and to add new 
ones where the particular circumstances suggested it. 
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Stages of genocide  
In 1998 Gregory H. Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch presented a paper 
at the United States State Department in which he explained that there are eight 
stages through which the causes and conditions for genocide develop and 
gradually degenerate into genocide. For genocide to happen there must be 
certain preconditions, including a national culture that does not place a high value 
on human life. Assuming that the government is authoritarian or totalitarian, such 
stages are the following: 
1. Classification: The main preventive measure at this early stage is to 
develop universalistic institutions that transcend divisions. People are  
categorized by type, and classified into different groups, such as whites, blacks, 
Asians; or into Christians and Jews; or into communists, leftists, or rightist; or into 
Arab or Kurds, Ba’athist or non-Ba’athist, Ottoman origin or Savawian origin. In 
Kurdish case there were also sub classifications like Barzani Kurds and Faylee 
Kurds. People are divided into “them” and “us”. Kurdish history demonstrates that 
the Iraqi state, since its creation by the League of Nations (who won World War I 
most notably the British), has always classified Kurds as a distinct ethnic 
minority. King Faisal I, the first King of Iraq who reigned from 23 August 1921 to 8 
September 1933, mentioned in his speech at his inauguration that Iraq consisted 
of groups of people, with different background and ethnic origins, a trend still 
visible nowadays in Iraqi society. It was only in 1924 that ‘Iraqi Nationality Law’ 
identified Iraqis of Ottoman and Iranian origin. 
2. Symbolization: Different groups are given names, such as Chinese, 
Jews, Hindus, or Marxists. Particular clothes, (like a Turban), their food (like rice), 
physical characteristic (like long noses), or behaviour (like inscrutable) may 
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become ways of stereotyping the group’s members. In Iraq, the Ba’athist regime 
distinguished Kurds from non-Kurds by classifying them as ‘traitors to the regime’ 
or as supporters of Iraq’s adversaries, Iran and Israel. In the context of the Iraq-
Iran war, Kurds were portrayed by Saddam’s regime as “a Trojan horse, working 
for an Iranian victory” and thus traitors to the State of Iraq (McDowall pp. 352-3). 
Also through their history they labelled and symbolized Kurds as “rebels”, “Fifth 
columnist”, “saboteur”,” dystructive”, and often ”separatists”.  
3. Dehumanization: Members of the out-groups or targeted group are 
dehumanized, as in calling them apes, monkeys, cockroaches, parasites, rats, 
vermin, traitors, trechaous, disloyal and the like. In this way, members of the out-
group are made to appear clearly outside of “our” moral universe. As vermin and 
such, members of the out-group have been stripped of the moral in-group 
protection against extermination. The use of the term ‘al-anfal’ by Saddam’s 
regime to describe their campaign to end Kurdish resistance evokes images of 
human inferiority, particularly to Muslim audiences in Arab and Kurdish Iraq. The 
historical reference ‘al anfal’ refers to a holy war in which the Prophet 
Mohammed led a battle to kill non-believers (anfals). The forced deportation and 
killing of Faylee Kurds, the second punishment and genocide of Barzani Kurds, 
all atrocities committed during Anfal campaign were great examples of Iraqi 
regime’s dehumanization performance.  
4. Organization: Officials, sympathetic in-group leaders, and intellectuals 
organize to repress, murder out-group members, or entirely destroy the 
dehumanized group. Weapons are stacked or handed out; militia, security forces, 
or military are selected and trained; preliminary plans are made in order to carry 
out the killings. Genocide cannot occur without a ‘killing machine’. As will be 
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addressed in the following chapters, Saddam’s regime ensured they had 
developed the army’s technical skills, intelligence and security, and an air force 
capable of convincingly suppressing any uprisings against the regime. Whilst the 
interference of Iran in Iraqi affairs attracted considerable attention, Saddam was 
equally concerned with internal threats to his regime. After determining that 
Kurdish resistance in the north of Iraq had become intolerable, Saddam as the 
Chairman of Revolutionary Command Council and president appointed his 
cousin, General Ali Hasan al Majid to ‘deal with’ the Kurdish problem.104  
5. Polarization: Officials, extremists, propagandists, or demagogues 
undertake a systematic campaign to maximize the social, psychological, and 
moral distance between “us” and “them”. At this stage, moderate intellectuals and 
leaders are silenced either through intimidation, beatings, arrests, and 
assassination. In most totalitarian regimes the neutral or the moderate groups are 
silent mainly in divided or fragmented society like Iraq and the best 
encouragement for dictators is the silence of the majority.105 
6. Preparation: All is ready for genocide and the final step is to tag those to 
be killed. They may be forced to wear identifying cloths or symbols, or be 
segregated in ghettos. Those who might lead the resistance to genocide, such as 
                                                          
104 . After the 1958 Revolution, Iraq had a series of interim or temporary constitutions. The 
Revolutionary Command Council as a legislative power came into being in 1963, pursuant to Law 
No. 25 of 1963 which was replaced by Law No. 61 of 1964, amended by Law No. 173 of 1964 
and then repealed by Law No. 137 of 1965. Under the 1970 interim constitution, the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was declared in Article 37 to be “the supreme institution 
in the state”. It was the highest legislative authority in Iraq, headed by Saddam Hussein. While 
Saddam involved himself personally in operational aspects of all genocides against Kurds 
through the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, supreme powers for handling Kurdish affairs 
between 1987 and 1989 were vested in his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid. See RCC decree No. 
160 on 29 March 1987 and RCC decree No. 244 on 20 April 1987. See Appendix No. (3) of this 
chapter. 
105. Batatu H. The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, London: Saqui, 
2004.  
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young men, may be conscripted into the military and segregated for subsequent 
execution, or simply jailed. General Ali Hasan al Majid, arguably the man driving 
the genocide against the Kurds, declared large areas of Kurdish land as 
prohibited areas. In article 5 of his memo no. 4008 dated 20th June 1987, General 
Hassan al Majid declared: “Within their jurisdiction, the armed forces must kill any 
human being or animal present within these areas.” He also ordered to take 
action in order to cut off the Peshmergas from any source of food or shelter. 
7. Extermination: It is genocide to the killers because they do not believe 
their victims to be human. They are always extreme in their implementation and 
they forget that their victims are human beings.  
8. Denial: The last stage is the perpetrator's denial of their genocide. They 
deny that they committed any crime. They destroy or hide the relevant official 
evidence, burn bodies, leave unmarked graves or invent a reasonable rational for 
the killing. The denial by itself is a crime. Arguably, denial is the most important 
stage of any genocide. The more perpetrators deny their involvement – or the 
more acts of genocide remain unrecognized by the national and international 
community – the more intangible justice is for the victims. The Kurds were 
presented as an intractable problem where the only solution was extermination. 
The process of isolating, stereotyping, and dehumanizing Kurds meant that those 
involved in the task of killing Kurdish populations believed they were not 
committing a ‘crime’, but admirably participating in a holy war in the name of Iraq 
or of the Ba’ath party. Perhaps one striking example of Iraqi denial is the failure 
of any former state combatants to come forward and admit their part in the 
genocide, or even those who observed acts of genocide to provide their accounts 
not even after 42 years (1971-2013) the Faylee Kurds genocide, 30 years (1983-
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2013) the Barzani Kurds genocide and 25 years (1988 - 2013) the Anfal 
campaign no one from the Iraqi army or the Ba’ath party members has come 
forward or admitted their participation in the genocides.  
History of genocide in Iraq 
In order to provide a new analysis of Kurdish genocide it is necessary to refer 
back to Adam Jones' approach to genocide mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter in which he leaves some legal ground in favour of an historical and 
sociological approach. This study aims to review the case of Kurdish genocide 
following the same path by analysing the gaps in the investigations left by the 
Court due to its lack of international supervision and support. In order to achieve 
this goal it is necessary, as Jones did in his study, to forget for a moment the 
various definitions of genocide offered by different scholars since the fifties, 
where most of the emphasis was on the physical suppression of the victims, and 
to refer back to the original categories of genocide strategies proposed by 
Lemkin in the analysis of the German occupation in Europe.  In his revision of 
Lemkin's work, talking about different definitions of genocide, Jones states that: 
Crucially, there is a growing agreement that group “destruction” 
must involve mass killing and physical liquidation (see, e.g., Fein 
[1993], Charny, Horowitz, and Katz/Jones). But to repeat: this is not 
a feature of either Raphael Lemkin's original formulation or of the 
UN Convention. In both these definitions, mass killing is only one of 
the panoply of strategies, available to génocidaires; the emphasis is 
on the destruction of the group “as such”, not necessarily the 
physical annihilation of its members. (Jones, p 24.) 
 
Iraq has its own philosophy of genocide from the early years of its creation until 
2003. This is due to many factors; its tribal nature,106 the sociological structure,107 
                                                          
106.   Ali Alwardi, Social Glimpses of Modern Iraqi History: The Ottomans, Safavids and Mamluks 
(Baghdad, 1969). His first volume of Social Glimpses of Modern Iraqi History is a detailed 
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and psychological nature of society,108 of the ruling administrations in Baghdad. 
After 1975, the Iraqi government transformed an ancient barbarity into a principle 
(policy) of government by justifying genocide as a sacred purpose of the Iraqi 
people. Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party was the doctrine of the biological superiority 
of the Iraqi people. Long before the Iraq – Iran war the Ba’ath leaders were 
announcing to the world and conducting propanganda campaign aimed at the 
Iraqis themselves about the program of genocide they had elaborated. Saddam 
Hussein and his associates like Hitler, von Rundstedt and the official Nazi 
philosopher Alfred Rosenberg seemed convinced that history and the mission of 
the future no longer meant the struggle of class against class, or the struggle of 
dogma against dogma, but the clash between blood and blood, race and race. As 
the Iraq war machine placed more and more occupied areas under the full control 
of Ba’ath authorities; Kurdish civilian populations found themselves exposed to 
the bloody and methodical applications of the Ba’ath regime’s systematic plan of 
genocide. In Iraq the situation was not far from German’s philosophy of genocide. 
The Ba’ath party in Iraq (1963-1991) was adopting the system of Arabization 
against all non-Arab peoples or ethnicities (mainly Kurds) in the country. If not all 
“others” were considered as enemies or a threat to national interests or part of 
conspiracy against the state.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
analysis of Iraqi politics, history, culture and society between the rises of the Ottoman Empire to 
the demise of the Mamluks in the mid-19th century. Influenced by Ibn Khaldun, William Ogburn 
and Robert MacIver, al-Wardi argues that the conflict between nomadism and urbanity and the 
dual personality of the Iraqi individual, all combine to explain the nature of Iraqi society. Al-Wardi 
also argues that Iraq has always been plagued by sectarianism ever since the introduction of 
Islam itself, but the violence peaked during the Ottoman-Safavid war that raged for almost three 
centuries. Iraqis saw these powers not as foreign invaders, but as vanguards of their respective 
faiths. Al-Wardi focuses on the societal aspect of this turbulent era in Iraqi history. His arguments 
are informed by sociological theory, archival material and, most interestingly, personal experience 
and observation. 
107.  Batatu, H. The Old Social Classes and The Revolutionary Movement in Iraq, London, Saqui, 
2004. 
108. Saad Ubaidi, Psychological and Political Reading of Iraq after the Change, Beirut: Arab 
Scientific Publisher, 2007, pp. 293-302. 
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 Similarity can easily be found between the Kurdistan and the Rwanda 
cases in the issues related to intent. In fact, the Iraqi leaders had knowledge of 
and then preached about killing and deportation of Faylee Kurds (1971 – 1980), 
massacre of Barzani Kurds (1983), conduct Anfal Campaign (1987-1988) and the 
use of chemical weapons in Kurdistan in 1988, as Akayesu had in Rwanda. In 
order to analyse further the condition and mechanism of Genocide against Kurds 
in Iraq, it is necessary to introduce a brief history of the Kurds in Iraq.  
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Figure 5 Copy of the medal received by the researcher ancestry from Pope Pio XI 
in 1924 based on the family attitude on protecting Armenians. 
 
Dear Sir, greetings. The venerable brother Domenico Berre’ bishop of Babylonia, apostolic 
ambassador in Mesopotamia, Kurdistan and Armenia Minor, informed us that you, the only one 
among the Kurdish nobility, are worth of our praise. In particular, our representative, praised your 
heroic commitments in saving the Christians and in defending the Catholic mission in the darkest 
times of war, you devoted so much to men that you conquered the gratitude of the Catholics of 
the region. And to show you our immense gratitude as testimony of our will, and since add to your 
courage those virtues proper of religion and you practice the good values of Catholicism, we 
proclaim you Knight of the Piano Order and we count you within the number of those illustrious 
knights. And in the same way, beloved son, we grant you the honour to wear the uniform of the 
order as well as the correspondent silk blue ribbon decorated with a double red line, on the left 
side of the uniform, according to the custom of other knights, so you can wear it freely and legally. 
In order for this to happen according we ordered for it to be delivered to you.  
Dated in Rome, sealed with Saint Peter’s ring, on 24 October 1924 of our third Pontificate. 
To the illustrious 
Mohammed Agha Mayor of Zakho.
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Chapter Three 
Kurds in Iraq from Creation to Genocide 
Introduction 
This chapter offers an overview of the Kurdistan question from 1921 to 1988 with 
a particular emphasis on the influence that foreign powers had on its self-
determination. It will analyse the two important treaties, the treaty of Sèvres and 
the treaty of Lausanne which constituted the basis for the geographical division of 
the Kurdish population into four different countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. 
Special attention will be given to the historical events starting in 1963 and 
culminating in 1968 with the Ba'ath regime, which led to Saddam Hussein era 
and the atrocities against the Kurds. All this will constitute the basis for a debate 
on the history of Kurdish people and their struggle for recognition after the fall of 
the Ba'ath regime and the consequent civil war. 
 Through an analysis of the expectations raised by new administration and 
still unstable country and the role played by the most numerous minorities in Iraq, 
this chapter will show how the past organization of Kurdish Regional Government 
could eventually lead the way to a federal, democratic country.  In conclusion, it 
will offer an overview of the current situation of the Kurdish region and the role of 
the Kurdish Regional Government and its struggle for international recognition. 
The Origin of the Kurdish Question 
For many centuries, Kurds and Arabs lived under the domination of the Ottoman 
Empire. In exchange for their loyalty, Sunnis Kurds, culturally more close to the 
Ottomans than to the Persian Shi’a, were able to preserve a degree of autonomy 
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under their tribal chiefs. Despite this, Kurdistan was always at the centre of the 
fierce struggle between the Ottoman and Persian empires. 
 At the end of the 19th century, a number of Kurdish uprisings against both 
Turks and Persians were contained harshly. The Ottomans destroyed the 
autonomous principalities and imposed a centralized rule. In the revolt of 1880-
81, led by Sheikh Ubaidddullah al-Nahri, Kurds declared their independence from 
both Ottomans and Persians.1  
 At the beginning of the 20th century, this brief experience of independence 
from the Ottoman Empire favoured the birth of the Kurdish nationalist movement. 
Following the example of other minorities, Arabs, Armenians, Bulgarians, 
Albanians and Greeks, now free from the Ottoman yoke, Kurdish nationalists 
started to cooperate with Turkish reformers and Persian constitutionalists in the 
hope of gaining some form of self-rule for Kurdistan. In 1908 a group of Ottoman 
Kurds, including tribal leaders, officers, intellectuals, and students formed a 
society called Al - Taali wa al- Taraqi (Turkish Reformers) and published a 
newspaper entitled Kurdistan2 along with a number of magazines. There was 
also an effort to open schools and education centres. Unfortunately, the 
beginning of World War I gave the central government an excuse to put an end to 
these initiatives. Furthermore, the Young Turks were not sympathetic to the 
nationalistic aspirations of ethnic groups within the Ottoman Empire and pursued 
a repressive policy towards them. As a result, the Kurds moved their operations 
                                                          
1.  Kinnane Derek, The Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Oxford University Press, 1924, p.14. 
2..  Kurdish intellectuals founded many secret organizations against Sultan Abdul Hamid and they 
also played an important role with The Young Turk Liberal Congress and “its upshot held in Paris 
in 1902”. Abdul Rahman Badr Khan, Hikmet Baban, represented the Kurds. Sheikh Abdul Qadir 
Al-Nahri (son of Sheikh Ubaidulllah ALnahri) was implicated in the committee’s abortive plot to 
overthrow the Sultan (see: E.E Ramsour Jr. L. The Young Turks, Princeton University Press, 
1957, p. 26). 
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outside Turkey. After World War I, Kurdish leaders asked for British protection 
demanding the full recognition of their independence.3 
The Kurds and the Treaty of Sèvres  
After the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, 
Armenian and Kurdish committees created in Cairo and Istanbul 4  presented 
territorial claims over Turkey at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 with a joint 
memorandum.5 Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians were rewarded when the Allies 
signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920.  This Treaty located a Kurdish 
national state within Turkish territory, and this is regarded as a milestone in 
Kurdish history. It recognized in articles 62, 63, and 646, the rights of these 
peoples to form their local autonomy (independent states) 7 . Provision 62, 
perhaps the most important part of the treaty for the Kurds, stated:  
A commission existing at Constantinople and composed of three 
members appointed by the British, French and Italian governments 
respectively, shall draft within six months from the coming to force of 
the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominately 
Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern 
boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of 
the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia8. 
  
Provisions 63 and 64 forced the Turkish government to accept the decisions of 
the Commission. This independence would be granted provided that it were 
ratified by the majority of the population living in the Kurdish area, and that the 
                                                          
3.  J. Talabani, Kurdistan and National Movement, Beirut: Dar Al Talia, 1971, pp. 95-97. 
4. In particular, the Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan founded in Istanbul in 1918 
worked in this direction. 
5.  After the armistice, “Sureya Bader Khan” formed the Committee of Kurdistan Independence in 
Cairo, many other societies were formed to the same purpose. (B. Nickitine, Les Kurds, Etude 
Sociologique et histoire, New York, 1939, p. 196. 
6.  For article 62, 63 and 64 of Sèvres Treaty see appendix No.1 of this chapter. 
7 . Zaki, Mohammed Amin, Khulaut Tarikh al-Kurd WA Kurdistan (The History of Kurds and 
Kurdistan), Cairo, 1936, pp. 282-283. 
8. Hasan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 
29-30. 
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Council of the League of Nations considered the Kurds capable of such 
independence. In addition, the treaty stipulated that if Turkey were to give up this 
area, the Allies would not be opposed to a voluntary union between the Kurdish 
state and part of the Mosul region where the Kurdish presence was the majority. 
Unfortunately, the emergence of the USSR within the international arena, along 
with the defeat of Greece by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk led to the Treaty of 
Lausanne on July 1923 putting an end to Kurdish aspirations and the idea of 
creating a Kurdish state was abandoned.9 
 The Sèvres - Lausanne period was a tragic incident in the Kurdish struggle 
for self-rule. The recurring and unfulfilled promises led many Kurds to consider 
that they were expendable tools in the hands of the great powers. Moreover, after 
Sèvres, the creation of new national boundaries, which distributed the Kurds 
among several countries - Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq - further complicated the 
Kurdish problem. 
The Formation of the Iraqi State and the Reaction of the Kurds  
The creation of Iraq was substantially a result of the Sykes-Picot Pact (18 May 
1916).10 It was Britain’s intention to retain the former vilayat of Mosul and the 
region of Kirkuk within their control in order to maintain Britain’s hegemony over 
of the oil fields (during Ottoman Empire the administration system was divided 
into vilayats instead of regions, governorates, or provinces). The break-up of the 
Ottoman Empire as a result of its total defeat in World War I allowed the British 
                                                          
9. Lausanne Conference (1923), Cmd. 1814; Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923. Cmd. 1929. Also 
see David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, Minority Group International, London, 1997, 
p. 15. 
10. Great Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement with Russia's silent consent, in 
1916 when the outcome of the war was still uncertain. Sir Mark Sykes of Britain and Georges 
Picot of France agreed to design a post-war Middle East after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement granted France and Britain huge territories stretching from modern 
Turkey to Iraq and south into the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. 
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Empire to take control of the vilayats (provinces) of Basra and Baghdad. The 
inclusion of the Mosul vilayat, with a Kurdish majority population, as part of Iraq 
was decided because of the presence of oil in this province. 
 It was not until after the armistice of Mudros on the 30th October 1918 that 
the British occupied the vilayet of Mosul.11 In fact, it was only a partial occupation 
because of the Kurdish nationalist movement led by Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, 
which held the Sulaimaniya region for some time. In order to form the Iraqi State 
the British called upon Emir Faisal (20 May 1885-8 September 1933), the 
Hashemite ex-king of Syria, who had been driven out of Damascus in July 1920, 
to accept Iraq as his Kingdom.12 In May 1921 a popular referendum was held, 
following a Provision 64 included in the treaty, to decide on a “voluntary” union. 
Since the suffrage was granted based on property ownership, British used the 
poor turn out as a pretext for annexation. A second ballot was equally 
manipulative, allowing the election of Faisal as king of the whole of Iraq. Once in 
power, he began to push for effective control of the vilayat of Mosul that, until 
then, had been under British rule.  
 The coming to power of the Kemalist (Kamal Ataturk) in 1922 led to the 
reopening of the Mosul question. Turkey initiated a campaign in the area that 
forced British troops out of Sulaymania in September. In order to control Turkish 
movements, Great Britain found an ally in Sheikh Mahmud Barzinji, appointing 
him their governor of the territory around Sulaymaniya in 1918. In 1922 the 
British made a joint declaration with Iraq in which they recognized the right of 
Kurdish people to have their local autonomy within the Iraqi borders. Almost 
                                                          
11. The province of Mosul included virtually all the predominantly Kurdish areas under British 
occupation. Turkey very reluctantly conceded the loss of Mosul in 1926. 
12.  McDowall, David, The Kurds, Minority Rights Group International, Cambridge, 1997, p.23. 
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immediately in the same year, Sheikh Mahmud announced the formation of a 
cabinet and proclaimed himself “Hukmdar (Governor) of Kurdistan”. 13 An 
embryonic administration was formed and a newspaper Roj-e-kurdistan (Sun of 
Kurdistan) was founded.  
 The failure of the first Lausanne conference in February 1923 led the 
British government to change its policy. The British accused Sheikh Mahmud of 
indulging in partisan unrest and of having contacts with the Shi'a rebels in the 
south. Sheikh Mahmud withdrew from Sulaymania on the 4th March 1923 and 
took refuge in the mountains with some of his followers to continue the struggle. 
British forces then launched an offensive to prevent Sheikh Mahmud joining 
forces with the Turks, who at the end, decided not to fight. After that the 
nationalist leader was forced to flee to Persia. 
 After the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 the council of 
the League of Nations sent an international commission of inquiry to the vilayat of 
Mosul.  The commission stayed there from January to March 1925 and 
undeniably established the existence of a Kurdish language and a Kurdish 
identity. In the end, on 16 December 1925, the council of the League of Nations 
decided in favour of the attachment of Mosul to Iraq and fixed the international 
frontier between Turkey and the newly created Iraq. The commission was invited 
to report to the League of Nations on the conditions of administration of the 
vilayat of Mosul and to guarantee Kurds their autonomous rights.14 The only 
concrete application was Baghdad's promulgation in 1926 of the local Languages 
                                                          
13.  After the battle of Derband Bazyan, Sheikh Mahmud was found among the wounded men. He 
was tried by a court and sentenced to death. However, the British Mucun reduced his sentence to 
life imprisonment after that he was sent into exile to India. (See, A. Wilson: Loyalties, pp.148-
139). He was sent to India, in September 1922 he was brought to Kuwait, to Baghdad, and finally 
back to Kurdistan. 
14.  Report on Iraq administration. April 1922 - March 1925. p. 38. 
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Law that allowed Kurds in Sulaymania and Erbil, exclusively, to have primary 
education in their own language and to print books in Kurdish. 
 In 1925, the Iraqi government had launched a campaign against deserters 
who had sought refuge with friendly tribes in Iran. In 1926 a similar operation was 
attempted with the collaboration of an Iranian column that suffered a painful 
defeat. In 1926 once again British Royal Air Forces attacks Sheikh Mahmud in 
order to negotiate with the British emissary and advisor to Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior, Mr. Kinahan Cornwallis (1883 – 1959). However, they were unable to 
reach any agreement.15 From the very beginning the whole of Iraqi Kurdistan 
refused to accept an Arab administration, despite Baghdad’s promises regarding 
the use of Kurdish as an official language. Various Kurdish cultural societies were 
formed between 1926 and 1927 and they contributed to the future political 
debate. 
 The Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, by which the colonial government had fixed 
a date for the termination of the mandate, made no mention of the rights of the 
Kurds. In response, the notables of Sulaymaniya, referring to the 16 December 
1925 agreement when the League of Nations decided in favour of the attachment 
of Mosul to Iraq, sent a petition to the council of the League of Nations.16  
Tension mounted and on 6 September 1930, troops shot into the crowd at 
Sulaimaniya, killing dozens of people. The Iraqi government then initiated series 
of arrests amongst Kurdish nationalists. Sheikh Mahmud decided to put pressure 
on the League of Nations by organizing a petition campaign. Alongside this 
diplomatic effort, he attempted, without success, to take the village of Panjwin. 
                                                          
15. C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travels and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 
Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. 315 -316. 
16.  Kamal Mozhir, Pages of Kurdish History, Erbil: Mokeryani Press, 2001, pp.101 -115. 
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 The repression of the Kurds did not begin until the League of Nations had 
rejected Kurdish demands. In April 1931, Sheikh Malunud’s troops suffered a 
severe defeat and he crossed over into Iran. Later, he was forced to give himself 
up to the government in Baghdad, which kept him under house arrest mostly in 
the southern Iraqi City of Nasirya and later in the capital, Baghdad.17 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish National Movement 
The most prominent and glorious name in the history of Kurdish national 
movement is that of Mulla Mustafa Barzani (14 March 1903 - 1 March 1979).  He 
was the leader of the nationalist movement and was destined to become almost 
synonymous with Kurdish revolt until his death in March 1979. Barzani was 
important, not only for his prolonged resistance to Baghdad, but also because he 
was a classic representative of the shaikh establishment,18 combining the secular 
power of an agha with that of religious and charismatic leadership.19 In addition, 
he was the only Kurdish leader prepared to fight for a united Kurdistan. His 
grandfather Abdulsalam I and his father Muhammed, had been prominent in the 
Naqshabandi order,20  and they were the first Barzanis to bring the family to 
prominence. Their descendants became temporal and spiritual leaders in the 
area. 
                                                          
17. C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travels and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 
Oxford University Press, 1957. 
18. Shaikh is a word as a term means an Islamic scholar or sometimes an elder of the tribe and for 
Barzanis this term is used as religious and tribal leader. Barzani is the only tribe in Kurdistan 
combined both title on the same family. 
19. Agha is a word of Ottoman origin used first for high level military or public service people and 
later for tribal leaders. 
20.  An order of Sufism founded by Mohammed son of Mohammed Bahadin (1317 – 1389). His 
name, which signifies “Painter”, is interpreted as (drawing incomparable picture of divine science) 
was born in Bukhara. He travelled extensively and his teaching spread westward and reached 
Kurdistan on the 17th century. It took its roots in Bahdinan region, and Shaikh of Barzan is noted 
as one of its men “Kutbs“, the religious form of their followers “Murids”. (See Encyclopaedia of 
Islam, A. Nakaband. Also B. Nikitine (pp.150 –151). Damalogie: Bahdinan (Mosul 1957) pp. 90-
190.  
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 The Barzani rebellion of 1931-32, led by Sheikh Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa 
was in fact not, as the Iraqi Government and some writers had claimed, the result 
of the government’s attempt to settle Assyrian Christian refugees from Hakkari 
inland adjacent to Barzan. It was instead an attempt to introduce police control by 
building permanent barracks in the area and impose taxation.21 In short, the 
immediate reaction to the intrusion of the external authority of the government 
was seen as similar to that of the Ottoman Empire.  Mulla Mustafa, his elder 
brother, Ahmad, and their family surrendered to the Turks over the border, but 
were granted an amnesty in 1933. 22  Ten years later he escaped from 
Sulaimaniya when he was exiled and returned to Barzan to resume his conflict 
with the government, assisted by Kurdish nationalists. This was an indication that 
the Barzani family had acquired a more nationalist stance. 23  By 1945 Mulla 
Mustafa was the effective ruler in a wide area, intervening in inter tribal disputes, 
in the government distribution of supplies, and repelling attempts by the Iraqi 
army to defeat him.  However, in 1945, he was forced to abandon the struggle 
and to cross the border into Iran, where he got in touch with the Iranian Kurdish 
Democratic Party (IKDP) in Mahabad. He spent the next twelve years in exile in 
the former USSR after the collapse of Kurdish Mahabad Republic in Iran.  
                                                          
21.  Space does not allow a discussion of the Assyrian Christians condition. They also were 
victims of the collapse of the old order and the creation of nation states in the region. Hoping for 
assistance from Christian countries, notably Russia and Britain, they rebelled against the Turks in 
their traditional areas, around Hakkari, Tur Abdin and also against the Iranian in Urmiya. The 
remnants that survived war and massacre ended up under British protection in Iraq where they 
suffered another massacre in 1933.   
22.  O’Ballance Edgar, The Kurdish Struggle, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p.20. Also see 
Michael Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq, New York: St. Martin’s, 1992, pp. 6-8. 
23.  Hasan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 
119-124. 
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 Following the 1958 coup carried out by General Abdulkarim Qasim toward 
the Hashemite monarchy, Mulla Mustafa was able to return to Iraq from Russia.24 
Barzani’s relationship with Qasim and with neighbouring Kurds reflected the need 
of any aspiring chief to recognition. From the moment of his return Barzani 
established a close and friendly relationship with Qasim.25 On the other hand, as 
the head of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) since its formation in 1947, he 
immediately took a vigorous part in the still not legalized Party. Using the prestige 
that rested on his own tribal followers and allies (at least 6,000 battle - aged men) 
who outnumbered any other Kurdish force, he persuaded the KDP politburo to 
accept his protégé and party secretary, Hamza Abdullah. He then managed to 
defeat Abdullah by force. Barzani's alliance with Qasim against the Arab 
nationalist and pro-monarchist enemies, granted him the legalization of the KDP. 
 In 1960, the assassination of the Zibari chief, Ahmad Zibari,26 was an 
unmistakable sign for Qasim that his authority as a “sole leader” was being 
challenged with the physical elimination in Kurdistan of all those loyal to him. The 
end of the 1960s saw the final rupture of their alliance. 
 In 1961 Barzani tried to fulfil Kurdish expectations from the new 
Constitution by demanding a substantial degree of autonomy for the Kurdish 
region. But by then he probably realized that Qasim was unlikely to co-operate 
further with him, not least because accepting Barzani's demands would raise the 
                                                          
24. See Michael Gunter, the Kurds of Iraq, p.11.  Also see Barzani, Masoud, al Barzani WA al- 
haraka al- tahaririya al- Kurdiya (Barzani and the Kurdish National Movement) (Kurdistan, 1992) 
pp. 52-66. 
25.  Abdul Rith, Majed, The Kurdish Question in Iraq: 1958- 1975, Beirut, 1975, p.163. 
26.  Zibari is a neighbouring tribe to the south of Barzan who had been in conflict with Barzanis for 
a long time. At the beginning of 1945, they joined their forces with Barzanis and allied themselves 
for the uprising and fought bravely alongside the rebels under Ahmad Agah’s leadership, but 
suddenly changed sides, leaving the field and joining the government forces. Mulla Mustafa and 
his brother Shaikh Ahmad had the only option to cross the borders into Iran with the whole tribe 
and warriors.   
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prestige and power of the latter in Kurdistan circles still further granting the KDP 
an unprecedented position. The provisional constitution of Iraq in 1958 (article 3), 
produced by Qasim clearly stated that:  “The Kurds and Arabs are partners within 
this nation. The Constitution guarantees their rights within the framework of the 
Iraqi Republic”. This article could have been used by the Kurds to demand some 
sort of autonomy.27 
 Kurdish national feeling had become more developed with the spread of 
education and the introduction of western technology. Although some Kurdish 
tribes still favoured the government, and many young Kurds from tribes 
previously opposed to the Barzanis now supported them, as did a number of 
Kurdish soldiers in the Iraqi army. Supported by these forces, Barzani assembled 
as many as 7,000-armed combatants and started to occupy strategic points and 
expelled the government police and small garrisons. Full hostilities began when 
the government bombed Barzan in September 1961. The cruel and 
indiscriminate bombing of Kurdish villages, in which the majority of casualties 
were women, children and old people, brought still more supporters from all over 
Kurdistan to Barzani.28 
 Despite their numerical superiority in troops and equipment, Qasim was 
not able to contain the uprising. Barzani successfully fought a classic guerrilla 
war by refusing to defend fixed positions. Even Barzan was abandoned, as 
Barzani correctly realized that he was winning as long as he continued to exist.  
Knowing virtually every inch of the terrain, the Kurdish Peshmergas29 (those who 
are willing to face death for their cause), never allowed them to be surrounded 
                                                          
27.  Abdul Ritha, Majed, The Kurdish Question in Iraq:  1958 - 1975, Beirut, 1975, p. 163. See also 
G.  Fathallah, Iraq under Qazim, Beirut: Dar Aljamal, 2012, pp. 430-449. 
28.  Abdul Ritha, Majed, The Kurdish Question in Iraq:  1958 - 1975, Beirut, 1975, pp. 96-98. 
29.   Peshmerga or Peshmerga is the term used by Kurds to refer to arm Kurdish fighters. 
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and always managed to slip away before the government forces could entrap 
them.30 
 
The Iraqi Ba'ath regime and the Kurdish question31 
On February 8, 1963 the Ba'ath party overthrew the Qasim regime, following a 
general unrest in the Middle East led by Jamal Abdul Nasser. The Arab world’s 
other political players, like the communist party in Iraq, strongly resisted the 
Ba’athist take over.  The Baath party fell from power nine months later, but 
resumed power in July 1968 32 . Throughout the 1960’s, conflict between the 
Baghdad government and the Kurdish national movement continued. Although 
outnumbered and out gunned, the Peshmargas intervened successfully, 
withstanding major offensives in June 1963, May 1966, and again at the end of 
1968. Indeed, in late May 1966, the Kurds won such a spectacular victory near 
Mt. Hindarin, north east of Rawanduz, that the civilian prime minister, 
Abdulrahman al-Bazzaz, made the “29th June Declaration” that specifically 
recognized Kurdish national rights. Although Barzani accepted it as a basis for 
negotiations, the Iraqi military disagreed with Prime minister al-Bazzaz and 
forced him to resign.  
 When the Ba'ath seized power in July 1968 the new government realised 
that, based on previous experience, it would be wise to make some concessions 
to the Kurds while they consolidated their political position. After some 
                                                          
30.  O’Ballance Edgar, The Kurdish Revolt 1961-1970, London, Faber and Faber, 1973, p.74. 
31.  It is out of the scope of this research to emphazise the role and the impact that the Ba’ath 
regime and its ideology had in the escalation of violence that led the Iraqi authorities to commit 
genocide. However, an exhaustive study on the subject can be found in Joseph Sasoon’s 
Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2012. 
32. Brifcani, Mostafa Barzani: The Leader of the Kurdish National Movement, Egypt: Al- Aharam 
Press, 1996, p. 184-186. 
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negotiations the “29th June Declaration” was replaced with the “11 March 1970 
Accord”.33 This agreement, stipulated that “The Iraqi people are made up of two 
nationalities; the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality”. In addition, Kurds 
to have legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population in Iraq; a 
Kurd to be one of two vice-presidents; unification of areas with a Kurdish majority 
as a self - governing unit; the use of Kurdish, alongside Arabic, as the official 
language and also the medium of school instruction in Kurdish majority areas to 
be Kurdish; implementation of the agrarian reform (still incomplete from 1958); 
and provision of a Kurdistan development budget.34 
 Unfortunately, the regime failed to form a National Assembly as it had 
promised, and it was clear that it had few political friends inside Iraq. Kurds 
began to realize how important their non-co-operation was in order to isolate the 
regime. At the end of the year an assassination attempt was made against Mulla 
Mustafa’s son, Idris, in Baghdad. A dispute arose over Kirkuk, Khaniqin and 
Sinjar, three sensitive areas where Mulla Mustafa believed the regime was 
deliberately settling Arabs to change the demographic balance. Kirkuk, in 
particular, with its vast oil resources became a sensitive and emotive issue on 
both sides.35 Later the researcher will discuss and provide better understanding 
of that Arab Settlement policy and how it become ethnic cleansing policy adopted 
by the Ba’ath Regime against Kurds. 
 A month later, in April 1972, the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was 
signed and the US decided to help Iran to contain Soviet influence in the region 
                                                          
33.  For full text see appendix no. 2 of this chapter. 
34. David McDowell, A Modern History of The Kurds, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1997, pp. 
327 - 330. 
35. Chapter four will explain in detail, using primary sources, the impact that this process had on 
Kurdish society and culture. 
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as part of the Cold War. In June, Iraq nationalized its oil facilities and the US had 
an even more important reason for undermining the regime in Baghdad. In June 
1973 Barzani made a public statement about awarding Kirkuk's oil rights to the 
US if it supported him.36 According to the Pike Commission Report to the United 
States House of Representatives dated 19 January 1976, both Iran and the US 
hoped to benefit from Iraq's instability due to the Kurdish refusal to give up their 
semi-autonomy.37  Until today, Kirkuk is a disputed area despite article 140 of the 
new Iraq constitution of 2005.38 As will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, 
this research found that a main sensitive issue for Saddam Hussein and his 
government was the demographic situation in Kirkuk (and other mixed areas), 
and that he was personally monitoring its implementation. The increase in Iraq’s 
oil revenues following nationalization and oil price increase after the 1973 Arab-
Israel war also hardened the Iraqi position.39 
 In March 1974 the regime published its Kurdish Autonomy Law on a “take 
it or leave it” basis (According to the information gathered,40 that step was the 
last attempt to solve the question following a negotiation route, from that moment 
both sides polarized into their positions).  The March 1974 law did not include 
Kirkuk and granted the regime the right to appoint its own officials. Mulla Mustafa 
                                                          
36 . Al Barak, Fathel, Mustafa Barzani, Baghdad:  Dar al Shounal Thakafiya, 1989, pp. 239 -240. 
37. See CIA, The Pike Report, Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977, pp.16-17, 141-148, 195-
198, 211 -217. 
38. Article 140: First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the 
implementation of the requirements of all sub paragraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional 
Administrative Law. Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi 
Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall 
extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this First Constitution, 
provided that it accomplishes completely normalization and census and concludes with a 
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens, by a date 
not to exceed the 31st of December 2007. For more information see (www.com140.com). 
39. Interview with Jargis Fatthulla, KDP senior member in Baghdad during 1970-1975, held in 
Salahadin, in August, 2009. 
40. Mohammed Ihsan, Kurdistan and War Dilemma, London, Dar Al Hikma, 2000, pp. 253-286. 
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and the KDP rejected it. Barzani planned to fight a conventional war, despite of 
his non-trust of Iran and the Americans.  
 By autumn the Iraqi army had already captured Amideya, Aqra, Qala Diza, 
Raniya and Rawanduz. Despite this, the regime found itself in a very bad position 
and they failed to win the military confrontation with the Kurds. On 6th March 
1975 Saddam Hussein, then vice-president, struck a deal with the Shah of Iran in 
Algiers, conceding the thalweg (deepest point) demarcation of the heavily 
disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway that borders Iran and Iraq, in return for the 
Shah’s undertaking to withdraw all assistance to the Kurds.41 Offered a cease-fire 
by Baghdad to re-consider his position, Mulla Mustafa gave up the struggle and 
went into exile in Karaj, a suburb of Tehran.42 
 The war claimed a large human and financial loss.43  In retaliation for 
Kurdish collaboration with Iran, the regime razed at least 500 villages and moved 
600,000 refugees to collective resettlement camps creating a sanitary cordon 
along the Iranian border, while the families of recalcitrant were exiled to southern 
Iraq. 44  These events constituted a strong setback for the Kurdish national 
                                                          
41. The 1975 Algiers Agreement (commonly known as the Algiers Accord) was an agreement 
between Iran and Iraq to settle their border disputes (such as the Shatt al-Arab –known as 
Arvand Rud in Iran– and Khuzestan and stop Iran’s support for Iraqi Kurds), and served as basis 
for the bilateral treaties signed on 13 June and 26 December 1975. Less than six years after 
signing the treaty, Iraq attacked Iran to invade its borderlands. However, that invasion was quickly 
countered with fierce resistance. The Iran–Iraq War lasted eight years, and finally ended with a 
United Nations ceasefire imposed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which 
was accepted by both sides. Friction remains along the border, despite the currently binding 
treaty and its detailed boundary delimitation [1] remaining in force since signed by both nations in 
1975 and ratified by both nations in 1976. Under international law, one nation cannot unilaterally 
reject a previously ratified treaty, and the treaty had no clause providing for abrogation by one 
nation only. Iraqi Parlament after 2009 started to rafify that treaty again. 
42 .   Meeting with Fazil Mirani high rank leader of KDP, Erbil 2012. 
43.   No one is sure of the total casualties during the Iran-Iraq war, but estimates range from 
500,000 to 1 million dead, 1-2 million wounded, and more than 80,000 prisoners. There were 
approximately 2.5 million refugees, and whole cities were destroyed. The financial cost is 
estimated at a minimum of 200 billion dollars. 
44. Some of the researcher's relatives were among those deported to Amara in the south of the 
country. 
97 
 
movement but, at the same time, they had the power to give the Kurdish cause 
international prominence and recognition. 
The Kurds and the Iraq - Iran War (1980-1988) 
It is important, in order to fully understand the Kurdish condition pre-genocide 
stages, to analyse the Iraq-Iran conflict. On 4th of September 1980 Iraq invaded 
Iran, beginning of the bloody war that dragged on until 8 August 1988. In July 
1983 the KDP, working in conjunction with Iranian forces, seized Haji Umran (on 
July 1983),45 an important border town on the road of Rawanduz. Further south, 
Iranian forces seized Panjwin and the high ground overlooking Qala Diza. 
 Suddenly Iraq appeared to be in great danger. Saddam Hussein reacted in 
two ways. He took vengeance on the Barzani clan for the KDP involvement in the 
loss of Hajj Umran. Eight thousand men of the clan living mostly in Qushtapa, 
Harir, Bahrika and Shaklawa were seized, paraded through the streets of 
Baghdad, and then executed in the southern village called Busaya.46 Saddam 
Hussein also sought respite from the Kurdish threat, in order to release the large 
number of troops stationed in Kurdistan for redeployment against Iran. Since 
1982 he concentrated his efforts in breaking Kurdish resistance through his 
intelligent organizations hoping that one of the main parties could be persuaded 
to abandon the struggle. In December 1983 he agreed a cease-fire with Jala 
                                                          
45. Ibid. p. 38. 
46. For an insight of the fieldwork see the BBC documentary 'Saddam's Road to Hell” released on 
September 5, 2006. The researcher gathered all the material during his time as minister for 
Human Rights in Kurdistan Regional Government from 2001-2005. His responsibility was to find 
out and document what have been done against the Kurds by Iraqi governments from 1968-2003, 
in order, after studying and collecting the material, to produce an assessment of Kurdish society 
through the drafting and creation of educational and social programs.  
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Talabani, negotiating the autonomy law on a basis acceptable to the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK).47 
 Since it was so controversial, why did the PUK entertain this negotiation 
and agreement with the Iraqi regime? Unlike the KDP, the PUK did not enjoy 
Iranian friendship. Indeed, when Iranian forces took Panjwin the PUK had to flee 
the area. They were frightened of being trapped in the Iraq - Iran war. Like 
Saddam, Talabani badly needed a respite. And if he had succeeded in 
negotiating the autonomy law satisfactorily, he would have brought peace to 
Kurdistan and cut the ground from under the feet of his rival, Masuod Barzani. 
However, the discussion failed, partly because no agreement could be reached 
over Khanaqin, Kirkuk and Sinjar, but more importantly because Saddam no 
longer needed to negotiate. Fearing an Iranian victory, the United States decided 
to provide Saddam with intelligence and weapons, and in 1985 the ceasefire 
negotiated with the PUK collapsed.48 
 The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) now found itself isolated and in 
great difficulty. Having lost the backing of its external supporters, including Syria, 
and having forfeited the confidence of the great mass of Kurds, tried to make an 
alliance with Tehran. With Iranian assistance, Talabani was able to obtain the 
PUK re-admittance into the resistance movement, and this was formalized in 
1988 with the formation of the Kurdistan Front, 49  a co-coordinating body 
composed of the KDP, PUK and six other smaller parties.50  
                                                          
47.  Interview with Dr.Barham Salih, held in Erbil in 2011. 
48.  Ibid., p. 39. 
49. The Kurdish Front was founded in principle in July 1987 but it entered into action formally in 
May 1988. All Kurdish Political parties agreed to work together against the dictatorship following 
Idris Barzani’s leadership. 
50. These six parties were: The Socialist Party of Kurdistan in Iraq  (SPKI) led by  Rasul  Mamand  
and  Mahmud Uthman as a prominent member, The  Kurdistan  Popular Democratic Party 
(KPDP) led by Muhammad Mahmud “ Sami Abdul Rahman”, The Kurdish  Socialist  Party 
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 While the Iranian offensive in the south slowly grounded to a halt, the 
Kurdish front became more important. By mid-1987, the Kurds held virtually the 
whole border area. After dark most of the countryside in Kurdistan was a no entry 
zone for the government’s army. The Kurdish Front was now a major player in 
the war against Iran since it controlled a vast area of the border. In order to 
defeat Kurdish military forces, the regime in Baghdad started a series of attacks 
against the civilian population. After the collapse of negotiations with the PUK, it 
adopted a systematic policy of razing villages and killing civilians. In September 
1985, for example, it rounded up approximately 500 children (aged 10 to 14) in 
Sulaymania and tortured and killed a substantial number of them apparently to 
extort information about Peshmerga movements, and to make Peshmarga 
relatives give themselves up. In October, a similar round - up took place in 
Erbil.51 
 In 29 March 1987 Saddam appointed his cousin, General Ali Hassan al - 
Majid governor of the north based on the Revolutionary Council decree no.160. 52 
He immediately began using chemical weapons (mustard gas, nerve gas, and 
cyanide) against Kurdish targets.53 Civilian survivors of such attacks who sought 
medical assistance were taken away and executed. He also decided on a 
scorched earth policy. As seen earlier, in June 1987 with memo no. 4008 
released on June 20, 1987 he declared a large part of Kurdistan a prohibited 
area. This is one of the two main “smoking gun” found to date about Iraq’s policy 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(PASOK) headed  by a collective leadership, The Kurdistan  Branch or  Section of the  Iraqi  
Communist  Party (ICP) led by  Aziz  Muhammed, The Assyrian  Democratic  Movement  and  
The Kurdish  Toilers Party  led by  Kadir Jabari.  
51. Interview with Dr.Barham Salih, held in Erbil, March 2013. 
52. Based on the Revolutionary Council decree No.160 of 29/3/1987 Ali Hassan Majid appointed 
as sole leader of the Kurdish autonomy region.  
53. More details about Iraq's use of chemical weapons will be discussed on Chapter 7. 
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toward the Kurds. This key directive, from June 1987, reinforces the existing total 
embargo on designated “prohibited areas” throughout those parts of the 
Kurdistan inhabited countryside outside government control. In paragraph 5, it 
orders a shoot on-sight policy in those areas. What is interesting here is that 
(according to the eyewitness testimonies) this policy had been in forced for 
several years. This is the first explicit admission of its actual exixtence. The 
document also refers to the policy of amalgamating villages that had remained 
under governmental control. The inhabitants were forcibly moved into housing 
complexes and their villages destroyed. This campaign was well under way at the 
time this order was issued. During that summer Al Majid destroyed more than 
500 villages.54 
 By January 1988 the threat to Baghdad had deepened, with Iranian forces 
entered Kurdistan. A breakthrough onto the Mesopotamian plain once the snows 
had melted became a serious threat. However, the failure of Iran’s exhausted 
forces to break through the southern front, released Iraqi troops that could now 
be deployed to fight in Kurdistan. With substantial reinforcements, al-Majid 
started “Operation Anfal”.55 In February his forces bombarded and swept the 
Janata valley near Sulamaniya. Virtually all adult men and teenage boys who 
were arrested disappeared. On 15 March Iranian and PUK forces captured 
Halabja, strategically situated above the Darbandikhan Dam. The following day 
                                                          
54 . On Iraq’s usage of chemical warfare, see Valerie Adams, (Chemical Warfare, Chemical 
Disarmament, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 85-90; and Edward M. Spiers, 
Chemical Weaponry: A Continuing Challenge (New York: St. Martine’s Press, 1989), pp.121-25. 
See also Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 
75-85. 
55.  The name “Anfal” derives from a verse (sura) of the Quran referring to the right to plunder an 
enemy of wealth and property. The “plunder “includes taking the lives of the enemy people, their 
goods and their women. For the Ba'ath Party, anfal was a military code-name for the operation of 
genocide launched against the Kurds in Iraq between 1987 and 1988. Saddam Hussein exploited 
the sura to justify the campaign. For the phases of Anfal see Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence:  
War, Tyranny and Uprising and the Arab World, Jonathan Cape, London, 1993, and Middle East 
Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds, (New York, 1993). 
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Iraq retaliated with a massive chemical attack on the town. Over 50,000 civilians 
perished. Baghdad’s savagery had a shattering effect on Kurdish morale, for it 
indicated both the capacity and intention of Baghdad to slaughter on a scale 
previously unimaginable. The following week Iraqi troops destroyed the whole 
Kurdish presence in Qara Dakh, south of Sulaimaniya. Then they turned to the 
district of Garmiyan, south of Kirkuk, before moving northwards to “cleanse” the 
area between Erbil, Kirkuk and Koi-Sanjak. There, additional Anfal operations 
during the course of the summer removed the population from Balizan and the 
mountains east of Shaqlawa. In each case a chemical attack preceded a massive 
land attack of the surrounded areas. In order to get a better understanding of 
Anfal operation as the "final solution" for Kurdish Issue in Iraq, this thesis will 
dedicate a whole chapter on the analysis of the Anfal campaign and its political 
and social impact. 
 On 22 July 1987 Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 after recalling 
Resolutions 582 and 58856, setting out the requirements for a cease-fire. During 
the next four weeks Iraq massed its forces around Bahdinan, the territory still 
held by the KDP. On 25 August, it launched a huge assault, including chemical 
attacks, the worst of which killed approximately 3,000 refugees fleeing to Turkey 
along the Bazi gorge. Approximately 60,000 Kurds found their way into Turkey 
and some 100,000 fled into Iran where they reached the Kurdish population 
already living there. By April 2003 more than 182,000 civilian Kurds were 
abducted and murdered by Iraqi troops. Turkey accepted the refugees with great 
reluctance, conscious of their potential effect on the Kurdish population already 
                                                          
56. For the full text of the UN Resolution 598, see, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1987/scres87.htm 
. 
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living in the country. In both Iran and Turkey, the Kurdish refugee movements 
were highly restricted. 
 Nothing illustrated more clearly the vulnerability of the Kurdish people than 
the utterly supine failure of the international community to take any substantive 
steps to curb Iraq’s atrocities. Most western government were aware of Iraq’s use 
of chemical weapons, as well as the brutal treatment of those Kurds who was 
taken prisoners. No nation tried to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 620 of 
26 August 198857; specifically adopted to ensure that  steps are taken against 
any country (but clearly with Iraq in mind) using chemical weapons. Western 
governments were far too interested in the enormous trade possibilities implicit in 
Iraq's reconstruction. In Spring 1989 most of these countries participated in a 
military fair in Baghdad, indicating the level of hypocrisy adopted by the West 
when discussing concepts like “regional security”, “stability” and “good 
governance” in addition to that many researches and column writers were 
doubting the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against the Kurds.58 
The Gulf War and the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government 
It is indispensable, in order to complete this historical background, to make 
reference to the development of the Iraqi state, the American invasion and the fall 
of the Ba'ath regime. It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the still 
ongoing process of state building that followed, however, it is important to 
establish a few points that can be useful to understand the context in which the 
Kurdish question exists. The 2005 constitution was the result of long negotiations 
and it did not guarantee a stable route towards peace and stability. The 
                                                          
57.  For the full text of UN Security Council Resolution 620, see 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1988/scres88.htm 
58.  Khalid Salih, Anfal: The Kurdish Genocide in Iraq, Goteborg, Ricardo Gutnik, 2012. 
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segmented Iraqi society, exacerbated by a long civil war, still struggling for a 
unified identity. However, the existence of a federal government constituted a 
fundamental change for the Kurdish region. Kurdistan is now the only and most 
important federal region in the country.  The region has existed since 1991 and 
has become a point of reference for the building of the new political and legal 
infrastructure of the country. In 2003, Gareth Stansfield wrote in his book Iraqi 
Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy:  
September 11 removed the blinkers of parochialism from the 
eyes of the Kurdish leaders. For the Kurds, the issue was no 
longer the development of the Iraqi Kurdish de facto state, it 
was now much larger and related to the future of Iraq. The 
PUK and the KDP faced a serious issue of survival. Regime 
change in Iraq would remove the forces which kept the Kurdish 
de facto state viable. (Stansfield 2003:183) 
 
The 2005 constitution stipulated the formation of federal regions. The Kurdistan 
region and because of its past political and administrative infrastructure became 
a unique example of a model federal system (David Cameron 2007:158).59 The 
Kurdish Regional Government web page mentions this moment as a pivotal one 
in the peaceful recognition of a Kurdish region stating, as part of its history, that 
in 2005 in a national referendum, Iraqis voted in favour of a new constitution. The 
new constitution, which was approved by 78% of voters, recognises the 
Kurdistan Region's institutions including the Kurdistan Regional Government and 
Kurdistan Parliament. (www.krg.org) and (www.kna.org)  
  The same source indicates as a major issue in its history that in 2006 'At 
the start of the year, the PUK and KDP agree to unify the two administrations. On 
7th May, Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani announces a new unified cabinet' 
                                                          
59. David Cameron, ‘Making Federalism Work’ in Iraq: Preventing a New Generation of Conflict, 
ed. Markus Bouillon, David Malone and Ben Roswell, 2007, Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colorado. 
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(www.krg.org).60 This means the end of the rivalries between the two parties and 
the beginning of a united effort to reconstruct Kurdistan within an Iraqi context. It 
is difficult to predict what the future of Iraq will be, but for the time being it looks 
like that Kurdish future is more predictable and secure. This means a change in 
perspective from the present political confrontation to an amicable coexistence 
towards building a new country. This also means that the Kurdish government 
has to assume a leading role in solving the security issues and in stopping the 
endless cycle of violence that still affects Iraq. In order to do so, and to secure a 
space for the Kurdish people within a peaceful Iraq, it is necessary to rewrite the 
Kurds most recent and dramatic history.
                                                          
60. www.krg.org accessed April 28, 2013. 
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Chapter Four 
Arabization as Ethnic Cleansing 
Introduction 
The first crime analysed in this thesis is Arabization. This crime is directly linked 
with all the others that will be presented in this thesis. As already mentioned in 
the introduction, Arabization constituted the first stage of the state engineered 
campaign aimed at the ethnic cleansing of Kurdish population in the country. This 
episode took place from 1963 to 2003.  
 The term “Arabization” refers to the imposition of Arab political values, 
beliefs and demographic changes. It occurred first when Islam was brought to 
Kurdish territories in the sixth century and stayed active in the Arab political 
culture throughout Iraq’s history.1 History sheds light on the fact that Arabization 
started, when the Arab invaders, under the banner of Islam invaded the regions. 
According to Yaqut Al Humary (1178 -1229), many people in Erbil were arabized 
(Muajam Al boldan "Encyclopedia of Town" part one). Later, during the Ottoman 
Empire, Madhat Pasha (1869-1872), settled the Shamars and Aniza tribes 
around Mosul and Baghdad.  
 Since its inception in 1921, Iraq has been a multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
and multi-sect society. Nonetheless it has been ruled under pan-Arab ideologies 
with no regards for the identity of other ethnicities in Iraq. Instead of adopting a 
                                                          
1 . Research shows that the Arabization policies began when Iraq became a country and 
continued up until the Ba’ath Regime was overthrown in 2003. (See for example Nouri Talabani, 
Khalil Ismail). The researcher shares this belief, but focuses on the Arabization process after 
1968 because then, for the first time, the state formally adopted and implemented a process of 
ethnic cleansing. This chapter is based on material found by the researcher in his role as Minister 
of Human Rights and Minister of Extra-Regional Affairs in the Kurdish Regional Government, in 
addition to the fieldwork carried out for the purpose of this thesis.  
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democratic constitution to represent all various people with different cultural or 
religious affiliations, they implemented a policy of Arab nationalism and declared 
that Iraq was a part of greater Arab nation with literally no viable constitutional 
recognition of non-Arab identities.  
 On the one hand, King Faisal I, the imposed king over the people of Iraq, 
saw Iraqis as "groups of people with nothing in common". On the other hand, he 
as the head of State failed to build bridges amongst the two major nationalities 
and other smaller ethnic groups in the country, but rather he laid a foundation 
and precedent to promote Arab nationalism and culture. As a result of such 
myopic policies, Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians and others suffered a lot and 
were deprived of their democratic, national, and cultural rights. Arabization as an 
institutionalized policy intensified under the Ba’ath regime after the Ba’athists 
came to power in July 1968, and Kurdistan was the main target of that policy. 
Nonetheless, at the beginning, this policy was implemented in a less visible 
fashion. 
 During the 1960s, Arabization has been a policy used by the consecutive 
regimes in Iraq to change the demography of Kurdistan. It was first adopted early 
in 1963, when the pan-Arab nationalists came to power. The policy was gradually 
implemented in the historically Kurdish territories. Arabization, slowly but steadily 
continued until the Ba’ath Socialist Party took over again through a military coup 
in 1968. Under the Ba’ath regime, particularly after Saddam Hussein became the 
president of Iraq in 1979, Arabization of Kurdistan intensified and continued 
strongly until the collapse of his despotic rule in 2003.  
 In order to complete the Arabization of Kurdistan, the Arab nationalist 
Ba’athist regime used the educational and judicial systems as well as the police 
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and security forces as tools to implement their policies. The aim was to promote 
the Arab culture and history, while banning anything related to Kurdish culture 
and identity. This policy slowly turned into an ethnic cleansing operation aimed to 
destroy the Kurdish presence in the country. This meant that in the Kurdish case 
there is a direct link between Arabization and genocide since this policy was 
adopted by the Ba’ath regime and by the pan-Arab nationalists in order to 
suppress Kurdish people and culture. It was the first step towards more 
sophisticated and more dangerous phases of genocide. 
 As it will be explained more in detail in the following chapters, Arabization 
was implemented in two ways: the first with massive forced deportation and the 
destruction of the livelihood of Kurdish people. The second, in the context of the 
Iran-Iraq war with the indiscriminate use of the Iraqi army against Kurdish 
civilians in the Anfal campaign. The displacement or forced deportation was 
somehow socially acceptable by the Arab public opinion perhaps because 
Kurdish territories were distributed amongst the Arabs, who were brought to 
Kurdistan from central and southern parts of Iraq.  Both these extreme measures 
were intended to literally destroy Kurdish daily lives, and cultural bonds amongst 
original Kurdish communities in the targeted areas.  
 In 1971, the Ba’ath Party in its newly adapted charter declared that the 
Iraqi Kurds must adhere to the political and social unity of Iraq and accept that 
Iraq was an inseparable part of the Arab Nation. This position was even more 
strengthened during the third conference of the Ba’ath party held on 27 July 1980 
in which the party identified Kurdistan as part of the Arab world and Kurds of the 
Arab nation. This process is illustrated in the maps reproduced below. 
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Figure 6 Map no. 4 Directions of Arabization from Central and Southern Iraq to Kurdistan. Source: 
Author. 
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Figure 7 Map No. (5) Arabization towards Kurdistan before 1991. Source: Author. 
 
110 
 
 
Figure 8. Map No. (6) Arabized areas of Kurdistan at the borders with Iran, Turkey and 
Syria until 1991(No Kurdish Zone). Source: Author. 
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Ethnic Cleansing in Iraq 
Raphael Lemkin in his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, 
Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress already mentioned in Chapter 2,  
stated that during World War II, the terms "Germanization","Italianization" and 
"Maggyarization" are often used to connote the imposition of Germany, Italy, 
Hungary their superior national cultures. In Iraq the same political culture was 
implemented to destroy Kurdish culture and identity. Using similar propaganda 
machines employed by the Nazis, the Ba’ath regime utilized the same derogatory 
methods to promote the Arabs as a superior race. However, there is a difference 
of the genocidal policies implemented in Iraq and Yugoslavia in relation to ethnic 
cleansing.  In the Kurdish case, the policy of ethnic cleansing was embedded in 
the policies of the Ba’ath regime, while in Yugoslavia these crimes took place 
after the end of the Cold War. In Iraq, the ethnic cleansing against non-Arabs 
was integrated into the nation building strategy to create a nation to reflect Arab 
ideologies. The term "cleansing" implies purification (in Arabic language tat’heer), 
which is corresponding to "cleansing" in English.  
Kirkuk Province 
It would be very long and out of the scope of this thesis to provide district-by-
district all the demographic changes that had occurred in Iraq due to the 
Arabization policies implemented by the Ba’atist regime. However, one case is 
emblematic because it involves disputed territories that until now risk to severely 
hinder Iraq’s path to stability and democracy: Kirkuk. Since before the last Gulf 
War, petroleum played a decisive role in determining the bounderies of future 
Kurdistan region in general and Kirkuk province in particular. During the colonial 
period in Iraq, the British-mandated government made special efforts to retain 
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the Kirkuk region for strategic and economic purposes.  The province is rich in 
natural minerals, fertile land, much-needed rural crops and forests, and important 
oil reserves.  Oil was first piped out in Kirkuk in 1927 in Baba Gurgur (well K172) 
and since then it has become an essential resource for the Iraqi state.  
 In the early 1970s the export capacity of the main pipeline system reached 
around 72 million tons per year (about 475 million barrel/year). However, due to 
the lack of strategic plans Iraq’s capacity to export was always very limited.  
Despite this, Kirkuk became the base for the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 
which initially included an ethnically mixed labour force representative of the 
diverse composition of the governorate: Kurds, Arabs, Turcoman and Christians 
(Chaldean, Assyrian and Armenian). However, with the conclusion of the 50-50 
profit-sharing agreement between the ICP and the Iraqi government in 1952, the 
IPC’s largely British staff was gradually replaced by trained Iraqis.  This change 
was part of the larger movement for Iraqi independence after the Ba’ath regime 
gained power in 1963. The new regime linked oil industry to the state’s 
Arabization processes paving the way for future genocide in the area.  The mixed 
IPC staff was transferred outside Kirkuk province and replaced by large numbers 
of Arab settlers. In one single decision, the central government transferred 2,500 
Kurdish employees from the company and other establishments out of the 
province.  Due to the nationalization of the IPC and the oil industry in 1972, 
followed by the Yom Kippur War and the OPEC crisis, the role of petroleum in 
Iraqi politics and economic life gained increasing significance.  The central 
government used its petroleum revenues to finance state-led development and 
consolidate its power base while neglecting social welfare and other programs.  
However, for the people of Kurdistan, Kirkuk meant more than mere petroleum.  
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Like other Kurdish regions, Kirkuk is deeply rooted in the Kurdish history and 
heritage. It symbolized decades of forced displacement. In addition, the 
occupation and redistribution of Kurdish lands to Arab settlers made life 
unbearable for Kurds in Kirkuk. This led to more human rights abuses, while the 
Arabization process was intensified. 
Changes in Administrative units and internal borders 
From 1929 to 1987 the administrative units of Kirkuk province underwent some 
drastic demographic changes that eliminated some districts while adding others.2  
In 1929 the province included: 
1. The district of Kirkuk, including the sub-districts of Kirkuk, Daqoq, and 
Alton Kopri. 
2. The district of Chemchemal, including the sub-district of Chemchemal. 
3. The district of Kifri (Salahiya), including the towns of Kifri, Toz Khormato, 
Qere Tape, Sherwana Castle, Shibicha. 
4. The district of Gil, including the sub-districts of Gil and Sangaw. 
In 1936 the administrative units of the province changed to include: 
1. The district of Kirkuk, including the sub-districts of Kirkuk, Alton Kopri, and 
Milha. 
2. The district of Chemchemal, including the sub-districts of Aghjalar, 
Shwan, and Sangaw. 
3. The district of Kifri, including the towns of Toz Khormato, Qere Tepe, and 
Sherwana Castle. 
4. The district of Gil, including the sub-districts of Qader Karam and Daqoq. 
                                                          
2.  See maps of Kirkuk from 1957, 1997 and 2003 for a demographic overview of the area at the 
end of this chapter. 
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In 1948 the administrative units changed again and included: 
(f) The district of Kirkuk, including the sub-districts of Qara Hassan (Laylan), 
Alton Kopri (Prde), Milha, and Shwan. 
(g) The district of Kifri, including the sub-districts of Kifri, Bebaz, Qere Tepe 
and Sherwan. 
(h) The District of Toz, including the sub-districts of Toz, Daqoq, and Qader 
Karam. 
In 1957 Kirkuk province underwent yet other additional changes in its 
administrative units and internal borders.  According to 1957 census, the 
province included: 
1. The district of Kirkuk, including the sub-districts of Haweeja, Shwan, Alton 
Kopri, and Qara Hassan.  
2. The district of Kifri, including the sub-districts of Bebaz, Sherwana, and 
Qara Tepe.   
3. The district of Chemchemal including the sub-district of Aghjalar and 
Sangaw. 
4. The district of Toz including the sub-districts of Qader Karam, and Daqoq.  
The most important administrative changes occurred after 1975 when via the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decrees no. 608 and 42 dated Dec. 15, 
1975 and Jan. 1, 1976 respectively the central government annexed the two 
districts of Chemchemal and Kelar to the province of Suleymaniya; the district of 
Toz Khormato to the province of Salahadin; and the district of Kifri to the 
province of Diyala. Later, via decree no. 111 issued on 16 November 1987 the 
district of Zab was annexed from Mosul province and attached to Kirkuk. While in 
January 1976, the Iraqi central government changed the name of Kirkuk province 
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to Tameem, which means nationalization (RCC decree no. 41).  At that time, the 
province measured 10,319 sq/km and had a population of 492,615, which 
increased to 752,743 in 1997 and then to 1,280,000 by 2007, by November 2013 
was 1,425,781. 
Demographic Changes 
The population of Kirkuk includes three main ethnic groups: Kurds, Turkmen, and 
Arabs. Prior to the central government’s Arabization campaign that commenced 
in the early 1960s, the Kurds constituted more than sixty-four percent of the total 
population of Kirkuk province and fifty-three percent of the population of Kirkuk 
district.  By 1977 they represented thirty seven percent while Arabs represented 
forty-four percent and Turcoman represented sixteen percent.  The Christian 
population declined from about nine percent to less than two per cent. The 
following graphic show the variation in the population by ratio between 1922 and 
1977. 
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Table No. 1 Ratio of the Ethnic Population of Kirkuk governorate, 1922-1977. Source: Ministry of 
Planning, Baghdad, 2004. 
Ethnicities 1922-1924 1957 1965 1977 
Kurds        65.1 48.3 36.1 37.6 
Arabs        20.9 28.2 39 44.4 
Turkomans       4.8 21.4 19.5 16.3 
Chaldeans, Syrians, 
Assyrians, Armenians, 
and others 
 
           9.2 
 
2.1 
 
5.4 
 
1.7 
 
As mentioned previously in Chapter 2, in 1974 the number of Kurds increased 
inside Kirkuk City due to the Peace Agreement between Baghdad and Barzani. 
The Agreement collapsed in 1975 with the signing of the alreaqdy mentioned 
Algeria Agreement (6 March 1975) between Iraq and Iran.3 This meant a shift in 
the population reflected in the ethnic distribution of the group as in the following 
chart. 
 
                                                          
3. The source of this data is Kurdistan Democratic Party Political Bureau, Kirkuk Office, 1974.  
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The previous data are important because they offer an overview on the 
population shift towards an increasing presence of Arabs from 1977 to 1997. The 
same shift can be observed in the population distribution by ethnicity of the 
workers of the Northern Oil Company in Kirkuk between 1958 and 2003 as in the 
following tables: 
Table 2. Number of workers in the Northern oil company in Kirkuk, 1958-2003. Source: Iraq 
Northen Oil Company, Staff Records. 2009. 
 
Year Arabs Kurds Turcomans Christians English Total 
1958 40 850 370 900 70 2230 
1960 55 1350 500 1100 65 3070 
1963 100 1150 700 1400 60 3410 
1965 170 1000 800 1350 55 3375 
1968 300 875 850 1000 50 3075 
1972 900 700 900 1000  3500 
1978 2700 500 1200 850  5250 
1982 4500 400 1500 800  7200 
1988 5200 300 1700 750  7950 
1995 6600 260 1800 700  9360 
2000 200 119 1920 600  9839 
2003 7300 610 2100 500  10,510 
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Table 3. Ratio of Ethnic composition of the Northern Oil Company workforce, 1958-2003. Source: 
Iraq Northern Oil Company – Staff Record 2009. 
 
Year Arabs Kurds  Turcoman Christians English 
1958 1 38  16 40 3 
1960 1 43  16 35 2 
1963 2 33  20 41 1 
1965 5 29  23 40 1 
1968 9 28  27 32 1 
1972 25 20  25 28  
1978 51 9  22 16  
1982 62 5  20 11  
1988 69 3  21 19  
1995 70 2  19 7  
2000 73 1  19 6  
2003 69.45 5.8  19.98 4.75  
 
The preceding tables reveal a negative relationship between Arab, Kurdish, 
Turkoman and Christian workers over time.  That is, as Kurds and Christian 
employees decreased, Arab workers increased while Turkmen manpower 
remained nearly the same.  No major population shifts occurred in Kirkuk from 
1996-2003, this is probably due to the fact that after 1991 Kurdistan has been 
liberated with the support of the US, the UK, France and Turkey. However, after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist regime in April 2003, population 
movements have been in two directions: a return of Kurdish families to Kirkuk 
(224,544) and an exit of Arab families from Kirkuk (about 5,986 families 
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numbering 52,973). The population of Kirkuk was 705,014, based on the food 
supply forms on April 30, 2007, but today is 1,425,781 and the total number of 
families is 299,132. In the residential Kurdish quarters of Raheem Awa, Iskan, 
Imam Qasim, Rizgari and Shorfja, the number of Kurds is 263,012.  Added to the 
number of Kurds in the mixed quarters at 163,700, the total number of Kurds in 
the city of Kirkuk is 426,712, sixty percent of the total population. The following 
statistics explains the demographic situation in Kirkuk province until 2003. 
 
Table no 4. Ethnicities between 1977 and 1997. Source:  Ministry of Planning –Baghdad- 2009. 
Ethnicities 1977 1978 1997 
Arabs 218,755  544,596 
Kurds 184,875  155,861 
Faylee Kurds 388  1,105 
Turcoman 80,347  500,99 
Armenians 581  116 
Syrian, Chaldean 4,050  758 
Others 180  205 
Unknown 3,439  3 
Total 492,615 601,219 752,743 
 
Despite the figures presented in the table above, the Governor of Kirkuk before 
the fall of the regime in 2003 was still concerned about the number of Kurds living 
within the province. In a letter dated November 8, 1996 to the commander of the 
Northern Bureau of the Ba’ath Party and member of the (RCC), the governor of 
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Kirkuk complained that the Kurds formed about sixty percent of the population.  
He added: “there are whole Arab quarters which have become solely Kurdish, 
such as Karama in Iskan and the police quarter in Shorja. In this letter he also 
stated that “trade and economic matters in the city are still in the hands of the 
Kurds, so are the contractors and artisans and public facilities and services.”4 On 
such advice, the RCC became concerned that the Arabization polices were not 
adjusting the demographic make-up in favour of Arabs as efficiently as possible. 
The RCC, therefore, intensified its Arabization and deportation policies, going as 
far as disallowing Kurds to be hired by Arabs. 
Kirkuk after 2003 
At present the province of Kirkuk consists of six districts, subdistrics: Kirkuk, 
Haweeja, and Dibis, Daqoq, Alton Kopri, and Sengaw.  The districts of 
Chemchemal, Kifry, Kelar, and Toz Khormato that were part of Kirkuk province 
prior to administrative changes in 1976 have become part of Suleymaniya, 
Diyala, and Salahadin provinces. It constitutes one of the most controversial 
cases of disputed territories in Iraq between the KRG and the Federal 
Government.5  
State of the negotiation with Baghdad 
In 2005, the American administration and the interim Iraqi Government 
established a high committee to implement article 58 of the TAl (Transitional 
                                                          
4.  Khafour Makhmori, Arabization and de Arabization (Erbil: Aras Publisher, 1998) p. 211. 
 
5. A lot has been written on the topic. See for example Crisis in Kirkuk: the Ethnopolitics of 
Conflict and Compromise by Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2009. In this pages the researcher will refer his findings and thinking as Kurdish 
representative in the negotiations with Baghdad. 
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Administrative Law) in Iraq.6 The researcher was the Kurdish representative in 
this committee and could verify that, unfortunately, the delibrations of this 
committee was short lived because of the lack of funding and also because both 
sides Americans and Iraqis did not have the commitment to sort out this issue. In 
2007, the new government established another committee, this time named High 
Committee of the Implementation of the article 140 because 58 of TAL has 
changed to 140 of the new constitution. According to the article 140 of the 2005 
Iraqi constitution this area, as others that experienced the tragedy of forced 
displacement, should go through three main steps: 1) Normalization: a return of 
Kurds and other residents displaced by Arabization. 2) A census taken to 
determine the demographic makeup of the province's population. 3) A 
referendum to determine the status of disputed territories. Obviously whether a 
territory is home to mainly Kurds or mainly Arabs will have an effect on who can 
lay claim to the area. Unfortunately, none of these steps has been implemented 
and this caused political and social tensions in the area that risked degenerating 
into a civil war. Various negotiations had taken place in order to solve this issue, 
but until now the unwillingness on behalf of the Federal Government to tackle the 
problem has exacerbated the situation.7 
 As minister of Extra Regional Affairs, the researcher represents Kurdistan 
in the negotiation and worked for the implementation of article 140 of the 
constitution and he witnessed how none of the three steps mentioned above 
have been implemented. The normalization, which requires the restitution to the 
                                                          
6. See Decree No 15th signed by Dr. Alyad Alawi (First Iraqi Prime Minster after the occupation) 
on 9th February 2005, Wakaiea iraqia, no.3995 date, 3 March 205. Gazeta. 
7 . See map no.7 for the disputed areas between Iraqi Federal Government and Kurdistan 
Regional Government until December 2013.  
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Kurds of the properties confiscated during the different phases of the Arabization, 
did not happened and this created a long lasting mistrust towards the Federal 
Government. A census is long due since the last one before Arabization was 
done in 1957, but the Federal Government is very reluctant in ordering one. The 
idea of having a referendum about the disputed areas remains an extremely 
sensitive issue because it would probably provide a legal basis for the annexation 
of Kirkuk. 
 In April 2013, KRG PM Mr. Nechir Van Barzani visited Baghdad and had 
many meetings with Iraqi PMs with the purpose to implement article 140 of the 
constitution. The government promised a round of negotiation, but up until now 
nobody has showen any will to tackle the problem. It seems there is lack of 
leadership to sort out this issue. The Fedral Government does not feel confident 
enough to tackle the problem. In addition, people who took part in the Arabization 
and genocide campaigns are still in office both in the civil service and in the 
military structure of the government and this lack of de-Ba’athification makes any 
attempt of negotiation very difficult. However, in contrast with the past, today the 
fedral government is weak and it does not have the military power to engage in a 
war against the Kurds. In addition, the international and regional political situation 
does not favor a solution by force. The researcher reckons that the Americans 
made a mistake by leaving such an important issue unsolved before their exit 
from Iraq. Their support would have ensured that the agreements reached before 
the war would have been implemented. This would have helped in the prevention 
of future breaches of human rights against the Kurds and it would have also 
promoted a safer route towards a peaceful coexistence and a stable democracy 
in the country.  
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Peace for the Future? 
In the last chapter the researcher will offer some recommendations in this 
subject. For the moment, regarding the analysis of Arabization and its 
consequences, the current mentality and culture makes the idea of peace in this 
area almost impossible. Without a strong reform of education, without a fairer 
division of wealth and power among the different sections of the society, the 
reality of a peaceful coexistence is still far away. The vacuum of power and the 
persistence of the old mentality and divisions still pose a real threat to the future 
of a country which seemed destined to experience the tragedy of dictatorship and 
struggles to break this cycle of violence. The following chapters will deal with 
other four genocides directly linked to the policy of forced Arabization 
exacerbated by Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
 The following chapters will show how Arabization constituted the 
beginning of the state engineered policy genocide against Kurds in order to 
eliminate them from Iraqi society. 
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Figure 8 Map no. (7) Dispute areas between Baghdad and Erbil until December 2013. 
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Figure 9 .Map No. (8) Kirkuk in 1957 before Arabization, the size was 18,220 square km. 
Source: Author. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Map No. (9) Kirkuk in 1997 after Arabization. Its size decreased to 8,931 
square km. Source: Author. 
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Figure 11 Map No. (10) Kirkuk in 2003. Its total area is now 10,170 square km. Source: 
Author.
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Chapter Five 
The Faylee Kurds (Genocide concept approval) 
Introduction 
The second crime analysed in this work is the mass deportation of Faylee Kurds 
during the Saddam's regime and the gradual changes of citizenship laws that led 
to it. This crime constitutes the second stage of a state engineered genocide 
against a targeted group. This chapter is based mainly on the documentation 
gathered by the researcher in two different phases of his work. The first phase 
coincides with the researcher’s participation in one of the opposition groups 
acting outside Iraq. During those years, as Legal Advisor at the Amnesty 
International European Institutions Office the researcher was able to gather 
primary sources on the Faylee Kurds case. It was only after the end of the Ba’ath 
regime that these documents, along with the ones gathered on the ground during 
the second phase of the research, could be archived and analysed in order to 
build up the court case on the Faylee Kurds genocide. The researcher had the 
opportunity as minister for Human Rights of the new established Kurdish 
Regional Government to gather more material from private sources. Unstructured 
interviews with Sami Faylee, director of the Faylee Kurds centre in Erbil helped to 
gather material from additional private sources. In addition, interviews with the 
judges Munir Hadad, Mohammed Sahib, Azzo Mohammed Sofi and Raed Juhi 
contributed to the reconstruction of the different phases of the Faylee Kurds 
case.1  
                                                          
1 . The judges mentioned worked at IHT (as judges and investigating magistrates) from the 
beginning of its creation and in many occasions the researcher worked with them on different 
Kurdish cases. 
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 As it will be proved through the evidence presented here for the first time 
out of a court of law, the crime against the Faylee Kurds can be defined as 
genocide because it covers points b) and c) of the article II of the 1948 
Convention mentioned at the beginning of chapter 2. By deporting the Faylee 
Kurds in repeated stages, the Iraqi government is guilty of causing them ‘serious 
bodily or mental harm’ and of deliberately ‘inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring physical destruction in whole or in part’.  
 The researcher will argue, linking this chapter to the other crimes 
presented in this work, which all these different steps caused an escalation of 
violence that, after the killing of the Barzanis, culminated in the Al Anfal campaign 
and the Halabja events. He also reckons that the campaign against Faylee Kurds 
constituted a sort of pilot project towards mass murder and genocide.  
 As already said in the introduction, in particular regarding the mass 
deportation of Faylee Kurds, it is paramount to establish some differences 
between the reasons and the strategies used by the Ba’ath regime to justify 
these crimes. In the Faylee Kurds’ case the researcher will argue, producing the 
texts of the decrees issued by the Iraqi government, that in this instance it is 
evident a strong relationship between existed genocide and the laws legislated 
since every step towards the forced deportation of the Faylee Kurds was taken 
within the law. This allowed the regime to act with impunity creating a deep divide  
within the Iraqi population and, at the same time, offering  a justification for its 
acts creating what the researcher will call a ‘concept of approval’ new to the 
regime. When the Ba’ath party seized power in 1968, genocide was not on the 
agenda. It was only later, with the need for the creation of an all Arab state that 
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the regime started to persecute minorities and found in genocide a way to fulfil its 
goal.  
 In addition to the decrees issued by the Ba’ath government, the 
researcher had access to a series of telegrams exchanged amongs various 
authorities, in different areas of the country that shared orders and information 
regarding the deportations. These documents reveal that the authorities were 
aware of the persecution and the resettlement of the Faylee Kurds population 
and proved to the IHT the clear responsibility of the regime. As it will be 
explained more in detail at the end of the chapter, and the documents provided in 
the appendix helped the researcher to present a convincing case.2 After the 
deliberation of the IHT, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 426 of 2010 
reproduced in the appendix stated the following:  
First: The Council of Ministers welcomes the decision of the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal, issued on 29/11/2010, ruling that the case of 
Extermination and Displacement of the Faylee Kurds shall be deemed a 
crime of Genocide by all measures, reiterating that which was resolved by 
the Council of Representatives and confirmed by the Presidency Council in 
its Resolution No. 26 of 2008, published in Al-Waqaea Al-Iraqia gazette, 
edition 4087 dated 22/9/2008. 
Second: The Council of Ministers undertakes to eliminate all of the negative 
impacts resulting from the oppressive resolutions issued by the former 
regime against the Iraqi people from the Faylee Kurds (such as the 
Deprivation of Iraqi Nationality and the Confiscation of Moveable and 
Immoveable Property, in addition to other violated rights). 
 
As already anticipated in the introduction, it is not the purpose of this study to 
report in detail the trial against the perpetrators of this crime. However, this 
                                                          
2. The researcher reproduced different documents in appendixes for this chapter besides the 
Resolution of Council Ministers no. 426 and resolution no. (6) of the Presidency office. All of them 
show how the all the stages regarding the deportation and the discrimination against Faylee 
Kurds have been recognized both by the Iraqi Federal Government and by the KRG as crime of 
genocide ‘by all measures’. Unfortunately, these documents are a striking reminder of how their 
content has never been implemented. See appendix No (1) A - B of this chapter. 
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chapter will deal with the legal outcomes of this trial and of what the researcher 
reckons is their social impact on Iraqi society in its effort towards reconciliation 
and state building. All this in an attempt to find a balance between the scale of 
the crime, the limit of the new justice system and the failure to fulfil the second 
point mentioned in the above declaration.  
Faylee Kurds historical background 
According to Michael Gunther, Faylee Kurds are a distinct group of ethnic Kurds 
and Shi’ite Muslims originating from the Iranian region of Kirmanshah who lived 
in Iraq as early as 539 BC, mainly in Baghdad but also in other areas of the 
country.3 Michael Gunther defined Faylee Kurds as a group of some 150,000 
Kurds originally from the Iranian region Kirmanshah. On the Iranian side of the 
border they can be found in Kramansha, Ellam, Khoziztan, Khesrowi, Qasr 
Sherin, Sarbil Zahab, and Irania Badra.4 The historian George Kersan stated that 
their name means ‘revolution’,5 while according to an American archaeologist 
Henry Filed who worked in both Iraq and Iran at the beginning of the 20th century 
means ‘rebellion’.6 Hugo Grottee, who travelled to Iran at the beginning in the 
same period, wrote that the origin of Faylee Kurds went back to Old Ellameins 
and the name Faylee came from the Peli King who established his own Kingdom 
in Ellameins.   
                                                          
3.  Fathel Barak, Iranian and Jewish School in Iraq, (Baghdad, 1984). For further information on 
the origin of Faylee Kurds, see Hana Battatu, Social Structure and Revolutionary Movements 
During the Ottoman Empire, (Beirut, 1990), pp. 60-69, Mossa Shah Baudar, A Memoir of 
Baghdad, (Cyprus, Dar Al Rais, 1993), and Khasro Guran, Kurdistan through History Part One 
(Stockholm, 1992), pp. 152-161. 
4.  For more information on Faylee Kurds areas or locations see map No (11).  
5. Kerson, G., Iran wa Al Kathiya al irania, translated by Ali Jawad Kalam ( Tahran, Ibin Sinna , 
1936) 
6.  Filed, H, Marifat al akwam al irania (Seweden: Al Mazda, 2001) p. 98. 
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 During the Ottoman Empire, Faylee Kurds living in Iraq chose to apply for 
Persian citizenship to avoid mandatory military service. Consequently, when the 
Empire fell after World War I, Faylee Kurds, along with others that had opted for 
Persian citizenship were left without a country and their Iranian citizenship 
became the source of a deep distrust and even hatred especially under the 
Ba’ath regime. Although Faylee Kurds have never enjoyed full Iraqi citizenship 
rights, the Arab nationalist movements and the rise of the Ba’ath Party to power 
in 1968 meant an intensification of the persecution against them as enemies of 
the state. Since 1968 the citizenship laws were amended several times with the 
purpose of denying them the Iraqi nationality and, at the same time, of justifying 
their systematic forced deportation from Iraq. It is estimated that up to 100,000 
Faylee Kurds were deported or disappeared from 1971 until the fall of the regime 
in 2003.  Their property were confiscated and inventoried for redistribution to 
Arab Iraqis. During the Iraq-Iran war, tens of thousands of young men were 
imprisoned and disappeared. The bodies of an estimated 10,000 men aged 
between 18 and 28 imprisoned during the war have never been found.7 This 
chapter documents the evolution of state policy towards the Faylee Kurds and 
identifies particular moments of brutality in Iraqi history. 
 
 
                                                          
7. The researcher has conducted fieldwork across Iraq searching for the bodies of the Faylee 
Kurds. In February 2013, the researcher visited Samawa, Nigrat Al Salman (N30 30 31.45 E44 39 
27.29), and the prisons where most of the imprisoned Faylee Kurds were kept during the 1980s.  
The researcher witnessed the names of Faylee Kurds carved into the prison walls, but has been 
unable to find the bodies, however, he was able to draw a map of the concentration camps where 
they were imprisoned. 
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Figure 12 Map No. (11) Faylee Kurds population’s distribution. 
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Citizenship Laws and Deportation 
The Treaty of Lausanne signed 24 July 1923 dealt only with the transfer of 
citizenship of former Ottoman citizens to the newly created states. Article 30 
stipulated that the new-formed states should automatically have granted 
citizenship to the former Ottoman citizens living in their territories.8 The Treaty 
was silent, however, on the status of people living within the newly created states 
who had not held Ottoman citizenship during the Empire, as the case of Faylee 
Kurds.  
 In 1924, the newly formed Iraqi state adopted its first domestic nationality 
law (Nationality Law No. 42). The law reiterated automatic citizenship for former 
Ottoman citizens and required that an Iraqi ID should be issued stating their 
former nationality. In order to apply for the Iraqi citizenship, those without former 
Ottoman nationality had to prove that at least one of their parents was born in 
Iraq as for the others their foreign origin would appear on their ID. Iraqi citizens 
with a second nationality were automatically deported.9 
 The Ba’ath Party used the nationality laws in order to change the 
demography of Iraq and to undermine the minorities present in the country, 
granting or revoking it depending on the political circumstances and their loyalty 
to the regime. For example, immediately in 1963, the Ba’ath party revoked Law 
No. 42 of 1924 replacing it with Nationality Law No. 43.10 This law change was an 
effort to monitor Faylee Kurds and record their whereabouts as well as their 
                                                          
8 .  Article 30 of the Lausanne Treaty stipulated that “Turkish subjects habitually resident in 
territory which in accordance with the provisions of the present Treaty is detached from Turkey 
will become ipso facto, in the conditions laid down by the local law, nationals of the State to which 
such territory is transferred”.  
9.   Articles 9, 13 of law no. 42 of 1923. 
10. Some Kurdish leaders such as Ali Sinjari and Fazil Mirani think that the main motive behind 
this law was Faylee Kurds’ support to General Abdul Karim Kassim before the 1963 military coup. 
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political loyalties. As early as 1971 the first group of Faylee Kurds was deported 
to Iran. Most of them came from Baghdad and were living in the districts of 
Kanbar Ali, Qishla, Bab al Shaikh, Khalani, and Akid al Akrad. The Iraqi state 
justified it with the Iranian occupation of three islands (Great Tumb, Lesser Tumb 
and Abu Muza) in Hurmiz, at the gate of the Persian Gulf. A few KDP 
representatives in Baghdad tried to intervene in an effort to stop the deportation. 
They managed to stop the forced displacement of Gowi Kurds from Mosul to 
Turkey but failed to hinder the deportation of Faylee Kurds from Baghdad to 
Iran. 11  It is estimated that 50,000 Faylee Kurds were deported during the 
decade.12 
 This was the situation when Saddam Hussein came to power. Many 
Faylee Kurds were ineligible for Iraqi nationality, and those who had gained Iraqi 
nationality were registered as of Iranian origin. Through the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC), Saddam’s issued Decree 180 dated 3 February 
1980.13  This decree granted the Minister of Interior the power to accept the 
nationality application on three requirements: (1) the citizen lived in Iraq before 
14 July 1958 and had never left the country until 3 February 1968; (2) one of their 
blood relatives had Iraqi nationality; (3) their stay in Iraq was not a threat to the 
security and safety of the Republic. This law was intended to be valid for six 
                                                          
11.  Gowi Kurds were Sunni Muslims without Iraqi nationality or ID cards living on the border Iraqi-
Turkish border. The KDP successfully avoided their deportation, meeting with Mr. Ali Sinjari KDP 
representative in Baghdad during 1970s, Dohuk, October 2012. 
12 . David McDowall, (1997) A Modern History of the Kurds, Minority Group International, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 330 
13.  Saddam Hussein as the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council issued many other 
decrees regarding Faylee Kurds such as RCC decree No.907 dated 9/6/1980, 916 dated 
10/6/1980, RCC decree No. 1134 dated 1124, RCC No. 873 date 31/7/1984, RCC No. 28 dated 
9/1/1985, RCC No. 1167 dated 18/10/194, RCC No. 1370 dated 12/12/1984, RCC No. 1227 
dated 1985, RCC 1250 dated 14/11/1984, RCC 1209 dated 18/11/1984, RCC 784 dated 
1984,RCC 855 dated 25/7/195, RCC 49 dated 12/1/1983, RCC 120 dated 27/1/1983,RCC 253 
dated 13/3/1982, RCC 533 dated 9/5/1983.  
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months only before reverting to previous Nationality Law 42. Anyone who did not 
apply for citizenship within the six months period, and who after six months 
lacked Iraqi nationality and an Iraqi ID card would be expelled. This six months 
period allowed the Iraqi state to record and monitor the Faylee Kurds and the 
information gathered contributed to the implementation of more systematic 
deportation policies. 
 Many Iraqis of Saddam' generation were educated in the hatred of Iran or 
people of “Iranians origin”. Khairall Tolfah (1910 -1985), the author of an overtly 
racist book entitled Anatomy of Khomeini Religion raised Saddam Hussein being 
his uncle and later his father in law. In it he criticizes Shi’ite harshly, condemning 
the way they prayed, their marriage system, and even the way they performed 
sexual activity. He also refers to the difficulty of understanding why God created 
three creatures: Jews, flies, and Persian, since in his views the Jewish stand 
against God, flies transfer diseases, and Persians converted to Islam in order to 
destroy it.  
  In 1980 Saddam ordered the deportation of Faylee Kurds “Iranian 
descendants” offering 10,000 ID, approximately $30,000 USD, to Iraqi people 
already married to Faylee Kurds to divorce their spouses and to remain in Iraq 
while their families were deported. This sum of money was in addition to the 
4,000 ID ($12,000) for a military and 1,500 ID ($3,000) for civilians provided by 
Decree No. 474, of 15 April 1971 to anyone who could present proof of 
deportation, and a new marriage certificate proving his remarriage to an Iraqi 
national. With Decree No. 150 issued by the RCC on 28 January 1980 any 
woman who refused to divorce her Iranian husband would automatically be 
banned from holding any public office.  
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 In 1975 the Algeria Treaty between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran 
meant a partial ease of the deportations. With this treaty both Iran and Iraq finally 
settled their dispute on territorial issues. Iran got control of a few islands in the 
Persian Gulf and in return it agreed to stop the supply of weapons to the Barzanis 
and the KDP; paving the way for the Iraqi government to a harsh repression of 
the Kurdish rebels on the Iranian border.  
 Whilst the deportation of Faylee Kurds may have slowed down, the 
Arabization process intensified after the Algeria Treaty. Decree No. 5, dated 11 
January 1975, granted the Minister of Interior the power “to give Iraqi citizenship 
to any adult Arab from the Arab world without taking into consideration the 
conditions of the citizenship mentioned on the first part of Article 8, Iraqi 
Nationality Law 43 of 1963”.14 The ease with which Arabs could apply for, and be 
granted, Iraqi citizenship directly contrasts the experiences of undocumented 
Kurds who had resided in Iraq for centuries but remained ineligible for Iraqi 
citizenship. To avoid any judicial regulation, Decree No. 413 was passed to make 
sure that no Court had jurisdiction to consider any case regarding the issue of 
nationality made under Nationality Law No. 43.  
 After the 1979 Iranian revolution Iraq relations with Iran deteriorated 
dramatically, especially because Iran threatened of exporting its revolution to 
other areas of the Arab World. The Ba’ath Party considered themselves as Arab 
                                                          
14. Article 8 of Nationality Law No. 43 of 1963 held that any Arab National may be naturalized 
provided that (a) he has attained majority; (b) he has entered Iraq legally, and was residing in Iraq 
at the time when he applied for naturalization; (c) he has been residing in Iraq legally for at least 
ten successive years before submitting the application. The Minister may not put himself under 
the obligation to perform this item, if it is required by the common interest; (d) he is of good 
conduct and reputation and has never been sentenced for felony or a misdemeanour prejudicial 
to honour, unless he has formerly been rehabilitated; (e) he has an obvious means of living; (f) he 
is safe from infections, diseases, physical and mental deficiencies; (g) Palestinians are excepted 
from granting Iraqi Nationality, until the liberation of Palestine and going back thereto. 
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socialist and nationalist (guards of eastern gate of the Arab world), and could not 
tolerate such rhetoric from their Persian and Shi’ite, neighbours. In addition, the 
Iraqi regime thought it was their duty to prevent Iranian Revolution from 
influencing the rest of the area, in a time when most of the Arab World – with the 
exception of Syria and Libya – referred to Iraq as the ‘Eastern Gate of the Arab 
World’. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates sent money, arms and 
manpower to Iraq in order to protect the Arab World from Iran.15 
 In April 1980 the attempted assassination of Deputy Prime Minister Tarik 
Azziz by Faylee Kurd Samir Mir Gullam provided an additional pretext for further 
deportations. Samir Mir Gullam planted explosives at Mustansiria University 
killing several students but failed to kill the Deputy Prime Minister. This attack 
provided Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party the evidence in support of their 
propaganda against Faylee Kurds. In a public speech following the fatalities at 
Mustansiria University, Saddam declared: “I swear to God, I swear by single 
single drop of Iraqi blood, I swear by every single drop of water of the two great 
rivers, I swear by every single grain of Iraqi soil, I swear I will not allow the blood 
of Mustansiria victims to go without punishment”.16  On the same day of the 
explosions, Saddam amended the citizenship laws, issuing Decree No. 180, 
preventing anybody or Iranian origins from applying for citizenship and opening to 
mass deportation of Faylee Kurds, sometimes even of Iraqi citizens. In an 
interview with Brigade General Saad Thuthir, the researcher found out that after 
the Mustansaria incident Saddam Hussein met senior members of the Ba’ath 
party in Baghdad. He wanted to hear their reactions to what had occurred at the 
                                                          
15.  Brigade General Wafik Al Samarai, Destruction of Eastern Gate (Kuwait, Kabas Press House, 
1997). He was the deputy Director of Iraqi Military Intelligence during the Iraq-Iran war. 
16.  Al Thawra daily newspaper, the spokesman of Baath Party newspaper, no. 3602, 5 April 
1980. 
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university.17 The first Ba’athist speaker was a woman named, Sanna al-Umari, 
and her reaction was that only the criminal should be punished, not the 
perpetrator's entire family. She was the only one that held that view. Saddam 
decided to punish all Kurds in Iraq, not only Samir Mir Gullam’s family.18  
 On 28 April 1980, Saddam Hussein delivered the following message on 
Iraqi TV:  
Yesterday our youth and women’s blood was shed in Mustansiria, 
the responsible was an agent named Samir Mir Gullam, he and his 
masters thought that they achieved a great thing by their criminal 
acts, we want to tell them, the foreigners, the Imperial Forces, and 
those whom think they can beat us, “come and fight us”. Iraq is a 
strong mountain, it will not be shattered by all their bombs, I swear to 
God, I swear by the smallest grain of Iraqi soil that the pure blood of 
our people in Mustansiria will not go without punishment or in vain.19 
 
There are three main points in this speech that deserved to be analysed: the first 
is the presumption that Samir Mir Gullam was not acting alone, but as a 
representative of a larger terrorist group with intent on undermine Iraqi 
sovereignty. Second, the linking of this hypothetical group to ‘foreigners’ and 
Imperial Forces suggests that ‘Samir Mir Gullam and his masters’ are not just an 
internal Iraqi security threat. Finally, the reference to the ‘pure blood of our 
people’ – being the Arab victims killed in the attacks – elevates Arabs over Samir 
and the Faylee Kurds. On the same date, the Ministry of Interior issued a 
Telegram (No. 2284) to all governorates on the Iranian Border where he said: 
                                                          
17.  Meeting Brigade General Saad Khuther, director of psychological warfare during Iraq-Iran 
war, Baghdad, November 2011. 
18.  Samir Mir Gullam and five members of his family were caught and killed, see Telegram cabled 
10493, dated 18 October 1987, from Security Office of lkanat Office to Security Directorate of 
Saddam City: “Criminal Samir Mir Gullam, was captured with all members of his family in 1980, 
and their names are Noor Ali Gullam, Amir Mir Ali Gullam, Farid Mir Ali, Faik Mir Alli, Latifa Mir Ali, 
Suham Mir Ali, and all of them were executed because they are the criminal family of Samir Mir 
Gullam and were behind the crime of Mustansiria against Ba’athist students.” Appendix No. (2)  
19.  Iraqi Channel No 1, 8 pm News, Full Speech of Saddam Hussein, 28 April 1980. 
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“We would like to reassure our order of opening fire on any deportees who try to 
enter Iraqi land again”.20 
 On 7 May 1980, in order that Iraqi blood would not go in vain, Saddam 
issued RCC Decree No. 666. 21 Through this decree, he determined to punish all 
Faylee Kurds. The first step was to strip all Iraqi citizens of foreign origin 
considered not loyal to the state from their Iraqi Nationality. It was a threatening 
as well as ambiguous message because it was unclear how such disloyalty could 
be measured. In any event, Saddam set about strip Iraqi Nationality from all 
Faylee Kurds, and deport them from Iraq. Kurds from the districts of Bab Al 
Shaikh, Kifah Street, Kurds District, Palestine Street in Baghdad and Kut, Badra, 
Jassan, Khanakin, as well as Faylee Kurds from Kirkuk, were targeted and 
expelled in this wave of deportations. The first group of deportees was a group of 
Faylee businessmen from Baghdad. The party invited them to the Ba’ath Party 
headquarter under the pretext of a legitimate business meeting, where they were 
captured, loaded into trucks and taken to the Iranian border where they were 
forced to walk across.22 
 By August of 1980, Iraq and Iran were openly exchanging fire and in 
September Iraq invaded Iran. The number of deportees fluctuated depending on 
the outcomes of the conflict. The scale of the deportation of Faylee Kurds to Iran 
increased with the victory reported by the Iraqi army. On 16 February 1981, Al 
Thawar newspaper published an article quoting Saddam Hussein’s justification 
for the expulsion of Faylee Kurds to Iran. He said: “[...] uproot them from the land 
of Iraq so they cannot spillary more and disgrace Iraqi blood, air and soil. The 
                                                          
20.  See Appendix no (3) of this chapter for the original and translation of telegram no. 2248. 
21. See Appendix no (4) for the RCC decree no 666 of 7 May 1980. 
22. Ahmed Nassir Faylee, Al Failyon, History and Destructive Citizenship, (Erbil, Aras Publishers, 
2012), pp. 215-217. 
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revolution uprooted them to put an end to their presence and to purify the Iraqis 
who are noble and do not accept humiliation”.23 In order to avoid an uprising the 
authorities gave orders to arrest every Faylee Kurd male able to use a weapon. 
These men and young boys were imprisoned in Nigrat Al Salman jail in the 
Salman district in Samawa governorate as shown in the map follow. 
 
 
Figure 13 Map No. (12)  Faylee Kurd’s concentration camps during their displacement. 
Source: Author 
 
In the Ba’ath Party Ninth National Conference Report of June 1982, Saddam 
Hussein spoke of the threat posed by the Faylee Kurds. He said: 
When, in April 1939 Shah of Iran cancelled the 1937 Treaty 
between Iran and Iraq, Iran started threatening the sovereignty of 
Iraq over Shat al Arab and to working against our Revolutionary 
system, they did it by financially supporting the Barzani’s group 
as well as the Iranian living in Iraq and Iraqis citizens of Iranian 
origin. All these groups formed a fifth column inside Iraqi society. 
                                                          
23. Article in Al Thawra newspaper No. 2342, 16 February 1981, p.5. 
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They were behind any anti-Ba’ath campaign, any sabotage 
operation inside the country. These people were supporting 
Iranian and Zionist intelligence against the Iraqi economy 
providing them with sensitive military secrets. They worked 
against the unity and stability of Iraq and, when the enmity 
between them and the Shah of Iran got to its highest point, the 
fifth column stood against the revolution in a very clear way, and 
accelerated its activities in the country. As part of this preventive 
action, the revolution started to deport a couple of thousands of 
them to Iran in order to put an end to their conspiracy and to 
punish any traitor of this country. This process started at the 
beginning of 1971 and went on in different moments.24 
 
It is estimated that when Saddam delivered this report over 50,000 Faylee Kurds 
had already been deported from Iraq.25 
 The President’s open enmity towards Faylee Kurds was shared by a close 
group of influential statesman around him. In 1985, the General Director of Iraqi 
Security at the time, Dr Fadhil al-Barak, published a book entitled Jewish and 
Iranian Schools in Iraq, discussing the threat posed by Faylee Kurds. In it he 
said: “Despite the fact that Iranian Kurds, or Faylee Kurds, had been living in Iraq 
since 539 BC, historically, psychologically, socially, politically and economically, 
they are linked to Iran”. For Dr Fadhil al-Barak, being an Iranian descendant 
meant Faylee Kurds would instinctively act against the ‘national interest’ and all 
Arab national hopes and aspirations.26 
 During the Iraq-Iran war, the Kurds were openly fighting against Saddam. 
With both the KDP and the PUK openly supporting Iran, the Kurds in the north of 
the Iraq threatened the stability of the regime. As it was common in Iraqi history, 
Saddam responded by amending citizenship laws, encouraging the stripping of 
                                                          
24. The term ‘fifth column’ deliberately suggested that Faylee Kurds were clandestinely assisting 
the Iranian behind enemy’s lines. 
25 . David McDowall (1997) A Modern History of the Kurds, Minority Group International, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 330. 
26. First version printed in 1980 (Baghdad), the researcher relies on the second version printed in 
1985 (Baghdad). 
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Iraqi nationality and forced deportation of opponents to the regime saying that: 
“We decided to continue the deportation of Iranian descendants, even for the 
people who are not included in the deportation lists previously compiled. The 
orders are to strip them of their Iraqi Nationality if you find that: (1) they are 
members of an opposition party, (2) they have started to form political groups, (3) 
they are against the Ba’ath Party and its revolution. If you find anyone who was 
not included in deportation lists before, and any of these three conditions apply to 
them, deport them” (Presidency Office 4248/7/C, 5 April 1986 to the Ministry of 
Interior). On 27 April 1986 Decree 363 granted the Minister of Interior the power 
to withdraw Iraqi citizenship from any Iraqi if proved that he is or was not faithful 
to the state and its people. 
 The expulsion of Faylee Kurds became a real national project for all of 
Iraq’s bureaucracy. They started to request all government employees to bring 
their national ID or nationality card to the Security Office of their workplace. They 
asked all students in school to bring their national ID and nationality cards of both 
parents to the teachers for documentation. Any member of the Ba’ath Party or 
Military Security Forces, or Intelligence Organizations, had to present their 
national ID or nationality card, and that of both of their parents to the security 
offices to be re-checked. Decree No. 11274, from the General Directorate of 
Military Intelligence to the Second Corps of the Iraqi Army, dated 27 July 1984 
stated that any Intelligence or Security employee of Iranian origin must be 
expelled, as he/she could not be trusted.  In addition to that, each Iraqi had to 
complete his/her family tree up to seven generations.27  
                                                          
27 . Other non-Arab minorities such as Assyrians, Chaldeans and Armenians (even those of 
Iranian origin) were not treated with the same intensity of suspicion as Faylee Kurds. 
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 The war against Iran ended with Iran’s acceptance of Security Council 
Resolution 598 and with a ceasefire between the parties.  While Iraq claimed 
victory, it continued to persecute Iranian descendants and anyone opposed to the 
regime in accordance with Saddam’s aspirations. On that occasion the 
authorities said: “Based on the Presidents (God Bless Him) directions, we should 
continue the process of deportation of those who cannot be approved by military 
organizations and security organizations, those remaining should be deported as 
soon as possible. Anyone who is reluctant to fulfil the orders of this telegram will 
receive punishment to the highest order” (40268/C from Presidency Office on 9 
November 1988).  
 Before the Iran-Iraq war, the state’s policy was to deport entire families in 
which at least one member was of Iranian origin. However, the massive 
deportation along with the open support of Iran by the Kurds in the North, soon 
presented itself as a real problem for Saddam. The regime realized that deporting 
Faylee young men would only serve to strengthen Iranian manpower since many 
deportees had joined the Iranian army. In April 1980, months before Iraq invaded 
Iran, the Ministry of Interior issued a telegram ordering all male Faylee Kurds 
aged between 18 and 28 eligible for deportation, should be imprisoned until 
further notice (see telegram No. 2884 reproduced in appendix). In addition, any 
military officer of Iranian descent, no matter his rank, should be handled to the 
military police in Baghdad to be detained until further notice. It is estimated that 
approximately 10,000 men were imprisoned as a result of this telegram. Their 
bodies have never been found.28 
                                                          
28. At the time, Amnesty International published many press releases and sent many letters of 
condemnation to the Iraqi state. 
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 Deported Faylees also suffered the confiscation of all their movable and 
non-movable property. The state confiscated their homes, lands, factories, bank 
accounts, and prohibited deportees to take any personal items with them from 
Iraq. From an interview with Brigade General, Najib al-Salahi, the researcher 
found out that Saddam had openly said that the first Faylee Kurds had come to 
Iraq with bare feet and were not carrying anything, and thus these generations 
should return back to their roots without anything as well.29 RCC Decree No. 
1131 issued on 18 August 1980, authorized the Minister of Interior to sell all the 
properties of Faylee Kurds, and to deprive them of all their rights. In each 
governorate a ‘Committee of Inventory and Clearance of Belongings of Iranian 
Deportees’ was set up by the Security Office and overseen by the Ministry of 
Interior and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Tarik Azziz, who had 
survived an assassination attempt only months before). At the same time they 
have described by Iranian officials as uninvited guests.30  
 It is interesting to notice that all the above measures against Faylee Kurds 
have a striking resemblances with the ones put in place during Nazi fascism in 
Europe, in particular in Germany and Italy. In both countries the persecution 
against the Jews starting with the publication of racial laws aimed at denying their 
civil rights. The authorities started to single them out in schools and in working 
places compiling lists of citizens to target. As for the Faylee Kurds, they were 
stripped of their jobs, properties, and of every civil rights until they were 
segregated in ghettos before deportation or death. What it is more interesting is 
that all this happened within the law and with the complicity of the other citizens. 
                                                          
29.   Meeting Brigade General Najib Al Salihi, Baghdad, March 2013. 
 
30.  Based on many interviews with Faylee Kurds who have been back from Iran or at some 
stages of their deportation they were in Iran, all confirmed that they were “non invited guests” to 
Iran as they have heard every day from Iranian officials. 
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This was possible thanks to a rhetoric that tended to distinguish “us” from “them” 
and to diminish them as not being part of the human race and as enemy of the 
State. In Iraq, the ideology of the pure race and of pure blood promoted in 
Europe during Nazi fascism was adopted by Saddam when mentioning that 
Faylee Kurds’ blood was polluted and that they should not be allowed to 
contaminate Iraqi blood through marriage. As we have seen earlier, following this 
ideology entire families were disrupted and forced to leave or disappear. While 
on the political side Faylee Kurds as Jews before them, were accused of being 
enemies of the state and to their deportation was to prevent another conspiracy.  
 This brief parallel between the European case and the Iraqi one is 
particularly significant if we keep in mind that the same extreme ideology can 
thrive in different historical realities. This should warn us about future dangers 
and the international community to put in place policies for the prevention of 
genocide crimes. 
IHT decision 
The trial regarding the experiences of the Faylee Kurds was heard by the Iraqi 
High Criminal Court over 44 sessions, commencing 26 January 2009 and ending 
on 29 November 2010 when the verdict was delivered.31 The trial was presided 
by Judge Saad Yahya Abdul Wahid, and four sitting members: Basil Abdul Latif 
Mohammed Ali, Sami Sajad Abdul Abbas, Mahdi Mohammed Ali and Asso 
Mohammed Sofi. Because Saddam Hussein had been executed before the case 
began his culpability for the treatment of Faylee Kurds was not directly 
considered. This is a summary of the people convicted for these crimes. 
                                                          
31.  IHT decision 29 November 2010 Case No. 2/C/2008. 
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 Sadon Shakir Mohammed Ahmad Alubaidi (1939- ) General Director of 
Iraqi Intelligence 1973-1979. He served as the Minister of Interior from 1979 to 
1986. Sadon Shakir was a member of Saddam’s inner circle of trust and was a 
well-known political figure across Iraq. In relation to RCC 666, dated 7 May 1980, 
as the Minister of Interior he was in charge of implementing this decree ordering 
the withdrawal of Iraqi nationalities and deportation of Faylee Kurds. Under his 
command, the policy was implemented and tens of thousands of people were 
deported or killed. He personally authorized signing the deportation orders of 
entire lists of Faylee Kurds. In addition, the Court found that Sadon Shakir was 
also responsible for judging those citizens “not faithful to the nation, to the 
country and to the highest national social value of the revolution”. (RCC Decree 
666).32 Finally, Sadon Shakir was in control of the redistribution of properties of 
the Faylee Kurds, and for the allocation of Faylee commercial and residential 
buildings as well as for their registration in the name of the President of the 
Intelligence Service.33  
 Ahmed Hussein Khuthair Awath Al Samarae (1939 - ) Chief of Staff in 
the Presidency Office from 1984 until 1991, and again from 1995 until 2003. The 
Court found that Ahmed Hussein did not play a role in drafting or implementing 
RCC Decree 666 of 1980. However, the Court found that Ahmed Hussein was 
                                                          
32.  He issued many decrees to that effect, Decree 16395, dated 15 December 1982, Decree 
16396, 25 December 1982, Decree 326, dated 8 January 1983, Decree 444, dated 10 January 
1983, Decree 580 dated 13 January 1983, Decree 774, dated 18 January 1983, Decree 1449, 
dated 1 February 1983, Decree 584, dated 10 January 1983, Telegram 6353, dated 5 June 1980, 
all written by Sadon Shakir and including lists of names of Faylee Kurds unfaithful to the regime 
and requesting to re-register most of the confiscated properties of them in the name of the 
President of the  Iraqi General Intelligence (Mokhabarat).  
33.  Sadon Shakir has been sentenced to death for genocide, sentenced to 15 years imprisonment 
for committing the crime of forced deportation as a crime against humanity, sentenced to 7 years 
for committing the crime of imprisonment as a crime against humanity, 7 years for committing the 
crime of torture as a crime against humanity, 6 years for the crime of oppression as a crime 
against humanity, 10 years for committing crimes against humanity. At the time of writing, Sadon 
Shakir had not been executed. See appendix (5) of this chapter for the details of the court 
decision regarding criminal Sadon Shakir. 
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responsible for concealing and denying what occurred to Faylee Kurds, 
particularly those killed during the war with Iran where Faylee Kurds were used 
as human shields and sent across the heavily mined Iraqi-Iranian border. 
Ahmend Hussein drafted denial policy and oversaw the payment of retirement 
salaries to the families of those Faylee Kurds left behind in Iraq who made 
enquiries of the whereabouts of their male family members. The state would 
respond to such enquiries by saying that the men must have been kidnapped by 
the Popular Army, sent to war, and died whilst serving the Army. He signed 
Telegram No. 9489, dated 8 March 1983, from the Presidency Office to the 
General Director of Security stating that the names recorded in the Telegram 
were Iranian descendants and prisoners of Nigrat Al Salman but were not 
members of the traitor Daawa Party. In the same telegram he suggested the 
General Director of Security to register them as dead as a result of the war. 
Further, he directed that the General Director of Security put their names on the 
retirement role, to make their deaths official. 
 Mozban Khothir Hadi, (1938 -) originally a school teacher at the 
beginning of the revolution in Najaf governorate, in 1981 became the Governor of 
Najaf, and was in charge of sending Faylee Kurds from his governorate in the 
south of Baghdad, to Nigrat Al Salman prison and of deporting others to Iran. In 
1977, Mozban was in charge of the Ba’ath Party Organization in Waast 
Governorate, and from 1979 until 1982, he was a Senior Member of the Ba’ath 
Party Headquarters of Iraq.34  
                                                          
34. Mozban was sentenced to death for committing genocide against Faylee Kurds, 15 years for 
deportation as a crime against humanity, 7 years for imprisoning people, 7 years for committing 
the crime of torture as a crime against humanity, 6 years for oppression as a crime against 
humanity, and 10 years as inhuman treatment as a crime against humanity. For the full court 
decision regarding his involvement see the) appendix no. (6) of this chapter. 
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 Azziz Salih Hassan Noman Al-Khafaj (1941- ) Deputy Minister of Interior 
between 1978 until 1979. Later he was in charge of the Ba’ath Party 
Headquarters in Najaf governorate until 1982. After 1982 Azzis Salih moved to 
Baghdad and became a Senior Member of the Ba’ath Party. The Court found that 
Azziz Salih ordered the killing and deportation of Faylee Kurds as a result of his 
position within the governorate.35  
 The victims were persecuted on ethnic and religious sectarian grounds. 
Their only crime was thus their ethnicity and religious views. Bystanders of the 
crimes included the international community, the Arab World, the Islamic World, 
Iranians and Iraqis in general. The most convincing encouragement for the 
regime would likely have been the silence of all bystanders as the horrific crimes 
committed against Faylee Kurds unfolded.  
Application of the Eight Stages of Genocide framework 
The eight stages listed by Professor Gregory Stanton are very useful in order to 
discuss the policies implemented against the Faylee Kurds in relation to each of 
the eight stages below. 
Classification: Gregory Stanton identifies classification as the first stage of the 
genocidal process. Classification involves inflicting clear, distinguishable 
boundaries between “us” and “them”, and in a genocidal society, between the 
genocidaires and their targets. In Iraq, members of society were classified along 
ethnic lines; Arab, Kurdish, Iranian, Assyrian, Turkomen, and Armenian. Further 
                                                          
35 . Aizi Salih Mohan sentenced to death for committing the crime of genocide, 15 years 
imprisonment for committing the crime of deportation as a crime against humanity, 7 years for 
illegally imprisoning people 7 years for committing the crime of torture as a crime against 
humanity, 6 years for committing the crime of oppression as a crime against humanity, 7 years for 
committing inhuman activities as a crime against humanity. For the full court decision regarding 
his involvement on Faylee Kurds Genocide see the appendix no. (7) of this chapter.  
149 
 
division and classification was made according to religion, identifying Sunni from 
Shi’ite Muslims, Christians and Jews. Ethnic origins were recorded on identity 
cards and in available census data. In the case of this study, the target group is 
classified as “Faylee Kurds”. 
Symbolization: Symbols are used as markers of the classified groups. In 
Ba’athist Iraq, Faylee Kurds (classified as Iranian) were referred to as ‘traitors’ of 
Iraqi nationalism, the “fifth column of Iraq”, as aides to Iranian and Zionist 
intelligence gathering inside Iraq, as a profane or disrespectful, and as an 
impurity of Iraqi blood. 
Dehumanization: For Gregory Stanton, dehumanization is the crucial third step 
that transports classification and symbolization from societal division to steps of 
genocide. In Ba’athist Iraq, Kurds and Faylee Kurds, or Iranians as they named 
them, are not likened to vermin or cockroaches as they were by Nazi Germany or 
Hutus in Rwanda. However, Saddam dehumanized Faylee Kurds with imagery of 
their contamination of Iraqi blood, and the justification for deportation being the 
cleansing of Iraq from impurities. Faylee Kurds were herded into trucks, 
humiliated and tortured during their deportation. 
Organization: One of the most striking characteristics of Iraq’s deportation 
policies was the efficiency with which they were implemented. The branches of 
state that came together to implement the deportation policies and eventually to 
kill the men held in custody included Republican Guard, the General Security 
Office, The General Nationalisation Directorate, all Ba’ath Party Offices, the 
Police, the Army, the Popular Army, and Saddam Hussein himself. In order to 
locate Faylee Kurds, Iraq’s extensive bureaucracy demanded the presentation 
and recording of all national identity cards. Lists of names of Faylee Kurds to be 
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deported were compiled, transport to the border was organized, men of military 
age were separated and held in custody, and confiscated property was 
inventoried and redistributed under the oversight of the Deputy Prime Minister.  
Polarization: Polarization refers to the systematic elimination of moderates, or 
those that could interfere to slow the genocidal process down. Again, this 
process was apparent in Iraq, and the institutions limiting moderation or 
opposition to Ba’athist ideology were well established when Faylee Kurds came 
to be deported. Gareth Stansfield describes the intensification of state control 
under Saddam’s Regime with the following words:  
Saddam remained wholeheartedly committed to the more 
violent attributes of state control, creating a sophisticated 
network of security and intelligence organizations. Five primary 
agencies constituted the Iraqi security apparatus: Jihaz as-
Amn al-Khas (Special Security); al-Amn al-‘Amn (General 
Security); al-mukhabarat (General Intelligence); al Istikhbarat 
(Military Intelligence); and al-Amn al-‘Askari (Army 
Intelligence). In addition to these organisations, there also 
existed a number of party security agencies, police forces, 
paramilitaries and special units, all armed to protect the regime 
from any actual, perceived, or threatened form of opposition. 
These organisations formed an Orwellian web of mistrust, fear 
and coercion which comprehensively permeated every aspect 
of Iraqi life, and new formations of civil or political life could 
exist in such an environment, least of all the fragile institutions 
necessary for representative democracy to emerge.36  
 
As shown above, affiliation or support of any party other than the Ba’ath party 
was punishable with the removal of citizenship and expulsion from Iraq, or in the 
case of the Da’wa party, punishable with death. There was little opportunity for 
moderates to emerge, and the political environment crafted by the Ba’ath party 
was certainly no environment in which opposition to deportation could be voiced 
safely.  
                                                          
36.  Stansfield, G. Iraq (UK, Polity Press, 2007), pp. 97-98. 
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Preparation: Preparation for genocide includes identifying targets, preparing lists 
of maps, logistics and training armed forces or militia to ultimately carry out the 
acts of genocide. As stated in the discussion on the organization stage of the 
deportation of Faylee Kurds, the massive state machine was able to efficiently 
identify and compile lists of names of Faylees to be deported. The intensity of 
control of citizens’ lives in Iraq meant state institutions could find information on 
the whereabouts, occupations, and political views of any of its members. 
Transport was arranged so that Faylee Kurds could be taken directly to the 
Iranian border and their deportation verified. 37  Military-age Faylee men aged 
between 18 and 28 years were held in Samawa and Nigrat Al Salman prisons in 
the south of the country. The Army, that had originally been strengthened in order 
to address problems within Iraq’s borders, was prepared to carry out orders and 
by 1971 had experience suppressing and killing Iraqi nationals at the directions of 
the regime.38 The army understood, and were proud of their role in protecting the 
Arab nationalist movement from the Shi’ite sect, the Kurdish drive for autonomy, 
and other internal security threats.39 
Extermination: Perhaps uncharacteristically for Ba’athist Iraq’s unquestioned 
brutality towards its citizens, this is the element of the eighth stages of genocide 
analysis that proves to be a disproportionally smaller aspect of the overall 
treatment of Iraq’s Faylee Kurds. Whilst up to 100,000 men, women, and children 
were forcibly uprooted from Iraq and expelled to Iran, without any of their 
personal property or moveable assets, it is estimated that a more modest figure 
                                                          
37. Due to space restrictions it is not possible to reproduce those list in this study, however the 
researcher has found them during his fieldwork and he included them in the report written for the 
IHT. 
38. The Iraqi Army had been engaged almost continuously throughout the 1960s in armed conflict 
with the Kurdish Peshmerga in the north of the country. See McDowall, D. A Modern History of 
the Kurds (London, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1997), pp. 323-327. 
39.  Stansfield, G. (2007), p. 87. 
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of 10,000 men were killed while imprisoned during the Iraq-Iran war. The killings 
were nevertheless mass killings, and most certainly had an effect on the exiled 
Faylee community in Iran with an inevitable demographic impact on the Faylee 
population. In the context of the Iraq-Iran war, killing the men would have found 
easy justification when the state had deliberately classified and symbolized them 
as enemies of the pure Iraqi Arab homeland. 
Denial: Although the Iraqi High Criminal Court has legally recognized the 
treatment of the Faylee Kurds as an act amounting to genocide, the Ba’ath 
regime has never disclosed where the bodies of the imprisoned men can be 
found.  
Conclusion 
Despite the massive amount of information gathered and the recognition by the 
judicial and political authorities that Faylee Kurds were victims of genocide, very 
little has been accomplished in order to heal the fracture inflicted to the Iraqi 
society. There are legal considerations that reverberated in political and social 
reality of post 2003 Iraq. From a legal point of view, the limitations of the IHT, 
born under the occupation, made a balance impossible between the number of 
convictions and the scale of the crime. According to the figure gathered around 
150,000 Faylee Kurds were deported and stripped of all their properties and for 
this crime only four individuals were convicted. This impossibility of pursuing a 
more balanced trial was also due to the high politicization of the Court, which 
could not be seen, favouring a group over another.  
 This lack of justice is having a detrimental effect on the Iraqi society as a 
whole. This also because of the political unwillingness of the Iraqi governments 
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ruling during and after the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. They have not 
fulfilled the second point of the Resolution No. 426 of the Council of Ministers 
mentioned earlier which recommended the elimination of “all negative impacts” 
suffered by Faylee Kurds. In fact, according to the last statistics gathered by the 
Minister for Immigration, from April 2003 to July 2013, of over 150,000 Faylee 
Kurds affected, only 16,580 of them had their Iraqi nationality restored and only 
6,853 are in possession of a national ID.40  This, while most of the “moveable and 
unmoveable assets” has not been returned to them. The decree was not 
workable also because people working as civil servants during the time of 
deportation are still in charge in the new administrations. In addition, the issuing 
of citizenships and national ID is competence of the federal government and the 
fact that the Faylee Kurds are geographically distributed all over Iraq (see map at 
the bottom), mainly ousite the Kurdistan Region, makes difficult a decisive 
intervention of the regional government regarding this issue. This explains also 
the absence of any decree issued by the Iraqi government regarding the other 
genocides treated in the thesis. The chapter dedicated to the recommendation 
will deal more in detail with this, for the moment it is fair to say that the failures of 
the Iraqi government are still hindering the reconciliation and healing process of 
Iraqi society.  
 After analysing this crime, it is evident how the existing judicial system has 
been used in order to implement the state engineered policy against Kurds. Time 
scale is also very important in order to understand how the state apparatus 
proceeded. As from the chart in the introduction, the operations took place from 
                                                          
40.  From a meeting with Mr. Dindar Doski, Iraqi Minister for Immigration, London, 5 October, 
2013. 
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1970 to 1988 showing that the state was still very slow in implementing its 
policies. However, with the persecution against the Faylee Kurds, the state 
started to approve the concept of genocide in order to deal with the Kurdish 
issue. The same pattern, with substantial differences due to the scale and 
particular characteristics of the crime, can be found in the building of the 
Barzanis’ case, topic of the next chapter.
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Figure 14 Map No.(13) Faylee Kurds Areas inside Iraq. Source: Author. 
 
 
156 
 
Chapter Six 
Barzani Kurds Genocide (Blueprint of Genocide) 
Introduction 
This chapter will present the third crime against the Kurds analysed in this thesis, 
the massacre of the Barzanis, a Kurdish tribe who led an independent movement 
since the Ottoman Empire. This section will deal in particular with the role they 
played in the construction and defence of Kurdish identity. Discrimination against 
Barzani Kurds was not a policy unique to the Ba’athist, or Saddam Hussein’s 
regime. From the beginning of the twentieth century until 2003, Barzani Kurds 
have been victims of approximately 46 campaigns of collective forced 
displacement inside and outside Kurdistan. Because Barzani Kurds have always 
played an antagonistic role in Iraqi history they have been targeted and disrupted 
for over a century.  
 This crime constituted an escalation of the planned genocide of the regime 
both in scope and chronology. The regime targeted only men belonging to the 
most powerful and influential Kurdish clan. By doing so the regime aimed at 
socially humiliating the Barzanis in order to curb any attempt of resistance. It is 
important to note that, from the evidence gathered, the Barzanis abducted were 
all civilians with no link with any insurgency group. The chronology of this crime 
also shows how the regime had learned to act quickly. The Barzanis were 
abducted and murdered in a month, between July and August 1983 (see chart in 
the introduction) in high secrecy and with the only involvement of the General 
Security (Amn Alam). In addition, in comparison to the Faylee Kurds case, this 
crime was carried out without the support of the judicial system. From document 
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number 4 reproduced in appendix no. 4 (page 364), it is also evident that there 
was an attempt to cover up this crime with the creation of false evidence. This 
document dated 29 March 1989 signed by Liutentant Coronel Haqi Ismail, in 
charge of political affairs at the Iraqi Security General Office, contains an order 
from the former Director of Public Security to  
Fabricate charges for the important ones, total of 667 charges 
were laid for 16 cases. The cases were sent to the Presidency 
of the Revolution Court, the verdict was death penalty. No 
death certificate was sent out. 
 
 Based on new documentary evidence, this chapter will prove how their 
deportation, imprisonment and massacre constituted an escalation in the process 
of annihilation of the Kurdish people carried out by the Iraqi government. In 2005, 
the researcher, in his role as Minister of Human Rights in the Kurdish Regional 
Government, was in charge of organising an investigation in order to find out the 
truth about the killing and disappearance of 8,000 men belonging to the Barzani 
tribe. As we saw in the previous chapter the regime and the state apparatus 
under its boundless control began to normalize the targeting and killing of huge 
groups of citizens.  This new scale of events represented what the researcher 
called a “blueprint”, meaning that the vast organization needed to carry out such 
a crime required a certain degree of acceptance by the military forces and some 
sector of the civil service. The documents show that the scale of the crime, the 
higher number of victims in comparison with the massacre of the Faylee Kurds, 
along with the official, public celebration of the perpetrators of the attacks by the 
regime meant a change in the organization of their forced displacements and 
killings. As we can see from the document provided, the persistent denial of the 
persecution supported by official channels strengthened the government's 
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confidence in the success of future genocide campaigns as well as the conviction 
of its impunity. Through an analysis of the evidence in support of the accusation 
of genocide against the Iraqi government and Saddam Hussein, this chapter will 
consider the history of Barzani Kurds and, particularly, how they were treated by 
the Iraqi state since its formation. It will demonstrate how genocide was 
committed against the tribe under Saddam Hussein’s direction. The researcher 
has been able to gather a significant amount of forensic evidence in 2005 and 
more recently in 2013 in order to prove the Iraqi government’s responsibility for 
the Barzanis’ disappearance and murder. This evidence was central in order to 
build up the case against Saddam Hussein and his accomplices for the IHT and 
later for the international community. In the appendix the researcher has 
reproduced the documents accusing the defendants and some of photos from his 
fieldwork. If, as stated earlier, the genocide against the Faylee Kurds can be 
considered a “genocide concept approval” in preparation to the other cases 
considered here, and it has been conceived and carried out with an 
unconventional and extensive use of the law, the Barzanis’ case shows a direct 
link between war and genocide and can be compared with the most recent cases 
of mass slaughter of civilians in Bosnia and Rwanda.  
 It is not the purpose of this study to point out parallelism of this case with 
the genocides occurred in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, however, one common 
feature is that these mass killings took place when the country was experiencing 
a war amonst different ethnic groups present on the territory. In the specific Iraqi 
context, in contrast with the genocide committed with the deportation of the 
Faylee Kurds, the crime against the Barzani followed different strategies and had 
different deep motivations. While, as mentioned in the previous chapter, every 
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step of the campaign against the Faylee Kurds was carried out justifying it 
through the issueing of decrees, in the Barzanis’ case the main motivation was 
revenge and terror; revenge for the Barzanis’ support to the Iranian during the 
Iran-Iraq war and their leading role in the Kurdish Nationalist Movement. In fact, 
this crime presents different characteristics from the one against the Faylee 
Kurds. While in the last one the regime deported indiscriminately whole families, 
in this one it targeted only males of the same group. In this context the role of 
culture in the planning and implementation of the genocide was very strong, 
since in Middle Eastern culture leaving wives, mothers, and children without men 
leads to the possible social and economic disruption of the group.  
 The case of the disappearance of the Barzanis presented different 
challenges to the researcher. First, in order to build up the court case it was 
necessary to present a convincing set of evidence on a case difficult to prove 
because of the lack of relevant documentation. In fact, the main difference 
between the previous two cases and this one is the secrecy and the conspiracy 
of silence surrounding the Barzanis’ disappearance. When after the fall of 
Saddam’s regime all the political prisoners were finally released, none of the 
missing Barzanis made his return home. This reaffirmed the suspicious about 
their fate and an investigation supported by the new established Kurdish 
Regional Government started.  
 During the first stages of the investigation only a few documents, some of 
them produced in the appendix, have been found which refers directly to the case 
and they constituted the first step towards the reconstruction of the events. One 
of the documents is a video in which Saddam Hussein in September 1983, just 
one month after their disappearance talks to the Iraqis about the Barzanis. 
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Calling them “traitors”, he tells the audience that they have been punished and 
that finally they “had gone to hell”.1 Words that confirmed what until that moment 
was only a suspicion: that the Barzanis had been abducted and killed. But it was 
from one of the documents that the researcher had the first clue of the 
whereabouts of the Barzanis mass graves. Document number 4 reproduced in 
appendix is a letter dated March 3, 1989 addressed to Mr M. M. H. for Political 
Affairs from Lieutenant Haqi Ismael who is informed about the detention of 2,225 
Kurds transported by buses to Buseya. The document also reveals that the 
prisoners (2,225) were executed in Al-Muthana governorate, Buseya region in 
coordination with the Director of General Security in Baghdad. The letter contains 
other details about the detainees, but the geographical location of these victims 
was useful for the organization of the forensic expedition to the area. Document 1 
reproduced in appendix (page 349) is from the Director of General Security and 
addressed to the Secretary of the Director of Public Security on the same date 
and offers more details about the abduction and death of the Barzanis. It states 
that most of the traitors are from the Barzani tribe and that a special top secret 
mission commenced on 1 August 1983 by a unit formed by member of the 
security from unites and directorates of the autonomous region. This special unit 
surrounded Al-Queds, Al-Qadissiya, Qushtappa compounds and, the letter 
continues, “All males from Barzani families over the age of 15 were arrested and 
transported using big vehicles prepared for this mission accompanied by military 
force”. The letter continues to state that their cases where referred to the 
Presidency of the Revolution Court whose verdict was the death penalty. This 
                                                          
1. This video was included in the BBC documentary film “Saddam’s Road to Hell” mentioned 
above. 
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document is also important because it establishes without any doubt the 
leadership’s responsibility of this killing: 
Since the criminal Massud Barzani insists on this issue, the 
Presidency of the Republic – the Secretary has instructed in file 
number 2651k on 24/8/1987 that the employees and member of 
the Public Security who are in charge of the Kurdish issue in 
case they were contacted by a third party that the response be 
one and specified that “nobody knows nothing about them 
except the country’s leadership and that the main issue is more 
important than these families”. This shall remain the only answer 
should anyone ask about the whereabouts of these families.2 
 
This quotation is reported literally from a top secret communication between the 
Secretary of the President of the Republic with Comrade Ali Hassan Al Majeed 
dated 24 August 1987 in which, facing the possibility of negotiation with Masoud 
Al-Barzani, the Secretary advices in this sense establishing a direct link between 
these events and Saddam Hussein. It is important to note the time in which these 
exchange of correspondence among different authorities took place. In 1987 the 
Anfal campaign against the Kurds was under way and in 1989 it was already over 
and now the regime felt safe and there was no need for keeping these details 
secrets. However, as already mentioned, these documents did not constitute 
enough evidence to build a sustainable court case for the IHT. 
Setting up the Crime Scene 
It was a challenge to start a forensic investigation on the crimes committed by the 
regime for different reasons, not least the fact that since the toppling of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003 several attempts had been made in order to tackle the issue of 
the disappearance of Iraqi citizens. The Coalition Provisional Authority was 
completely unprepared to deal with the sudden revelation of mass graves 
                                                          
2.  Document 1 appendix to Chapter 6. 
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locations, which were stormed by thousands of desperate families in search for 
their loved ones. Hence, the missing persons issue started out in Iraq with the 
worst case scenario of emotionally distressed families digging for their loved 
ones in mass graves, destroying evidence that could have been essential for 
investigating the circumstances of the crime and possibly providing clues for the 
identification of the individuals. 
 Only after many attempts that the random digging could be gradually 
contained through public awareness campaigns and cooperation with local and 
religious leaders and other representatives of civil society appealing to the local 
population to wait for international support. At the same time, the Iraqi population 
had to understand that the mass graves and missing person issue would take 
considerable time to be addressed. The United Nations Assistance Mission to 
Iraq UNAMI lobbied in 2004 and 2005 with relevant authorities of the Interim 
Government of Iraq for the establishment of a 'National Centre for Missing and 
Disappeared Persons',3  a centralized institution that would cover the missing 
persons issue in Iraq from the assessment of a mass grave to the return of the 
identified bodies of the “missing persons” to their families for a dignified reburial. 
Unfortunately this centre was never formed and the investigation had to continue 
without this support.  
                                                          
3.  Conferences, working and policy groups hosted by UNAMI and the Ministry of Human Rights, 
Iraqi Interim Government in Amman included participation of the Iraqi Interim Government, 
Baghdad, along with delegations of MoFA, MoD, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of 
Municipalities and Public Works, Council of Ministers, National Assembly, Supreme Judiciary 
Council; the Kurdish Regional Government: delegations of the MoHR, KRG, Ministry of Awqaf, 
Ministry of Interior; Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education; Governors of Kerbela and Kirkuk; 
Iraq Civil Society Initiatives (NGOs from Baghdad, al-Muthanna, an-Najaf); representatives of the 
Medico-Legal Institute, Baghdad; Governmental delegations from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sweden, 
USA, UK, Bahrain, Canada, Germany, Japan and EU expert team; representatives of ICRC, 
ICMP, DePaul University, Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Archaeologists for 
Human Rights, Inforce Foundation, UNMIK, UNDP.  
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 Nevertheless, it was due to these efforts that in 2006 the 'Law on the 
Protection of Mass Graves' was ratified in Parliament. This is the first and only 
law to define technical and legal procedures and responsibilities of state 
agencies dealing with the mass graves in Iraq. It also establishes the intentional 
and unauthorized disturbance or destruction of a mass grave location as a 
criminal offence. As the law relies to a large extent on witnesses coming forward 
with information on mass grave locations, it also states in Chapter 1, Art. 13 that 
providing information on a mass grave shall be considered as a legal extenuating 
excuse for a criminal should he or she report to the Ministry (IMOHR) information 
on its victims or perpetrators of crimes against the victims.” This article is taking 
into account that the most reliable information on a mass grave site comes from 
the perpetrator himself or collaborators, present at the scene, but assumingly not 
directly involved the crime, such as heavy equipment operators, bus and truck 
drivers, low-ranking guards, etc. 
 In December 2010 the Iraqi government signed the International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(ICPAPED). The convention obliges the Iraqi Government to adjust national 
legislation according to the convention and to take steps to effectively protect its 
citizens from enforced disappearance. It also gives Iraq legal advice to prosecute 
those committing the crime in the present and in the past. The convention also 
allows civil society representatives to hold their government accountable and 
demand justice and transparency in front of an international body, namely, the 
UN Committee of Enforced Disappearance. The ratification also obliges Iraq to 
report to relevant UN bodies on the implementation of the convention in the 
country. 
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 Iraq undertook numerous successful measures in accordance with its 
domestic legislation and with international support to address the gruesome 
legacy of the Ba’athist Regime. After the ratification of the Law on the Protection 
of Mass Graves in 2006, the Government of Iraq sought international assistance 
for the technical and forensic side for the excavation of the mass graves. The 
Iraqi population could be stopped from undertaking unauthorized excavations. 
However, the problem needed to be addressed quickly as the pressure from the 
population to get answers was growing. The main players initially dealing with the 
technical and forensic side of the mass graves were the Ministry of Human 
Rights in Baghdad and the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad. Both institutions 
sought the assistance of the International Commission on Missing Persons 
ICMP, an inter-governmental organization based in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 Before introducing the Barzanis and entering into the details of the 
disappearance of the 8,000 men, it is necessary to talk about the sensitive 
fieldwork carried out by the researcher and the training he received in order to 
investigate on the ground this specific case. The skills required to carry out an 
investigation which includes the search and discovering of mass graves, does not 
rely solely on documentation. As we already saw in Chapter 2, forensic 
investigation has been a powerful tool in the discovery and then in the trial of the 
ones responsible for the atrocities committed in different countries over the years 
such as Argentina and more recently in Bosnia. Human Rights was one of the 
first areas to be involved in this new scientific area and, as well as the researcher 
himself, many professionals involved in these kind of cases had to be trained in 
order to acquire the necessary skills to carry out the investigation and also to 
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form a team of experts to support the multidisciplinary knowledge that these 
investigations require. 
 The first step to initiate the investigations of mass graves in Iraq was to 
immediately increase the forensic expertise. Therefore both institutions started in 
2005 to send selected staff to several trainings in Bosnia introducing them to 
international standards of forensic archaeology and forensic anthropology by 
renowned experts in the field, the researcher was among the first group from Iraq 
despite his knowledge and relations with the ICMP before that date. 
 As suggested by Peggy Thomas in her book Forensic Anthropology 
(2003) and as previously mentioned in Chapter 2, three are the main steps 
necessary to collect ante mortem data in a human rights work: interviewing family 
members, excavating the graves, and analysing the remains (Thomas, 182). The 
researcher’s knowledge of the culture and the territory where the massacres took 
place has been important for his search allowing him to deal with the informants, 
the families of the victims and also the population who lived closed to the mass 
graves. The cultural knowledge of the territory helped him to deal with the cultural 
and linguistic differences on the territory in order to collect as much ante mortem 
information possible for a positive identification of the victims. In order to submit 
hard evidence to the Iraqi High Tribunal, the researcher focused not on 
identifying remains of single individuals but on establishing the chains of events 
that led to the killings and on collecting evidence to individuate and identify the 
ones responsible.  
 Human Rights Watch supported this investigation in 2003 just after 
Saddam's Hussein fall. Due to the unstable political situation in Iraq the 
investigation faced many obstacles including the impossibility to reach the 
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geographical regions where the crime took place, in particular the region at the 
border with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Once the investigation team was ready, 
security had to be organised in order to guarantee the safety of its members. The 
team included the researcher and the security personnel and excavations. 
 The first step was interviewing surviving family members. In the Bazanis 
case most of them were women looking for their sons, brothers and husbands. 
This allowed the researcher to collect even the smallest detail as little as a 
recognised medical condition or a piece of cloth fundamental for the 
investigation. The forensic experts at a later stage documented all these details 
in logs, which constituted the basis for a later identification of the victims. For the 
moment, it was important to find the mass grave everybody was talking about 
and collect evidence. The researcher started to travel all over Iraq from Mosul, 
Baghdad, Najaf, Nasiriya, Ammara, Diwaniya, Basrah, Samawa, Karbala, Kut, 
Kirkuk and Diyala. On November 8th 2005 he attended a training in Baghdad 
organized by CPA under the title Investigation of Mass Graves: Excavation, 
Recovery of Evidences and Identification of Remains. The training included: 
introduction to Mass Grave Action Plan, Basic principle of Forensic 
investigations, specific roles of Mass grave investigations, Basic principles of 
archaeology / mass gave excavation, Basic Skeletal anatomy and identification 
techniques, principle of recording and continuity of evidence. After the formation 
of the Government of Iraq, following the Interim Government, in 2006, the 
Ministry of Human Rights in Baghdad continued the cooperation with the ICMP 
and sent selected staff to another training course in Bosnia in 2007. The first 
excavation of a mass grave under Iraqi law and authority of the Ministry of 
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Human Rights, Baghdad, took place in al Haidarija, an-Najaf, in 2008, with 
internationally trained staff. 
  It is not the purpose of this study to explain all the details linked to the 
forensic investigation carried out in the Barzanis’ case. However, it is important to 
say that both the documental evidence and the forensic investigation were 
fundamental in order to understand all the different phases of the abduction and 
disappearance of the Barzanis. 
Who are Barzani Kurds? 
Barzan area is a mountainous area located 100 km from Erbil in the heart of the 
triangle connecting Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The area is divided into fourteen 
regions: Baroshi, Nizari, Dolla byari, Sarem Mazinan, Mamshdyan, Mamdolan, 
Dashkeri, Shwerwan Dere, Dollamari, Walate Roshi, Walate Sheri, Zinya 
Barkale, Davara Gardiyan and Harkien Bnajehe. These fourteen regions contain 
approximately 265 villages.4 Within the Barzan area live a confederation of seven 
tribes (clans), Sherwani, Mizori, Dolamari, Baroshi, Nezari, Harki and Gardi.  
 Some scholars linked the origin of the word Barzani to the ancient Hurrian 
God Barzani. The sheikhs of Barzan are descendants of Amedia princes. 5 
Massoud Barzani, moved to the village of Nafneka, near Barzan, where he 
settled and married. His son continued his work and his grandson, Taj al-Din, a 
talented religious scholar, attracted a great number of followers, and eventually 
founded his own tekkeyeh (special place for praying) in Barzan. His son, Sheikh 
                                                          
4.  See map No. (14) Barzan Location inside Kurdistan. 
5. This family is rooted in the village of Barzan, in Iraqi Kurdistan (but was for centuries the 
Ottoman Empire). Unlike the Shemzini or the Barzinji shaykhs, the Barzanis do not claim any 
famous genealogy; they were obscure mullahs until Taj ad-Din became the khalifa (deputy) of 
Mawlana Khalid (died 1826), who introduced the Naqshbandi tariqa (Sufi order) to Kurdistan. For 
more information see family tree of Barzani Sheikhs. 
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Abdul Rahman, inherited the sheikhdom, and passed it on to his son Sheikh 
Abdullah, who was known for his asceticism and piety. However, it was Abdul 
Salam Barzani that ultimately brought together the seven tribes living in Barzan, 
and forged a common identity for Barzani Kurds. He subscribed to the 
Nakhshbandi School of Islam and was one of the earliest Kurds to offer a tribal 
and religious leadership (Aga and Sheikh). The relative isolation of Barzan from 
other parts of Kurdistan, and the centrality of tribal allegiance in Kurdish society, 
meant that Kurds from Barzan soon adopted the same culture and customs 
under Abdul Salam Barzani, since then they are called ‘Barzani’.  
 After the death of his father, Sheikh Abdul Salam led the Barzan Tekkeyeh 
and the number of his followers grew immensely. He founded a seminary in 
Barzan, which became famous throughout the region. After him, his son 
Mohammad administered the Barzan Tekkeyeh that became an asylum for the 
oppressed and the presecuted of the tribes adjacent to Barzan. He had four 
sons: Sheikh Abdul Salam, Sheikh Ahmed (Khudan), Mohammed Siddique and 
Mustafa Barzani. Sheikh Ahmed Barzani is considered the architect of 
contemporary Barzan. He was a social reformist, and brought changes to the 
way in which members of the tribe expressed loyalty to the Aghas. In particular, 
refusing to accept money or payment from the members of the tribe, breaking 
with the tradition, Sheikh Ahmed endorsed the collective ownership of land and 
resources. 
 People from Barzan soon became known for their spirit of independence 
and for their continuous struggle against the Iraqi state seen as an occupier. This 
spirit prepared them to defend Kurdish rights and values against any outside 
interference. Traditionally, most tribes in Kurdistan held power and influence 
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according to their respective relationships with the governments of the state in 
which they were living. On the contrary, Barzani Kurds did not follow this pattern 
and they always avoided affiliating themselves with the government. For 
example, in the early 20th century, the Barzanis opposed the Ottoman Empire 
and refused to pay taxes to the government in Istanbul. In 1916 Abdul Salam 
Barzani was hanged in Mosul after leading a campaign against the government 
in Istanbul. From 1921 to 1925, Barzani Kurds opposed the creation of Iraq 
refusing to participate in the referendum carried out by the British, instead 
seeking an alternative autonomous Kurdish region in which the Barzanis would 
lead. As their protests failed to secure autonomy, they continued to oppose the 
British representatives between 1925 and 1932. In 1932, Iraqi and British 
authorities decided to build and operate military barracks on Kurdish soil, in 
response to the Barzanis hostile opposition to the project the Royal Air Force was 
deployed to bomb the Barzan area. In February of 1936, the Iraqi government 
launched a significant military operation against the Barzanis. Sheikh Ahmed and 
Mulla Mustafa Barzani responded to the military offensive, but after a relatively 
short battle in June of 1936 the Barzanis were forced to retreat into the 
mountains. Mulla Mustafa sought refuge in Turkey, and upon his return was held 
under house arrest in Sulaimaniyah from 1936 until 1943. In 1943, Mulla Mustafa 
escaped house arrest in Sulaimaniyah, and led his second uprising against the 
Iraqi Government. Upon returning to Barzan, he closed the road accessing the 
region and prevented all government operations and ventures in the area. 
Thanks to this success Mulla Mustafa was able to negotiate a peace settlement 
with Baghdad in January 1944. However, the peace and prominence of Mulla 
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Mustafa was short lived. By October 1945, the Iraqi Army had invaded Barzan 
and burned entire villages and agricultural land.  
 In 1946, the Barzanis defied once again Iraqi authorities when Gazi 
Mohammad formed the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad, Iran. Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani became a Chief of Staff of their armed forces bringing with him 560 
Peshmerga from Iraqi Kurdistan. Mulla Mustafa was in charge of the armed 
forces in Mahabad until the Iranian and the British intervention forced the 
collapse of the Republic in December 1946. Mulla Mustafa fled Iran with more 
than 560 Peshmergas, and found asylum in Russia. Whilst in exile he began to 
campaign publicly in defence of the collective Iraqi Kurdish population.6 
 When Mulla Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq after the 1958 coup, he was 
welcomed as a Kurdish hero and since then has been considered the liberator of 
Iraqi Kurds. The name Barzani has therefore become synonymous with the 
Kurdish nationalist movement and of the Kurdish independence in the region. 
The Barzanis were targeted for two reasons: the first one is due to Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani’s legacy. After his death his two sons Massoud Barzani and Idris Barzani 
assumed the leadership of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). The second is 
the strength of the Peshmerga fighting in support of the Barzani’s cause. 
Approximately 1,000 Peshmerga came from Barzan alone, and the regime saw 
the Barzani’s leadership within the Kurdish community as a primary target on the 
road to crushing Kurdish resistance altogether. The devastation of the social 
structure within Barzan was intended to cause a domino effect, whereby the 
weaker Kurdish tribes would certainly crumble without their impassioned leader.  
                                                          
6.  Shawkat Sheikh Yazdin, La Araz wa bo Mohabad (Erbil, Aras Publishers, 2003). 
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 When Saddam Hussein took over the Presidency of Iraq, the Barzanis 
soon came to occupy a prominent role on his internal security agenda. Under 
Saddam’s direction and close supervision, tens of thousands of Kurdish children, 
women, elderly, and disabled individuals were executed between 1963 and 1991. 
Saddam Hussein, Sadon Shakir, Tarik Aziz, Hikmat Mizban Hadi, Sufyan Mahir 
Hussain and Hamid Yousif Hamadi were held responsible for crimes against the 
Barzani Kurds and have been prosecuted by the Iraqi High Tribunal in relation to 
the attacks. 7  The Iraqi government launched more than 50 extermination 
campaigns against the Kurds and the Barzanis were no exception. 
Forced Relocation and Displacement prior to the Ba’ath Regime 
As explained previously, the Barzanis have witnessed 46 occasions of forced 
relocation, mass displacement and mass exiling from the time of Iraq’s creation 
up until 2003. 8  This chapter will focus only on the events leading to the 
                                                          
7.  In Addition to these perpetrators, there many more who involved in this genocide: Brigadier 
General Jawad Thanon, Brigadier General Mahir Abdul Rashid Mohammed Rashid, Brigadier 
General Mahmoud Shakir said Shahin, Security Colenel Haki Ismael Izat, Abdullah Ali Baria 
(General Security Director of Baghdad), Security Brigadier General Khairi Salih Dawoud (named 
as Khairi Chelmiran), Security Brigadier Genral Abdul Mihsen Khalil Ibrahim, Abdul Fatah 
Mohammed Amin and General Staff Abdul Rahman Khalf Jasem. 
8.  In 1975, after the Algiers Agreement, some of the Barzanis were expelled Iran and many 
others were forcibly relocated to the central and southern areas of Iraq. In Iran, the former Shah 
of Iran, Mohammed Riza Pahlawi, followed the same method of the former Soviet government by 
isolating the Barzanis away from each other and relocating them in areas distant from one 
another. Thus, every two or three families were removed to a distant city or village. They were 
kept very remote from Kurdistan and the nearest point of residence was the city of Tabriz in Iran. 
In 1980, the Barzanis in Iraq and Iran were able to return to their land. Those who were in Iran 
returned to Uriah (also known as Rizaiya), and those who were banished to southern Iraq 
returned to the Erbil governorate. The following are only a few examples. On 10 June 1932, 
approximately 400 Barzani families deserted their properties and possessions when the 
government troops attacked them due to their first uprising against newly established Iraq 
government. Women and children scattered inside Turkish territories, and some 250 armed men 
stayed within the borders to defend their land. Between 1932 and 1934, the Iraqi Army backed up 
by British Royal Air Force fighter jet airplanes, shelled 79 villages in Barzan. All of them were 
destroyed and more than 2,382 families were made homeless. On 11 November 1945, after the 
second uprising of the Barzanis and after the fierce battles between the Barzanis and Iraqi Army, 
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displacement, imprisonment and final death of 8,000 men carried out by the Iraqi 
regime just before and during the Iraq-Iran war. The researcher will analyse each 
crime attributed to the Iraqi government by stating the reason for committing it 
and the different stages in which it was carried out. This effort will be supported 
by new, previously undisclosed documents that the researcher has gathered 
during his fieldwork in search for evidence of the crimes against the Barzanis. As 
already anticipated in the introduction, as minister of Human Rights of the 
Kurdish Regional Government, the researcher had the opportunity to lead a team 
to the places where these atrocities took place.  His research lasted various 
years and has been the source for the award winning BBC documentary entitled 
'Saddam's Road to Hell', broadcasted in 2006. The material gathered by the 
researcher was used as evidence during the trial against Saddam's and his 
generals in front of the IHT. Each of the crimes is analysed here along with the 
causes and consequences for the Barzanis. 
Forced Relocation 
Forced relocation is a crime according to the international law and is illegal under 
all Iraqi constitutions. However, from the day of Iraq’s creation, the state has 
sought to uproot various groups of citizens and forcibly relocate them to other 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the British Air Forces shelled their villages three times on one date using 7-14 fighter aircrafts. 
This caused the destruction of 35 villages and the killing of hundreds of innocent civilians as well 
as wounding hundreds more. More than 15,000 women and children lost their homes and were 
forced to find shelter in caves and secluded areas in Iran. On April 10th 1947, the Iranian Army 
attacked the Barzanis with tanks and artillery, forcing them to return to Kurdistan. They were 
4,567 people under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Barzani, and included 1,550 men, 1,688 
women and 1,329 children. They were kept in detainment facilities, and imprisoned for 2-12 years 
in the jails of Kirkuk, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. Their families were scattered and relocated 
among the villages of the governorate of Dohuk and Erbil. On May 6th 1947, Mulla Mustafa 
Barzani accompanied by 560 Barzani men, started their march to free themselves from the 
clutches of the three states of Iraq, Iran and Turkey. They headed towards the former Soviet 
Union. The Soviet government dealt with them according to the “Divide and Rule” policy so they 
were scattered and relocated far away from each other in distant Soviet regions. 
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areas within and outside Iraq in order to disperse them. As we have seen in more 
detail in Chapter 4, forced displacement was part of a broader plan to integrate 
and assimilate Kurds into the Arab population. Step by step, the process of 
Arabization and forced displacement included almost all of Kurdistan, with 4,500 
villages destroyed. Over the years, before and after the Ba'ath regime, different 
pretexts have been put forward in order to justify this overtly breach of human 
and civil rights, including their being too close to oil fields, for example in Kirkuk, 
Khanaqin, and Makhmor, or because they occupied a territory involved in major 
infrastructure projects as dams, for example Hasinani Areas and Zumar. 
However, it was in particular during the Iraq-Iran war that forced deportation of 
Kurds escalated. With the pretext that they were too close to the border areas 
(1975-1978), many Kurds have been uprooted from their land and many villages 
have been destroyed. In 1982, due to the Iraq-Iran war Barzanis experienced 
another forced displacement. However, it was between 1987 and 1990 that their 
overt support with the intervention of the Peshmarga fighters in the war on the 
Iranian side caused the persecution by the regime. In each of these occasions 
they were imprisoned in different concentration camps the most famous of which 
was Nigrat Al Salam. In all cases the deportation of the Barzanis aimed at 
dividing Kurdish unity and the relations between them, in particular between the 
northern and eastern parts of Kurdistan. At the same time, the regime aimed at 
destroying one of the traditional strongholds of struggle and resistance against 
the central power as well as avoiding that Barzan became a heaven for 
Peshmerga fighters. Ruining Barzan economy and social infrastructure also had 
a detrimental effect on the prisoners held in the concentration camps who 
suffered physical and psychological torture. It is necessary, in order to 
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understand the escalation of the persecution against the Barzanis to analyse 
each one of these phases. 
Forced Displacement due to the Closeness to the Border (1975-1978) 
First Stage 
As part of the Algiers Agreement of 1975, Iraq, Iran and Turkey agreed to create 
a security belt around and to move the all the population living within 10-20 km 
from the border.  The Ba’athist regime implemented this plan immediately and 
started by deporting the Barzanis by moving the clans of Harki binejeh, Nizari 
Baroshi and few Mizuries to the south of Iraq by helicopters, military personnel 
carriers and also by train from Mosul. The deported people were imprisoned in 
the concentration camps numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the villages of Jehaysh, Al 
Khayria and Merejweya adjacent to the towns of Al Shanafiiya, Al Ghadeer and 
Al Faware around Diwaniya. As part of this process, the regime destroyed 76 
villages in Barzan area with explosives. Anyone who attempted to return to 
Barzan was killed.  
Second Stage 
The forced displacement campaign continued on 26 June 1978. The entire 
population of Argush Village, more than 300 families, was deported to the 
concentration camp in Harir. On 7 July 1978, the entire population of Mizuri tribal 
villages was deported along with other the population of some Sherwani villages. 
They were taken to five concentration camps in Erbil city and the adjacent areas. 
At this stage, 77 villages were destroyed. However, this forced displacement was 
quite different from the previous one, as the deportees were given a nominal 
compensation and were allowed to stay in Kurdistan. 
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Forced displacement due to the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) 
When the war between Iraq and Iran broke out, a large part of Kurdistan turned 
into a battlefield. On January 1982 people from the administration centre of 
Sherwan Mazin along with the inhabitants from Kirkamo village were deported to 
the SeBiran concentration camp adjacent to Erbil City. The deportation continued 
into July 1983 when, according to a letter to the Secretary of State dated 29 
March 1989, the Director of General Security reports on the situation in Harir 
area: 
 In July, 1983 during an Iranian, Zionist aggression on Haj 
Umran front and as substantiated the participation of the 
clique descendants of treason the group who are mostly from 
Barzani family an order from the former Director of Public 
security “Dr Fadhel Al-Barrak” to the Directorate of General 
Security in the autonomous region to assemble a big unit from 
members of the security from units and directorates of the 
autonomous region on a top secret mission to commence at 
down on the next day. The mission commenced on 1/8/1983 
with members of the Republican Guards to surround Al-Quds, 
Al-Qadissiya, Qushtappa compounds, which were specifically 
built for Barzani families. All males from Barzani families over 
the age of 15 were arrested and transported using large army 
vehicles prepared for this mission accompanied by military 
force. 
This document shows that massive deportation of Barzanis started in at the very 
beginning of the war and with it the denigration campaign against them. At the 
end of the letter, the director of general security assures that the security 
situation in the region is good and free from infiltration, but more interestingly, he 
makes final remarks on the Barzanis in particular. He says: 
The Barzani clan is known for their disloyalty to the Party, 
Revolution and the country for decades, they have persistently 
resisted the unity of the nation and they were the real traitors. 
They consider themselves the legitimate representatives of the 
Kurdish people; they are full of hatred and animosity. 
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A detailed map of the forced displaced suffered by barzani Kurds can be found 
below. 
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Figure 15 Map No. (14) Forced Displacement of Barzani Kurds (1975 –1978- 1982). 
Source: Author. 
 
178 
 
First Stage 
The Kurds were aware of the fact that this was not their war and that it would not 
serve Kurdish nationalist interests. They rejected “Saddam’s Qadisiya” 9  and 
instead they reinforced their own Peshmerga forces. Peshmerga’s presence 
across Kurdistan diminished Iraqi control over a strategic part of the border and 
allowed Iranian forces to enter the country supported by the insurgents.  On 22 
April 1989, the Iraqi army attacked the villages of Girkal, Kulefan, and Maydan 
adjacent to Mazne and set fire to them. The people of these areas were rounded 
up in the concentration camp in Delziyan. After the increase of Peshmerga 
activities, a forced displacement campaign took place. The people of 34 Mazne 
villages, with a large number of Dolamaris, were deported to the concentration 
camp of Sardaw. 
 In a top secret and personal telegram number 5783 dated 24 August 1987 
reproduced in the appendix of this chapter, the Secretary of the Presidency of the 
Republic writes to “Comrade” Ali Hassan Al Majeed regarding Barzani families. 
The orders are to ignore any attempt by any part to investigate the destiny of the 
people deported in the concentration camps. The telegram recommends:  
Due to the persistence the criminal Masoud Al-Barzani holds on 
the issue of Bazani families from Erbil governorate in Qushteppa 
complex and upon the indirect communication with his entourage 
since 1983 until now due to this issue (Barzani families) being 
outlined as the main condition to start any serious negotiations 
with the Leadership of the Party and Revolution… his Excellency 
the Commander in Chief has instructed all General Security 
personnel and its apparatus that deals with the Kurdish issue - 
whom they may be contacted by third parties - that their response 
be one and unified that ( nobody except the country’s leadership 
knows anything about this matter and that the main issue is more 
                                                          
9 . Saddam Hussein named his eight years war with Iran as “Qadisiyat Saddam” he 
returned back the name of the first Qadisiya in Islam of Saad Bin Waqas the Islamic 
leader who occupied Iran - Iraq during the Islamic era. 
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crucial than those families). This should be the response to any 
enquiry should anyone ask about the whereabouts of these 
families. 
This document is important because it reconstructs the chronology of the 
deportations in the different movements, but it also shows very clearly that the 
government was aware of what was going on in the area and that it gave orders 
to ignore any attempt of investigation by third parties. 
Second Stage 
At the beginning of 1990, the Ba'athist regime informed the people of Mergasor 
district and the inhabitants of Goretu collective village both inhabited by the 
deportees from the Mizuri since 1978, that they would be deported again to the 
concentration camps of Besirme and Shakholan within the Erbil governorate and 
Shaqlawa district. This plan was implemented on 6 June 1990, only a few months 
from the Spring Uprising of 1991, all the population was deported and the 
buildings of Mergasor district together with those of Gorato collective village were 
destroyed. The following table shows the data collected on the forced 
displacements carried out from the Barzani area from 1975 to 1990 complete 
with the number of individuals, family and infrastructure destroyed. 
 
Barzan Area Forced displacement Data: 
Date Villages 
  Destroyed 
Head 
families 
Schools 
destroyed 
Mosques 
destroyed 
Clinic 
destroyed 
18th .11.1975 76 1479 5 27 3 
7th .7.1978 77 2136 15 28 4 
1st.1.1982 2 165 5 1 1 
10th.5.1989 34 485 2 4  
6th.6.1990 8 440 3 3 2 
Total 197 4705 30 63   10 
Source: Author 
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Mining Barzan Area  
In addition to the forced deportation and the destruction of their territory, in order 
to prevent the Barzanis to return to their land, the regime in obvious breach of 
international laws, planted millions of mines all over Kurdistan. It is estimated that 
this policy caused approximately 13,000 mine victims between 1991 and 2006. 
Between 75-100 mine fields can be found in the following areas: Piran Mountains 
and the surrounding areas, Pirfat, Sherwan Mazin, Keri Spindare, Segrkan, 
Khware Gweza, Soura, Gali Balinda, Pires Mountans, Bermeeze, Mergasur, Sere 
Bedarin, Marrane, Ber Siyav, Zeeniya Sarke, Kulekan, Resu Meran, Kala 
Salimkhan, Kaniya Linja, etc. 10   Thousands of mines of various types were 
planted in the farms and cornfields and many areas close to the Iranian border 
are still littered with mines. This in flagrant breach of human rights and against 
the UN resolutions that forbid planting mines at a massive scale in populated 
areas. As a consequence, more than 788 square km of territory is polluted and 
cannot be used for agriculture.11  
 The percentage of the mined areas accordingly to the survey undertaken 
by the Kurdistan Regional Mine Program assisted by NGOs between 2004 and 
2006 appears in the table below. Fortunately, after the liberation of Kurdistan, 
NGOs, the UN and the Kurdistan Region Mine Program cleared many minefields 
in a united effort.12 
 
 
Table of damages caused by mines from 2004 to 2006  
                                                          
10. Report of the Kurdistan Region Mine Action, Annual Report 2010. 
11. Ako Aziz Mohammed,”Mine Problem in Kurdistan” (in Kurdish) Khazir magazine, No. 1222 
date 22 July 1998. 
12.  Kurdistan Region Mine Program, 2007 Report. 
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Township Mined 
Areas 
Size in 
KM2 
Killed Wounded 
Mergasor 25 11,544,5 22 23 
Barzan   1   6.0 29 64 
Piran 25   7,56 18 5 
Sherwan 19 14,640,5 34 48 
Mazene 10 8,247,5 12 3 
Total 80 42,592,5 115    153 
 
Source: Anfal Center in Barzan, 2007. 
Concentration Camps  
Kurdish villages were always the sources of powerful support for the Kurdistan 
Liberation Movement because they supplied the revolution with food and other 
life necessities, as well as offering a strong recruitment base.  As a consequence, 
the Ba’athist regime planned to destroy every Kurdish village in order to cut off 
the revolutionaries' lifeline and to defeat the Kurdish National Liberation 
Movement. After 1974, as a result of a series of consultations, the regime 
conceived the plan of deporting the inhabitants of the Kurdish villages to the 
concentration camps under the misleading name of “Agricultural Reform”.13  In 
addition, under these pretext the Ba’athist built more than 100 concentration 
camps in Kurdistan some of them with the misleading names of “Modern 
Villages”, “Socialist Villages” and “Civilised Villages”.  
                                                          
13.  Dr. Aza Shekhani,'Al Anfal in the framework of Building Concentration Camps (in Kurdish), 
Brayati Centre Magazine, no. 24, p.438. 
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 According to the evidence gathered, the inhabitants of Barzan were 
deported from 18 November 1975 until 6 June 1990 to 13 collective villages near 
the cities of Erbil, Shaqlawa and Soran: Gortu, Sardaw, Delziyan, Diyana, Harir, 
Basirme, Kesneza, Bahrike, Shaklawa, Sebiren, Qushtapa, Qadisiya and 
Qushtapa Quds. These collective state-built villages were really like 
concentration camps or jails in open space lacking all the basic life conditions. 
The prisoners were always under the survillance and the watchful eyes of the 
security authorities. All their movements were strictly watched and they could not 
go anywhere without prior written permission. The men were forcibly recruited as 
soldiers in the Iraqi army or the popular army. The teenagers were forced to join 
the Ba'ath Youth Organizations and the children had to be trained as the avant-
garde groups of the Ba’athists and join the “Qadisiya Saddam” to be later sent to 
the front line to fight against Iran. 
 In the camps the Ba’athists arrested and tortured people arbitrarily and 
they managed to control everybody's moment through a vast web of intelligence 
that made life in the camps very insecure. Detainment, disappearance, 
oppression and death under torture became daily routine. The Ba’athists 
murdered so many people under torture and handicapped others forever. 
Hundreds of old men and women, children, mothers and infants were imprisoned 
under the suspicion that their fathers, husbands, sons, daughters or relatives 
joined the Peshmerga forces or escaped to Iran. The inhabitants of these camps 
demonstrated against the inhuman treatment they received from the authorities, 
but the Ba’athists reacted by shooting them in cold blood.  In the Harir camp, for 
example, they executed six men and women without trial in front of their relatives, 
friends and families. This sort of summary execution happened to other people 
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detained in other concentration camps. Others were arrested or disappeared 
fnever to be found again.14 
Genocide  
Barzanis' displacement and incarceration in concentration camps constituted only 
the first steps towards their organised mass killings and disappearance. The 
reasons for such an escalation in violence are to be found in the powerful 
relationship between the Barzanis and their Sheikhs as well as their loyalty to the 
Kurdish nationalist cause and refusal to participate in the state killings ordered by 
the government. Traditionally the Barzanis have been very active supporters of 
the Kurdish national movement. Ofra Bengio talking about the influence of the 
Barzanis on the Kurdish national movement in 1980s says: 
But there were still unmistakable echoes in statements by 
Kurdish leaders of the belief that the division of Kurdish 
territory was a historical injustice. The term wahda wataniyya 
Kurdiyya (Kurdish national unity) was still employed, and the 
influence of Kurdish movements in Iraq, and of the leadership 
of Mustafa Barzani, extended to Kurdish areas outside Iraq. 
(Bengio, 120) 
 
The Iraqi troops lost part of the strategic area of Hajji Omeran near the border 
with Iran. So, instead of admitting that the Iraqi troops were not in control, the 
Ba'athists tried to justify their losses by accusing the Barzanis.  
 The Middle East Human Rights Watch in their 1994 report “Genocide in 
Iraq and Anfal Operation against the Kurds”15 stated that the reason for arresting 
                                                          
14.  Photos of the mass graves discovered by the researcher can be found in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
15.  Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq, The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds (United 
States, HRW, 1993). 
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the Barzanis was because the town of Haji Omeran was taken by Iranian troops. 
But the whole thing was no less than a Ba’athist conspiracy.  
First stage 
On July 29th 1983, Sheikh Othman, son of Sheikh Ahmad Barzani (one of the 
main leaders of all Barzan), was deported with his son Sheikh Emad from Erbil to 
Baghdad under the pretext of a meeting with the regime. The following day, on 
30 July 1983, the Barzani Sheikhs and the Barzanis living in Baghdad and 
surrounding areas were rounded up and detained. Prior to the genocide, a small 
group of Barzanis moved voluntarily to Baghdad to avoid the continuous violence 
and uprisings occurring in Kurdistan. Some of those relocated close to Mulla 
Mustafa’s immediate family. However, despite their active disassociation from the 
Kurdish rebellion in the north of the country, they were the first to be targeted by 
the regime. 
Second Stage  
 A huge Republican Guard Brigade, supported by helicopters, surrounded the 
concentration camp of Quds and Qadissyia in Qushtapa Township. The Ba’athist 
soldiers and officers entered the camp and spoke through loud speakers calling 
on the people to attend a meeting in Kirkuk city and advising that they would be 
brought back afterwards. However, the inhabitants did not believe these words 
and did not respond to this call. Therefore, the troops attacked the houses, 
searching each one of them and arresting everyone between 10 and 90 years 
old. Later, buses with black curtains on the windows deported them to an 
unknown place16. 
                                                          
 
16.    Interviews with many female eye witnessed from victims’ families.  
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Document No. 84 from the Director of Public Security, dated 29 March 1983, to 
the Secretary of the Commander in Chief, (the Personal Secretary of Saddam 
Hussein) reproduced in the appendix confirmed the events: 
Upon your Excellency’s request, find below information at hand 
about the town of Harir in the governorate of Erbil. Al-Barak, 
the Director of Public Security, who ordered the Directorate of 
General Security in the Autonomous Region, and Directorate of 
General Security in Erbil, to form a special unit led by the 
Republican Guards in order to surround the three main 
components of Barzanis, Al Quts, Al Qadasir, and Qushtapa in 
order to capture all males from Barzani families who are over 
15 years old, and transfer them to Baghdad in order to be 
received by Sector 3 of the Directorate of General Security in 
Baghdad, who can transfer these detainees to Al Muthana 
governorate. 17  
 
Third Stage 
On 10 August 1983, the same method was used to siege the concentration camp 
of Behrike, Harir and Dianna where most of the houses were searched18. The 
men were arrested and taken in army buses to Baghdad, and from there, to Al-
Muthana governorate. According to the researcher's fieldwork, these two groups, 
a total of 2,225, were taken from Baghdad by a special unit to Nigrat al Salman, 
more than 300 km south of Baghdad (N 295l, 14.24, E 4557, 13.08) then they 
were moved to Abu Aljad (N 2949, 13.00, E 4555 11.83) and Laya (N 2951, 
2375, E 4554, 0330). Originally, these two locations were collection camps built 
by Abdul Karim Qasim to settle Bedouins moving between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. 
The researcher has discovered that the Barzanis were killed in Busaya, between 
40-45 km from the two locations and their bodies were found in mass graves 35 
km from the triangle border of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.  
                                                          
17.  See Telegram No. 84, dated 29 March 1983, from the Directorate of Public Security to the 
Secretary of the Commander in Chief in the appendix of this chapter. 
18.  For the details of this operation see the appendixes at the end of the thesis. 
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Document No. 84 mentioned earlier stated the following: 
By orders from the former Director of Public Security to 
fabricate charges for the important ones, total of 667 charges 
were laid for 16 cases. These cases were sent to the 
Presidency of Revolutionary Court, the verdict was the death 
penalty, no death certificates were sent out and no charges 
were laid for the rest of the group, 1558 persons. The sum of 
194,648,440 Iraqi Dinar was received from the deportees and 
deposited to the account of the Director of Public Security 
Office.  
 
Fourth Stage 
On 10 October 1983, the Security Forces put the concentration camps of AL 
Qudis and Qadissiya under siege. The young teenagers who were hidden in the 
previous stage in wardrobes and refrigerators by their mothers were now 
arrested and taken to unknown places. 
Fifth Stage 
From 1983 to 1990 the Ba’athist assassinated individual Barzanis, and 8,000 
male Barzanis disappeared without a trace. The researcher has (individuated) 
their mass graves in an investigation lasted fourteen years and still on going.  
Sixth Stage 
On 23 August 1988, another genocide campaign against the Barzanis came to 
an end with the shelling of Barzan with chemical weapons as part of the last face 
of Anfal campaign, which ended on 6 September 1988. The Anfal campaign will 
be analysed in the following chapter. 
The following map summarizes the previous phases. 
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Figure 16 Map No. (15) Forced Displacement and Genocide of Barzani Kurds (1975-
1980- 1983) Source: Author. 
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Court Decision 
The evidence gathered by the researcher was used against the defendants and 
contributed to the final verdict. It was fundamental in order to establish individual 
and institutional responsibilities for all the charges contested as from the final 
ruling of the IHT. On 3 May 2011, the Iraqi High Criminal Court, Chamber 1, 
formed a Court under the Presidency of Judge Asso Mohammed Sofi, and the 
membership of Abdul Kathim Hussain Al Sheikh, Jabar Dshar Utaiwi, Afar Asyab 
Ibrahin, and Jalil Abbas Ala. The court found the former Minister of Interior and 
Member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), Sadon Shakir Mahmod, 
former Minister and Member of the RCC, Tarik Aziz, and Director of Ba’ath Party 
North Branch and Member of the RCC, Hikmat Mozban, guilty of genocide under 
Article 11(1)(a) of the High Iraqi Criminal Court Statute no. 10 (2005), of forced 
displacement as a crime against humanity under Article 12(1)(d) of the Statute, 
of torture as a crime against humanity under Article 12(1)(J) of the Statute, and 
for committing inhumane acts which cost high pain and psychological and 
physical harm against humanity under Article 12(1)(l) of the Statute. Sofyan 
Mahir Hassan, in charge of the Republican Guard Brigade was convicted for 
genocide under Article 11(a), and torture as a crime against humanity under 
Article 12(1)(j). Hamid Yossif Hamadi, Special Secretary of Saddam Hussein, 
was convicted for committing inhumane acts causing serious psychological and 
physical harm as a crime against humanity under Article 12(1)(l) of the Statute.19  
 
                                                          
19.  See pages (36,37, 38) of the Case No 4/C2/2009 of Barzani Genocide (dated 3/5/2011) at 
IST. The researcher was invited as an International forensic expert for this case in order to 
present his findings at Busaya 1 mass grave.   
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Conclusion 
It is evident from this case that the state increased its skills, scope of operation 
and atrocities by targeting a single group in a very short span of time.  It did this 
by neglecting the judicial system and by acting in secrecy. The murder of 8,000 
Barzanis constituted the blueprint, a sort of pilot project, for a regime that grew 
more confident in the perpetration of genocide. 
 As for the two cases presented before, there is a lack of balance between 
the crime and punishment of the crimes committed. The organization required to 
carry out a similar operation relied on the complicity of different sections of 
Government. In addition, the direct link of these crimes to the leadership is 
demonstrated by the documents found, which points directly to the political high 
command. Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein’s early death after he was sentenced 
for a minor crime, prevented Kurdish people and Barzanis from having their 
justice. Only few individuals, mentioned above have been charged and tried for 
the disappearance and mass murder of the Barzanis denying Kurdish of their 
right to know the whole truth about these events.  As for the previous cases this 
hindered profoundly any possibility of reconciliation and it is also making difficult 
the integration among the different populations in the country.  
 Enforced disappearance has a long-lasting effect on the families of the 
missing person, way beyond the actual crime. The large-scale, state-organized 
deportations of whole groups of populations had a devastating effect on the 
society. The impact is lingering on even after the oppressive regime has been 
toppled off. Therefore the crime of enforced disappearance is defined as 
'ongoing crime' and there should be no time bar for the prosecution of the 
perpetrators. However, this is not applicable in Barzanis case. Most of these 
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responsible have not been charged or tried and the families are still waiting for 
some kind of closure and justice. In the final chapter the researcher will provide 
some recommendations regarding the policies that the Iraqi federal government 
along with the strategies the KRG should adopt in order to foment the 
reconciliation among between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs. For the moment it is 
important to say that investigating these atrocities constituted an important step 
in order to tell people the truth and to avoid the repetition of these crimes in the 
future.  
 This research and its fieldwork constitute the only effort made in order to 
exhume and identify the missing Barzanis. Mass graves were discovered in 2005 
and 2013. The remains of 606 victims were returned to Kurdistan for burying with 
dignity.  
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Photos from Barzanis’ mass graves 
 
Figure 17 Barzani Kurd Blindfolded Head at Busaya  1 mass grave 2005. Source: Author. 
 
Figure 18 .Barzani Kurd Blindfolded head at Busaya  2 November 2013.Source:  Author. 
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Figure 19 Barzani ID and Iraqi notes and coins. From Busaya 1 2005. Source: Author. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20 Watch and wedding ring Busaya 1 2005. Source: Author. 
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Figure 21 Piece of Koran for prayers from Busaya  1 mass grave for Barzani Kurds. 
Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 22 Damaged Head of Barzani Kurds from Busaya 2 mass graves, November 2013. 
Source: Author. 
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Figure 23 The researcher at Barzani Kurds Mass Grave Busaya 1, July 2005. Source: 
Author. 
 
 
Figure 24 Researcher at Barzani mass grave Busaya 2, July – November 2013. Source: 
Author. 
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Figure 25 The Researcher cleaning human remains in Busaya 2 Mass Grave. November 
2013. Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 26 The Researcher is preparing the remains of a Barzani Kurd from Busaya 2 
Mass Grave (November 2013).Source: Author.
196 
 
Chapter Seven 
Anfal Campaign (State Engineered National Project) 
Introduction 
The fourth crime considered in this thesis is the Anfal Campaign. After accepting 
the concept of genocide with the persecution of Faylee Kurds and implementing 
a blueprint policy with the mass murder of the Barzanis, the state was ready to 
engineer its national project against the Kurds. As will be explained more in detail 
later in the chapter and in contrast with the previous crimes analysed, the state 
did not abuse the judicial system nor acted with speed and secrecy in order to 
commit this crime. The Anfal campaign was conducted with the participation of 
most of the state agencies and supported by a wide and strong propaganda 
campaign against the Kurds were portraited as traitors of Iraq and Islam.   
 As for the previous cases, the researcher was directly involved in the 
process to gathering all the evidence to present the case in front of the Iraqi High 
Tribunal. It is important before introducing the events, to highlight that, because 
of the fieldwork carried out by the researcher the sources used in this chapter are 
mainly primary sources some of which still undisclosed. Most of them were 
gathered by the researcher in his role as minister of Human Rights of the Kurdish 
Regional Government between 2001 and 2005. All the information has been 
collected in two different stages: the first one pre 2003, were documents held in 
the United States since the uprising of 1991. The researcher accessed them in 
order to organize the fieldwork on site. The second lot of information was 
gathered after 2003 and the fall of Saddam Hussein. These came from former 
collaborators of the regime and from people working with the Ba’ath party. In 
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order to investigate these events, the researcher as in the case of the Barzanis 
participated in a fieldwork whose purpose was to dig the mass graves in order to 
gather the forensic evidence necessary and to build up the case against the Iraqi 
government and to identify personal and institutional responsibilities. Some of the 
photographs taken during the excavation are reproduced in the appendix to this 
chapter. After a short background to the Anfal campaign, this chapter will 
reconstruct, through the evidence gathered, how it has been considered 
genocide by the IHT and more recently by the international community. Later, it 
will explain the legal outcome of the trial and their consequences for the current 
coexistence of Iraqi Arabs and Kurds and the challenges of the Kurdish Regional 
Government in trying to heal this fracture in post 2003 Iraq.  
Background to Anfal Campaign 
In his book “Saddam’s word: Political Discourse in Iraq” (1998), Ofra Bengio 
offers a crucial analysis of the political discourse used by the Ba’ath party and 
Saddam Hussein in the different stages of their power. The word(s) used, the 
way the regime defined its friends and its enemies, the influence of the 
philosophy of ‘Arab Unity’, was always present in the regime’s discourse. 
However, the manipulation of the different discourses used by the regime during 
its years in power reflect the inevitable changes in the balance of power and the 
particular historical circumstances in which they find themselves. At the 
beginning of its rule, the regime pretented to adopt a secular stance. There is no 
mention in its rhetoric of any religious content, not even when the regime was 
promoting the identification between being an Arab and a Muslim. It was during 
the Iran-Iraq war that the Ba’ath party broke its silence on religion and the 
rhetoric started to change. Bengio describes this change as follows: 
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This approach – implying the secular character of the state 
and the separation of state and religion – remained official 
policy for only a few years, until the early 1980s. Cracks 
started to appear in it even earlier, caused by the pressures 
of domestic developments. The above warning against the 
politicization of religion notwithstanding, the association for 
Religious Guidance (Jam’iya al-dini) “in the light of Ba’ath 
principles” became active in the middle of 1977, if not earlier. 
Set up by the party, it apparently served as an instrument of 
domestic intelligence gathering in religious quarters. Later, it 
was renamed the Committee for Religious Indoctrination 
(Lajnat al-taw’iya al-diniyya) (Bengio, 178). 
 
This trend becomes even more evident at the beginning of the 1980s and the war 
with Iran. In that moment in history Saddam and the Ba’ath party needed to divert 
the attention from the internal confrontation to the external war. In doing so their 
propaganda had to change in order to harvest the wider possible consensus. In 
this context references to the Qur’an became very common in Saddam’s 
speeches that started portraying all the enemies of Iraq as infidels and non-
Muslims justifying the war in religious term. For example, as referred by Bengio, 
on one occasion Saddam quotes the battle of Badr (13 March 624 or 17 
Marathan 2nd of the Hegira) making a direct reference to an episode in which a 
small group of Muslim defeated an enemy three times their number quoting 
directly from Al-Anfal surat.  
 This strategy suggested a swift change not only in the language but also in 
the target of Saddam’s regime and the Ba’ath party: starting from this moment 
they were not a nation struggling against western imperialism along with the 
Soviet Union. As of that point in time an enemy of the state would be defined as 
those who are against Saddam, the defender of real Islam. This in tune with the 
new rhetoric promoting the identification between Saddam and the prophet 
Mohammed. In an effort to wipe out external and internal resistance, the regime 
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started to refer to the holy texts. It was in this context of high religious rhetoric 
that the campaign against the Kurds started. Saddam wanted to exploit the 
religious meaning of Anfal, which is associated with the distribution of booty 
amongst Muslim fighters. 1  This had the purpose to condition the army’s 
psychology around the material gain when implementing the operation rewarding 
the soldiers for their combat performance and victory. In fact the Al-Anfal Surat 
verse 41 in the manipulated version of the regime was intended to incite Muslims 
to fight against the infidels with the promise of the booty. It says:  
Know that whatever spoils you take, a fifth of it belongs to 
God and the prophet, and to family and orphans and the 
poor, and the traveller, if you believe in God and what we 
sent down on our servant on the Day of Deliverance, the day 
the two forces met. God is powerful over everything. (Qur’an 
in the translation by Arthur J. Droge, p. 110) 
 
As well as to incite Iraqis to fight war, these words were intended to scare the 
enemy in this case the Kurds with the threat of depriving them of their land and 
wealth. According to the Qur’an, early Muslims fought in harsh conditions, and in 
order to call more people to the fight the enemy’s booty was distributed among 
the conquring soldiers. 2  Considering himself the custodian of Islam and the 
representative of Mohammed, Saddam’s intent was that of justifying the atrocities 
he was planning to commit against the Kurds.3 This was achieved by accusing 
them of betrayal and treachery, in the same way the prophet Mohammed did with 
the tribes that opposed him “Bani Qinqaa” and “Bani Natheer”. By using the same 
words 4 to address the Kurds and their national movement, Saddam and his 
numerous security organizations created the ideological conditions and 
                                                          
1.  Mahdi Razak Allah Ahmad, Al Sira Al Nabawiya fi thawe al Masader al asliya, Riyad 2011. 
2.  Al Sheikh Mohammed AL Khothari, Nour AL Yakin fi Sirat Said Al Morslin, Beirut 2004. 
3.  Abdul Aziz Rashid Al Ubaidi, Min Maarek Al Muslimin Fi Ramathan, Al Riyad, 1994. 
4.  Abdul Malik Bin Hisham, Al Sira Al Nabawiya, Tahkik Mustafa Al Saka wa Al Akhareen. 
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justification for their annihilation. In addition, the reference to the Al-Anfal Surat 
verse 17, mentioned also by Bengio, in which the prophet says: “You did not kill 
them, but God killed them, and you did not throw when you threw, but God threw, 
and (he did that) in order to test the believers (with) a good test from Himself. 
Surely God is hearing, knowing”, strongly suggest to who ever is listening that 
this war against the infidels is a holy and legitimate one. 
The State Crime of Al-Anfal 
The fact that the Kurdish region has been at the centre of the war against Iran 
contributed greatly to the planning and staging of the Al-Anfal campaign. In 
addition, by 1988 the Iraqi government, confident of the support of the Arab 
countries counted on the international support as well due to the balance of 
power existing in the area5. The political situation in Iraq during that period and 
the manner in which it managed the state, as well as the regional and local 
circumstances of Kurdistan, required a political leadership in order to gain the 
national rights for the Kurds. In the meantime, the Kurds called for the 
Peshmerga to defend them and mounted pressure on the government to respond 
to their demands in achieving Kurdish national goals. International politics and 
the interests of the superpowers have hindered the Kurds from seeking their full 
rights as well as been unable to secure its full national rights. The conflict 
between both parties was not resolved not even when international diplomacy 
could be used6. Regarding a possible reaction by the international community; it 
is interesting to report a conversation that Arif Qurbani mentioned in his book 
                                                          
5. Cameron R. Hume, The United Nations, Iran, and Iraq: How Peacekeeping Changed, An 
Institution for the Study of Diplomacy, Indiana University Press, 1994. 
6.  Aida Ali Sir Aldeen, Al Masalla Al Kurdiya fi Malaf Al Siyasa Al Dawliya (Beirut: Dar Al Itifak Al 
Arabiya, 2000). 
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entitled Shahid Halakani Anfal published in Sulaimaniya in 2002, a conversation 
occurred in 1983 between the representative of the PUK Mr. Fraydon Abdul Kadir 
and the Iraqi foreign minister Tarik Aziz. With the following threatening words, the 
Iraqi minister predicted what it would happen to the Kurds at the end of the war 
against Iran: 
We will not fall down, never miscalculate, because we have full 
back up from international community in order to control Iran. 
One day this war will be over and if you go back to your national 
front you will do a good job for us and we will not forget it, but if 
not you do at the end of the war which will definitely come one 
day, we will turn the army we have against Iran against you and 
we will destroy you completely. Your nation and your country 
and nobody in the international community will hear your voice. 
This is what you have to tell your leaders. (Arif Qurbani, 2002) 
 
This encouraged the authorities to divert their troops far away from the combat 
line with Iran in order to achieve military and psychological gains on the ground, 
to govern the torn post-war Iraq and get rid of the frustration that accompanied 
them throughout the eight years of war.7 In fact, the war against Iran diverted the 
attention from the internal insurgence. Saddam Hussein decided that this was the 
moment to eliminate the Kurds and to guarantee a smooth post war period. The 
central government in Kurdistan during and after the campaign had huge military 
presence including three military corps, reserve of Republican Guards backed by 
Kirkuk and Mosul air force bases and strategically Al-Bakr airbase, also 
supported by field Wings Aviation army helicopters from Erbil, Suleimania and 
Mosul. Further, it consisted of intelligence backed by the North and East 
intelligence office as well as by the Autonomous Region Intelligence Directorate 
and the Military Intelligence from every brigade and corps and Erbil, Suleimania 
                                                          
7.  Abdul Halim Abu Gazala, Iraq-Iran War1980-1988 (Cairo, Al Ahram Publisher, 1993) pp. 135-
140.  
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and Dohuk Security Directorates. They all have the skill and unlimited capacity 
reporting to one united military, political body. There was also a network of light 
regiments (some times named National Defense Battalions, National Defense 
Regiments, in Kurdish they have been named as Jash) from local faithful to the 
regime covering the region, who could move in the battlefield without restriction. 
As for the Kurdish side in the battlefield, it comprised no more than 35,000 
Peshmerga fighters from the two leading leadership of Kurdistan Democratic 
Party, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, however, the constant conflict between 
the two parties it undermined the unity of the combat efforts. They were armed 
with light machine guns “Berno or Kalashnikov”, mortars and anti-tank launchers 
(RPG7) and some fixed anti-aircraft. Despite the superiority of the central 
government forces; there was no room for negotiations, and the Kurds were 
inevitably drawn to war.8 
 The government chose a suitable time to carry out the Anfal campaign, the 
Iraqi forces had achieved tangible success in the battlefield with Iran and 
adjusted the balance of forces with Iranians. The Iraqi army was aware that a 
curtain of primary and supportive fire that will cause a shock in the opponent and 
lift their morale. It prepared for the fight in the spirit of anticipation to gain rewards 
the leadership has promised which will give them further combat motivation. To 
sustain morale, the leadership mobilised a huge media, administrative and 
psychological effort to create a challenging atmosphere. 
 As for the Kurdish side, it entered the battleground and had no choice but 
to defend themselves. In the circumstances, the whole Iraq was silent as if this is 
irrelevant to them; the international community was silent as the perpetrators 
                                                          
8.  Meeting with Ezzadin Barwari, member of KDP political Bureau was in charge of Kirkuk sector 
during Anfal campaign, Erbil, October 2011.  
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wished. The Peshmerga prepared to defend the land, but unfortunately, due to 
the overwhelming power of the Iraqi army they had to retreat.9 
Premeditated Crime 
It is important, in order to understand the development of the events and also to 
analyse the legal frame in which the responsible were tried to present evidence 
that show the premeditation of this crime. In contrast with the other crimes 
analysed until now, this one and the one committed in Halabja, involved the 
complicity of many military and political authorities. As we will see more in detail 
later in the chapter, the reason lies in the evidence that Saddam Hussein himself 
as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ordered to formation of Special 
Forces to carry out the operation. The outcome was a huge combat force formed 
by three corps based in Kirkuk, Mansouriet Al-Jabal and Erbil. When orders were 
handed down from the General Command to commence the operation, the Air 
force, and started a propaganda campaign on two fronts: the first one had the 
purpose to convince the Iraqis and the international community of the need for 
this campaign, in order to keep peace and guarantee the unity of the country. 
The second one had the purpose of reducing the strength of the Kurdish 
resistance by dividing and isolating them from their national movement by issuing 
a general amnesty to all who fought against the central government. This was 
achieved by issuing an explicit decree from the Revolution Command Council, 
the highest authority in the country signed by Saddam Hussein himself.  
 The events occurred in the immediate aftermath of the Anfal campaign 
prove the intent of resolving the Kurdish issue by destroying them. In fact, the 
                                                          
9.  Meeting Ezzadin Barwari, Ibid. 
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documents show that this amnesty was used to trap the Kurdish youth in 
concentration camps. In addition Ba’ath Party Committees were formed 
supported by intelligence and security units in order to check the applicability of 
the amnesty on every individual case. Those committees had the power to detain 
and isolate whoever fell into pre-established categories (male, female, loyal, not 
loyal, good tribe, bad tribe, etc.) regardless of the amnesty. 10  All these 
organisations had the intent to weaken the Kurdish National Movement and its 
combat ability by blocking the enlisting of fighters into its ranks. After the deadline 
set for the amnesty, the field commanders received orders from the government 
to detain in concentration and then execute 1,800 youths who posed a risk to the 
country. They were executed on 21 December 1988.11 
The Anfal Campaign Plan and Implementation Phases 
The General Command of the Armed Forces identified two areas for their 
operations; the first stretched from Kalar (Lat. 34.638 Long 45 03 30) in Diyala 
(Lat. 33.735 Long 45 03 36), south to the east of Tuz (Lat. 35. 303333 Long. 
44.3308333) in Salahaddin extending to east of Tobzawa and Dibs (Lat.  35. 7 
Long. 44 .11) in Kirkuk (Lat. 35 468 long. 44 35400), then to Shaqlawa (Lat. 36 
398 0 Long 44 33 777) in Erbil in the north to further stretch eastward to the 
Iran-Iraq border to descend toward the south to Rania (Lat. 36 258 Long. 44 
88100) then Dokan lake (Lat.  35 929 Long. 44 9620) north of Suleimania (Lat.  
35 56 17 Long. 45 44110). In the south-west down to the west of Halabja (Lat. 
35 5617 Long. 45 4411) then Qaratu (Lat. 34.6066667 Long. 45.49 22 22 2) 
and Kalar (Lat.  34.638 Long. 45 32 22) composing a rectangular battlegrounds 
                                                          
10. Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, A Middle East Watch Report, 
Human Rights Watch, New York, 1993. 
11. ibid. 
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occupying a large part of Kurdistan. The second area stretched from North of 
Mosul towards Duhok and Zakho, to move towards to the east and end in the 
south creating a semi-circle shape as outlined in the map below: 
 
 
Figure 27 Map No. (16)  8 Stages of Anfal. Source: Author. 
 
The government prepared the battleground to achieve the greatest possible 
physical and psychological destruction to the Kurds, bolstered by the intention to 
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clear the area and to make it uninhabitable. The authorities did not only bomb 
villages but flattened especially the ones that resisted and burned them to 
prevent the residents from returning.12 Ali Hassan Al-Majeed13 was given the full 
authority as the commander of the security, military and ground operations. He 
was given the absolute power from the president and the Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces.14  
 The military operations began on 23 February 1988 and expanded 
gradually to include the First and Fifth corps on several fronts: Qadir Karam, 
Sordash, Raniya and Qaladiza. The Bahdinan region was assigned to the fifth 
corps, while the second corps was given a minor role in the region. The main aim 
of the campaign was to invade the region from Chamchamal (Lat. 35.53400 
Long. 44 8310), Bazian (Lat. 35 5999 Long. 45 137 11), Qaradagh (Lat.  35 31 
00 Long, 45 39 99) to Kalar border and the surrounding areas depending on 
infantry backed by tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Jet fighters were 
involved in the attack. Their mission was to attack the Peshmerga with close 
range air raids and with guided rockets and machine guns. 
The Eight Phases of Anfal 
First Anfal (21 February 1988 – 18 March 1988)   
Artillery and air bombardment started in the morning of 23rd of February 1988. 
After several hours in the same day the first corps attacked the headquarters of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and its command centres in Sergelo and Bergelo. 
                                                          
12.  Rauff Akrawi, Al Hamla Al Badinan wa Awtha al lajieen (Erbil: Dar Aras, 2002). 
13.  Ali Hassan Al Majid (30 November 1941 - 25 January 2010), He was first cousin of Saddam 
Hussein. He was appointed to many positions during Ba’ath Party’s era in Iraq such as Interior 
minister, Defence minister, and chief of Iraqi intelligence service and governor of Kuwait during 
Iraq’s invasion.   
14.  See RCC decree No. 160 on 29 March 1987.appendix no.(1) 
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The troops continued their close fight backed by heavy artillery and air support 
for three weeks. The Peshmerga resistance was intense. As the map below 
shows during this stage the battlegrounds covered about 1,154 square 
kilometres. 
 
Figure 28 Map No. (17) Anfal Campaign Stage 1. Source: Author. 
 
Second Anfal (22 March – 2 April 1988) 
After the Iraqi troops achieved some success to invade the area mentioned in the 
first Anfal, they took a few days to get re-organised and to count their losses 
before re-grouping. The second phase started on 22nd of March where 
Qaradagh, Bazian and Darbandikhan (Lat. 35 10700 Long. 45 68722) in 
Suleimanyia governorate were attacked. The fight continued until April 1. The 
attack took place strategically after Newroz, the Kurdish celebration of the New 
208 
 
Year. This had the purpose of taking the Peshmerga by surprise while isolating 
them from the civilians. The fight for this stage lasted until the end of March, 
shorter than the first Anfal due to the casualties suffered by the Peshmerga. In 
the meantime the insurgents had to focus on assisting the wave of Kurdish 
civilians who were seeking refuge in Iran. This stage covered 1,484 square 
kilometres as showed in the map below: 
 
 
Figure 29 Map No. (18) Anfal Campaign Stage 2. Source Author. 
 
Third Anfal  
On April 7 the corps involved concentrated in the area they captured, destroying 
all Peshmerga headquarters and building a barrier in order to prevent people 
from reaching the Iran-Iraq border. They surrounded the battlegrounds to help 
the first corps to carry out further attacks and invade Garmian the region east of 
Kirkuk, Kalar, Bawnoor (Lat. 34 8240 Long. 45 5090), Kafri (Lat. 34.6890 Long. 
209 
 
44 9570), Dooz, Singaw (Lat. 35 2870 Long. 45 1750) and Qadir Karam (Lat. 
35.20333 Long. 44.89444). The Iraqi armed occupied most of the countryside in 
the Kurdistan region until the 20th of the same month. 
 This was the most devastating stage and the most effective amongst other 
Anfal stages due to the heavy casualties on the Kurdish side in the battlefields. In 
addition most of the deportation of civilians were carried out in this phase. The 
purpose to make Kurdistan’s country side a barren land in order to annihilate the 
Kurdish National Movement and continue the Arabization campaign the 
government has started before. This extensive campaign has contributed, 
according to some sources, to the killing of some 150,000 from the total number 
of 180,000 who disappeared in the Anfal campaign. This stage covered 3,273 
square kilometres in total as showed in the map below. 
 
Figure 30 Map No. (19) Anfal Campaign Stage 3. Source Author. 
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Fourth Anfal  
The fighting started on the first of May to include all the targets in Small Zab 
basin, in the plains of Zai Bichuk and the surrounding area including Koya region 
(Lat. 36 0840 Long. 44 6280), Taktak (Lat. 35 8900 Long. 44 5860), Aghjiler, 
Nawshwan, and concluded after a week on May 8. This stage covered roughly 
about 2,818 square kilometres as in the map below. 
 
Figure 31 Map No. (20) Anfal Campaign Stage 4. Source: Author. 
 
Anfal five, six and seven  
These three stages overlapped to cover most of the mountainous area in Erbil 
governorate. The forces embarked on attacks on 15th of May until the 7th of July. 
These stages witnessed the harshest fight between the two parties. The 
government mobilized all military units, and the Peshmerga resisted valiantly 
forcing the attacking Iraqi units to retreat temporarily before resuming the attack 
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at the end of July. The confrontation ended the first week of August and the Iraqi 
army announced the cleansing of the region from what it called “Saboteurs”. A 
map of these three phases is available below: 
 
Figure 32 Figure 30. Map No. (21) Anfal Campaign Stages 5, 6 and 7. Source: Author. 
 
Eighth Anfal 
At the conclusion of the seventh Anfal which covered parts of the governorates of 
Diyala, Sallahuddin, and rural areas of Kirkuk, Suleimaniya and Erbil, and the 
cease fire in the Iran-Iraq war, the General Command felt relieved from the 
burden of war and had more time for revenge. This stage of the aggression 
included the Bahdinan region, the area between north of Mosul to Amedi, Akre, 
Zakho, Shekhan, Duhok to the Turkish-Iraqi border, this was the eighth stage and 
called the “Final Anfal” and lasted from 25th of August to the 6th of September. At 
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this point the general Command announced the outright victory over the Kurdish 
enemy. At the same time the amnesty mentioned above was announced with the 
massive deportation of the survivors. This stage of Anfal covered roughly about 
6,228 square kilometres as showed in the map below.  
 
Figure 33 Map No. (22) Anfal Campaign Stage 8. Source: Author. 
 
After 2003, and with extensive efforts from the researcher, a few mass graves of 
innocent people, victims of Anfal were found. The researcher managed to find out 
of 103 victims of Anfal at Nigrat Al Salman during his fieldwork for this thesis.15 
The Iraqi Supreme Criminal Court used the evidence gathered during this 
research in order to build up the Anfal case.16 
                                                          
15.  Mohammed Ihsan, Mass Graves in Iraq, KRG Council of Ministers, 2008. 
16 . Some photographs taken during the excavation of the Anfal mass graves have been 
reproduced in the appendix at the end of this chapter, including one example of the 103 death 
certificates. 
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 As seen the Anfal military operations required the involvement of a long 
chain of command and this contributed to the evidence towards the charge for 
genocide. This is evident from official documents, including decree 160 issued by 
the Revolutionary Command Council authorising Ali Hassan Al-Majeed to kill the 
largest number of villagers and eradicate all signs of life, including all human and 
livestock.17 In addition to this evidence the intent of the government to commit 
genocide is proven by the existence of another documentation that the 
researcher found during his fieldwork and that he reproduces partially in the 
appendix to this chapter. As already mentioned, when when hostilities were over, 
the government, with the excuse of the amnesty, gathered surviving Kurds and 
deported them to Nigrat Al Salman near the Saudi border. Upon their arrival at 
Nigrat Al Salman, a concentration camp in the middle of the desert they were 
forced to live in appalling conditions. During his fieldwork, the researcher found 
more than 325 graves of Kurdish people who were at Nigrat Al Salam18 and died 
of torture between 1987 and 1989.19 The evidence above is a clear indication this 
happened in clear violation of International Laws; in addition it proves that 
Saddam Hussein, Ali Hassan Al-Majid (Commander in Charge of the operations), 
Sultan Hashim (Commander of 1st Corps), Sabir Al Dori (the Director of Military 
intelligence), Farhan Motlik Aljebori (Director of Eastern directorate of 
Intelligence), Hussain Rashid (Deputy to chief of the staff for operations), Tahir 
                                                          
17.  See document no. 4008 dated 20th June1987 from the Northern Bureau of the Ba’ath Party, 
headed by Ali Hassa Al Majid to all corps and security and intelligent organizations regarding how 
to deal with the Kurdish prohibited areas. See appendix no. 2 of this chapter. 
18.  See photographs of the prison at the end of this chapter. 
19. Interview with Mr. Jabar Thanoon, military driver at Nigrat Al Salman jail. From Samawa, 
interviewed, August, 2011.  
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Tawfil Al Ani (Secretary for Nothern Bureau of Baath Party) and others committed 
genocide against the Kurds.20 
The Prosecution of Detainees 
The military operations concluded on 20 April 1988 and they were followed by the 
explicit orders to flatten any remaining house and detain any survivor. Later, 
witnesses told the court that military vehicles transported the captives to a 
concentration camp in Topzawa a region near Kirkuk. The detainees included the 
transport of “elderly, women and children” to concentration camps in 
open/exposed trucks “Eva type” in severe cold rainy weather. Witnesses reported 
that they were exhausted, most haven’t had any food or drink as if they were 
been enslaved. The documents found also reported the formation of special 
committees from the Topzawa camp leadership, North Military Intelligence, 
Directorate of Security of Autonomous region, intelligence of North, and Kirkuk 
hospital to oversee the immediate execution of detainees in concentration camps 
and other tasks related to prosecution. 21   According to the witnesses men 
between 14 and 45 years old were immediately isolated and executed. This led 
to the temporary detention of elderly men, women and children. All the rest of the 
detainees aged over 45 were transferred to the concentration camp of Dibis. 
While some women were killed and some other prisoners were displaced to 
unknown locations.22 
                                                          
20. See appendix no. 3 of this chapter for the list of the accused members of Ba’ath Party who 
participated in Anfal Campaign including many Kurds. 
21. Testimony of the accused Farhan Al Jabouri, Anfal Case at Iraqi High Criminal Tribunal, pp. 
305-963. Also see document no. 1467 of 6 April 1989 from Taemim Mukhbaral Office regarding 
the execution of the elderly people after checking that they no more important information. 
22.  Bill of indictment for Anfal case, Iraqi High Criminal Tribunal, No. 1/2nd C/dated 24/6/2007. 
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 According to the evidence mentioned above the Anfal campaign was 
judged as genocide in line with the letter and spirit of the International 
Convention. Therefore, all who took part in it were found guilty. In addition to the 
gathered evidence, the regime admitted to the crimes openly when during a visit 
by a Kurdish delegation to Baghdad, asked about the fate of 1,800 missing in 
Anfal operations, Ali Hassan Al-Majeed said “why is all this exaggeration when 
the number didn’t actually exceed 100,000”. 23  The Swedish and Norwegian 
parliaments already recognised Anfal campaign as genocide and a crime against 
humanity and the British parliament voted unanimously along these times on 
28/2/201224.  
Conclusion 
There are different reasons for considering this crime as a national project 
engineered by the state. First, as we have seen the use of a powerful 
propaganda machine made possible the backing of the rest of the population by 
fomenting the hatred towards the Kurds. In addition, the involvement of most of 
the government agencies revealed the increased military capability of the state. 
The size of the theatre of the attack increased involving a wider geographical 
area including Kirkuk, main target of the Arabization campaign described in 
Chapter 4. In addition, the time of the continuous genocide was longer than any 
other crime described in this work. The following table shows the extent of the 
size of the atrocities commited by the state of Iraq against the Kurdish population 
during the Anfal campaign. 
                                                          
23. Meeting with Dr.Mahmud Othman, member of the negotiation team with Baghdad after 1991 
uprising, Erbil. February 2011.  
24. www.krg.org. Accessed 11 July 2013. 
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Death-toll 182,000 Kurds 
Villages destroyed 2,451 
Mosques destroyed 2,027 
Deportation and refugees to Turkey and 
Iran 
1,000s 
Confiscations including land properties, 
etc. 
Millions of dollars 
Huge damage to the environment and 
nature 
 
Destruction of water springs 100 
Mines More than 25 million mines planted in 
Kurdistan during the state engineered 
genocides 
 
 As explained more in detail later, despite the extent of the damage and the 
involvement of most of the state agencies, the judicial system was able to try only 
a small number of perpetrators of this crime. In his article entitled ‘A Critical 
Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgement: Genocide Against the Kurds’ 
published in volume 30 of the Michigan Journal of International Law pp. 305-
412), Jennifer Trahan, denounces the deficiencies of the IHT along with the 
difficulties encountered by its judges to manage a trial with such an impressive 
number witnesses and evidence. It would be too long and out of the scope of this 
chapter to summarize Trahan’s findings. However, there are a few points that we 
have to remember in order to be able to understand fully the impact of this trial on 
the process of nation building and in restoring the trust in the federal government 
by the Kurdish population. The first one is that the number of people convicted 
was completely disproportionate to the amount of the killings committed and to 
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the charges against the defendants and this despite a tremendous amount of 
physical evidence and witnesses. These crimes were not perpetrated in secrecy 
with the complicity of the intelligence service and with an efficient, but limited use 
of logistic organization.  
 These series of crimes that included not only genocide but also crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, was an indiscriminate and planned attack 
against the Kurds with the intent to destroy them and their land. This required, as 
we have seen, a noticeable logistic and organizational effort and for this reason 
the impact on the population affected is even greater as well as its right to look 
for answers. The second point is that the tribunal that was acting during a state of 
occupation and civil war was lacking an outreach program. This meant that the 
trial passed almost unnoticed by the majority of the Kurdish population and in this 
way it failed in its role communicating its activities. Jennifer Trahan, analysing the 
cases of the most famous defendants, also insists on the fact that the IHT was 
not able to fully address the question of individual responsibilities and this could 
be indicated as a fundamental factor because most of the lower rank military 
personnel involved did not face any trial and are still living in the society without 
paying for their crimes making difficult the coexistence between Kurds and Arab 
Iraqis. The propaganda made by the regime against the Kurds depicting them as 
infidels and enemies of Islam has long-term consequences and it is still a source 
of distrust between the two groups. On the other hand, the Kurdish Regional 
Government has to deal with an increasing anti Islamic sentiment in the region 
due to the overt manipulation of Islam by the Ba’ath regime in order to discredit, 
persecute and kill the Kurds.  
 The lack of an outreach program by the IHT comes with a lack of efforts in 
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this direction. Some recommendations about how to regain the trust and 
guarantee a peaceful coexistence between the two groups will be offered later in 
the conclusive chapter. For the moment it is fair to say that the victims deserve 
that the public know about these crimes by the former Iraqi regime, and that the 
government make an effort in order to raise the awareness in this sense.  The 
international recognition by Finland, Norway and Great Britain is a first step 
towards this goal. 
Photos from the fieldwork for Anfal 
 
Figure 34 The researcher at Hatra 1 Mass Grave of Anfal Victims. Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 35 In Hatra 1 Mass Grave of Anfal Victims, The researcher find out a pregnant 
lady with 7 months baby. Source: John Tample.  
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Figure 36 The Researcher during his fieldwork on Anfal Case in the south of Iraq August 
2007 Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 37 Hatra 1 mass grave before the exhumation. Source: Author. 
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Figure 38 Blind folded Anfal victim at Hatra 2 mass grave. Source: Author. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39 The researcher during his fieldwork on Anfal Case mass graves near Diwaniya 
in the south of Iraq, March 2010. Source: Author.  
 
221 
 
 
Figure 40 Remains of woman pregnant with seven months baby found at Hatra 1. Source: 
Mrs. Sinje. 
 
Figure 41 Remains of a child killed in Hatra. Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 42 The Researcher inside Nigrat Al Salman Prison following the stories of Faylee 
Kurds genocide. Source: Author.  
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Figure 43 Samples  of death certificates regarding Anfal victims found by the resercher in 
Nigrat Al Salman dated 1988. Source: Author.
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Chapter 8 
 
Genocide and Chemical Weapon (Halabja): The Birth and Development of 
the Iraqi Chemical Weapons 
 
Introduction 
The fifth and last crime considered in this thesis is the chemical attack by the Iraqi 
forces on the civil population of Halabja. This crime differs in nature from the 
others. First because of the international exposure it had received since the 
beginning, and also because of the excessive use of military power. Halabja 
gassing constitutes the extreme use of chemical weapons against the civilian 
population in Iraq. The scene of the crime was limited to a single city targeted for 
its closeness to the Iranian border and suspected for its collaboration with the 
enemy. Due to the smaller size of area involved, the level of damage caused by 
the attack is still visible in the area. The city was completely destroyed and so the 
environment.  The consequences of this attack are due to remain for generations 
to come. 
 As for the other crimes considered, the researcher will base his analysis on 
two different sets of sources: primary sources will include unpublished interviews 
with former Iraqi Government personnel, former Kurdish leaders from the 
resistance against the regime and on undisclosed official documents. Comparing 
their testimonies with the ones heard by the IHT during the trial, the researcher will 
reconstruct the development of the chemical arsenal in Iraq and the events that led 
to its indiscriminate use against a specific sector of the Iraqi population, the Kurds. 
The researcher will also refer to the legal requirements necessary to prove the 
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physical evidence of the attack as well as the presence of the intent to wipe out a 
targeted group of Iraqi citizens, referring to actus rea and to mens rea respectively.  
 A lot has been mentioned about Halabja’s chemical attack because it was 
the first time that international media managed to cover such horrendous crime.1 
For this reason, this chapter will not rely on the information already given by other 
sources but it will focus mainly on how chemical weapons, as instruments of war, 
have been used in order to commit genocide against the Kurdish establishing a 
direct link between chemical weapons and genocide. According to the Federation 
of American Scientists this crime was and still remains the largest chemical 
weapons attack directed against a civilian-populated area in history.2 All this in 
order to demonstrate to the international community that the use of banned 
chemical weapons against a civil population cannot be ignored and has to be 
punished in order to prevent history from repeating itself. In order to achieve this 
goal, this chapter will show how, according to international law on the use of 
chemical weapons, all the chain of command must be held responsible for the 
crime committed. A recount of the legal outcomes of the trial for the Halabja 
campaign will be presented in order to offer the reader an analysis of the long-term 
consequences of this crime. The chapter will then conclude by explaining how 
these events hindered the relationship between the federal government and the 
KRG as well as the whole process of nation building in Iraq. 
 Halabja is a Kurdish district that belongs to Sulaimaniya governorate. It lies 
roughly 10 miles inside Iraq from the Iranian border in southern Kurdistan. In 1988 
the population of Halabja was roughly 75,000.  During the Iraq – Iran war, on 
Sunday, March 13, 1988, Iranian forces began shelling Iraqi military positions in 
                                                          
1.  See Ghosts of Halabja by Michael Kelly, London: Praeger Security International, 2008. 
2.  http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/program.htm. Accessed 16-10-2013. 
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and around the city of Halabja, and by Tuesday, March 15, Iranian advance forces 
(Pazdaran)3 already reached the Zalim River 5 kilometres south of Halabja where 
they started to destroy the bridge in order to prevent Iraqis’ return. At the same 
time the Iraqi government started to cut the electricity, water and telephone lines 
from the city.  With the town completed isolated and disarmed, Saddam’s forces 
counterattacked the next day, first with napalm then with conventional bombs and 
artillery and finally with gas killing 5,000 and wounding 15,000 civilian Kurds.4  On 
the same day Iraqi helicopters started to bomb the mountains around the city while 
aircrafts bombed inside it. The People of Halabja described that day as if it was the 
end of the world.5 They tried to hide themselves down into tunnels, cellars and 
basements in order to escape certain death. As we will see more in detail from the 
interviews mentioned later, by 11 am the same day the Iraqi army started bombing 
the city with chemical weapons. Saddam’s Hussein direct responsibility for this 
crime can be found in the secret memo no.153 date March 16 1988 sent from the 
Office of the chief of staff to the headquarter of the 1st Corps, signed by Brigade 
General Staff Nazar Abdul Karim Faizal Al Khazraji reproduced in appendix.6 
According to another memo no. 7371 dated March 31, 1987 sent from the General 
Military Intelligent to the Headquarter of Military Staff, hand written for security 
purposes, this was not the first time that Iraqi forces used chemical weapons 
against their own citizens, this happened before in the areas of Siyosinan, Askar 
Goptapa, Balisan and Shaikh setting a dangerous precedent.7 
                                                          
3.  Pazdaran was the Persian word for the Revolutionary Guards during the Iraq-Iran War. 
4.  Taha Baban, alam al kurd al morab (Erbil: Aras Publisher, 2008) pp.10-24. 
5.  Interview with Harme Faraj Abdula. She was 12 years old girl hiding in basement with some 
relatives during that day and she lost all members of her family during that attack, Sulaimaniya, 
April 2012. 
6.  See appendix no. 1 of this chapter for the original copy. 
7.  For the original copy, see appendix no. 2 of this chapter for memo no. 7371 of 31 March 1987.  
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 A survivor named Aras Abed Akra, who was 20 years old at the time of the 
events told his story to a reporter of the Financial Times in 2002. He said:  
We could smell something strange like rotten eggs. Down in our shelter 
we felt short of breath. A soldier went out and next door he saw that the 
birds in the cage of our neighbour were all dead. We stayed in the 
shelter until evening, but then I just wanted to escape. We wrapped our 
faces in wet towels. It was hard to breathe. One friend became blind 
immediately when he removed his towel. We were confused and lost, 
we couldn’t see more than a meter ahead.8  
 
Kaven Golestan, a Pulitzer Prize Winning Iranian photographer, witnessed the 
Iraqi MiG-26 sortie from outside Halabja: “it was not as a nuclear mushroom cloud, 
but several smaller ones: thick smoke.” Golestan then entered the city after the 
bombing with a gas mask and protective suit to cover the story via military 
helicopter: 
It was life frozen. Life had stopped, like watching a film and 
suddenly it hangs on one frame. It was a new kind of death to me. 
You went into a room, a kitchen and you saw the body of a women 
holding a knife where she had been cutting a carrot. The aftermath 
was worse. Victims were still being brought in. Some villagers came 
to our shop. They had 15 or 16 beautiful children, begging us to 
take them to the hospital. So all the press sat there and we were 
each handed a child to carry. As we took off, fluid came out of my 
little girl’s mouth and she died in my arms.9 
 
Despite of all what Iraqi did to Kurds in Halabja, they started to campaign that 
Iranians were behind that attack. This campaign lasted until March 1991 uprising 
during the first Gulf War when the Kurds and the coalition forces gathered the 
documentation related to this case. Only then, the Kurds were able to access most 
of the documents related to that attack and the international community started to 
accept the fact Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds. Saddam Hussein 
admitted during the first half of the Anfal trial that he used chemical weapons 
                                                          
8.  Guy Dinsmore, ‘The Enduring Pain of Halabja’, The Financial Times, July 10, 2002. 
9.  Ibid. 
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against Iran but he denied attacking Iraqi Kurds. This despite all the evidence 
produced and despite Ali Hassan Majid admitted that he had used them and he will 
never hesitate to do it again.10 Saddam Hussein was never tried for Anfal despite 
all the evidence against him.  
 It is important, in order to analyse these facts and their consequences, to 
understand how the idea of the use of chemical weapons, banned by the 
international community became acceptable during Saddam’s regime. Two are the 
fundamental aspects of this exercise: the first one is that it is paramount to 
understand how a regime with no prior history of use of chemical weapons is able 
not only to produce them, but also to use them despite its ban by international law. 
Second, how this can be prevented in the future and what was the culture of 
violence behind it.  
 Since, as mentioned earlier, the facts are available and the different phases 
of the crime are in the public domain, the researcher opted for a different approach 
starting with the history of the development, production and use of chemical 
weapons narrated by the military personnel, some of who did not want to be 
mentioned for security reasons.  
Chemical weapons in Iraq 
Neither Iraq nor its army, established in 1921, was interested in chemical weapons 
despite their extensive during World War I and their consequent ban agreed by 
western countries in 1925. This lack of interest was due to different reasons: the 
first one is that since its foundation up to the mid-20th century Iraq did not have 
enough scientists specialized in pharmacology and chemistry. Even the scientists 
                                                          
10. For Iraqi’s allegations, see Zanders, John Pascal. Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical 
Analysis of Past Allegations. SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Project (March 7, 2001), 
briefing available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/programs/dc/briefs/030701.htm  
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who were established were merely teachers and traditional pharmacists. Iraq also 
lacked the infrastructure for the chemical or alternative industries. Even the 
significant oil revenues, in the first half of the last century, were not enough to 
support the infrastructure necessary for the chemical weapons. In addition, its lack 
of political instability prevented Iraq and most of its neighbouring countries from 
allocating sufficient funds for scientific research. For example, in the eighties Iraq 
allocated no more than 0.02% of its internal revenue to science against the 4.2% 
spent by Israel.11  
 Until 1958 the Iraqi Governments was aware of their limits imposed by the 
international community and did not want to cause an international imbalance in 
the operation of conflict management, therefore, it focused mainly on internal 
issues. This situation continued even after 1968 and the rise to power of the Ba’ath 
party. Iraqi governments were not interested in establishing huge armies because 
the Iraqi army was originally established, and in large part is still the same, in order 
to deal with internal opposition, and border protection has always been a second 
priority. This explains the defensive ideology of the army prior to 1968. Even in 
1964 when the Iraqi military establishment started thinking of introducing chemical 
warfare in its multiple fields, it was just for a defensive purpose. In fact the main 
focus was on the production of military equipment to protect soldiers in case of a 
chemical attack. According to one of the witnesses interviewed, this was a widely 
common practice within all armies similar to the Iraqi one at the time.12 In addition, 
Iraq being a developing country, its military capability depended strongly on other, 
                                                          
11.  Ahmad Thabit, Jawanib al Siraa al arabi al Israeli wa majalatihi, Al Jazirah, 3 October 2004. 
12 . Meeting Staff General S. A. from Iraqi Chemical Branch, former Iraqi Officer, Baghdad, 
November, 2012. 
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more developed countries that did not have any interest in giving Iraq the 
possibility of building chemical weapons.  
The Development of the Iraqi Chemical Weapons 
After 1958 and the falling of the monarchy, Iraq became closer to the eastern block 
and in this way was able to distance itself from the boundaries set by the western 
countries regarding the control on armaments. In the mid-sixties it bought from the 
Soviet Union defensive chemical equipment and started sending officers to be 
trained for its use. On their return the officers started working in two directions: 
first, they founded a new unit separated from the Military Corps of Engineers and 
founded a school were the officers could be trained. The school was named first 
“Atomic and Mass Warfare School”. 13  They selected “Al-Tajee Camp” as a 
permanent base for the school and the department and then later it was 
transferred to “Khan Bani Saad Camp” closer to Baghdad. This Branch developed 
slowly before 1968 and then accelerated after that, in harmony with the fast 
development of all other branches of the Iraqi Army. In each military division, 
including aviation, new chemical platoons and squads were formed and until the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war. One of them was a chemical platoon at battalion level and 
was in charge of the decontamination of the soldiers, the second for the 
decontamination of equipment and machineries, the third one of chemical 
reconnaissance. According to a general of the former Iraqi army interviewed there 
were also with the Corps Staff Members a Chemical Staff Officer, while in the 
headquarters there were two Chemical Platoons and a Napalm Squad attached to 
                                                          
13.  Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical History, London and New York: out Ledge. ISBN 0-415-
40078-3.  
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the Chemical Branch Department whose duty was to support the military units with 
chemical weapons when needed.14 
 In 1968, with the Ba’ath party, the interest for chemical weapons spiralled 
for political reasons. That same year, the party established, within the Public 
Relation Office, the base for the Intelligence Service - Mukhabarat - for Chemical 
matters. 15  According to the documents found, they transferred staff member’s 
officers from the Chemical Department as well as pharmacists who worked in 
special laboratories connected to this office. The General directorate of Security 
made a similar effort sending 40 students to the United States to specialize in 
chemistry. These became the first scientists trained abroad to collaborate, in the 
mid-seventies, in the production of chemical weapons in a location called Al-
Kamalia east of Baghdad. In 1979 CS 16  was manufactured and this success 
resulted in the building of a new facilities called Al-Muthana. It was built close to 
Samara’a and these facilities equipped with laboratories were devoted entirely to 
producing material for military use. In the following years they managed to expand 
the production from the simple CS to Mustard Gas, Bubble Factors, Nerve Agents, 
Sarin and Zouman.17 This facility was under the supervision of Husain Kamil18 
who, with the collaboration of some German and Dutch companies protected 
                                                          
14.  Meeting with Brigade General F. H. Division commander in Former Iraqi Army. 
15 . The researcher has found documents from Iraqi Mukharabat confirming the existence of 
chemical branch at their headquarters since 1971. 
16.  A gas causing tears, salivation, and painful breathing, used in civil disturbances; ortho-
chlorobenzal malononitrile. Formula: C6H4ClCH:C(CN)2 
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/cs-gas Accessed: 17/10/2013. 
17.  Meeting with Chemical Brigade Khalid Ali Maho Al Sufi, Mosul, March 2012. 
18.  Hussain Kame (1954 – 23 February 1996) was the son-in-law and second cousin of Iraqi leader 
Saddam Hussein. He defected to Jordan and assisted United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection teams assigned to look for 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After his return to Iraq based on special amnesty from 
Saddam Hussain. Ali Hassan Almajid and his relatives killed him with all the members of his family. 
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under a semi-open budget which provided them equipment and basic material,19 
provided the army chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and the attack on 
Halabja. 
The organized use of Iraqi Chemical Weapon 
Chemical Weapons were used for the first time in Iraq at the beginning of the 
seventies during the security interrogations to gain confessions and retaliate 
against political opposition members. Some of the opposition members reported 
having seen politicians being thrown in tanks full of acid in the General Directorate 
of Security during “Nadhim Gzar’s” management. 20  On the military side, this 
weapon was used during the Iran-Iraq war. The Iranian side recorded the first use 
during the battle of “Al-Shalamja close to the city of AL-Muhamarra” in March 
1983. The Iranians reported the explosion of multiple Iraqi artillery producing a 
white smoke with a strong smell covering a wide area of the battle zone. This 
caused some of the fighters to feel drowsiness and nausea.21  
 It is worth mentioning that the use of chemical weapons at the beginning of 
the Iraq-Iran war was limited and ineffective and this use was intended for 
intimidation and retaliation purposes. The officers who participated in the war 
during that time never mentioned a decisive order regarding the use of chemical 
weapons in any battle until 1984. However, after that date, as a result of the 
development in the production of Mustarad, Taboun and Sarin gasses in huge 
                                                          
19.  After the 1991 embargo the establishment stopped working and become under the supervision 
of the UN inspection teams until 2003 when the coalition forces destroyed it completely. In the case 
of two Dutch companies, it is firmly established that they delivered chemicals to Iraq which, in all 
probability, have been used to produce chemical weapons. The two companies involved are 
Melchemie (Arhem, now called Melspring) and KBS Holland (Trneuzen, now called Bravenboer and 
Scheers). Furthermore, for many years, on 24 April 2013, the convicted businessman Frank van 
Araat acted as illegal dealer in chemicals for the Iraq’s chemical weapons program. 
20 .  Nadhim Gzar was the General Director of Security during 1968, after he had been 
assassinated by Saddam Hussein on 1973. 
21.  UN Report S/16433 of 29 March 1984. 
232 
 
amounts thanks to the success in manufacturing special bombs that can be 
airborne, its use became more effective as seen in Halabja.22 In addition to that, 
the Iranians confirmed that from that date until March of 1984, the Iraqi Army used 
chemical weapons around 65 times.23 
 The use range and its effectiveness had increased between the years 1985-
1986 where the Iranians mentioned that during the battle of Al-Howayza Marches 
around 2,000 fighters were wounded, while in 1986 during the battle of Al-Fao 
around 7,000 artillery bombs filled with chemical materials were launched. On the 
occasion, according to Iranian sources, Iraqi jets dropped 1,000 Chemical bombs 
on the battlefield and on the troops that causing 1,200 injuries.24 
 The regime used the war period between 1980 and 1988, when less 
monitoring was in place, to change the use of chemical weapons use from the 
battlefield to the opposition forces that were fighting in the mountains of Kurdistan 
and the fighters in the Marshes in the south. Witnesses from that era recorded 
incidents where the use of chemical weapons was not only limited to attack the 
gathering site of the Peshmergas and Al-Ansars (the fighters from the Communist 
Party) in areas of Halabja, Balisan and Bahdinan, but it extended to Kurdish 
villages in May of 1987.25 
 The regime referred to the chemical weapons ‘Special Ammunition’ to add 
some secrecy on its use as well as to spread terror amongst soldiers. The 
authority for its use was limited to the Armed Forces General Commander Saddam 
                                                          
22 .  Meeting with Brigade General N.M. Brigade Commander in Former Iraqi Army, Erbil, 
September 2013. 
23.  Mr Sabah Kanji’s testimony was presented to the International Tribunal in The Hague regarding 
the investigation of the use of Chemical Weapons by the Iraqi Regime. 
24.  UN Report No. S/19711 of 1986. 
25.  The Directorate of the General Military Intelligence latter labelled Classified and personal no. 
808 date 12 March 1987. 
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Hussein who, through a special committee headed by the Deputy Army Operations 
Chief of Staff, planned the attack and suggested its implementation. This 
committee had other members – the director of Al-Muthana Facility as well as 
another officer from the directorate of planning and another one from the General 
Military Intelligence.26 The committee continued its work until 1990 where it was 
detached from the Operations Department and attached to the Directorate of the 
Chemical Branch. Its operations were stopped after the Gulf War and the 
destruction of the Chemical Weapons stockpile.27 An analysis of the pattern in the 
use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi army shows clearly how the chain of 
command worked at the vigil of a strike. The higher political authorities proposed 
the use of chemical weapons both against external and internal enemies. Then 
through the special committee they evaluated the importance and effectiveness of 
these suggestions and decided whether it was advisable to proceed or not.  
 Although The Chemical Branch and its sub - branches were coordinated, 
they were not directly involved in the execution of chemical strikes because they 
needed the support of the artillery to carry out the attack. The same thing 
happened for Stalin Organ Rocket Launcher Battalions: the Air Force received 
chemically charged bombs designed to fit the military airplanes and these would 
be delivered to the aviation before the strike and used only under strict orders.28 In 
addition, the Artillery and the Air Force were separate entities that worked under 
the Military/Political Higher Command. Therefore the “Chemical Department” had a 
coordination and advisary role, and the purpose of its troops was always that of 
                                                          
26.  Meeting with Chemical Brigade Khalid Ali Macho Al Sufi, deputy director of Iraqi Chemical 
branch 1980-1985. 
27.   Mr Sabah Kanji’s testimony that presented to the International Tribunal in the Hague regarding 
the investigation of the use chemical weapons by Iraqi Regime during the war with Iran. 
28.   Meeting with Chemical Brigade Khalid Ali Maho Al Sufi, Mosul, March 2012. 
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preventing any potential enemy strike or to monitor the direct or indirect 
consequences of the strike. For example, it was in charge of monitoring the 
direction of the wind in order prevent the chemical substances from reaching the 
Iraqi forces. The criminal responsibility of the use of chemical weapons both 
against the Iranian soldiers and against the Kurds lies almost entirely on the 
Armed Forces General Command as well as on the General Commandership who 
suggested the strikes. It should be taken into consideration that all troops followed 
the orders of the General Commandership, of the Field implementers from the 
Chemical Branch staff, the Artillery, the Air Force and the Military Aviation. 
International Ban on the Use of the Chemical Weapons 
The Historical Aspect 
Chemical Weapons have been used in many forms since ancient times. Some 
historical sources indicate that around 2000 B.C. the Indians used toxic “chemical” 
fumes to influence their enemies’ activities in the battlefield.29 Since that day to our 
present time, humans continued to use it when available. The reason is obvious: 
chemical weapons can disseminate panic and death in the enemy’s lines but, at 
the same time, they save building and the infrastructure.30 In addition, this kind of 
weapons have the advantage of neutralizing the enemy who most of the time is not 
equipped to respond to the attack or might not have the time to use it if available. 
The first organized use of the chemical weapons within the frame of what is so-
called chemical warfare in the modern time was during World War I where the 
German army in April of 1915 deployed a “Cloud of Chlorine Gas” over their 
enemies’ areas causing the death of 15,000 soldiers. The German continued to 
                                                          
29.   Malcom N. Shaw QC. International Law, 5th edition, Cambridge University Press, UK 2003.  
30.  B. Bollecker- Stren, Le Prejudice dans la theries de la responsabilite internationale, Pedone, 
Paris, 1973. 
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use this weapon until a study found out that it was the cause of about 800 
thousands to one million deaths from the Russian, French, British and American 
sides.31 
 The huge loss caused by the active use of chemical weapons by Germany 
who lost World War I along with the gravity of the injuries and their physical and 
psychological consequences, led to the establishment of a political, social and 
legal lobby whose purpose was to ban their use. A legal framework was created in 
order to ban their use internationally and was ratified by the “Geneva Protocol” in 
1925 with the ban on the use of Chemical and Biological Weapons without 
mentioning specific substances.32 This ban was repeated in the Conference on 
Disarmament held in 1932 and 1934. It was also emphasized in the International 
Ban on the use of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BTWC) in 1972 signed by 170 
as part of the Ban on Development.33  
International Ban Compliance 
The 1925 protocol signed by most of the western countries has been very 
successful in preventing the repeating of the horrors caused by chemical weapons 
on a large scale. The events of World War II are known for the level of discipline 
and compliance with the ban since it started and ended without a noticeable use of 
them. On the other end, they used it in some regional wars. For example, the 
United States of America had used some of these weapons in Vietnam in order to 
remove the obstacles caused by the nature of the territory and to destroy 
                                                          
31.  Michael Freemantle, Gas! Gas! Quick, Boys!: How Chemistry Changed the First World War, 
(The History Press, 2013). 
32 . Shareef Atlim Mohammed Mahir & Abdul Wahid, The Encyclopaedia of the International 
Humanitarian Law, The Official texts for the treaties and the states signing them, International Red 
Cross Committee Publication, Cairo, 2002. 
33 .  Sharif Altam and Mahir Abdul Wahid, Encyclopaedia of Humanitarian International Law 
Treaties, Red Cross, Cairo, 2002. 
236 
 
agricultural crops and in this way influencing the course of the war. The 
compliance of the majority of the western countries was due to the fact a mere 
killing of the enemy was not the first purpose any war until 1918.34 Not every 
country followed this trend. Iraq, for example, after 1968 moved in the opposite 
direction from this internationally prevailing logic, and in order to fulfil its nationalist 
ideology, and due to its total lack of understanding of global conflicts, the Arab 
Ba’ath Socialist Party and its leadership introduced the chemical factor in order to 
achieve the total control of the country. 
 Other countries that produce and sell weapons of mass destruction like 
chemical weapons set very strict regulations on its use. They rely on their deterrent 
power in order to avoid an unsuitable use. In Iraq, it was very different, so when 
the government owned a weapon, it did not hesitate in using it without calculating 
the side effects or considering the unavoidable international reactions. 35  For 
example, the Iraqi Army under Saddam Hussein’s command on the third year of 
the war with Iran used chemical weapons even though it did not need to from a 
strategic point of view. It used in a time where it did not have enough stockpile to 
resolve the conflict or affect the outcome of the fight. Saddam Hussein and his 
higher political leadership’s indiscriminate use of chemical weapon show their 
ignorance of its military, political and psychological effects. The use of this weapon 
resulted in an increase in the hostility of the enemy to the level led to improve their 
fighting performance and hindered any possibility of a negotiated ending of the 
hostilities. In fact, the military and political power balance “performance- Morales- 
Steadfastness in the battlefield” between the fighting sides had shifted in favour of 
                                                          
34. Joseph Nye, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and 
History (USA, Pearson, 2012). 
35. Edward Willett, the Iran-Iraq War, War and conflict in the Middle East, The Rosen Publishing 
Group, 2004. 
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the Iranian side in a noticeable way during that period and the aftermath until 1987 
until when the indirect American intervention in favour of the Iraqis forced the 
Iranians to accept the cease fire with the known result of negative tie for both 
sides. 
 On the internal front, the use of chemical weapon was not a successful 
strategic intervention in Halabja either. Although the international community 
considered the loss of 5,000 Kurdish lives a humanitarian disaster, the fact that the 
Iraqi government violated the International Law did not decide the conflict between 
the Central Government and the Kurds. On the contrary, the distance became far 
apart where the Kurds insisted on continuing their political and military fight in 
order to put an end to Saddam’s criminal regime. In addition to the military reasons 
presented by the accused to justify their attack on Kurdish civilians, during the trial 
their depositions revealed a will to take revenge on their enemies by inflicting them 
with a psychological trauma. 
 The desire to take revenge upon the peaceful Kurdish people is confirmed 
by the testimonies heard during the Higher Iraqi Criminal Court hearings from 
people charged of the crime main defendants such as Saddam Hussein, Ali 
Hassan Al-Majeed, Sabir Al-Douri, Sultan Hashim, and Farhan Mutlak Al-Jibouri. 
All of them testified that the Iranian enemy had entered Halabja with the 
Peshmerga fighters from the Patriot Union of Kurdistan and the city had collapsed 
militarily. Later in the chapter, the testimonies of some of the witnesses will confirm 
that at the moment of the attack no Peshemerga or Iranian forces were present. 
This shows that the Iraqi government intentionally attacked the Kurdish population 
to take revenge for their support to the insurgents. In addition and according to the 
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documents and to their same testimonies they thought that the chemical weapons 
could mean a final solution for the Kurdish issue. 
 All the evidence presented in court by the people of Halabja as well as the 
photographs published by the media and articles that covered the strike and its 
effects on the civilians excluded the presence of fighters from Iran or of Kurdish 
Peshamergas inside the city during the attack. It also confirmed the non-existence 
of bodies of Iranian military personnel among the ones that remained scattered 
between houses, allies and escape routes. This confirms that the Iranian Forces 
left the city in order to fight the Iraqi army from a more favourable position .The 
same can be said for the Peshmerga who left the city, which was not a fit place for 
defensive fighting against the organized Iraqi forces that exceeded them in 
equipment and number. These facts from the field confirm that the strike driven by 
the psychological hatred in the hearts of the Ba’ath’s Commanders. The news 
circulating about the presence of Iranians troops and Pershmergas fighters in 
Halabja led the authority represented by Saddam Hussein and those close to him 
to carry out the strike to retaliate against the Kurds 
 The strike on Halabja did not provide the Ba’ath regime the results it was 
looking for. It actually increased the number of volunteers who joined the 
Peshmergas to fight the regime’s forces all over Kurdistan. This presented a ready 
made propaganda material for the Kurdish Leadership and its media exposed the 
true nature of the regime and its rutheless actions. It gave the Kurdish political 
leadership a chance to present the Kurdish cause, the sufferings of the Kurds from 
oppression genocide, to the public opinion who looked increasingly more 
sympathetic until, in 1991, western countries intervened by imposing a no-fly zone 
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that offered protection to Kurdistan.36  It is worth mentioning that Iraq’s use of 
chemical weapons in its war with Iran and against the Kurds in Halabja in the 
eighties of the last century motivated the International Community to sign the 
Treaty of Paris in 1993 fully banning the production, stockpile and use of Chemical 
Weapons. 37  
Actus reus: as already mentioned in the introduction, according to Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention, killing members of a group is considered a basic element 
towards the recognition of a crime of genocide,38 and in this specific case Kurdish 
people killed in Halabja provided to the court all the physical evidence in support of 
this point. The international law does not specify a number of victims nor 
establishes by which means the killings had to be carried out in order to commit 
genocide because the legal case focuses on providing the evidence that a severe 
bodily or mental harm has been inflicted to the members of a specific group.39 
What happened in Halabja on March 16, 1988 proved the case: according to the 
documentation presented in this research, that day the Armed Forces General 
Commander gave the specific order to carry out an air strike on Halabja using 
special “chemical” weapons. These orders were followed by different divisions of 
the army: first, the Air Force Commander ordered their war planes based in Kirkuk 
and Al-Bakir bases armed with special chemical bombs to carry out air strikes on 
the city of Halabja in the afternoon.40  Then the Military Airforce passed the same 
order to its headquarters in Kirkuk. The mission was executed using PC7 
                                                          
36. See UNSC resolution 688 of 5th April 1991.  
37. Helen Chapin Metz, Iraq: A Country Study, Kissinger Publishing. First Edition. 2004 
38. Abdul-Ftah Bayoumi Hijazi (2005) al mahkama al jinaeya al dawliya, Dar Al-Fikr Al-Jamiee, 
Beirut. 
39. Abdul-Wahid Mohammed Al-Far (1996) al jaraem al dawliya wasultat al ekab alaiha. Dar Al-
Nahdha AL- Arabiya, Cairo. 
40. Testimony under oath for the Former Iraqi Pilot Hamid Raja Shelah Al-Hadithee in the Higher 
Iraqi Criminal Court on Halabja case. 
240 
 
airplanes, which started their attacks within the same time-period and in 
coordination with the Air Force aircrafts. Stalin Organs rockets were distributed to 
the artillery and the battalions that shelled the city during the bombing. The 
violence of the strike did not offer the civil population the opportunity to shelter and 
this caused the death of around 5,000 Kurdish citizens. The Kurds being a sub-
group of the Iraqi citizens the physical element need to prove of a genocide crime 
had been fulfilled.41  In addition, all the documentation provided to the tribunal by 
civic societies and NGOs, including photographs, medical exams and forensic 
analysis, showed that the victims were from all ages and represented the 
traditional population of Kurdish society. The crime scene showed how mothers, 
children and elderly were taken by surprise by the attack, their corpses piled up in 
the alleys and streets in the attempt to escape death. The long-term consequences 
of this attack were immediately clear with many survivors suffering from loss of 
vision and physical deformities. Some of them are still suffering from mental 
diseases even today .All these details can be found in Dr. Christine Gosden’s 
report, which analysed from a medical point of view the expected impact on the 
injured.42 Dr. Gosden from the University of Liverpool, who initially treated the 
survivors decided to conduct a study in order to assess the aftermath and long-
term effects of the chemical attack on the Kurdish population of Halabja. She found 
that congenital malformation, long term neurological and neuropsychiatric effects 
and cancers in women and children are particularly frequent.43 Those who survived 
the strike or the gasses did not reach them, were forced to live in detention camps 
                                                          
41.  The number related to the casualties was confirmed by the Higher Iraqi Criminal Court during 
the court’s hearing and sentencing, which were about 5,000 civilians. 
42. Halabja Post Graduate Medical Institute (HMI) and Dr. Christine Gosden, August 1992.  
43 . Christine M. Gosden, ‘The1988 Chemical Weapons attack on Halabja, Iraq’, in Super 
Terrorism: Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear (Yonath Alexander and Milton Hoening, eds.) 
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or in special housing compounds where they faced all types of humiliations, insults 
and physical torture. When the perpetrator forces a group to endure harsh living 
conditions with the intend of destroying it in whole or partially preventing the 
victims to live their normal lives, the physical element required by the international 
law is fulfilled and the intent proved.  
 
Mens Rea 
Saddam Hussein and Ali Hassan Al- Majeed, the Air force Commander, the 
Military Aviation, the unit in charge of leading the operations in the area, and 
Armed Forces General Command members, were fully aware of the nature of the 
strike on Halabja and for this reason they are accessories to the crime.44 This 
proved without any doubt in this case there are both individual and institutional 
responsibilities. In addition, during the trial it has been proved that all the high 
command of the army was aware that this attack would breach international laws.45 
The trial also proved that besides the high commanders individual responsibilities 
could include also members of the armed forces in lower ranks. This is because 
the treaty states that can be charged for genocide all individuals, constitutional 
rulers, civil servants and lower rank employees who participated in the 
implementation of the plan.46 This fulfils the Immaterial Element for this crime and 
all of its consequences and the legal framework defined by the Treaty and 
International Conventions .The criminal intent of the crime is proven from the fact 
that the perpetrators aimed to destroy the group totally or partially and that the 
witnesses have confirmed the strike was not the result of a military reaction in the 
                                                          
44. Mohammed Mansousi Al-Sawi, International Law Articles, Earlier source. 
45. Ali Yousif Al-Shukri, International Criminal Law in a changing world. Earlier source. 
46. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Statute of Iraqi High Tribunal no.10 
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battlefield, but a cruel act of retaliation against unarmed civilians. The Iraqi 
leadership did not have the right to use the internationally banned weapon on a 
city where its people were still living there and it is considered an Iraqi city.47 As 
the action of the deliberate murder had not happened as an accident using 
traditional weapons that had missed its targets as it happens sometimes in the 
battlefield. The following points supported this thesis:  
First: The leadership responsible for the attack specifically suggested the use of 
‘Special Ammunition.’ 
Second: The armed forces General Commandership confirmed the strike or 
suggested changing it or postponing it. 
Third: The Special Technical Military Committee studied the plan to verify its 
technical viability. 
Fourth: Saddam Hussein as armed forces High Commander, accepted the plan 
and gave orders to execute it and wanted to be informed about its progress. 
Fifth: The Special Ammunition were transferred from their location in al-Muthana 
to the air base from where the aircraft started their deadly journey towards Halabja. 
Every stage of the attack has been carefully planned and executed proving the 
intent of striking against the civilians. This also refute the government’s argument 
supported by the witnesses for the defendants that this was a strike against the 
Iranian and the Peshmerga forces that entered the city.  
The International Element 
In order to analyse a the Crime of Genocide within the international law, it is 
necessary to introduce along with the Physical and Moral Elements an 
                                                          
47. The Special Treaty related to adhering to traditions of the Land Wars. 
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International Element: first, genocide crimes in general are well-planned48 as we 
have just seen in the case of Halabja. These crimes are usually committed against 
social, racial or religious oppressed groups by rulers or social sects that are in 
control, have the authority or are well connected to the authority. Second, if as in 
this case, the responsibility of the ruler is proven, he has to face all the legal 
consequences and be tried under the international law. In the Halabja case, 
Saddam Hussein responsibility was proven. This is why the crime was taken to the 
international court49 that determined first that the chemical attack on Halabja was a 
pre-planned and that it was the climax of the Anfal campaign as described in 
Chapter 7. Second, it established that the loss of 5,000 civilian Kurds in one 
chemical strike in a city of a population of 9,000 (52%) proves “The intent to 
destroy” and “Partially or totally”. According to international law the intent and not 
its fulfilment is important in order to establish responsibilities. In this case, for 
example, a high percentage of the group has been destroyed, and this has been 
enough to prove the intent to annihilate it.50  
 The Criminal intent as a non-physical element in Halabja Crime is parallel 
with the physical element of the crime, both became one unit that appears in a 
criminal behaviour that matches the definition of Genocide adopted by the 
international community. The Crime committed in Halabja is considered a crime 
against humanity because it violated Kurds’ human rights. In this context, Saddam 
Hussein was considered a dangerous international criminal according to the 
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definitions adapted by the Nuremberg Court Principals51. In addition, the Crime of 
genocide in Halabja is described in the ruling as awful crime because it took place 
under the supervision and with the covering of the higher officials of the state.52 
 In addition to the evidence presented above, the researcher during his 
fieldwork managed to gather further information that can help to build up the case 
against the defendants. It was important for this purpose to offer a field description 
of the crime scene and a new version of the events. The Iranian army led an 
offense on the Iraqi forces defensive lines located on the border between the two 
parties close to the town of Halabja in March 1988, this despite the heavy shelling 
during which Halabja became a target. They entered on 15 March and the next 
morning they retreated without leaving any military unit behind. According to many 
witnesses this was comforting for the people there, because they could leave their 
houses and attended their necessary livelihood needs.53 That same morning, at 
about 11:45 am, the Iraqi airforce leaving from the airbase of Al-Bakir base close 
to Balad district in Salahaddin province and from the airbase of Al-Huriya in Kirkuk 
and from Saddam Base in Mosul started an air raid against the city using highly 
explosive napalm bombs. The raid lasted until 15:00 pm. When the inhabitants of 
Halabja realized that the attack would not stop they started fleeing with any means 
available, at the same time then the Iraqi air force launched a chemical strike on 
the city centre blocking the main exits and causing the death of thousands of 
victims mainly women, children and elders. Those who were able to flee and 
reached the adjacent villages were also attacked and died along with their 
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inhabitants; this was the case of Al-Naee and Abo Ubaida.54 The families who 
managed to cross the border with Iran were reached by the deadly gas that spread 
all over the area, and those who received help in camps specially built for the 
refugees of Halabja and received the medical attention died because of the injuries 
suffered during the attacks.55  
 It was not only the use of chemical weapons against international law that 
turned the crime against Halabja into genocide. The attacks were immediately 
followed by a detention operation. Due to the big media coverage of the attacks, 
the Iraqi government in order to avoid international condemnation due to the 
presence of NGOs and international rescue organizations, issued a pardon to the 
people of Halabja. Many refugees decided to return to their home, but they were 
detained and deported to detention camps by the military forces surrounding the 
city. 
 The evidence on which the IHT based its sentence confirmed the field 
description just offered in this study. This was confirmed by the Second Criminal 
Court of the Iraqi Criminal High Tribunal headed by Judge Mohammed Al-Arabi 
who convicted four main defendants in accused of the crime: Ali Hassan Al-
Majeed, Sultan Hashim Ahmed, Sabir Abdl Aziz AL-Dourim, and Farhan Mutlak Al-
Jibory. The papers regarding the fifth defendant Tariq Ramadan Al-Azawi were 
transferred to another court because he escaped Sulaimanyah prison.56  
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Eye Witnesses  
Many of the witnesses who deposed in the trial were high-ranking military 
personnel who had the opportunity to eyewitness the different phases of the crime 
but there were not directly involved in it. The most important testimonies were the 
ones that proved the Iraqi government under its leader Saddam Hussein gave the 
explicit order to attack the city of Halabja on the afternoon of March 16, 1988 and 
that Ali Hassan Al-Majeed was given the full authority to direct the military 
operations all over Kurdistan including the power of using special ammunition and 
detain prisoners. The most important witness in this case was Staff General 
Waleed Naif Shabeeb Ibrahim Al-Aalousy, director of the Northern Area Military 
Intelligence Organization, witness in the cause #: 1/E/2005/ dated August 4, 2005. 
The witness had worked in many positions in the Military Intelligence among them 
he was a staff officer for the third branch and the director of the Northern Area 
Intelligence Organization. His testimony was given in front of the Investigative 
Judge at the High Iraqi Criminal Court where he confirmed that the Iraqi Forces 
used ‘Special Ammunition’ in the whole Al-Anfal Operations and also confirmed 
how that use led to shifting the results to the Iraqi army’s side. He also talked 
about the mechanism of the Special Ammunition use by the Armed Forces 
General Leadership, he explained the role of the military intelligence and their part 
in discussing the use as it was represented by its director as a member the general 
leadership. In the testimony, he confirmed the detention of the Kurds in areas 
covered by the fighting and that they were sent in groups to special camp in 
Tobzawa close to Kirkuk and then to other places. This was an operation under the 
direct supervision of Ali Hassan Al-Majeed and implemented by the Directorate of 
General Security. He also confirmed that Ali Hassan Al-Majeed had issued orders 
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to the attacking military units to kill any person in the banned area (no-man’s-land) 
and the evidence was the actual killing orders from the Northern Organization. He 
personally signed the records of executing Kurdish Groups57. Other key witnesses 
were: 
Pilot Staff General Hamid Rajaa Shalah Hasoun Al-Hadithi 
Date of birth: 1951 
Air Defense Commander 
Case number: 1/E/ 2004/ dated November 31, 2005 
The witness was a Pilot Officer who worked as The Commander of Aviation Wing 
at the AL-Bakir Air Base before his last position as the Air Defense Commander, 
he gave his testimony in the Aviation Technical Aspect and its uses. He elaborated 
in his testimony the methods of issuing orders and the implementations of the 
special orders related to the air missions and how to deal with the limited use of 
‘Special Ammunition’ in limited missions and how such weapon is not stored in the 
Air Basis and how the remainder “unused” is returned ONLY to the place it came 
from. He confirmed the actual participation of Al-Bair Based as well as Al-Hurriya 
and Saddam Basis in many air strikes on the northern areas “Kurdistan” without 
naming the struck targeted for quite some time after it took place.58  
Mahoud Faraj Bilal Abdullah Al-Samaraee  
Date of birth: 1948 
Al-Muthanna General Facility Research Director. 
Case number: None date December 26, 2005. 
The witness was an Officer in the Chemical branch with a PhD degree in chemical 
biology that worked first in the Chemical branch of the Iraqi Army then as a 
                                                          
57.   The Special Criminal Court, The investigative Judges, Pages 4379-4401. 
58.   Iraqi High Criminal Court, Investigative Judges, Pages 4472-4477. 
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researcher and director of researches in the facility specialized in the production of 
chemical weapons. This testimony is considered important in order to prove the 
details of the chemical weapon used in Halabja. He explained in his testimony that 
the facility he was directing called “Al-Muthanna” specialized in the production of 
the Chemical Weapons like Taboun, Sarin, Mustard, VX and SC, and he also 
provided details of how these weapons were loaded into bomb shells, Stalin 
Organs rockets and airborne bombs. He confirmed its use in the northern area of 
Kurdistan and also confirmed the presence of a special committee in the Armed 
Forces General Commandership that dealt with requesting special weapons and 
gathered information on their use in the aftermath of the attacks. He also 
confirmed that in the case of Halabja this committee granted permission to use the 
Nerve Gas-Sarin. He also explained which the symptoms were caused by the 
inhalation of this gas: shivering of the body, loss of control on the body organs, 
injury of the iris, loss of vision and death. The description of these symptoms 
matches the testimonies of some of the people of Halabja.59 
Their Yousif Abbo 
Date of birth: 1961 
Active Soldier 
The testimony provided the court a different insight since he was a soldier who had 
not witnessed the chemical attack but he could testify about some of the effects of 
the attack on the environment. With some of his colleagues in the army unit he had 
entered an orchard and since they were very hungry with their rifles picked and eat 
some of the fruits from the trees. Only a few days after he could notice that some 
                                                          
59.  Iraqi High Tribunal, Investigation Judges, pp. 2032-2041. 
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bubbles appeared on their bodies. When they consulted a doctor he diagnosed as 
being exposed to a chemical agents used a month before.60  
The Official Documents 
Despite the secrecy in which this operation were carried out, the official 
correspondence, found, clearly, supports the versions offered by the witnesses. 
This study will reproduce some of them. The first one is a classified personal letter 
from the Armed Forces General Command Secretary to the Armed Forces Deputy 
General Commander to the Minister of Defence and to the Army Chief of Staff. 
This letter contains a series of orders issued by the Armed forces General 
Commander. In paragraph (2) it says: “In Darbandi Khan Sector and in Al-Anfal 
Operations Sector …you must continue attacking the enemy and the saboteurs 
with fires, shelling and air bombardment, they should not be given the chance to 
settle down or re-gain their breaths. It is preferred to use the Special Ammunition 
through shelling at night as a surprise element, or loading regular shelling with 
strikes of the Special Ammunition”.61 The use of the name ‘Special Ammunition’ is 
confirmed in this letter as well as the intent of the General Commander to commit 
genocide to a specific ethnic group. 
 The second document is also a letter labelled “Classified and Personal” 
from the Army Staff Leadership addressed to the Commander of the First Brigade, 
Staff General Sultan Hashim and The Fifth Brigade, Staff General Ayad Khalil. 
Again with the subject “Directives” it shows the hostile activities of the operation. In 
paragraph (w) of article (2) the letter says: “The use of the ammunition against the 
enemy’s troops as much as possible using the air bombardment/ Shelling/ Pipe 
                                                          
60.  Halabja Case documents in the Iraqi High Criminal Court, p. 4481. 
61 . The Presidency’s Office the Armed Forces General Commandership Secretariat letter, 
Classified and personal numbered A/13/177 dated March 20, 1988. See appendix no. (2) and no. 
(3) to this chapter. Memo no. 2405, dated 22 March 1988. 
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rockets/ Helicopter before with a pre-emptive strike before they start their 
operations against our troops. You can also attack the saboteur’s sites using 
‘Special Ammunition’”. This is a hand-written letter, which shows the importance 
and secrecy of the subject. The last phrase of the letter, paragraph (w) quoted 
above shows how the Armed Forces General Leadership who is the only person 
who has the authority to use the ‘Special Ammunition’, is granting permission to 
use them against the Kurds which he kept labelling as “saboteurs”, in addition and 
he is the one who identified the sites for the attacks. This was not enough 
identification to prevent this chemical weapon to reach the local civilians because 
the Peshmergas where moving between sites and those make shift fixed sites 
used for fighting where usually locate close to the villages and populated area. The 
Iraqi authority were aware of the dangers of a chemical attack close to an 
inhabited areas since the gas can spread into a much wider area that the intended 
one. This is clear from some documents from the military that did not recommend 
the use of chemical weapons close to the Turkish border in order to avoid an 
international uproar.62 
 Another letter presented as evidence was one from the Intelligence 
Organization for the Eastern Area addressed to the Fifth Assisting Branch in the 
Military Intelligence Directorate, the subject was “Information”. In paragraph 5 the 
letter says: “The enemy’s loss due to our air strikes against the city of Halabja as 
well as our shelling were huge and about 3,000 people were killed by the Guards 
and Bassej.63 Their corpses have been transferred to the city of Bawa along with a 
high number of injured people. The civilian loss was of about 4,000 people all from 
                                                          
62.  The Armed Forces General Commandership letter numbered review/ 349 dated April 27, 
1988. pp. 9653-654) of the documents of High Criminal Court. 
63.  Iranian special units. 
251 
 
the city of Halabja and the residential camps and villages around it. Most of the 
losses were the result of the chemical strike”. This letter also shows that Halabja 
was under the jurisdiction of the intelligence service. It is a hand-written-letter 
evaluation of the chemical strike that took place against Halabja. This letter is the 
proof that the strike was on the city centre and neighbouring areas as well as on 
the road leading to the city and along with the testimonies that place the Iranian 
troops out of Halabja before the afternoon of March 16 and it constitutes a clear 
and undeniable admission of the use of the chemical weapon.64 
 On page 17 of this 23 pages long letter obtained from the general military 
intelligence and presented to the High Criminal Court, 7th paragraph it says: “On 
the next day after our troops struck Halabja with the ‘Special Ammunition’, Mir 
Hassan Mosawi, the Prime Minister of the Farsi Regime arrived accompanied by 
the criminal “Mala Ali” the head of the Military Wing of the Islamic Movement in 
Kurdistan with Iranian Journalists as well as Journalists from France and Italy, then 
they all left to Iranian city of Bawa after visiting the area”. This is a clear admission 
from an official intelligence authority of the use of the chemical weapons against 
Halabja. With this visit Iran took advantage of the attack on Halabja both on the 
external and on the internal front. Internally, they were offered a propaganda 
weapons against the infidels Iraqi who did not hesitate in acting against Islam by 
killing their own people. Internationally, they could show the whole world the 
atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime.65 
                                                          
64. A letter from The Intelligence Organization Eastern Area labelled Highly Classified numbered 
/S1/Q1/3405 dated March 22, 1988. Pages (2499-2501) from the documents of the High Criminal 
Court. 
65.  Page 2511 from the documents of the High Iraqi Criminal Court. 
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 The last letter produced here is a highly classified one from the Intelligence 
Organization for the Eastern Area to the Third Branch of the Military Intelligence. 
The subject again is information. In the second paragraph of this letter he mentions 
the losses resulting from the chemical strike. According to a special estimate made 
by a source working for the organization in the city of Halabja during the strike 
around 1,200 people died in the Armed Guards and the Baseej in the city and its 
suburbs. This in addition to 2,500 victims among the residents. 
 Despite the difficulty in calculating the exact number of losses, the tribunal 
took into consideration the evidence presented to the court. It is worth mentioning 
that in the aftermath of a strike of this proportion it is very difficult to agree on an 
exact number of victims and that an estimated number could be reached only 
through the witnesses’ accounts or after a reconnaissance visit by external NGOs 
or other organizations.66  
The Ruling of the Court 
The complaint was filed at the Iraqi High Criminal Court against some Iraqi 
officials, under the number 2/C the Second/2008 for the action in attacking Halabja 
using chemical weapons. The defendants Ali Hassan Al-Majeed, Sultan Hashim 
Ahmed, Sabir Abdul Aziz Al-Douri, and Farhan Mutlak Al-Jibori were tried. The first 
one was convicted under the paragraph numbered 12/First/A) code and 
14/First/Second/Third/Forth) articles of the Iraqi High Criminal Court numbered 
(10) dated 2005 for the first charge. He was sentenced to be hanged for his 
participation in murder and crimes against humanity. The other defendants were 
convicted under Article 12/First-D and article 15/Second/A, B, C and Third, Fourth 
                                                          
66. A letter from The Intelligence Organization Eastern Area labelled Highly Classified numbered 
/S1/Q1/3552 dated March 27, 1988, page (2502) from the documents of the High Criminal Court. 
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Chapters of the mentioned above court statutes. They were sentenced to 7 years 
for the forced deportation of civilians. They all were convicted in accordance with 
articles 12/First – T and article 15/ First and Second of the Courts Code. They 
were sentenced to 15 years in prison for their crime the forced deportation as a 
crime against humanity. The accusers and petitioners appealed their personal right 
in accordance with the bill dated January 27, 2010. Their objection focused on the 
decision related to the strike on Halabja with chemical weapons considered as a 
crime against humanity and for this reason illegal.  
 The appellate body at the High Iraqi Criminal Court accepted these appeals 
and confirmed the strike against Halabja was indeed a Crime of Genocide. After 
evaluating all the evidence the Court acknowledged a clear intent of annihilation of 
a specific ethnic group according to articles (11/First/A) of the High Iraqi Criminal 
Court numbered 10 dated 2005.67 
The defendants’ testimonies 
In the case of Halabja Ali Hassan Al-Majeed during the first hearing dated June 16, 
2009 admitted his crime saying that that if it was proven that Iraq is the one who 
attacked Halabja using Chemical Weapons, then he will bear some responsibility 
along with the Armed Forces General Leadership. He also confessed in front of the 
accusers and other witnesses saying (I attacked and then why are you still alive…I 
am the ruler of the Kurds and President Saddam Hussein is the Ruler of Iraq and 
Halabja is a setback that needs to be purified by sea water) 68. 
                                                          
67. For a full statement from the Iraqi High Tribunal regarding the Halabja case see the text of the 
sentence mentioned. 
68.  The Iraqi High Criminal Court records in the Halabja Case. The researcher has all recorded 
copies of the case sessions. 
 
254 
 
Conclusion 
Looking back at the previous crimes analysed, it is evident that Halabja constitutes 
the peak of the state engineered genocide against Kurds. In the eighth year of war 
against Iran, the regime distanced itself completely from an indifferent international 
community and international law. The attack on Halabja was carried as a revenge 
against a population traditionally against the regime.  What happened in Halabja 
is not disconnected act from the Al-Anfal Operations that started the night of 
February 22-23 and ended on September 9, 1988. All the official letters that 
discussed the use of the “Special Ammunition” were hand-written for security 
reasons. The researcher has translated and reproduced them in the appendix to 
this chapter.
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Chapter Nine 
Recommendations for Prevention of Genocide in Iraq 
 
With the failure of the Iraqi state and society in 2003, the country had to deal with 
different challenges. The most important of these challenges was and still is the 
security issue along with healing the wounds of the victims of genocide and their 
remaining families. The federal government born after the fall of Saddam’s regime 
under the protection of the United States has not been able until now to contain the 
wave of sectarian violence, which is the main obstacle to a unified Iraq. In this 
context, the Kurdish case is particularly significant because the new country will 
have to deal with its uncomfortable and unjust past.  In the case of Iraq, in contrast 
to what happened in other cases around the world, the violence is still engulfing 
the whole society. This makes it difficult to propose effective changes in order to 
prevent these events from happening in the future. The researcher, directly 
involved in building the case for some of the crimes considered in this thesis, 
thinks that the route to reconciliation has to pass through the equation 
Truth+Justice=Reconciliation  
 In order to establish truth and justice it is paramount to deal with all the 
individuals and institutions involved in preventing the crimes. In a schematic but 
useful simplification the actors of this drama are the victims of the perpetrators and 
the bystanders. Each of this group and the relation among them in term of justice 
has to be taken into account. In this chapter the researcher will deal with each of 
them, explaining, in the light of the events, how the new government should 
recognise the rights and wrongs of each group.  
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Victims 
A victim has name, a face, a past, hope and aspiration for the future. In an 
amorphous mass, however, the victims become nameless and faceless statistics. 
The humanity of the victims is lost in the vastness of the crime. We must strive to 
remember the human dimension of these crimes, and not forget that these 
numbers, aggregated into sterile and abstract totals, represent human lives brutally 
and tragically cut short for ideological, economic and political purposes. If we look 
at the victims of genocide in Iraq, we will find that they were killed not for a crime 
they have committed but for who they are; such as Faylee Kurds, Barzani Kurds or 
Kurds in general and this is why we can say that genocide targets identity rather 
than behaviour thus Kurds have been subjected to crime of genocide not for their 
behaviour but for their identity.  
 The Social and psychological consequences of genocide against the Kurds 
still affect the victims in their daily life. As we already mentioned earlier, Dr. 
Christine Gosden, who testified before a US Senate Judiciary subcommittee 
hearing in 1998, prepared a study on the long-term consequences of the Kurdish 
genocide. Preliminary studies have concluded that people Halabja experienced a 
dramatic higher rate of cancers, vision and respiratory problems, miscarriages, and 
children born with deformities compared to other towns that did not suffer the 
chemical attacks. Access to sophisticated healthcare treatments has been limited, 
and many people, especially women, suffer from depression. The people of 
Halabja are frustrated with the lack of assistance they have received from both 
Kurdistan Regional Government’s officials as well as Iraqi Federal Government. 
For this reason they should be provided with better medical care in order to lead a 
normal life. However, in order to rebuild the civil society, a series of steps are 
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necessary. For example, the state should return to them their rights. As we have 
seen in Chapter 5 on Faylee Kurds, the Iraqi government failed in fulfilling its own 
promises included in resolution No. 426 of the Council of Ministers the elimination 
of all negative impacts caused by their forced deportation. The statistics mentioned 
at the end of the chapter show that very few Faylee Kurds saw their Iraqi 
nationality and even less are in possession of a national ID card. In addition, their 
“moveable and unmoveable assets” has not been returned to them. All this is 
having a detrimental effect on society. The unwillingness of the Federal 
Government to take the route of reconciliation is evident in its attitude towards all 
the other cases analysed here. The victims of the Barzanis’ killing, for example, 
pose different challenges. In their case, recognising them as victims implies much 
more than material compensation. The secrecy in which the crime was carried out 
calls for a major effort from the government in order to establish the truth of what 
happened and assist the victims in dealing with their loss. The Federal 
Government should propose a law dealing with missing person in tandem with 
international law. It is recommended that a high-level inter-institutional work group 
established that includes decision-makers and legal experts, as well as 
representatives of the families of missing persons to initiate a wide consultative 
process in order to discuss this law. In addition, a simplified process should be 
enforced in order to allow the families of the victims with all the support during the 
different stages of the process. In particular, it is important that their rights when 
dealing with the forensic aspects of the search for the missing persons. Up until 
now, the Federal Government did not have any credible plan in place in order to 
identify the victims of genocide. Any discovery of mass grave, and leak of 
documentation regarding the mass killing committed by the former regime have 
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been left to private initiatives. As we will see in more detail later, this stance by the 
Federal Government is due mostly to the fact that the most of the civil servants 
were working for the previous regime and may be accessary to the killings. To 
overcome this situation the government should establish local and civil society 
groups in order to outreach the victims’ families and involve them in the process of 
discovering the truth. This would imply the protection of personal data, in particular 
genetic information used of the identification of the missing persons. Until now this 
process has been very flawed if we think that over 1,000,000 victims only 30,000 
DNA samples have been collected. In this moment a Search Commission for the 
victims of forced disappearance does not exist. 
 The role of the Search Commission should be strengthened, ensuring that 
high-ranking representatives from its member institutions regularly attend meetings 
and that the institutions implement its decisions. In this moment the only 
governmental office in charge is the Minister of Human Rights that lacks the 
facilities and the administrative capacity to deal with this issue. The collaboration 
with the families of the victims would also help to restore confidence in the Federal 
Government and in its willingness not to perpetrate genocide in the future. For this 
purpose the Federal Iraqi Government should adopt a consistent definition of who 
constitutes a victim of enforced disappearance. While it is generally acknowledged 
that the victims of enforced disappearance include not only the disappeared 
persons themselves, but also their family members, this is not uniformly prescribed 
by Iraqi law. The Search Commission should also lead to the creation of an inter-
institutional plan for information to be entered and/or transferred into the National 
Registry and be verified by relevant institutions. The possibility of incorporating 
data collected and maintained by associations of family members of missing 
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persons and other NGOs into the National Register, in line with security concerns, 
should be explored. The Search Commission should issue periodic public reports 
on the compliance of Federal Iraqi Government institutions in transfer and 
verification process. 
 The Federal Iraqi Government should also provide reliable and accurate 
information regarding the process of searching for missing persons as well as 
conducting a comprehensive review to determine the magnitude of the issue of 
enforced disappearance, including a determination of the general characteristics of 
the issue. This includes a compilation and verification of all existing information 
with the relevant institutions, which should result in enhancing the search and 
identification efforts, as well as the provision of assistance to the victims. In 
addition, a centralised information system able to store all the information gathered 
on the issue of forced disappearances should be put in place. This would 
guarantee the protection of all genetic information obtained from the families of 
missing persons.  
 It is imperative that during the judicial proceedings and the search process 
all crimes committed in relation to the crimes of genocide (e.g. torture, sexual 
violence, and mutilation) are properly recorded and investigated. The effective right 
to remedy should be strengthened. Further, the right to reparations should be 
implemented equally for all victims of enforced disappearance, without regard to 
the perpetrators of the crime. 
  A Federal Iraqi Government strategy for addressing the rights of victims 
during the search process and judicial proceedings is necessary. Such strategy 
should clarify which Federal Iraqi Government institutions are responsible to 
implement specific rights, establish a single standard for the entire country, as well 
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as provide for better inter-institutional coordination on the issue. The Prosecutor’s 
Office should assess the level of urgency for the exhumation of a site. It should 
also regulate the access to the mass grave in order to avoid the application of 
poorly applied forensic procedures as happened in 2003 after the revelation to the 
public the existence of various mass graves. In these cases the exhumation should 
be postponed until sufficient investigative information is available in order to 
ensure the proper application of forensic procedures. All this should be done with 
the active participation of the international community that should provide a 
coordinated and sustainable assistance to the associations of the families of the 
missing to ensure that they are educated and engaged in addressing their rights 
and in raising awareness about enforced disappearances. 
Create a Law on Missing Persons 
There is a clear need for a legislation to holistically address the issue of enforced 
disappearance and the specific needs of the victims.  It is recommended that a 
high-level inter-institutional work group be established, that includes decision-
makers and legal experts, as well as representatives of the families of the 
disappeared, to initiate a wide consultative process to formulate such a law in 
support of the victims. The creation of a centralised National Register of Missing 
Persons is also recommended to house all information relevant in order to locate, 
recover and identify the missing persons. When launching an investigation, the 
prosecutor should ensure that available information concerning the victim of 
enforced disappearance is incorporated into the National Register. 
 The government should provide sustainable funding to institutions 
responsible for incorporating data. This will enable them to handle the increase in 
information that needs to be incorporated in the system, as well as the transfer of 
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the existing backlog of information registered in hard copies, or their internal 
databases. 
Technical Recommendations 
Along with the legal and administrative organization, some technical provisions 
have to be guaranteed in order to deal with forced disappearances. For example, 
the government should provide funding in order to support the daily work of ad hoc 
facilities for the exhumation and identification of the victims. This involves an 
increasing of personnel and administrative staff. As forensic anthropologists are 
vital to both the exhumation and examination process, provisions should be made 
to compensate for the draw on personnel from laboratories. Hiring additional 
anthropologists and/or including well-managed lower-level staff can facilitate this. 
An increase in staff will require an increase in equipment and supplies, which 
should be constantly available due to the high turnover of sites and limited 
preparation time. 
Revision and Standardization of Field Activities and Examinations 
Existing protocols, report formats and methods of documentation relevant to the 
recovery and post mortem examination of the remains, should be reviewed and 
standardized. Exhumations should be postponed until sufficient investigative 
information on the potential identity of the victims is available, and/or until or 
logistical and operational conditions allow for best exhumation practices to be 
followed, in line with provisions of protections of graves/sites. 
 Continuous and reliable security with adequate and comprehensive 
procedures for assessing and ensuring site safety with regard to unexploded 
ordinance and landmines must be provided for the exhumation teams. The 
practice of exhuming sites near areas of on-going hostilities should be 
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reconsidered. Despite the emphasis on recovery of human remains, it is imperative 
that all sites are treated as crime scenes, and as such are fully investigated and 
documented. The sites should be reliably secured 24 hours a day during the 
recovery. 
 The routine implementation of stratigraphic archaeological approaches to 
exhumation and evidence recovery, and the use of 3D topographic site surveys for 
evidentiary documentation should be considered. Detection and investigation of 
pre mortem and post mortem trauma, with an emphasis on documentation of 
torture, should be strengthened and consistently applied. Chain of custody 
requirements must be consistently adhered to during the entire process, from the 
recovery to final burial. 
Standardization of Protocols, DNA Testing Kits, Population Databases, and 
Development/validation Across DNA Laboratories 
 
It is imperative that a single multiplex STR (Short Tandem Repeats) system is 
used by all laboratories. Appropriate industry standards include the ABI Identifier 
kit and the Promega PowerPlex16 kit. One of these should be selected and used 
consistently. 
 Each of the DNA laboratories should work towards the optimization of the 
existing methods or the implement of new ones, in an attempt to increase 
throughput and/or success. It is highly recommended that the laboratories proceed 
in a coordinated manner. A division of labour should be agreed, with different 
laboratories evaluating particular candidate protocols, new instrumentation, or 
technical improvements. When improved techniques are identified through a 
systematic process, a single selected laboratory should conduct and document the 
requisite formal developmental validation. The new protocols can then be 
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established in all laboratories, with minimal modifications for lab-specific Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs) and a greatly reduced set of experiments to 
establish internal validation. Application of such a process will establish much 
greater uniformity between the laboratories. 
Improvement of the DNA Laboratory throughout by Revision of Process Flow 
A revised approach to work flow should be considered by the various DNA 
laboratories. The current model of sample processing falls far short of the capacity 
of the facilities, and the labs should evaluate how they can turn to a modular 
approach or otherwise modify their workflow. For example, the International 
Commission of Missing Person DNA laboratory is a single molecular biology lab, 
supported by a separate, smaller laboratory, which concentrates on bone cleaning 
and grinding. The combined ICMP staff totals 26 (e.g. technicians, analysts, team 
leaders). Since 2002, the ICMP laboratory has generated 85,853 family reference 
DNA profiles, 25,458 bone/tooth DNA profiles, and generated 23,073 DNA match 
reports representing 15,023 individuals. The high output of ICMP‟s laboratory is 
based on a modular work flow, where particular teams work exclusively on one 
segment of the DNA typing process, which permits each team to focus on effective 
processing of a high volume of samples, with an overall flow through the system 
averaging approximately 65 bone samples per day. Provision of training should 
also be provided for any stage of the investigation. All these actions should 
guarantee a wider transparency in the relationship between the Federal 
Government and the victims of the genocides perpetrated by the regime. It should 
also restore the confidence in the system that in the current situation is lacking 
because of the Federal Government unwillingness to make sure that the new 
constitution is implemented.  
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 All these measures should aim at forming new citizens who are aware of 
their past and in this way they are able to stop the cycle of violence of Iraqi society. 
In order to do this, the Federal Government should promote and support a wide 
reform of education not only of the families of the victims, but also of all Iraqis. This 
would help the reconciliation among the different groups and would also provide 
the country with specialised professionals who can make a different in the society 
as a whole. For example, fomenting education in forensic anthropology could be a 
way to deal with the massive amount of work in the area and would show the 
public that the government is actively searching for the victims. In addition, a 
comprehensive and uniform education system should be implemented all over the 
country making education a platform towards the creation of a common sense of 
belonging to a shared society and united country. This would educate the new 
generation in a unified meaning of justice and rights along with the awareness of 
what their responsibilities are as citizens. This education should guarantee the 
respect for other people’s right to their beliefs and religion paving the way for a 
peaceful coexistence among the different sections of society. 
Perpetrators 
It is very important, in order to build a new country, to guarantee that the victims of 
genocide receive justice. In Iraq this process has been compromised from the 
beginning because the institutions in charge of the administration of justice after 
2003 experienced a lot of external pressures and also because of the precarious 
situation experienced in the country due to the civil war. The Interim Government 
set up the Iraqi High Tribunal, also known as the Iraqi Special Tribunal in 2004 
under the watchful eye and financial support of the US, which provided 150 million 
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dollars, tight security and lawyers from the Justice Department. For this reason, 
the IHT was not an international tribunal and its independence and authority was 
dubious. In addition, the IHT lacking of external support was formed by judges 
heavily compromised with Saddam’s regime and without any experience in dealing 
with genocide. The result was that for every crime analysed here the number of 
defendants was completely disproportionate to the scale of the crime.  
 If we look at all the cases of the Kurdish genocide in Iraq we can find out 
that they were planned and implemented by thousands of people. However, 
looking at the legal outcomes of the all these cases we can find that they are so 
limited that it is very difficult to talk about justice.  
 
Case of Study Agencies participating in 
the crimes 
No. of  final 
verdicts 
Arabization 
1963-2003 
All government’s agencies 8 
Faylee Kurds 1970-1991 Security, Ba’ath Party, Mukhbarak 
agencies 
5 
Barzanis  (1983) Security and Republican Guards 4 
Anfal Campaign (1987-
1988) 
All Government’s Military, Security Intelligent 
and Ba’ath Party agencies 
6 
Halabja(1988) Military, Air forces and Baath  Party 
agencies 
4 
 
Some high-ranking members of the Ba’athist government have been tried and 
sentenced. The former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was initially tried in the 
Dujail case, in which he was charged with the killing 148 Shi’a men and boys in 
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southern Iraq after a failed assassination attempt against him in 1984. Saddam 
Hussein was also a defendant in a second trial, which focused on crimes 
committed during the Anfal campaign. In November 2006, while the Anfal trial was 
underway, Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death for the Dujail crimes and 
swiftly hanged on 30th December 2006. Three other former officials, including his 
half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, were also hanged. Many felt that his Shi’a 
enemies executed the ex-president before he was made to pay for crimes against 
Kurds. This led most Kurds to think that justice had been hijacked by the tensions 
between Sunni and Shi’a leaving the Kurds without the possibility to see justice for 
the crimes committed against them. 
 If Saddam Hussein held ultimate authority for the repression of the Kurds, 
Ali Hassan al-Majid was the campaign’s principle architect. Al-Majid was found 
guilty of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and sentenced to 
death on 24 June 2007. His sentence was confirmed by the Iraqi High Tribunal’s 
appellate court on 4 September 2007; he received the death penalty to be 
executed within 30 days from the verdict. The death sentences of two other 
defendants-former Defence Minister Sultan Hashem Ahmed al-Jabouri al-Tai and 
former Iraqi Military Deputy Commander of Operations Hussein Rashid were also 
upheld. It appears at this point that Sultan Hashem, who is widely respected by 
senior US military officials, may have his sentence reduced. Two other officials in 
the military intelligence – Abdul-Aziz Al-Duri and Farhan Motlak Al-Jabouri – 
received life imprisonment for their roles in the Anfal campaign. 
 In the autumn 2007, a trial specifically focusing on the attacks at Halabja 
had been prepared along with at least ten other trials under the jurisdiction of the 
Iraqi High Tribunal. The highest authorities in the former Iraqi government are thus 
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being held accountable for crimes against the people of Iraq: Saddam Hussein for 
his repression of the Shi’a – and not the Kurds – and “Chemical Ali” for the Anfal – 
not Halabja. If al-Majid was executed before the Halabja trial began, then middle – 
rank military officers and government officials have been prosecuted for their 
supportive roles in the March attacks. 
 But while former Iraqi officials have been publicly paraded into a court of 
law, other parties, with less visible and more indirect roles - such as the companies 
that supplied Iraq with the means to make chemical weapons – have managed to 
deflect responsibility and evade prosecution. One exception is the Dutch 
businessman, France van Anraat, who was found guilty of complicity in war crimes 
for selling chemical weapons to Iraq and sentenced to 17 years in prison. The 
American, Christopher Drogoul, was convicted of fraud for illegally granting 
Saddam Hussein more than 5 billion dollars in secret loans largely used to make 
arms purchases. Drogoul was sentenced to three years and one month in prison. 
Alcolac, a Baltimore, Maryland – based chemical manufacturer, pled guilty to 
federal export violations and paid a 438,000 dollars fine for its role in supplying 
chemical precursors used in mustard gas to the region. 
 Some companies that have eluded accountability include Al Haddad 
Enterprises, which supplied a component of Sarin nerve gas to Saddam Hussein. 
German companies supplied Iraq with much of its CW equipment and technology. 
Employees of Pilot Plant, a subsidiary of Karl Kolb, were charged with export 
violations but were found not guilty. All these will not satisfy the victims or their 
families if they will not be compensated or forced to directly spend extra money on 
their destroyed villages.  
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Bystanders  
Genocide is not a crime that happens in dark alleys. It is too massive and all 
consuming to be hidden away from the public view. All genocide crimes in Iraq 
must have had many witnesses. Bystanders have integral roles in the drama of 
genocide because the consummation of genocide requires not only the active 
participation of the perpetrators but the willingness of the great part of the society 
to do nothing, thus the best encouragement for the perpetrators is the silence of 
the bystanders mainly in divided – fragmented - society such as Iraq. Edmund 
Burke mentioned that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good 
men to do nothing”,1 this is why, as stated before, the government should make an 
effort to educate the new generation into a new way of being  good citizens in 
order to build a democratic society. However, justice would not be completed until 
the whole society admits its active or passive participation in the killings. As we 
have seen this investigation has been able to show that the responsibilities lay 
much beyond the top of the regime.  
 In Chapter 7 dedicated to the Anfal campaign, for example, it is evident, 
besides the involvement of the armed forces and of different governmental 
agencies, that the campaign was preceded by a well-organised massive 
propaganda against the Kurds. In his article entitled ‘Genocide: Responsibility of 
Bystanders’, Arne Johan Vetesen talks about the role of intellectuals in the building 
up of the genocide in Bosnia. The famous or infamous Manifesto signed by 
prominent intellectuals and university professor paved the way and justified the 
coming genocide to the citizens promoting the demonization of the Muslims living 
in the country. This provided the public with some kind of justification for what it 
                                                          
1. http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/17142.Edmund_Burke 
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was going to come and prevented any action against it. In Iraq, as we have seen 
previously, something very similar happened. By demonizing the Kurds on 
religious grounds, the regime was able, thanks to its total control of the media, to 
demonize the Kurds as enemy of the State, the later being portaited as the 
defendants of Islam. This was orchestrated in collusion with civil servants as well 
as journalists and intellectuals. According to Article 3 of the convention, the 
participation, even if not active, to genocide is a crime that should be punished. 
The application of Article 3 would allow Iraqi society to recognise its responsibility 
towards the Kurds and other minorities. Currently, the presence in governmental 
offices of exponents of the Ba’ath regime is hindering the credibility of the Federal 
Government. The presence of ex Ba’atists in the civil service is also due to the fact 
that the process of de Ba’athification included in the constitution is compromised 
by the divisions between Sunni and Sh’ia. 
 One of the aims of this study was to identify in the Kurdish case the eight 
stages that lead to genocide according to Gregory Stanton. The analysis of the 
different crimes presented in the thesis show how these stages acted 
simultaneously in the Kurdish case. According to Stanton the early stage of the 
genocide is characterized by a sort of classification, people are typed into different 
groups according to race, religion or political creed. As we have seen in the 
chapters dedicated to different crimes, Kurdish people were categorized into sub 
groups: Arabization, Faylee, Barzanis, Anfal and Halabja. In all four cases these 
groups have suffered different kind of genocides and have been targeted in 
different ways. In order to prevent this first stage to happen in the future it is 
important in the process of nation building to overcome these divisions. In front of 
the law everybody is just a citizen with all the rights and responsibilities 
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independently from his/her group of origin. This can be done through a capillary 
system of civic education, through the awareness of citizenship and peace 
programs. The second is a symbolization stage. This is when the propaganda 
machine of the regime becomes more intense and paves the way to the 
justification of its future crimes. The different groups are stereotyped or presented 
as enemy of the state and its citizens. It was the case of the Jews accused of 
being part of a world conspiracy, and the same happened with the Kurdish people 
who, as we saw in the case of the Faylee, the Barzanis, Anfal and Halabja, were 
for different reasons accused of belonging to a non-existent fifth column, or 
addressed as traitors or non believers. In order to prevent this to happen agains 
symbols of hate should be banned as it happened in Europe after World War II 
where the symbols of the Swastika or the ones reminding Nazi fascism have been 
banned by law.  
 The third stage is dehumanization. Calling people belong to other groups 
denying them their humanity is dangerous because it makes them appear out of 
our moral universe. As animals, the members of the out-group have been stripped 
of the moral in-group protection against extermination. In the Kurdish case the 
consequences of this process of dehumanization translated into forced deportation 
of Faylee Kurds to Iran, forced detention in Nigrat Al Salman prison for the 
Barzanis, and the destruction with chemical weapons of their towns and villages in 
the case of Anfal and Halabja. In these cases local and international leaders 
should condemn racial hatred and the leaders who incite or support genocide 
should be banned from travelling abroad and should have their wealth frozen. In 
addition, in many countries like the United Kingdom, for example, the incitement to 
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racial hatred in any form is an indictable offence. In this way, any citizen is 
responsible for the peaceful coexistence of the different groups in the society. 
 Organization is another of the stages indicated by Stanton. Officials or 
sympathizers of the regime organized in order to destroy the targeted group. In all 
the crimes analysed in this thesis, from Arabization to Halabja the level of 
organisation included the issues of decrees ad hoc as the in the Faylee Kurds’ 
case as well as the military planning and training of personnel in order to carry out 
detentions and mass killings as in the Barzanis’ case or military attacks on a big 
scale as in Anfal or Halabja. In these cases, when the international community is 
aware of the genocide, the UN should impose embargos on weapons imports by 
the governments and the citizens of the countries involved in the massacres. It 
should also create a commission to investigate the crimes. International public 
opinion is very important because it could exercise pressure through the media to 
stop the events from happening. 
 Another stage is polarization. The propaganda machine is needed by every 
totalitarian regime to support the officials who undertake a systematic campaign to 
maximise the social, psychological and, moral distance between ‘us’ and ‘them’. At 
this stage all moderate intellectuals are silenced in different ways, from exile to 
intimidation and torture. During the Arabization this was very clear. The Barzanis 
were negotiating with the government asking to stop the forced deportation and 
proving with demographic data how this was detrimental for the Kurds. However, 
no room for negotiation or discussion was granted to them when the Faylee Kurds 
were deported and stripped of their citizenship and properties. In all other cases 
considered the polarization is very clear: the Barzanis were traitors; the Kurds from 
Anfal and Halabja were infidels. In order to prevent this to happen the State should 
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allow moderate groups to participate in human rights groups and avoid any 
temptation of totalitarianism.  
 Preparation is the final stage of genocide. No massive deportation and 
killing can take place without an organization on a big scale. This stage was very 
clear when Jews in Europe were forced to wear a yellow star on their cloths and 
were segregated in ghettos. In addition young men who could be an obstacle can 
be detained or killed. Regarding the Faylee Kurds, this stage was represented by 
the different decrees allowing the Arabization of different areas, the publication of 
the decree authorizing their detention and expulsion. The preparation for the 
Barzanis’ case meant the involvement of the State Security and Intelligence 
Service in order to organize their detention and mass killing. In the cases of Anfal 
and Halabja the RCC decrees ordered the moving of the troops to the area in 
preparation for the attacks. At this stage, in order to prevent the genocide, a 
Genocide Emergency should be declared. The international community and the 
Security Council should intervene under section 7 of UN mandate.2 If the State is 
involved in genocide then it should held accountable and charged with threating 
regional and international security. 
 When the stage of extermination arrives, the perpetrators do not believe in 
the humanity of their victims. They do not deal with them as human being and in 
the Kurdish case this was clear in all the crimes considered. At this point only an 
armed intervention from the international community can stop the genocide. They 
should guarantee safe areas or refugee escape corridors with heavily armed 
international protection in order to offer refuge to the potential victims. 
                                                          
2.  http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 
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 The last stage indicated by Stanton is Denial. This implies the destruction of 
evidence that could lead to the discovery of the crimes, including as we have seen 
in almost all the cases considered, leaving unmarked mass graves, burning 
bodies, or threatening the survivors into denying what they witnessed. This is a 
very destructive stage because the accused try to deny the events and this make it 
difficult the building of the legal cases against them jeopardizing the possibility of 
having justice.  
 The new Iraqi constitution of 2005 was the first to be voted through an open 
referendum and the intention was born for the need to deal with Iraqis unjust past. 
In the Preamble of the new Iraqi constitution, which  was overseen by most 
political parties and components of the Iraqi society,  it acknowledges what Kurds 
and others have been through and it invokes “the pains of sectarian oppression 
inflicted by the autocratic clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq’s martyrs, 
Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds and Turkmen and from all other components of 
the people, and recollecting the darkness of the ravage of the holy cities and the 
South in the Sha’abaniyya uprising and burnt by the flames of grief of the mass 
graves, the marshes, Al-Dujail and others and articulating the sufferings of racial 
oppression in the  massacres of Halabja, Barzan, Anfal and the Fayli Kurds”. It 
also mentions that we have to take “lessons from yesterday for tomorrow”. The 
new Constitution is also the second one to recognise that “Iraq is a country of 
multiple nationalities, religions, and sects”. Article 7 goes even further by 
condemning the Ba’ath philosophy and “any entity or program that adopts, incites, 
facilitates, glorifies, promotes, or justifies racism or terrorism or accusations of 
being an infidel (takfir) or ethnic cleansing, especially the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq 
and its symbols, under any name whatsoever, shall be prohibited. Such entities 
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may not be political pluralism in Iraq.”  Unfortunately, until now for the reasons 
discussed above, the constitution has not been fully implemented. Sectarianism 
and de Ba’atification have not been fulfilled and it is difficult to see a new multi-
ethnic and multi-cultural being a reality in the near future. In addition, there are 
some worrying patterns that are repeating themselves and gives the impression 
that history can repeat itself. Article 9 of the constitution mentioned all Iraqis no 
matter their ethnicity should join the new Iraqi army and, most important, that it 
would be subject to the control of the civilian authority. This to avoid any 
interference in the political affairs and in any transfer of authority.  After 2003 a 
new Iraqi army was formed with the participation of Kurd, Arab, Turkoman and 
others, but if we look at it today it is easy to find out that it is under Shi’a Arab 
domination. In addition, many high ranking Ba’athists are in office and occupy 
military positions. For example, the general who was one of the main commanders 
during the Anfal campaign, Brigade Abdul Amir Al Zaidi now, thanks to decree no. 
372 of the Iraqi Council Ministers, is in command of the Tigris Forces based in 
Kirkuk, a very daring and symbolic step by the Federal Government considering 
that in 1988 Wafiq Al-Samarra’I, deputy director of the Military Intelligence 
Directorate said: “you can kill half a million Kurds in Erbil but that won’t do 
anything. It would still be Kurdish. But killing 50,000 Kurds in Kirkuk will finish the 
cause forever” (Hitermann, 2007). Currently, the Iraqi army is constituted of 15 
divisions for a total of about 350,000 soldiers, most of them belonging to the former 
Iraqi military forces. In addition to that Iraqi interior ministry have more than one 
million policemen. 
 As shown in articles 132, 134, 136 and 140 the constitution guarantees the 
care for the families of the victims of the dictatorship, including the constitutional 
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duty to look for the missing Iraqis; the independence of the IHT; the institution of a 
Property Claim Commission in charge of returning the property confiscated to the 
Faylee Kurds during the Arabization; and the duty to sort out the disputed areas 
respectively have not been implemented. 
The future from Kurdistan  
The Kurdish Regional government inherited a region plagued by the 
consequences of the genocides against its citizens. For each crime analysed in 
this work the social, economic and cultural consequences are still felt in the area 
and abroad by the Kurdish community in the diaspora. In particular, the loss of a 
common identity suffered because of the forced displacement during the 
Arabization along with the genocide against the Faylee Kurds had caused a 
consistent decrease of Kurdish presence in northern Iraq. 
 In addition, the military intervention on Kurdish people, in particular Anfal 
and Halabja destroyed almost completely the Kurdish infrastructure. More than 
4,500 villages were wiped out from the map and this meant that their local 
economy and way of living have been compromised. At this regard, according to 
the last statistics, the agricultural production is currently 75% less than it was 
before the genocides. This meant a strong change in the economy of the area that 
now relies most on the oil whose revenue should be invested in improving the 
living conditions of the victims. Another important consequence of the genocide, in 
particular the one committed against the Barzanis, is that the social fabric of more 
than 2,000 families has been destroyed because of the death of their men. For 
many women this meant misery and destitution.  
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 All this changed the way Kurdish people look at them and had a big impact 
on any future that the region wishes for itself. For example, it changed forever the 
way they relate themselves to Iraq and the Middle East in general. The persistence 
in the society of the mentality and propaganda anti-Kurdish supported by the 
regime that sees Kurds as an alien presence in the country, makes difficult the 
idea of integration with Iraq and exacerbate Kurdish route towards independence.  
 In this context, one of the main goals of the KRG has been to support 
Kurdish traditions and culture in order to heal the wounds caused by the genocides 
and to regain a sense of belonging to the land they were expelled from by force. 
The preservation and valorisation of the historical heritage of the northern region is 
an example of this attempt. For example, the names of different cities have 
changed from the Arabic ones used previously to Kurdish ones. Kurdish language 
is more widespread used and bilingual education is now considered an option in 
educational institutions.  
 In order to establish a peasful coexistence with the Iraqis, the KRG should 
show them that these were state crimes and were not the result of just one man’s 
will. Taking responsibility for their past would help them to understand that it is 
their own society who created the abnormality of dictatorship and that this is likely 
to repeat itself. As said in different occasions when presenting the legal outcomes 
of the trial, the perception that justice has not been done and the presence of 
supporters of the past regime in key positions in the Federal Government, makes 
Kurdish people mistrust a country that still refuses to grant them justice by 
implementing the constitution and to negotiate on crucial issues such as 
compensation and disputed territories.  
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 For all these reasons, in the twenty years of its existence, the KRG worked 
at international level in order to raise awareness about the genocides committed 
by the Ba’ath regime. This resulted in the international recognition of these crimes 
by various countries including Sweden, Norway and the UK; this would also 
guarantee the prevention of these crimes in the future.  
 From a political point of view, it is important that Kurds are represented in 
Baghdad in order to guarantee the interests of the victims and make sure that the 
2005 constitution is respected. Kurds should never forget that their disputes  is not 
about having a Kurdish leader in Baghdad, such President of Deputy Prime 
minister,  they should instead focus on the route to democracy and on the respect 
of human rights if they want to be part of Iraq.  
 With law no. 9 of 2008 ratified by the KRG, the ministry of Martyrs and Anfal 
victims is paying salaries of 40,000 I.D. to the families of the victims of genocide, it 
is also providing 250 square meters of land in the place of origin, marriage and 
education grants. However, this is not enough to provide them with a decent 
standard of living. The KRG should rebuild all the villages in Kurdistan with modern 
roads and infrastructure as well as providing permanent housing, clean water, 
paved roads, electricity, and schools. 
 In order to preserve the memory of what happened, Kurds should establish 
a National Archive Centre. This would give Kurds the opportunity to study their 
recent history. It should be a digital archive available to researchers from all over 
the world with the purpose to make Kurds aware of the dangers posed by the 
endless repetition of totalitarianism in Middle Eastern society. The purpose of this 
work has been to show how quickly a political system can degenerate into a 
bloody dictatorship as well as to suggest some recommendations to prevent it. 
278 
 
Kurdish people, along with others who suffered genocide, have to learn that 
“knowing the past is safeguarding the future”.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis was to illustrate the details of the genocides crimes 
committed by the state of Iraq between 1963 and 2003. In particular it analysed 
five crimes each one on its own right, represent different stages of a state 
engineered national project aimed to the annihilation of Kurds in the country. The 
crimes are Arabization, the persecution of Faylee Kurds, the disappearance of 
8,000 males belonging to the Barzanis tribe and the events leading to the chemical 
attacks of Al Anfal and Halabja. The analysis was based on the first-hand 
experience of the researcher as minister of Human Rights in the Kurdish Regional 
Government between 2001 and 2005 and on his current role as minister of Extra 
Regional Affairs in the same government. Part of his role was to gather the 
evidence for the prosecution of the perpetrators of the crimes to be presented to 
the IHT. 
 After the introduction, Chapter 2 offers an overview of the concept of 
genocide from its introduction into the international legal system and the analysis 
of the definition of purpose and intent. Through a study of the investigations and 
the trials carried out by the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as well as the 
Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), this chapter demonstrated how the international 
community has failed in recognising these crimes as genocides. 
 With an analysis of the Treaty of Sèvres and Lausanne, Chapter 3 offers an 
overview of the Kurdish presence in the Middle East and especially in Iraq from the 
19th to the 20th centuries focusing on the historical events starting in 1963 to the 
seigure of power by the Ba’ath regime in 1968 which led to Saddam Hussein’s era 
of atrocities. In addition, this chapter offered an insight of the role played by the 
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most numerous minorities in Iraq, and of the role of the Kurdish Regional 
Government in the new reality after the fall of the regime in April 2003. 
 Chapter 4 offered an analysis of the first crime considered in this thesis: 
Arabization. Focusing primarily on the area of Kirkuk, this chapter aimed to show 
how this crime constituted the first stage of the state engineered ethnic cleansing 
against the Kurds. This crime was carried out the displacement of Kurdish people 
from their historical places of residence and aimed to change the demography of 
the region. Ethnic cleansing was the main target of the state against Kurds. 
Genocide and forced deportation were used to achieve this goal. The investigation 
proved how the area of Kirkuk is still a sensitive issue in the relationship between 
the Federal Government and the Kurdish Regional Government.  
 Chapter 5 analysed the mass deportation of Faylee Kurds between 1971 
and 1988. This crime was planned and executed through the issueing of laws and 
decrees, which ordered their gradual marginalization from the Iraqi society. The 
documentation gathered show how the authorities encouraged these measures 
with the use of force displacing entire communitties while detaining and killing 
those who did not comply with the new national strategy. This crime constituted a 
concept approval of genocide because all the administration of the state was 
involved in it. In addition, due to its chronology and scale, it offered the state the 
opportunity to increase the scope and atrocities of the genocide. 
Chapter 6 analysed the disappearance and murder of 8,000 men belonging to 
the Barzanis between July and August 1983. This investigation, as the following 
ones of Anfal and Halabja, was carried out relying on the researcher’s forensic 
expertise. This crime, in contrast with the previous ones, was carried out in 
secrecy and with the only collaboration of the General Security and Republican 
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Guards. Only a few documents relating to the events have been found and in order 
to build up the case against the defendants the IHT needed forensic evidence in 
support of the charges. This meant a forensic investigation that led to the 
discovery of Barzanis’ mass graves in Iraq’s south desert. The researcher, thanks 
to his training as forensic expert, carried out various fieldworks in 2005, 2007, 
2012 and 2013 in order to recover the remains of the victims and return them to 
their families. As an outcome of his fieldwork, the researcher managed to return a 
total of 606 bodies of Barzani Kurds back to Kurdistan. 
Chapter 7 dealt with the crime of Anfal as a national project to destroy the 
Kurdish nation and with how the state started to enlarge the targeted areas by 
involving in the crime all the state and military agencies. This crime showed how 
the state developed an efficient propaganda machine in support of its genocide 
campaign by using religious and nationalist rhetoric. This chapter offers an 
analysis of the propaganda machine used by the regime to stir up the hatred 
against Kurdish people accused of being traitors of the faith and of the country. 
Forensic evidence had to be collected in order to build up the court cases against 
the defendants.  
Chapter 8 dealt with the chemical attacks carried out by the regime against 
Kurdish civil population during the Iran-Iraq war. The novelty in comparison with 
the previous crimes is that these attacks were carried out with the involvement of 
different civil and military agencies and that the amount of evidence gathered was 
very substantial. From this chapter it is evident the level of hatred against the 
people of Halabja. However, as for the previous cases, the number of people 
found responsible has been very low, thereby hindering the healing process within 
Iraqi society. 
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After analysing Iraq’s state sequenced crimes of genocide committed 
against the Kurds, it became evident that Iraq has been the theatre of one of the 
most serious cases of genocide of the 20th century. Thus, in Chapter 9 the 
researcher provided a list of recommendations for the prevention of future 
genocide in Iraq so that the society can heal its wounds and stop the history does 
from repeating itself. The researcher reckons that the state should implement 
some strategies in order to actively search for the missing people. This would 
imply the adoption of modern methods of identification depending on DNA 
analysis.  
The recommendations provided in this thesis concerned with the victims of 
genocide and their families as well as perpetrators and bystanders. For the victims, 
the state should recognise their pain. As most of the analysed crimes were state 
engineered, Iraq state is legally and morally responsible for compensation to all the 
families of the victims. In addition, the families of the victims should be involved in 
all the decision-making process regarding their future.  
 After analysing the outcomes of the trials, it is evident that justice has not 
been done. For each crime the number of defendants tried and sentenced does 
not compare with the scale and level of atrocity of the crimes committed. Thus, the 
state should make an effort to help the families of the victims to seek more justice. 
The state should actively prosecute the individuals responsible for the crimes and 
bar them from public offices. In this way the state would guarantee a fair treatment 
and protection to all its citizens.  
 The research showed that the number of bystanders during these crimes 
was outstanding despite the scale of the killings. It also proved that the best 
encouragement for any dictatorship is their silence. Thus the state should come 
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out with new strategies of creating active peace education, through media, 
research and studies in order to create a democratic society. 
 The researcher found out, after analysing these state crimes, that there is 
mistrust between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the new Iraqi Federal 
Government in Baghdad, despite their partnership in the government. This is 
because the memory of the atrocities is still alive in Kurdish collective memory. At 
the same time, the new administration in Baghdad is still hostile towards Kurdish 
ambitions for the future. Thus KRG should make sure through all levels of 
education that all generations are aware of the past, based on the concept that 
“knowing the past, safe guarding the future.” In addition, it should provide better 
psychological and medical treatment for the victims. It also should improve their 
economic standards by re-building villages and communities and by restoring the 
destroyed infrastructure.  
As the main part of the field work dealt with the discovery of mass graves, 
the researcher found out that the KRG should amend law no. (5) 2006 published 
on Al-Wakiy al Iraqia (Law Gazette) on 16th April 2006 in order to work side by side 
with the Iraqi minister of Human Rights since the majority of mass graves belong to 
Kurds. At this regard, the KRG should strengthen its forensic team in collaboration 
with the international organizations such as the ICMP. 
 In conclusion, after analysing these crimes, referring to the Semele 
massacre of Assyrians in 1933 mentioned by Raphael Lemkin and the situation of 
Iraq after the fall of the regime in 2003, the research proved that Iraqi society is a 
genocidal and fragmented one, thus the State of Iraq should take into account its 
unjust past in order to change the culture and education of its society by promoting 
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a peaceful coexistence inside and outside the country if Iraqis are to live together 
in a united federal state. 
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Appendixes for Chapter 2  
Appendix No (1) Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court 
Resolution no. (10) 
 
 
In the Name of the people 
The presidency Council 
 
Pursuant to what has been approved by the National Assembly and in 
accordance with Article No. (33) Paragraphs A and B and Article No. (30) of 
the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period. 
The presidency Council decided in the session of October 9, 2005 to 
promulgate the following resolution: 
 
Law No. (10) 2005 
Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court 
 
SECTION ONE 
The Establishment and Organization Of the Court  
 
PART ONE Establishment 
Article 1: 
 
First: A court is hereby established and shall be known as The Iraqi Higher 
Criminal Court (the “Court”). The Court shall be fully independent. 
 
Second: The Court shall have jurisdiction over every natural person 
whether Iraqi or non-Iraqi resident of Iraq and accused of one of the crimes 
listed in Articles11 to 14 below, committed during the period from July 17, 
1968 and until May 1,2003, in the Republic of Iraq or elsewhere, including 
the following crimes:  
A.  The crime of genocide; 
B.  Crimes against humanity;  
C.  War crimes 
D.  Violations of certain Iraqi laws listed in Article 14 below. 
 
Article 2: 
The Court shall have its main ofﬁce in the city of Baghdad and may hold its 
sessions in any governorate, on the basis of a proposal by the Council of 
Ministers pursuant to a proposal from the President of the Court. 
 
Article 3: PART TWO Organizational Structure of the Court 
  
The court shall consist of: 
First: 
A.  Cassation Panel, which shall specialize in reviewing the provisions and 
decisions issued by one of the criminal or investigative courts. 
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B.  One or more criminal courts. C.  Investigative judges. 
 
Second: Public Prosecution. 
 
Third: An administration, which shall provide administrative and ﬁnancial 
services to the Court and the Public Prosecution. 
 
Fourth: 
A.  The Cassation Panel shall be composed of nine judges who shall elect 
a president for amongst them. The president of the Cassation Panel shall 
be the senior president of the court and shall supervise its administrative 
and ﬁnancial affairs. 
B.  The felony court shall be composed of ﬁve judges who shall elect a 
president from amongst them to supervise their work. 
 
Fifth: The Council of Ministers may, if deemed necessary, based upon a 
proposal by a President of the Court, appoint non-Iraqi judges who have 
experience in conducting criminal trials stipulated in this law, and who are 
of very high moral character, honest and virtuous to work in the Court, in 
the event that a State is one of the parties in a complaint, and the judges 
shall be commissioned with the help of the International Community and the 
United Nations. 
 
PART THREE Selection of Judges, Public Prosecutors and their retirement 
 
Article 4: 
First: Judges and public prosecutors shall be of high moral character, 
integrity and uprightness. They shall possess experience in criminal law 
and shall fulﬁl the appointment requirements stipulated in the Judicial 
Organization Law No. 160 of 1979 and the Public Prosecution law No. 159 
of 1979. 
 
Second: As an exception to the provisions of paragraph (First) of this Article 
the candidates for the positions of judges at the Cassation Panel, the 
Criminal Court, the investigative judges and public prosecutors do not have 
to be active judges and public prosecutors. Retired judges and members of 
public prosecution may be nominated, without restrictions age requirement 
and Iraqi lawyers who possess a high level of experience, competence and 
efﬁciency and of absolute competence, in accordance with the Legal 
Profession Code No. 173 of 1965 and have served in judicial, legal and the 
legal profession ﬁelds for no less than (15) years. 
 
Third: 
A.  The Supreme Juridical Council shall nominate all judges and public 
prosecutors to this Court. The Council of Ministers after approving their 
nomination shall issue their appointment order from the Presidency Council 
and will be classiﬁed as class:  
(A) Judges, in an exception to the provisions of the Judicial Organization 
Law and the Public Prosecution Law. Their salaries and rewards shall be 
speciﬁed by guidelines issued by the Council of Ministers. 
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(B). The judges, public prosecutors and the employees appointed in 
accordance with the provisions of law before this legislation shall be 
deemed legally approved starting from the date of their appointment 
according to the provisions of paragraph (Third/A) of Article (4) taking into 
account the provisions of Article (33) of this law. 
 
Fourth: The Presidency Council in accordance with a proposal from the 
Council of Ministers shall have the right to transfer Judges and Public 
Prosecutors from the Court to the Higher Judicial Council for any reason. 
 
Fifth: The term of service of a judge or a public prosecutor covered by the 
provisions of this law shall end for one of the following reasons: 
1.  If he is convicted of a non-political felony. 
2.  If he presents false information. 
3.  If he fails to perform his duties without a legitimate reason. 
 
Article 6: 
 
First: A committee comprised of ﬁve members elected from among the 
Judges and public prosecutors shall be established in the Court under the 
supervision of the Cassation panel of the Court and they shall select a 
President for a term of one year. This committee shall be called “Judges 
and Public Prosecutors Affairs Committee”. The Committee shall enjoy the 
authorities stipulated in the Judicial Organization Law and Public 
Prosecution Law. It shall consider disciplinary matters and the service of 
Judges and the members of the public prosecution. Its decisions shall be 
appealable before the extended panel of the Federal Court of Cassation if it 
decides to terminate the service of the judge or a member of the public 
prosecution. 
 
Second: The committee shall submit a recommendations, after the appeal 
before the extended panel of the Federal Court of Cassation is denied, to 
the Council of Ministers to pass a resolution from the Presidency Council 
terminating the service of a judge or a public prosecutor, including the chief 
justice in case the provisions of Article (6) of this Law are met. 
  
Third: At the end of the Court’s work, the judges and the Public Prosecutors 
shall be reassigned to the Higher Judicial Council to work in the Federal 
Courts. Those reaching the legal age for retirement shall be retired in 
accordance with the Law. 
 
Article 7: PART FOUR Presidency of the Court 
  
First: The president of the court shall: 
A.  Chair the proceedings of the Cassation Panel. 
B.  Name the original and alternate judges of the Criminal Courts. 
C.  Name any of the judges to the Criminal Court in case of absence. 
D.  Accomplish the Court’s administrative work. 
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E.  Appoint and end the service of the Administrative Director, security 
director, public relations director and archive and documents keeping 
director in the court. 
F.  Name the ofﬁcial spokesman for the Court from among the judges or 
public prosecutors. 
 
Second: The President of the Court shall have the right to appoint non-Iraqi 
experts to act in an advisory capacity for the Criminal Court and the 
Cassation Panel. The role of the non-Iraqi nationals shall be to provide 
assistance with respect to international law and the experience of similar 
Courts (whether international or otherwise). The panelling of these experts 
is to be done with the help from the International Community, including the 
United Nations. 
 
Third: The non-Iraqi experts referred to in paragraph (Second) of this Article 
shall also be persons of high moral character, uprightness and integrity. It 
would be preferable that such non-Iraqi expert should have worked in either 
a judicial or prosecutorial capacity in his or her respective country or at the 
International War Crimes Court. 
 
Article 8: PART FIVE Investigative Judges 
First: Sufﬁcient number of Investigative Judges shall be appointed. 
Second: The Court’s Investigative Judges shall undertake the investigation 
with those accused of crimes stipulated in paragraph (Second) Article (1) of 
this law. 
Third: The Investigative Judges shall elect a Chief and his deputy from 
amongst them. 
Fourth: The Chief shall refer cases under investigation to investigative 
judges individually. 
Fifth: Each of the Investigative Judges’ Ofﬁces shall be composed of an 
investigative Judge and qualiﬁed staff as may be required for the work of 
the investigative judge. 
Sixth: An Investigative Judge shall collect evidence from any source he 
deems appropriate and question all relevant parties directly. 
Seventh: An Investigative Judge shall act independently in the court since 
he is considered as a separate entity from the court. He shall not fall under 
nor receive requests or orders from any Government Department, or any 
other party. 
Eight: The decisions of the Investigative Judge can be appealed in 
cassation before the Cassation Panel within ﬁfteen days from the date of 
receipt of notiﬁcation or from the date notiﬁcation is considered received 
pursuant to law. 
Ninth: The Chief Investigative Judge, after consulting with the President of 
the Court, have the right to appoint non-Iraqi nationals experts to assist the 
Investigative Judges in the investigation of cases covered by this law, 
whether international or otherwise. The Chief Investigative Judge can 
commission these experts with help from the International Community, 
including the United Nations. 
Tenth: The non-Iraqi experts and observers referred to in paragraph (Ninth) 
of this Article are required to be persons of high moral character, honest 
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and virtuous; it is preferred that the non-Iraqi expert and observer had 
worked in either a judicial or prosecutorial capacity in his or her respective 
country or in the International War Crimes Court. 
 
Article 9: PART SIX The Public Prosecution 
  
First: Sufﬁcient number of prosecutors shall be appointed. 
Second: The Public Prosecution shall be composed of a number of public 
prosecutors who shall be responsible for the prosecution of persons 
accused of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Third: Public prosecutors shall elect a Chief and his Deputy from amongst 
them. 
Fourth: Each ofﬁce of public prosecution shall be composed of a prosecutor 
and such other qualiﬁed staff as may be required for the work of the Public 
Prosecutor. 
Fifth: Each prosecutor shall act with complete independence since he is 
considered as a separate entity from the Court. He shall not fall under, nor 
receive instructions from, any government department or from any other 
party. 
Sixth: The chief prosecutor shall assign individual cases to a prosecutor to 
investigate and to try in court based on the authority granted to the public 
prosecutors pursuant to the law. 
Seventh: The Chief Public Prosecutor, in consultation with the President of 
the Court, shall have the right to appoint non-Iraqi nationals to act as 
experts helping the public prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution 
of cases covered by this law whether in an international context or 
otherwise. The Chief Prosecutor can commission these experts with the 
help of the international community, including the United Nations. 
Eighth: The non-Iraqi experts, referred to in Paragraph (Seventh) of this 
Article are required to be persons of high moral character, honest and 
virtuous. It is preferred that such non-Iraqi experts had worked in a 
prosecutorial capacity in his respective country or in the International War 
Crimes Court. 
 
Article 10: PART SEVEN The Administration Department 
  
First: The Administration Department shall be managed by an ofﬁcer with 
the title of Department Director who holds a bachelor degree in law and 
have judicial and administrative experience. He shall be assisted by a 
number of employees in managing the affairs of the department. 
Second: The Administration Department is responsible for the 
administrative, ﬁnancial and service affairs of the court and the Public 
Prosecution. 
 
SECTION TWO 
The Court Jurisdictions 
 
PART ONE 
The Crime of Genocide 
 
290 
 
Article 11: 
 
First: For the purposes of this law and in accordance with the International 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
dated December 9, 1948 as ratiﬁed by Iraq on January 20, 1959, 
“genocide” means any of the following acts committed with the intent to 
abolish, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as 
such: 
A.  Killing members of the group. 
B.  Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 
C.  Deliberately inﬂicting on the group living conditions calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part. 
D.  Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. E.  
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Second: The following acts shall be punishable 
A.  Genocide. 
B.  Conspiracy to commit genocide. 
C.  Direct and public incitement to commit genocide.  
D.  Attempt to commit genocide. 
E.  Complicity in genocide. 
 
PART TWO Crimes against Humanity 
 
Article 12 
 
First: For the purposes of this Law, “crimes against humanity” means any of 
the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
A.  Wilful Murder;  
B.  Extermination;  
C.  Enslavement; 
D.  Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
E.  Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental norms of international law; 
F.  Torture; 
G.  Rape, sexual slavery, forcible prostitution, forced pregnancy, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
H.  Persecution against any speciﬁc party or group of the population on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds 
that are impermissible under international law, in connection with any act 
referred to as a form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. 
I.  Enforced disappearance of persons. 
J.  Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to the body or to the mental or physical health. 
 
Second: For the purposes of implementing the provisions of paragraph 
(First) of this Article, the below listed terms shall mean the stated 
deﬁnitions: 
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A.  “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of con- 
duct involving the multiple panel of acts referred to in the above paragraph 
“First” against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
state or organizational policy to commit such attack; 
B. “Extermination” means the intentional inﬂiction of living conditions, such 
as the deprivation of access to food and medicine, with the intent to bring 
about the destruction of part of the population; 
C.  “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attached 
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such 
power in the course of human trafﬁcking, in particular women and children; 
D.“Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced 
displacement of the concerned persons concerned by expulsion or other 
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without 
grounds permitted under international law; 
E.“Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of 
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of 
the group or collectivity; and 
F.“Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or 
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence 
of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to 
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate 
or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from 
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 
PART THREE War Crimes 
 
Article 13 .For the purposes of this Law, “war crimes” means: 
 
First: Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected 
under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: 
A.  Wilful killing; 
B.  Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
C.  Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; 
D.  Extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justiﬁed by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
E.  Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the 
forces of a hostile power; 
F.  Wilfully denying the right of a fair trial to a prisoner of war or other 
protected person; 
G.  Unlawful conﬁnement; 
H.  Unlawful deportation or transfer; and 
I.  Taking of hostages. 
 
Second: Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
inter- national armed conﬂicts, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
A.  Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or 
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; 
B.  Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects 
which are not military objectives; 
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C.  Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, 
units or vehicles used in a peacekeeping missions in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations or in a humanitarian assistance missions, as 
long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects 
under the international law of armed conﬂicts; 
D.  Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects 
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantages anticipated; 
E.  Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment, which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated; 
F.  Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings 
or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives; 
G.  Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or 
having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion; 
H.  Making improper use of a ﬂag of truce, of the ﬂag or of the military 
insignia and uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the 
distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or 
serious personal injury; 
I. The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Government of Iraq or any of its 
instrumentalities (which includes for clariﬁcation any of the instruments of 
the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party)), of parts of its own civilian population into 
any territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the 
population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory; 
J.  Intentionally directing attacks against buildings that are dedicated to 
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided 
they are not military objectives; 
K.  Subjecting persons of another nation to physical mutilation or to medical 
or scientiﬁc experiments of any kind that are neither justiﬁed by the medical, 
dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his 
or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health 
of such person or persons; 
L.  Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile 
nation or army; 
M.  Declaring that no one remained alive; 
N.  Destroying or seizing the property of an adverse party unless such 
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war; 
O. Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law, or 
otherwise depriving, the rights and actions of the nationals of the hostile 
party; 
P. Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the 
operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in 
the belligerent’s service before the commencement of the war; 
  
Q. Pillaging a town or place, even when it is taken by force; R.  Using 
poison or poisoned weapons; 
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S. Using asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices; 
T. Using bullets, which expand or ﬂatten easily in the human body, such as 
bullets with a hard envelope, which does not entirely cover the core or is 
pierced with incisions; 
U. Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
V. Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
W.  Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render 
certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations; 
X.  Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material and medical 
units, transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva 
Conventions in conformity with international law; 
Y.  Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by 
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully 
impeding relief supplies as provided for under international law; and 
Z.  Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of ﬁfteen years into the 
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities. 
 
Third: In the case of an armed conﬂict, any of the following acts committed 
against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause: 
A.  Use of violence against life and persons, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
B.  Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment; 
C.  Taking of hostages; 
D.  The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all 
judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable. 
 
Fourth: Other serious violations of the laws and customs of war applicable 
in armed conﬂict not of an international character, within the established 
framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
A.  Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or 
against civilian individuals not taking direct part in hostilities; 
B. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, materials, medical 
transportation units and means, and personnel using the distinctive 
emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law; 
C.  Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, materials, 
units, or vehicles used in humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping 
missions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as 
they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian targets under 
the international law of armed conﬂict; 
D.  Intentionally directing attacks against buildings that are dedicated to 
religious, educational, artistic, scientiﬁc or charitable purposes, and historic 
monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are 
collected, provided they are not military objectives; 
294 
 
E.  Pillaging any town or place, even when taken over by assault; 
F.  Committing rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
G.  Conscripting or listing children under the age of ﬁfteen years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities; 
H.  Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related 
to the conﬂict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative 
military reasons so demand; 
I.  Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary; J.  Declaring 
that no person is still alive; 
K.  Subjugation persons who are under the power of another party of the 
conﬂict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientiﬁc experiments of any 
kind that are neither justiﬁed by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of 
the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, causing death to 
such person or persons, or seriously endangering their health; and 
L.  Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary, unless such 
destruction or seizure is imperatively demanded by the necessities of the 
conﬂict. 
 
 
PART FOUR Violations of Iraqi Laws 
 
Article 14 
The Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who have committed 
the following crimes: 
 
First: Intervention in the judiciary or the attempt to inﬂuence the functions of 
the judiciary. 
Second: The wastage and squander of national resources, pursuant to, 
item G of Article 2 of the Law punishing those who conspire against the 
security of the homeland and corrupt the regime No. 7 of 1958. 
Third: The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that were about to 
lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an 
Arab country, in accordance with Article 1 of Law Number 7 of 1958. 
Fourth: If the court ﬁnds a default in the elements of any of the crimes 
stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13 of this law, and it is proved to the Court that 
the act constitutes a crime punishable by the penal law or any other 
criminal law at the time of its commitment, then the court shall have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. 
 
Article 15 
SECTION THREE Individual Criminal Responsibility 
First: A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of this Court 
shall be personally responsible and liable for punishment in accordance 
with this Law. 
Second: In accordance with this Law, and the provisions of Iraqi criminal 
law, a person shall be criminally responsible if that person: 
A.  Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that this person is criminally 
responsible or not; 
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B.  Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime, which in fact 
occurs or is attempted; 
C.  For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, 
abets or by any other means assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission; 
D.  Participating by any other way with a group of persons, with a common 
criminal intention to commit or attempt to commit such a crime, such 
participation shall be intentional and shall either: 
1. Be made for the aim of consolidating the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; or 
2. Be made with the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit the crime; 
E.  In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to 
commit genocide; 
F.  Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its 
execution, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances 
independent of the person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons 
the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the completion of the 
crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Law for the attempt to 
commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the 
criminal purpose. 
 
Third: The ofﬁcial position of any accused person, whether as president, 
chairman or a member of the Revolution Command Council, prime minister, 
member of the council of ministers, a member of the Ba’ath Party 
Command, shall not relieve such person of criminal penal, nor mitigate 
punishment. No person is entitled to any immunity with respect to any of the 
crimes stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this law. 
Fourth: The crimes that were committed by a subordinate do not relieve his 
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and the 
superior failed to take the necessary and appropriate measures to prevent 
such acts or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
Fifth: The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of the 
Government or of his superior, shall not relieve him of criminal 
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the 
Court determines that justice so requires. 
Sixth: Pardons issued prior to this law coming into force, do not apply to the 
accused in any of the crimes stipulated in it. 
 
Article 16 
SECTION FOUR: Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
The Court shall apply the Criminal Procedure Law No. 23 of 1971, and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence appended to this law, which is an 
indivisible and integral part of the law. 
 
Article 17 
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SECTION FIVE: General Principles of Criminal Law 
First: In case a stipulation is not found in this Law and the rules made there 
under, the general provisions of criminal law shall be applied in connection 
with the accusation and prosecution of any accused person shall be those 
contained in: 
A.  The Baghdadi Penal Law of 1919, for the period starting from July 17, 
1968, till Dec. 14, 1969. 
B.  The Penal law no.111 of 1969, which was in force in1985 (third version), 
for the period starting from Dec.15, 1969, till May, 1, 2003. 
C.  The Military Penal Law no.13 of 1940, and the military procedure law 
no.44 of 1941. 
 
Second: To interpret Articles 11, 12, 13 of this law, the Cassation Court and 
Panel may resort to the relevant decisions of the international criminal 
courts. 
Third: Grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility under the Panel Law 
shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with this Law and with 
international legal obligations concerning the crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
Fourth: The crimes stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 shall not be 
subject to limitations that terminate the criminal case or punishment. 
  
Article 18 
SECTION SIX: Investigations and Indictment 
First: The Investigative Judge shall initiate investigations ex-ofﬁcio or on the 
basis of information obtained from any source, particularly from the police, 
or governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The Investigative 
Judge shall assess the information received and decide whether there is 
sufﬁcient basis to proceed. 
Second: The Court Investigative Judge shall have the power to question 
suspects, victims and witnesses, or their relatives to collect evidence and to 
con- duct on-site investigations. In carrying out his task the Court 
Investigative Judge may, as appropriate, request the assistance of the 
relevant governmental authorities concerned, who shall be required to 
provide full co-operation with the request. 
Third: Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Investigative 
Judge shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the 
facts of the crime with which the accused is charged under the Statute and 
shall refer the case to the criminal court. 
Article 19 
PART ONE: Guarantees of the Accused 
First: All persons shall be equal before the Court. 
Second: The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before 
the Court in accordance with this law. 
Third: Every accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, in pursuance with 
the provisions of this law and the Rules issued according to it. 
Fourth: In directing any charge against the accused pursuant to the present 
Law, the accused shall be entitled to a just fair trial in accordance with the 
following minimum guarantees: 
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A.  To be informed promptly and in detail of the content nature and 
cause and of the charge against him; 
B.  To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence and to communicate freely with counsel of his own choosing 
and to meet with him privately. The accused is entitled to have non-
Iraqi legal representation, so long as the principal lawyer of such 
accused is Iraqi; 
C.  To be tried without undue delay; 
D.  To be tried in his presence, and to use a lawyer of his own 
choosing, and to be informed of his right assistance of his own 
choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of 
this right; and to have legal assistance and to have the right to 
request such aid to appoint a lawyer without paying the fees, case if 
he does not have sufﬁcient means to pay for it; if he does not have 
the ﬁnancial ability to do so. 
E.  The accused shall have the right to request the defence 
witnesses, the witnesses for the prosecution, and to discuss with 
them any evidence that support his defence in accordance with the 
law. 
F.  The defendant shall not be forced to confess and shall have the 
right to remain silent and not provide any testimony and that silent 
shall not be interpreted as evidence of convection or innocence. 
 
Article 20 
SECTION SEVENTH:  Trial Proceedings 
First: A person against whom an indictment has been issued shall, pursuant 
to an order or an arrest warrant of the Investigative Judge, be taken into 
custody, immediately informed of the charges against him and transferred 
to the Court. 
Second: The Criminal Court shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious 
and that proceedings are conducted in accordance with this Statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence annexed to this Law, with full respect for 
the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of the victims, 
their relatives and the witnesses. 
Third: The Criminal Court shall read the indictment, satisfy itself that the 
rights of the accused are respected and guaranteed, insure that the 
accused understands the indictment, with charges directed against him and 
instruct the accused to enter a plea. 
Fourth: The hearings shall be public unless the Criminal Court decides to 
close the proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence annexed to this Statue, and no decision shall be adopted under 
the session secrecy unless for extreme limited reasons. 
 
Article 21 
The Criminal Court shall, in its Rules of Procedure and Evidence annexed 
to this Statue, provide the protection for victims or their relatives and 
witnesses and also for the secrecy of their identity. 
 
Article 22 
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Families of victims and Iraqi persons harmed may ﬁle a civil suit before this 
court against the accused for the harm they suffered through their actions 
constituting crimes according to the provisions of this Statue. The court 
shall have the power to adjudicate these claims in accordance with the Iraqi 
Criminal procedure Code No. 23 for the year 1971, and other relevant laws. 
Article 23 
First: The Criminal Court shall pronounce judgments and impose sentences 
and penalties on persons convicted of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
Second: The judgment shall be issued by a majority of the judges of the 
Criminal Court, and shall announce it in public. The judgment shall not be 
issued except pursuant to the indictment decision. The opinion of the 
dissenting Judges can be appended. 
 
Article 24 
First: The penalties that shall be imposed by the Court shall be those 
prescribed by the Iraqi Penal Code No (111) of 1969, except for sentences 
of life imprisonment that means the remaining natural life of the person. 
With considering the provisions of Article (17) of this Statute. 
Second: It shall be applied against the crimes stipulated in article (14) of 
this Statute the sentences provided under the Iraqi Penal Code and other 
punishable laws 
Third: The penalty for crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 shall be determined 
by the Criminal Court, taking into account the provisions contained in 
paragraphs fourth and ﬁfth. 
Fourth: A person convicted of sentences stipulated under Iraqi Penal Code 
shall be punished if: 
A.  He committed an offence of murder or rape as deﬁned under Iraqi 
Penal Code. 
B.  He participated in committing an offence of murder or rape. 
Fifth: The penalty for any crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 which do not 
have a counterpart under Iraqi law shall be determined by the Court taking 
into account such factors like the gravity of the crime, the individual 
circumstances of the convicted person, guided by judicial precedents and 
relevant sentences issued by the international criminal courts. 
Sixth: The Criminal Court may order the forfeiture of proceeds, property or 
assets derived directly or indirectly from a crime, without prejudice to the 
rights of the bona ﬁde third parties. 
Seventh: In accordance with Article 307 of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure 
Code, the Criminal Court shall have the right to conﬁscate any material or 
goods prohibited by law regardless of whether the case has been 
discharged for any lawful reason. 
  
SECTION EIGHT: Appeals Proceedings 
 
Article 25 
PART ONE Cassation 
First: The convicted public prosecutor has the right to contest the 
judgments and decisions before the Cassation Panel for any of the 
following reasons: 
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1.  If a judgment issued is in contradiction with the law or there is an 
error in interrupting it. 
2.  An error in procedures. 
3.  Material error in the facts which has led to violation of justice. 
Second: The Cassation Panel may afﬁrm, reverse or revise the decisions 
taken by the Criminal Court or the decisions of the Investigative Judge. 
Third: When the Cassation Panel issues its verdict to revoke the judgment 
of acquittal or release issued by the Criminal Court or the Investigative 
Judge, the case shall be referred back to the Court for retrial of the accused 
or for the Investigative Judge to implement the decision. 
Fourth: The period of appeal shall be in accordance with the provisions of 
the Iraqi Criminal procedure Code No. 23 for the year 1971 that is in effect, 
in case there is no speciﬁc provision in that regard 
 
Article 26  
PART TWO Retrial 
First: Where a new ﬁndings or facts have been discovered which were not 
known at the time of the proceedings before the Criminal Court or the 
Cassation Panel and which could have been a decisive factor in reaching 
the decision, the convicted person or the Prosecution may submit to the 
Court an application for a retrial. 
Second: The Court shall reject the application if it considers it to be 
unfounded. If it determines that the application has merit, and for the 
purpose of reaching a modiﬁcation of the court decision after hearing the 
parties in the case, may: 
1.  Send case back to the original Criminal Court that issued the 
ruling; or 
2.  Send case back to another Criminal Court; or 
3.  The Cassation Panel takes jurisdiction over the matter. 
  
Article 27 
SECTION NINE: Enforcement of Sentences 
First: Sentences shall be carried out in accordance with the Iraqi legal 
system and its laws. 
Second: No authority, including the President of the Republic, may grant a 
pardon or mitigate the punishment issued by the Court. The punishment 
must be executed within 30 days of the date when the judgment becomes 
ﬁnal and non-appealable. 
 
Article 28 
SECTION TEN: General and Final Provisions 
Investigative judges, Judge of the criminal courts, members of the public 
prosecution committee, the director of the administrative department and 
the court’s staff must be Iraqi nationals with due considerations given to the 
provisions of Article 4 (Third) of this statute. 
 
Article 29 
First: The Court and the national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to 
prosecute persons for those offences stipulated in Article 14 of this statute. 
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Second: The Court shall have primacy over all other Iraqi courts with 
respect to the crimes stipulated in Articles 11, 12, and 13 of this statute. 
Third: At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may demand of any other 
Iraqi court to transfer any case being tried by it involving any crimes 
stipulated in Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this statue, and such court shall 
be required to transfer such case upon demand. 
Fourth: At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may demand of any 
other Iraqi court to transfer any case being tried by it involving any crimes 
stipulated in Articles 13, 14, 15, 16 of this statue, and such court shall be 
required to transfer such case upon demand. 
 
Article 30 
First: No person shall be tried before any other Iraqi court for acts for which 
the Court, in accordance with Articles 300 and 301 of the Iraqi Criminal 
Procedure Code, has already tried him or her. 
Second: A person, who has been tried by any Iraqi court for acts 
constituting crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, may not be 
subsequently tried by the Court except if the Court determines that the 
previous court proceedings were not impartial or independent, or were 
designed to shield the accused from criminal responsibility. When decisions 
are made for a retrial, one of the conditions contained in Article 196 of the 
Iraqi Civil Procedure Code and Article (303) of the Iraqi Criminal Procedure 
Code must be met. 
Third: In determining the penalty to be imposed on a person convicted of a 
crime under the present Statute, the Court shall take into account the time 
served of any penalty imposed by an Iraqi court on the same person for the 
same crime. 
 
Article 31 
First: The President of the Court, the Judges, the Court’s Investigative 
Judges, the Public Prosecutors, the Director of the Administration 
Department and their staffs shall have immunity from civil suits in respect to 
their ofﬁcial functions. 
Second: Other persons, including the accused, required at the seat of the 
Court shall be accorded such treatment as is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the Court. 
 
Article 32 
Arabic shall be the ofﬁcial language of the Court. 
 
Article 33 
No person who was previously a member of the disbanded Ba’ath Party 
shall be appointed as a judge, investigative judge, public prosecutor, an 
employee or any of the personnel of the Court. 
 
Article 34 
The expenses of the Court shall be borne by the State’s general budget. 
 
Article 35 
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The President of the Court shall prepare and submit an annual report on 
the Court activities to the Council of Ministers. 
 
Article 36 
The provisions of the civil service law no. (24) Of 1960, Personnel law no. 
(25) Of 1960, government and socialist sector employees disciplinary law 
No (14) of 1991 and civil pension law No. (33) Of 1966 shall apply to the 
court’s employees other than the judges and members of public 
prosecution. 
 
Article 37 
Law No. 1 for the year 2003 the Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence issued in accordance with the provisions of Article 
(16) thereof are revoked from the date this statute comes into force. 
 
Article 38 
All decisions and Orders of Procedure issued under law No. 1 for the year 
2003 are correct and conform to the law. 
 
Article 39 
The Council of Ministers in coordination with the President of the Court 
shall issue instructions to facilitate the implementation of this statute. 
 
Article 40 
This law shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Ofﬁcial 
Gazette. 
 
 
Jalal Talabani       Adil Abdul-Mahdi  Ghazi Ajil Al-Yawir 
President of the Republic    Vice- President     Vice-President 
 
Justifying Reasons 
 
In order to expose the crimes committed in Iraq from July 17, 1968 until 
May 1,2005 against the Iraqi people and the peoples of the region and the 
subsequent savage massacres, and for laying down the rules and 
punishments to condemn after a fair trial the perpetrators of such crimes for 
waging wars, mass extermination and crimes against humanity, and for the 
purpose of forming an Iraqi national high criminal court from among Iraqi 
judges with high experience, competence and integrity to specialize in 
trying these criminals. And in order to reveal the truth and the agonies and 
injustice caused by the perpetrators of such crimes, and for protecting the 
rights of many Iraqis and alleviating injustice and for demonstrating 
heaven’s justice as envisaged by the Almighty God. ...  
 
This law has been legislated. 
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 5002 fo truoC lanimirC hgiH iqarI eht fo etutaS eht fo ypoC lanigirO ehT
 
 2115) لسنة 10قانون المحكمة الجنائية العراقية العليا رقم (
  
 ) 10قـرار رقــم (
 بأسم الشعــب 
 مجلس الرئاسـة 
بناء على ما اقرته الجمعية الوطنية طبقا ًللمادة الثالثة والثلاثون الفقرتين (أـ ب ) والمادة السابعة الثلاثون 
من قانون ادارة الدولة العراقية للمرحلة الانتقالية. قرر مجلس الرئاسة بجلسته المنعقدة بتأريخ 
 م اصدار القانون الآتي : 2115/10/9
  
 2115) لسنة 10رقم (
 ون المحكمة الجنائية العراقية العلياقان
  
 الفصـل الاول
 تأسيس المحكمة وهيكلها التنظيمي
  
 الفــرع الاول
 التأسيس
  
 ) : 0المادة (
تؤسس محكمة تسمى (المحكمة الجنائية العراقية العليا) وتعرف فيما بعد بـ(المحكمة) وتتمتع  اولاً :
 بالاستقلال التام.
المحكمة على كل شخص طبيعي سواء أكان عراقيا ًام غير عراقي مقيم في العراق متهم تسري ولاية  ثانيا ً:
) من هذا القانون والمرتكبة من 10، 10، 50، 00بارتكاب احدى الجرائم المنصوص عليها في المواد (
  في جمهورية العراق او اي مكان آخر .. وتشمل الجرائم الآتية : 1115/2/0ولغاية  1990/1/10تاريخ 
 جريمة الابادة الجماعية  ( أ )
 الجرائم ضد الانسانية  (ب)
 جرائم الحرب  (ج)
 ) من هذا القانون.10انتهاكات القوانين العراقية المنصوص عليها في المادة ( (د )
  
 ) :5المادة (
مجلس في مدينة بغداد، ولها عقد جلساتها في اية محافظة من محافظات العراق بقرار من   مقر المحكمة
 الوزراء بناء على اقتراح من رئيس المحكمة.
 الفرع الثاني
 الهيكل التنظيمي للمحكمة
 ) :1المادة (
 تتألف المحكمة من:
    :  اولاً 
هيئة تمييزية تختص بالنظر في الاحكام والقرارات الصادرة من احدى محاكم الجنايات او قضاة  ( أ )
 التحقيق. 
 ر. محكمة جنايات واحدة او اكث (ب)
 قضاة التحقيق.   (ج)
 هيئة الادعاء العام.  ثانيا:ً
 ادارة تتولى تقديم الخدمات الادارية والمالية للمحكمة والادعاء العام.ثالثا:ً 
 رابعا:ً 
تتألف الهيئة التمييزية من تسعة قضاة ينتخبون من بينهم رئيسا ًلهم يكون رئيس الهيئة التمييزية هو  ( أ )
 كمة ويشرف على شؤونها الادارية والمالية.الرئيس الاعلى للمح
 تشكل محكمة الجنايات من خمسة قضاة ينتخبون من بينهم رئيسا ًلهم يشرف على اعمالهم. (ب)
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يجوز لمجلس الوزراء عند الضرورة وبأقتراح من رئيس المحكمة انتداب قضاة من غير العراقيين  خامسا:ً
الجرائم المنصوص عليها في هذا القانون وممن يتحلون بقدر عال ممن لهم خبرة في مجال المحاكمات في 
من السمو الاخلاقي والاستقامة والنزاهة للعمل في المحكمة في حالة كون احد اطراف الدولة وينتدب هؤلاء 
 القضاة بمساعدة المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك الأمم المتحدة.
  
 الفرع الثالث
 وانهاء خدمتهم اختيار القضاة والمدعين العامين
  
 ) :1المادة (
والاستقامة    يشترط ان يتحلى القضاة والمدعون العامون بقدر عال من السمو الأخلاقي والنزاهة  أولا:ً
وتتوافر فيهم الخبرة في القانون الجنائي وشروط التعيين المنصوص عليها في قانون التنظيم القضائي رقم 
 .9190) لسنة 920ام رقم (وقانون الادعاء الع 9190) لسنة 190(
ائف القضاة في الهيئة استثناء من احكام البند (اولا)ً من هذه المادة يكون المرشحون لشغل وظ ثانيا:ً
التمييزية وفي محاكم الجنايات وقضاة التحقيق والمدعين العامين المستمرين بالخدمة ويجوز ان يرشح 
تقيد بشرط العمر ومحامون عراقيون يتمتعون بالكفاءة للمحكمة قضاة واعضاء ادعاء عام متقاعدون دون ال
ولديهم خدمة  2990) لسنة 110والخبرة العالية ومن ذوي الصلاحية المطلقة وفقا ًلقانون المحاماة رقم (
 ) خمس عشرة سنة.20قضائية او قانونية او في مجال المحاماة لاتقل عن (
  ثالثا :
قضاة والمدعين العامين في هذه المحكمة ويتم تعيينهم بقرار من يرشح مجلس القضاء الاعلى جميع ال ( أ )
مجلس الرئاسة بعد موافقة مجلس الوزراء ويكونون في الصنف الاول استثناء من احكام قانون التنظيم 
 القضائي وقانون الادعاء العام وتحدد رواتبهم ومكافآتهم بتعليمات يصدرها مجلس الوزراء.
ون العامون والموظفون المعينون وفق احكام القانون للمحكمة قبل هذا التشريع يعتبر القضاة والمدع (ب)
) مع مراعاة احكام 1مصادق على تعيينهم قانونا ًمن تاريخ التعيين حسب احكام الفقرة (ثالثا/ًأ) من المادة (
 ) من هذا القانون.11المادة (
اي قاض او مدع عام من المحكمة الى مجلس لمجلس الرئاسة بناء على اقتراح مجلس الوزراء نقل  رابعا:ً
 القضاء الاعلى لأي سبب كان.
  
 )2المادة (
 تنهى خدمة القاضي والمدعي العام المشمول بأحكام هذا القانون لأحد الأسباب الآتية: 
 اذا ادين بأرتكاب جناية غير سياسية. اولا:ً
 اذا قدم معلومات كاذبة او مزيفة. ثانيا:ً
 في تأدية واجباته دون سبب مشروع.اذا قصر  ثالثا:ً
 ) 9المادة ( 
تؤلف لجنة من خمسة اعضاء ينتخبون من بين القضاة والمدعين العامين في المحكمة بأشراف الهيئة :اولاً 
التمييزية فيها ينتخبون من بينهم رئيسا ً لهم وتسمى (لجنة شؤون القضاة والمدعين العامين) ولمدة سنة 
لمنصوص عليها في قانون التنظيم القضائي وقانون الادعاء العام، تتولى النظر في واحدة ولها الصلاحيات ا
الشؤون الانضباطية والخدمة الوظيفية بالقضاة واعضاء الادعاء العام وتكون قراراتها قابلة للطعن امام 
 عام.الهيئة الموسعة في محكمة التمييز الاتحادية اذا قضت انهاء خدمة القاضي او عضو الادعام ال
ترفع اللجنة توصياتها بعد رفض الطعن من الهيئة الموسعة في محكمة التمييز الاتحادية الى مجلس  :ثانيا ً 
الوزراء لاستصدار قرار من مجلس الرئاسة لانهاء خدمة القاضي او المدعي العام بمن فيهم رئيس المحكمة 
 ه المادة.) من هذ9في حالة تحقق احدى الحالات المنصوص عليها في المادة (
عند انتهاء اعمال المحكمة ينقل القضاة والمدعون العامون الى مجلس القضاة الاعلى للعمل في  ثالثا:ً
 المحاكم الاتحادية ويحال على التقاعد من اكمل السن القانونية وفقا ًللقانون.
 الفـرع الرابـع
 رئاســـــة المحكـمــــــة
  
 :)1المادة (
 مة المهام الآتية: يتولى رئيس المحك :اولاً 
 رئاسة جلسات الهيئة التمييزية.  ( أ )
 تسمية قضاة محاكم الجنايات الأصليين والاحتياط. (ب)
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 تسمية اي من القضاة لمحكمة الجنايات في حالة الغياب. (ج)
 انجاز الاعمال الادارية في المحكمة. (د )
ت العامة ومدير الأرشيف وحفظ الوثائق في تعيين مدير ادارة المحكمة ومدير الامن ومدير العلاقا (هـ)
 المحكمة وانهاء خدماتهم وفقا ًللقانون.
 تسمية ناطق رسمي للمحكمة من القضاة او اعضاء الادعاء العام. (و )
لرئيس المحكمة ان يعين خبراء من غير العراقيين للعمل في محاكم الجنايات والهيئة التمييزية لتقديم  ثانيا ً:
جال القانون الدولي والوقائع المماثلة سواء كانت دولية او غير ذلك، ويكون انتداب هؤلاء المساعدة في م
 الخبراء بمساعدة المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك الأمم المتحدة.
يجب ان يتحلى الخبراء غير العراقيين المنصوص عليهم في البند (ثانيا)ً من هذه المادة بقدر عال   ثالثا ً :
الاخلاقي والاستقامة والنزاهة. ويفضل في الخبير غير العراقي ان يكون قد عمل في القضاء او من السمو 
 الادعاء العام في بلده او في محاكم جرائم الحرب الدولية.
  
 الفرع الخامس
 قضــــــاة التحقيــــــــق
  
 ) :1المادة (
 يعين عدد كاف من قضاة التحقيق.  اولا ً:
قضاة التحقيق في المحكمة التحقيق مع المتهمين في ارتكاب الجرائم المنصوص عليها في يتولى   ثانيا ً :
 ) من هذا القانون.0البند (ثانيا)ً من المادة (
 ينتخب قضاة التحقيق من بينهم رئيسا ًونائبا ًللرئيس.  ثالثا ً:
 د.يحيل الرئيس القضايا التحقيقية الى قضاة التحقيق كلاً على انفرا  رابعا ً:
يتكون كل مكتب من مكاتب قضاة التحقيق من قاض للتحقيق وملاك مؤهل يكون لازما ًلعمل قاضي  خامسا:ً
 التحقيق.
 لقاضي التحقيق جمع ادلة الاثبات من اي مصدر يراه مناسبا ًومخاطبة الجهات ذات العلاقة مباشرة. سادسا:ً
بأعتباره جهازا ًمنفصلا ًعن المحكمة ولايخضع  سابعا ً: يتصرف قاضي التحقيق في المحكمة بأستقلالية تامة
 او يستجيب لأي طلبات او اوامر صادرة من اي جهة من الجهات الحكومية او غيرها.
) خمسة عشر يوما ً20تكون قرارات قاضي التحقيق قابلة للطعن تمييزا ًامام الهيئة التمييزية خلال (  ثامنا ً:
 ة وفقا ًللقانون.من تاريخ التبلغ بها او اعتبارها مبلغ
لرئيس قضاة التحقيق وبعد التشاور مع رئيس المحكمة ان يعين اشخاصا ًمن غير العراقيين خبراء   تاسعا ً:
لتقديم المساعدة القضائية لقضاة التحقيق في مجال التحقيق عن القضايا المشمولة بهذا القانون سواء 
 بمساعدة المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك الامم المتحدة.
يشترط ان يتحلى الخبراء والمراقبون غير العراقيين المنصوص عليهم في البند (تاسعا)ً من هذه  عاشرا:ً
المادة بقدر عال من السمو الأخلاقي والاستقامة والنزاهة. ويفضل في الخبير والمراقب غير العراقي ان 
 لحرب الدولية.يكون قد عمل في القضاء او الادعاء العام في بلده او في محاكم جرائم ا
  
 الفرع السادس
 هيـئـــــة الادعـــــــــاء
  
 ) :9المادة (
 يعين عدد كاف من المدعين العامين. اولاً ً :
تتألف هيئة الادعاء العام من عدد من المدعين العامين ويكونون مسؤولين عن الادعاء تجاه   ثانيا ً :
 ص المحكمة.الاشخاص المتهمين بأرتكاب الجرائم الداخلة ضمن اختصا
 ينتخب المدعون العامون من بينهم رئيسا ًونائبا ًللرئيس. ثالثا ً:
 يتألف كل مكتب من مكاتب الادعاء العام من مدع عام وملاك مؤهل يكون لازما ًلعمل المدعي العام. رابعا ً:
او يستجيب يتصرف كل مدع عام باستقلالية تامة باعتباره جهازاً منفصلا عن المحكمة ولايخضع  خامسا:ً
 لأي طلبات او اوامر صادرة من الحكومة او اي جهة اخرى.
يوكل رئيس هيئة الادعاء العام الى مدع عام القضية المطلوب التحقيق فيها والترافع في مرحلة  سادسا:ً
 المحاكمة استنادا ًللصلاحيات الممنوحة للمدعين العامين وفقا ًللقانون.
التشاور مع رئيس المحكمة ان يعين اشخاصاً من غير العراقيين بصفة لرئيس هيئة الادعاء بعد  سابعا:ً
خبراء لتقديم المساعدة للمدعين العامين فيما يتعلق بالتحقيق والادعاء عن القضايا المشمولة بهذا القانون 
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لي في المجال الدولي او غيره ، ولرئيس هيئة الادعاء العام انتداب هؤلاء الخبراء بمساعدة المجتمع الدو
 بما في ذلك الأمم المتحدة.
يشترط ان يتحلى الخبراء غير العراقيين المنصوص عليهم في البند (سابعا)ً من هذه المادة بقدر عال  ثامنا ً:
من السمو الاخلاقي والاستقامة والنزاهة.ويفضل في الخبير الدولي غير العراقي ان يكون قد عمل في 
 رائم الحرب الدولية.الادعاء العام في بلده او في محاكم ج
  
 الفرع السابع
 الدائـرة الاداريـة
 )10المادة (
يدير الدائرة الادارية موظف بعنوان مدير الدائرة حاصل على شهادة البكالوريوس في القانون ومن   اولاً :
 ذوي الخبرة القضائية والادارية يعاونه عدد من الموظفين لتسيير عمل الدائرة.
 الدائرة الادارية مسؤولية الشؤون الادارية والمالية والخدمية للمحكمة وهيئة الادعاء العام.تتولى  ثانيا ً:
  
 الفصل الثاني
 اختصـــاصـات المحكـمـــــة
  
 الفرع الاول
 جريمة الابادة الجماعية
 ) 00المادة (
دة الجماعية المعاقب عليها لأغراض هذا القانون وطبقا ً للاتفاقية الدولية الخاصة بمنع جريمة الابا  اولاً :
/كانون الثاني ـ 15المصادق عليها من العراق في  1190/كانون الاول ـ ديسمبر/9المؤرخة في 
فان الابادة الجماعية تعني الافعال المدرجة في ادناه المرتكبة بقصد اهلاك جماعة قومية او  9290يناير/
 او جزئيا.ًاثنية او عرقية او دينية بصفتها هذه اهلاكا ًكليا ً
 قتل افراد من الجماعة  ( أ )
 الحاق ضرر جسدي او عقلي جسيم بأفراد من الجماعة  (ب)
 اخضاع الجماعة عمدا ًلأحوال معيشية يقصد بها اهلاكها الفعلي كليا ًاو جزئيا.ً (ج)
 فرض تدابير تستهدف منع الانجاب داخل الجماعة. (د )
 جماعة اخرى.نقل اطفال من الجماعة عنوة الى  (هـ)
 وجب العمال التالية ان يعاقب عليها: ثانيا ً:
 ابادة الجماعية  ( أ )
 التآمر لارتكاب الابادة الجماعية  (ب)
 التحريض المباشر والعلني على ارتكاب الابادة الجماعية  (ج)
 محاولة ارتكاب الابادة الجماعية.  (د )
 الاشتراك في الابادة الجماعية   (هـ)
  
 ثانيالفرع ال
 الجرائم ضد الانسانية
 )50المادة (
الجرائم ضد الانسانية تعني لأغراض القانون أياً من الافعال المدرجة في ادناه متى ارتكبت في اطار  اولاً :
 هجوم واسع النطاق او منهجي موجه ضد اية مجموعة من السكان المدنيين وعن علم بهذا الهجوم.
 القتل العمد. ( أ )
 الابـادة.  (ب)
 الاسترقاق. (ج)
 ابعاد السكان او النقل القسري للسكان. (د )
السجن او الحرمان الشديد على اي نحو آخر من الحرية البدنية بما يخالف القواعد الاساسية للقانون   (هـ)
 الدولي.
 التعذيب.  (و )
و اي شكل آخر من اشكال العنف الاغتصاب، الاستبعاد الجنسي،الاكراه على البغاء، الحمل القسري، ا  (ز )
 الجنسي على مثل هذه الدرجة من الخطورة.
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اضطهاد اية جماعة محددة او مجموعة محددة من السكان لاسباب سياسية او عرقية او قومية او اثنية  (ح)
بأي او ثقافية او دينية او متعلقة بنوع الجنس او لأسباب اخرى لايجيزها القانون الدولي وذلك فيما يتصل 
 فعل مشار اليه من اشكال العنف الجنسي على مثل هذه الدرجة من الخطورة.
 الاخفاء القسري للأشخاص. (ك)
الافعال اللاانسانية الاخرى ذات الطابع المماثل التي تتسبب عمداً في معاناة شديدة او في اذى خطير  (ل)
 يلحق بالجسم او بالصحة العقلية او البدنية.
طبيق احكام البند(اولا) من هذه المادة نعني المصطلحات المدرجة في ادناه المعاني المبينة لأغراض ت ثانيا ً:
     -ازاءها:
هجوم موجه ضد اية مجموعة من السكان المدنيين يعني نهجاً سلوكياً تضمن الارتكاب المتكرر   ( أ )
من السكان المدنيين عملاً بسياسة للأفعال المنصوص عليها في البند (اولا)ً من هذه المادة ضد اية مجموعة 
        دولة او منظمة تقضي بارتكاب مثل هذا الهجوم او تعزيزا ًلهذه السياسة.
الابادة تعني تعمد فرض احوال معيشية ، كالحرمان من الحصول على الطعام والدواء ، بقصد اهلاك   (ب)
 جزء من السكان.
سلطات المترتبة على حق الملكية ، على شخص ما ، بما الاسترقاق يعني ممارسة اي من او جميع ال (ج)
 في ذلك ممارسة هذه السلطات في سبيل الاتجار بالاشخاص ، ولاسيما النساء والاطفال.
ابعاد السكان او النقل القسري للسكان يعني نقل الاشخاص المعنيين قسراً من المنطقة التي يوجدون  (د )
 فعل قسري اخر، دون مبررات يسمح بها القانون الدولي.فيها بصفة مشروعة ، بالطرد او بأي 
التعذيب يعني التعمد في تسبب الالم الشديد والمعاناة ، سواء كان بدنيا او فكريا على شخص قيد  (هـ)
الاحتجاز او تحت سيطرة المتهم على ان التعذيب لايشمل الألم أو المعاناة الناجمة عن العقوبات القانونية او 
 بها.ذات علاقة 
الاضطهاد يعني الحرمان المتعمد والشديد من الحقوق الاساسية بما يتناقض والقانون الدولي بسبب   (و )
 هوية الجماعة او المجموعة.
الاخفاء القسري للأشخاص يعني القاء القبض على اشخاص او احتجازهم او اختطافهم من قبل الدولة   (ز )
لهذا الفعل او بسكوتها عنه ثم رفضها الاقرار بحرمان هؤلاء او منظمة سيلسية او بأذن او دعم منها 
الاشخاص من حريتهم او اعطاء معلومات عن مصيرهم او عن مكان وجودهم بهدف حرمانهم من حماية 
 القانون مدة زمنية طويلة.
  
 الفرع الثالث
 جـرائـــم الـحــــرب
 ) 10المادة (
 ي:تعني جرائم الحرب لأغراض هذه القانون مايأت
وبالتحديد اي فعل من الافعال المدرجة  9190آب  50خروقات جسيمة لأتفاقيات جنيف المؤرخة في  اولاً :
 في ادناه المرتكبة ضد الاشخاص او الممتلكات المحمية بموجب احكام اتفاقية جنيف ذات العلاقة.
 القتل العمد.   ( أ )
 اجراء تجارب بايولوجية.التعذيب او المعاملة اللاانسانية ، بما في ذلك   (ب)
 تعمد احداث معاناة شديدة او الحاق اذى خطير بالجسم او بالصحة. (ج)
الحاق تدمير واسع النطاق بالممتلكات والاستيلاء عليها دون ان تكون هناك ضرورة عسكرية تبرر ذلك  (د )
 وبشكل مخالف للقانون وبطريقة عابثة.
 الخدمة في قوات سلطة معادية.ارغام اسير حرب او شخص محمي على   (هـ)
 تعمد حرمان اسير حرب او شخص محمي من حقه في ان يحاكم محاكمة عادلة ونظامية.  (و )
 الحجز غير القانوني.  (ز )
 الابعاد او النقل غير القانوني.  (ح )
 اخذ رهائن.  (ط)
لى المنازعات الدولية المسلحة ، الانتهاكات الخطيرة الاخرى للقوانين والاعراف الواجبة التطبيق ع ثانيا ً :
 في النطاق الثابت للقانون الدولي وبالتحديد اي فعل من الافعال الآتية : ـ
تعمد توجيه هجمات ضد السكان المدنيين بصفتهم هذه او ضد افراد مدنيين لايشاركون مباشرة في   ( أ )
 الاعمال الحربية.
 مواقع لاتشكل اهدافا ًعسكرية.تعمد توجيه هجمات ضد اهداف مدنية بضمنها   (ب)
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تعمد شن هجمات ضد مستخدمين ،منشآت،مواد وحدات او مركبات تستخدم في مهام المساعدة  (ج)
الانسانية او حفظ السلام طبقا لميثاق الامم المتحدة ، طالما كانت مثل هذه المهام تستحق الحماية الممنوحة 
 منازعات المسلحة.للمدنيين او الاهداف المدنية بموجب القانون لل
تعمد شن هجوم مع العلم بكون هذا الهجوم سيسفر عن خسائر تبعية في الارواح او عن اصابات بين  (د )
المدنيين او عن ألحاق اضرار مدنية يكون افراطاً واضحا ً بالقياس الى مجمل المكاسب العسكرية المتوقعة 
 الملموسة والمباشرة.
ن هذا الهجوم سيسفر عن احداث ضرر واسع النطاق وطويل الأمد تعمد شن هجوم مع العلم بكو  (هـ)
وشديد للبيئة الطبيعية يكون افراطاً واضحا ً بالقياس الى مجمل المكاسب العسكرية المتوقعة الملموسة 
 والمباشرة.
 المهاجمة او القصف بأية وسيلة كانت ضد المدن او القرى او المساكن او المباني التي لاتوجد لها  (و )
 دفاعات وهي ليست اهداف عسكرية.
قتل او جرح مقاتل كان قد تخلى عن سلاحه او انه لم يعد يمتلك وسائل الدفاع عن نفسه واستسلم بشكل  (ز)
 واضح.
اساءة استعمال علم الهدنة او علم العدو او شارته العسكرية وزيه العسكري او علم الامم المتحدة او  (ح)
وكذلك الشعارات المميزة لاتفاقيات جنيف ممايسفر عن موت الافراد او الحاق شاراتها وازيائها العسكرية 
 اصابات بالغة بهم.
قيام حكومة العراق او اي من اجهزتها (وتشمل على سبيل التوضيح اي جهاز من اجهزة حزب البعث  (ط)
لى اي ارض تحتلها العربي الاشتراكي) على نحو مباشر او غير مباشر ، بنقل اجزاء من السكان المدنيين ا
 او ابعاد او نقل كل او بعض سكان الارض المحتلة ضمن هذه الارض او خارجها.
تعمد توجيه هجمات ضد مبان لاتشكل اهدافا عسكرية ومخصصة لأغراض دينية ، وتعليمية، فنية،   (ي)
 علمية او خيرية، او ضد اي اثار تاريخية ، مستشفيات واماكن تجمع المرضى والجرحى.
اخضاع الاشخاص التابعين لأية دولة للتشويه البدني او لأي نوع من التجارب الطبية او العلمية التي  (ك)
لاتبررها المعالجة الطبية او معالجة الاسنان او المعالجة في المستشفى للشخص المعني ولاتجري ايضا ً
 لصالحه متسببة في وفاة ذلك الشخص او الاشخاص او تعريض صحتهم لخطر شديد.
 اي من افراد دولة معادية او جيش معاد بطريقة غادرة.  قتل او جرح (ل)
 اعلان انه لم يبق احد على قيد الحياة.  (م )
تدمير او الاستيلاء على الممتلكات المدنية للطرف المعادي مالم يكن التدمير او الاستيلاء أمراً ألتزمته  (ن)
 ضرورات الحرب.
منع اللجوء الى القضاء بقصد حرمان مواطني الطرف المعادي من المطالبة اعلان الغاء او تعليق او  (س)
 بحقوقهم.
اكراه رعايا الطرف المعادي على المساهمة في عمليات حربية موجهة ضد دولتهم حتى وان كانوا في  (ع)
 خدمة الدولة المتحاربة قبل اندلاع الحرب.
 عليه عنوة.نهب اية بلدة او مكان حتى وان تم الاستيلاء   (ف)
 استخدام السموم او الاسلحة السامة. (ص)
استخدام الغازات الخانقة او السامة او اية غازات اخرى وكذلك اية سوائل او مواد او معدات اخرى   (ق)
 مشابهة.
استخدام الرصاصات التي تتمدد او تتسطح بسهولة في الجسم البشري مثل الرصاصات ذات الاغلفة   (ر )
 تغطى كامل جسم الرصاصة او الرصاصات المخرزة الغلاف.الصلبة التي لا
 الاعتداء على كرامة الشخص وخاصة المعاملة المهنية والحاطة بالكرامة. (ش)
الاغتصاب او الاستعباد الجنسي او البغاء القسري او الحمل القسري او اي شكل اخر من اشكال العنف   (ت)
 الجنسي على مثل هذه الدرجة من الخطورة.
استغلال وجود اشخاص مدنيين او اشخاص آخرين محميين لجعل بعض النقاط او المناطق او القوات  ث)(
 العسكرية محصنة من العمليات العسكرية.
، وسائط نقل واشخاص يستعملون الشعارات المميزة هجمات ضد مبان، مواد وحدات طبية تعمد توجيه )(خ
 لاتفاقيات جنيف طبقا ًللقانون الدولي.
تعمد تجويع المدنيين كأسلوب من اساليب الحرب بحرمانهم من المواد التي لاغنى عنها لبقائهم بما في  )(ذ
 ذلك تعمد عرقلة امدادات الغاثة كما هو منصوص عليه بموجب القانون الدولي.
تجنيد او تسجيل اطفال دون الخامسة عشرة من العمر في قوات الجيش الوطني او استخدامهم  (ض)
 بفاعلية في الاعمال العدائية. للاشتراك
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حالات وقوع نزاع مسلح من اي نوع من الافعال التالية المرتكبة ضد اشخاص غير مشتركين فعليا ًفي  :ثالثا ً 
الاعمال الحربية بما في ذلك افراد القوات المسلحة الذين القوا سلاحهم واولئك الذين اصبحوا عاجزين عن 
 الاحتجاز او لاي سبب اخر. القتال بسبب المرض او الاصابة او
استعمال العنف ضد الحياة والاشخاص وخاصة القتل بجميع انواعه والتشويه والمعاملة القاسية  )(أ
 والتعذيب.
 الاعتداء على كرامة الشخص وخاصة المعاملة المهنية والحاطة بالكرامة. (ب)
 اخذ الرهائن (ج)
سابق صادر عن محكمة مشكلة تشكيلا ًنظاميا ًتكفل جميع اصدار احكام وتنفيذ اعدامات دون وجود حكم  (د )
 الضمانات القضائية المعترف بها والتي لايمكن الاستغناء عنها.
الانهاكات الخطيرة الاخرى للقوانين والاعراف الواجبة التطبيق على المنازعات المسلحة غير الدولية  :رابعا ً 
 فعل من الافعال الآتية: ـ في النظاق الثابت للقانون الدولي وبالتحديد اي 
تعمد توجيه هجمات ذد السكان المدنيين بصفتهم هذه او ذد افراد مدنيين لايشاركون مباشرة في   ( أ )
 الاعمال الحربية.
تعمد توجيه هجمات ضد مبان ،مواد، وحدات ووسائل نقل طبية وافراد من المستخدمين للشعارات \  (ب)
 قانون الدولي.المميزة لاتفاقيات جنيف طبقا لل
، وحدات او مركبات مستخدمة في مهام المساعدة تعمد شن هجمات ضد مستخدمين، منشآت، مواد (ج)
الانسانية او حفظ السلام طبقا ً لميثاق الامم المتحدة طالما كانت مثل هذه المهام تستحق الحماية للمنوحة 
 المسلحة. للمدنيين او الاهداف المدنية بموجب القانون الدولي للمنازعات
تعمد توجيه هجمات ضد مبان مخصصة لاغراض دينية تعليمية فنية ، علمية او خيرية او ضد اثار  (د )
 تاريخية ومستشفيات واماكن تجمع المرضى والجرحى شريطة ألا تكون اهدافا عسكرية.
 نهب اية بلدة اومكان حتى وان تم الاستيلاء عليه عنوة. (هـ)
الجنسي، البغاء القسري، الحمل القسري، او اي شكل اخر من اشكال العنف الاغتصاب، الاستعباد  )(و
 الجنسي على مثل هذه الدرجة من الخطورة.
تجنيد او تسجيل اطفال دون الخامسة عشرة من العمر في قوات او جماعات مسلحة او استخدامهم   (ز )
 للمشاركة فعليا في الاعمال الحربية.
ان المدنيين لأسباب تتصل بالنزاع مالم يكن ذلك من اجل المدنيين المعنيين او اصدار اوامر بترحيل السك (ح)
 لاسباب عسكرية ملحة.
 قتل او اصبة احد مقاتلي الطرف المعادي غدرا ً. (ط)
 اعلان انه لم يبق احد على قيد الحياة. (ي)
لأي نوع من التجارب اخضاع الاشخاص الخاضعين لسلطة الطرف الاخر في النزاع للتشويه البدني او  (ك)
الطبية او العلمية التي لاتبررها المعالجة الطبية او معالجة الاسنان او المعالجة في المستشفى للشخص 
المعني ولاتجري ايضا لصالحه متسببة في وفاة ذلك الشخص او الاشخاص او في تعريض صحتهم لخطر 
 شديد.
مالم يكن التدمير او الاستيلاء امراً ألزمته ضرورات تدمير او الاستيلاء على ممتلكات الطرف المعادي  (ل)
 الحرب.
  
 الرابع الفرع
 انتهاكات القوانين العراقية 
 ) 10المادة (
 ولاية المحكمة على مرتكبي احدى الجرائم الآتية:  تسري
 التدخل في شؤون القضاء او محاولة التأثير في اعماله. :اولاً 
ها استناداً الى احكام الفقرة (ز) من المادة الثانية من قانون معاقبة هدر الثروة الوطنية وتبديد :ثانيا ً 
 .1290) لسنة 1المتآمرين على سلامة الوطن ومفسدي نظام الحكم رقم(
سوء استخدام المنصب والسعي وراء السياسات التي كادت ان تؤدي الى التهديد بالحرب او استخدام  :ثالثا ً 
 .1290) لسنة 1عربية وفقا ًللمادة الاولى من القانون رقم ( القوات المسلحة العراقية ضد دولة
) 00اذا وجدت المحكمة تخلف الركن الخاص لأي جريمة من الجرائم المنصوص عليها في المواد ( :رابعا ً 
) من هذا القانون ويثبت لديها ان الفعل يشكل جريمة يعاقب عليها قانون العقوبات او اي 10) و(50و(
 وقت ارتكابها فتسري ولايتها القضائية للنظر في القضية. قانون عقابي اخر
  
 الفصل الثالث
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 المسؤولية الجنائية الشخصية
  
يعد الشخص الذي يرتكب جريمة تدخل ضمن ولاية المحكمة مسؤولاً عنها بصفته الشخصية وعرضه  :اولاً 
 للعقاب وفقا ًلاحكام هذا القانون.
 م هذا القانون ولاحكام قانون العقوبات اذا قام بما يأتي: ـيعد الشخص مسؤولا وفقا لاحكا :ثانيا ً 
كان هذا   اذا ارتكب الجريمة بصفة شخصية بالاشتراك او بواسطة شخص آخر بغض النظر عما اذا  ( أ )
 الشخص مسؤولا او غير مسؤول جنائيا.ً
 تكابها.الامر بارتكاب جريمة وقعت بالفعل او شرع فيها او الاغراء او الحث على ار (ب)
تقديم العون او التحريض او المساعدة بأي شكل آخر لغرض تيسير ارتكاب الجريمة او الشروع في  (ج)
 ارتكابها بما في ذلك توفير وسائل ارتكابها.
, على ارتكاب جريمة او  الاسهام بأية طريقة أخرى مع مجموعة من الأشخاص بقصد جنائي مشترك )(د
 تكون هذه المساهمة متعمدة وان تقدم.الشروع في ارتكابها, على ان 
اذا كان هذا النشاط او الغرض منطويا ً اما بهدف تعزيز النشاط الاجرامي او الغرض الاجرامي للجماعة،  )0
 على ارتكاب جريمة تدخل ضمن ولاية المحكمة.
 مع العلم بنية ارتكاب الجريمة لدى هذه الجماعة.  )5
 ارتكاب الجريمة فيما يتعلق بجريمة الابادة الجماعية. التحريض المباشر والعلني على (هـ)
الشروع في ارتكاب الجريمة من خلال البدء بتنفيذ فعل بقصد ومع ذلك يعد عذراً معفياً من العقاب اذا  )(و
بذل الفاعل نشاطا ً يحول دون ارتكاب الجريمة او اتمامها، ولايعاقب على الشروع بموجب هذا القانون اذا 
 ل تماما وبمحض ارادته عن مشروعه الاجرامي.تخلى الفاع
، سواء كان المتهم فيا من العقاب او مخففا ً للعقوبةلاتعد الصفة الرسمية التي يحملها المتهم سببا مع :ثالثا ً 
زراء او عضوا رئيسا للدولة او رئيسا او عضوا في قيادة مجلس الثورة او رئيسا او عضوا في مجلس الو
ولايجوز الاحتجاج بالحصانة للتخلص من المسؤولية عن الجرائم المذكورة في المواد ، في قيادة حزب البعث
 ) من هذا القانون.10) و(10) و(50) و(00(
لايعفى الرئيس الاعلى من المسؤولية الجنائية عن الجرائم التي يرتكبها الاشخاص الذين يعملون  رابعا:ً
شك ارتكابها ولم يتخذ الرئيس الاجراءات الضرورية بأمرته، اذا كان الرئيس قد علم او او كان على و
 والمناسبة لمنع وقوع هذه الافعال او ان يرفع الحالة الى السلطات المختصة بغية اجراء التحقيق والمحاكمة.
في حالة قيام اي شخص متهم بارتكاب فعل تنفيذا لامر صادر من الحكومة او من رئيسه فان ذلك لن  خامسا:ً
ؤولية الجنائية ويجوز ان يراعى ذلك في تخفيف العقوبة اذا رأت المحكمة تحقيق العدالة يعفيه من المس
 يتطلب ذلك.
لاتشمل قرارات العفو الصادرة قبل نفاذ هذا القانون أياً من المتهمين في ارتكاب احدى الجرائم  سادسا:ً
 المنصوص عليها فيه.
  
 الفصل الرابع
 قواعد الاجراءات وجمع الادلة
 ) 90المادة (
وقواعد الاجراءات وجمع الادلة الملحقة  0190) لسنة 15يسري قانون اصول المحاكمات الجزائية رقم (
 بهذا القانون والتي تعد جزءا لايتجزأ منه ومكملا ًله على الاجراءات التي تتبعها المحمكة.
  
 الفصل الخامس
 المباديء العامة للقانون الجنائي
 )10المادة (
في حالة عدم وجود نص قانوني في هذا القانون والقواعد الصادرة بموجبه ، تطبق الاحكام العامة  :اولاً 
 للقانون الجنائي على اتهام ومحاكمة الاشخاص المتهمين المنصوص عليها في القوانين الآتية: 
 . 9090قانون العقوبات البغدادي لسنة  9990/50/10لغاية  1990/1/10للفترة من   ( أ )
الذي كان نافذا  9990) لسنة 000قانون العقوبات رقم ( 1115/2/0لغاية  9990/50/20للفترة من  )(ب
 (الطبعة الثالثة). 2190سنة 
) لسنة 11واصول المحاكمات العسكرية رقم ( 1190) لسنة 10قانون العقوبات العسكري رقم ( (ج)
 .0190
) 00المحاكم الجنائية الدولية عند تفسيرها لاحكام المواد ( للمحكمة وللهيئة التمييزية الاستعانة باحكام :ثانيا ً 
 ) من هذا القانون للتقادم المسقط للدعوى الجنائية وللعقوبة.10) و(10) و(50و(
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 الفصل السادس
 التحقيــــق والاحـالــــــة
 ) 10المادة (
لومات تصله من اي مصدر يشرع قاضي التحقيق في التحقيق اما من تلقاء نفسه او بناء على مع اولاً :
خصوصا المعلومات الواردة من الشرطة او من اية جهة حكومية او غير حكومية ، ويتولى قاضي التحقيق 
 تقويم المعلومات الواردة اليه ليقرر ما اذا كانت الادلة كافية للبدء في التحقيق.
شهود من اجل جمع لادلة واجراء لقاضي التحقيق سلطة استجواب المتهمين والضحايا او ذويهم وال :ثانيا ً 
التحقيقات الميدانية، وله من اجل تنفيذ مهمته ان يطلب المساعدة من السلطات الحكومية ذات العلاقة كلما 
 اقتضت الحاجة ذلك، وعلى الجهات الحكومية ذات العلاقة التعاون التام وتلبية الطلبات.
لة فعليه احالة الدعوى الى محكمة الجنايات ويجب ان عند اتخاذ قاضي التحقيق قراره بكفاية الاد :ثالثا ً 
يتضمن قرار الاحلة موجزاً بالوقائع وبالجريمة المنسوبة للمتهم والمادة القانونية التي احيل بموجبها وفقا ً
 لهذا القانون.
  
 الفصل الاول
 ضمـانات المتهـم
 )90المادة (
 جميع الاشخاص متساوون امام المحكمة. :اولاً 
 المتهم بريء حتى تثبت ادانته امام المحكمة وفقا ًللقانون. :ثانيا ً 
 لكل متهم الحق في محاكمة علنية استنادا الى احكام هذا القانون والقواعد الصادرة بموجبه. :ثالثا ً 
عند توجيه اية تهمة ضد المتهم طبقا ً لهذا القانون فللمتهم الحق في محاكمة عادلة ونزيهة وفق  :رابعا ً 
 لتالية كحد ادنى.الضمانات ا
 ان يعلم فورا ًبمضمون التهمة الموجهة اليه وبتفاصيلها وطبيعتها وسببها.  ( أ )
ان يتاح للمتهم الوقت ويمنح التسهيلات الكافية لتمكينه من اعداد دفاعه وان تتاح له الحرية في  (ب)
يستعين بمحام غير عراقي، الاتصال بمحام يختاره بملء ارادته ويجتمع به على انفراد ويحق للمتهم ان 
 طالما ان المحامي الرئيس العراقي وفقا ًللقانون.
 ان تجري محاكمته دون تأخير غير مبرر. (ج)
ان يحاكم حضوريا ً وبالاستعانة بمحام يختاره بملء ارادته او اعلامه بأن له الحق بطلب المساعدة  (د )
الحق في طلب هذه المساعدة التي تتيح له توكيل محام القضائية اذا لم تتوافر لديه المقدرة المالية ، وله 
 دون ان يتحمل اجور المحاماة.
له الحق في طلب شهود الدفاع وشهود الاثبات ومناقشتهم وفي تقديم اي دليل يعزز دفاعه وفقا ً  (هـ)
 للقانون.
يفسر هذا الصمت لايجوز ارغامه على الاعتراف وله الحق في الصمت وعدم الادلاء بافادة دون ان   (و )
 دليلا ًعلى الدانة او البراءة.
  
 الفصل السابع
 المحاكمــة
 )15المادة (
يجب ايداع الشخص الذي يصدر بحقه الاتهام في التوقيف استناداً الى امر او مذكرة قبض صادرة من  :اولاً 
 قاضي التحقيق ويجب اعلامه فورا ًبالتهم المسندة اليه ونقله الى المحكمة.
على محكمة الجنايات ضمان اجراءات محاكمة عادلة وسريعة وفقا لاحكام هذا القانون وقواعد  :ثانيا ً 
الاجراءات والادلة الملحقة بهذا القانون مع ضمان حقوق المتهم والاعتبارات المطلوبة لحماية الضحايا او 
 ذويهم والشهود.
سها باحترام حقوق المتهم وكفالتها وعليها على محكمة الجنايات تلاوة قرار الاحالة وان تقتنع بنف :ثالثا ً 
التأكد من ان المتهم على دراية وادراك بالتهمة او التهم المسندة اليه وعليها ان توجه السؤال للمتهم كونه 
 مذنبا ًاو بريئا.ً
تكون جلسات المحاكمة علنية الا اذا قررت المحكمة جعلها سرية وفقا لقواعد الاجراءات والادلة  :رابعا ً 
 لملحقة بهذا القانون ولايجوز اتخاذ القرار بسرية الجلسة الا لاسباب محدودة جدا.ًا
  
 )05المادة (
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على محكمة الجنايات ان تؤمن الحماية للضحايا او ذويهم وللشهود وفقا لما يرد في قواعد الاجراءات 
 ذويهم وللشهود.والادلة الملحقة بهذا القانون بما في ذلك تأمين السرية لهوية الضحايا او 
  
 )55المادة (
الضحايا والمتضررين من العراقيين الادعاء مدنيا ً امام هذه المحكمة ضد المتهمين عما اصابهم من  لذوي
ضرر من الافعال التي تشكل جريمة بمقتضى احكام هذا القانون وللمحكمة الفصل في هذه الدعاوي وفقا 
 والقوانين ذات العلاقة. 0190لسنة ) 15لقانون اصول المحاكمات الجزائية رقم (
 )15المادة ( 
على محكمة الجنايات اعلان وفرض الاحكام والعقوبات على المتهمين المدانين عن جرائم تدخل ضمن  :اولاً 
 ولاية المحكمة.
نة وتنطق بها علناً ولايصدر الحكم الا بناء على قرار الادا ،الجنايات احكامها بالاغلبية تصدر محكمة :ثانيا ً 
 ويمكن ان تلحق به رأي القاضي المخالف.
  
 )15المادة (
) 000العقوبات التي تحكم بها المحكمة هي العقوبات المنصوص عليها في قانون العقوبات رقم ( اولاً :
) من 10، عدا عقوبة السجن المؤبد التي تمتد مدى الحياة المحكوم مع مراعاة احكام المادة (9990لسنة 
 هذا القانون.
) من هذا القانون العقوبات المنصوص عليها 10تسري على الجرائم المنصوص عليها في المادة ( نياً :ثا
 في قانون العقوبات والقوانين العقابية الاخرى.
مع مراعاة احكام البندين (رابعا)و(خامسا) من هذه المادة تتولى محكمة الجنايات تحديد العقوبات  ثالثا ً :
 ) من هذا القانون.10) و(50) و(00وص عليها في المواد(الخاصة بالجرائم المنص
 يعاقب الشخص المدان بالعقوبات المنصوص عليها في قانون العقوبات اذا : ـ    رابعا ً:
 ارتكب جرائم القتل او الاغتصاب بموجب قانون العقوبات.  ( أ )
 او ساهم في ارتكاب جرائم القتل او الاغتصاب .  (ب)
) من هذا 10)و(50)و(00يد المحكمة عقوبة اية جريمة منصوص عليها في المواد (عند تحد  خامسا:ً
القانون التي لايوجد لها مايماثلها في القانون العراقي ، فان المحكمة تاخذ بنظر الاعتبار عوامل معينة مثل 
جنائية خطورة الجريمة والظروف الشخصية للمدان استرشاداً بالسوابق القضائية وعقوبات المحاكم ال
 الدولية في هذا المجال.
لمحكمة الجنايات ان تأمر بمصادرة اي اصول او ممتلكات او عائدات متحصلة مباشرة او بصورة   سادسا:ً
 غير مباشرة من جريمة دون الاضرار بالاطراف الثالثة الحسنة النية.
النظر عما اذا كانت القضية لمحكمة الجنايات مصادرة اي مادة او بضاعة يحرمها القانون بصرف   سابعا :
) من قانون اصول المحاكمات 111او الدعوى قد اغلقت او انقضت لأي سبب قانوني وفقاً لاحكام المادة (
 الجزائية.
  
 الفصل الثامن
 طــــرق الطـعـــــــن
  
 الفرع الاول
 التمييز
 )25المادة (
حكام والقرارات لدى الهيئة التمييزية لاي من للمحكوم او لادعاء العام الطعن بطريق التمييز بالا اولاً :
 الاسباب الاتية: 
 اذا صدر الحكم مخالفا ًللقانون او ماشابه خطأ في تفسيره.  ( أ )
 الخطأ في الاجراءات.  (ب)
 حصول خطأ جوهري في الوقائع يؤدي الى الاخلال بالعدالة. (ج)
 او قرارات قاضي التحقيق او نقضها او تعديلها.للهيئة التمييزية تصديق حكم محكمة الجنايات  ثانيا ً:
عند اصدار الهيئة التمييزية حكمها بنقض الحكم الصادر بالبراءة او بالافراج من محكمة الجنايات او  ثالثا ً:
 قاضي التحقيق فلها ان تعيد الدعوى الى المحكمة لاعادة محاكمة المتهم او اتباع قاضي التحقيق لقرارها.
في حالة  0190) لسنة 15ون مدة الطعن وفقاً لاحكام قانون اصول المحكمات الجزائية رقم (تك   رابعا ً :
 عدم ورود نص خاص بذلك.
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 الفرع الثاني
 اعـــادة المحاكمــــة
  
عند اكتشاف وقائع او حقائق جديدة لم تكن معروفة وقت اجراء المحاكمة امام محكمة الجنايات او  اولاً :
ام الهيئة التمييزية التي يمكن ان تكون عاملاً حاسما ًفي التوصل الى القرار، للشخص وقت نظر الدعوى ام
 المحكوم وللادعاء العام التقدم الى المحكمة بطلب اعادة المحاكمة.
على المحكمة رفض الطلب اذا وجدته يفتقر الى الاسس القانونية اما اذا وجدت المحكمة ان الطلب  ثانيا ً :
 مقنعة فللمحكمة بهدف التوصل الى تعديل قرار الحكم بعد الاستماع الى اطراف الدعوى :يستند الى اسباب 
 ان تعيد الدعوى الى محكمة الجنايات التي اصدرت الحكم للنظر فيها مجددا.ً  ( أ )
 او ان تعيد الدعوى الى محكمة جنايات اخرى.  (ب)
 او ان تتولى الهيئة التمييزية نظر الدعوى. (ج)
  
 التاسعالفصل 
 تنفيـــذ الاحكــــــام
 )15المادة (
 تنفذ الاحكام الصادرة من المحكمة وفقا ًللقانون. اولا ً:
لايجوز لأية جهة كانت بما في ذلك رئيس الجمهورية اعفاء او تخفيف العقوبات الصادرة من هذه  ثانيا ً :
اريخ اكتساب الحكم او القرار درجة ) ثلاثين يوماً من ت11المحكمة وتكون العقوبة واجبة التنفيذ بمرور (
 البتات.
  
 الفصل العاشر
 احكام عامة وختامية
 )15المادة (
يكون قضاة التحقيق وقضاة المحكمة الجنائية و اعضاء هيئة الادعاء العام ومدير الدائرة الادارية ومنتسبو 
 ذا القانون.) من ه1المحكمة من العراقيين مع مراعاة احكام البند (ثالثا)ً من المادة (
  
 )95المادة (
للمحكمة وللمحاكم الوطنية ولاية مشتركة لمحاكمة الاشخاص المتهمين عن الجرائم المنصوص عليها  اولا ً:
 ) من هذا القانون.10في المادة (
للمحكمة اولوية التقدم على جميع المحاكم العراقية فيما يتعلق بولايتها على الجرائم المنصوص عليها  ثانيا ً:
 ) من هذا القانون.10) و(50) و(00في المواد (
للمحكمة في اي مرحلة ان تطلب من اي من المحاكم العراقية ان تنقل اليها اي قضية منظورة امامها  ثالثا ً:
) من هذا القانون وعلى 10)و(10)و(50)و(00تخص اياً من الجرائم المنصوص عليها.في المواد (
 .المحكمة ارسال القضية حال الطلب
للمحكمة في اي مرحلة ان تطلب من اي من المحاكم العراقية ان تنقل اليها اي قضية منظورة    رابعا ً :
) من هذا القانون وعلى 10)و(10)و(50)و(00امامها تخص ايا من الجرائم المنصوص عليها في المواد (
 المحكمة ارسال القضية حال الطلب.
  
 )11المادة (
شخص امام اية محكمة عراقية اخرى عن جرائم تمت محاكمته عنها سابقا ًامام  لايجوز محاكمة اي اولاً :
 ) من قانون اصول المحاكمات الجزائية.011)و(111المحكمة استنادا ًالى احكام المادتين (
في محاكمة الشخص امام اية محكمة عراقية عن جريمة او جرائم تدخل في ولاية المحكمة فلا يحق  ثانيا ً:
عادة محاكمته عن ذات الجريمة او الجرائم الا اذا قررت ان اجراءات المحاكمة لم تكن نزيهة للمحكمة ا
ومحايدة، او ان تلك الاجراءات كانت معدة لحماية المتهم من المسؤولية الجنائية، وعند اتخاذ القرارات 
ن المرافعات المدنية ) من قانو990باعادة المحاكمة ينبغي ان تتوافر لدى الحالات الواردة في المادة (
 ) من قانون اصول المحاكمات الجزائية.111والمادة (
عند تحديد العقوبة التي ستفرض على شخص مدان بجريمة على وفق هذا القانون فعلى المحكمة ان  ثالثا ً:
 تأخذ بنظر الاعتبار المدة المنقضية من اية عقوبة فرضتها محكمة عراقية على ذات الشخص اذات الجريمة.
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 )01المادة (
يتمتع رئيس المحكمة وقضاتها وقضاة التحقيق والمدعون العامون ومدير الدائرة الادارية والعاملون  اولاً :
 بالمحكمة بالحصانة ضد الدعاوى المدنية فيما يتعلق بواجباتهم الرسمية.
الضرورية لضمان اداء يجب ان تعامل المحكمة الاشخاص الآخرين بمن فيهم المتهم المعاملة  ثانيا ً :
 المحكمة لوظائفها.
  
 )51المادة (
 تكون اللغة العربية هي اللغة الرسمية في المحكمة.
  
 ) 11المادة (
لايحق لأي شخص منتمي الى حزب البعث ان يكون قاضيا ًاو مدعيا ًعاما ًاو موظفا ًاو ايا ًمن العاملين في 
 المحكمة.
  
 ) 11المادة (
 مة للدولة نفقات المحكمة.تتحمل الموازنة العا
  
 )21المادة (
 يتولى رئيس المحكمة اعداد تقرير سنوي عن اعمال المحكمة ويقدم الى مجلس الوزراء.
  
 ) 91المادة (
وقانون  1990) لسنة 25وقانون الملاك رقم ( 1990) لسنة 15تسري احكام قانون الخدمة المدنية رقم(
) لسنة 11وقانون التقاعد المدني رقم ( 0990) لسنة 10الاشتراكي رقم(انضباط موظفي الدولة والقطاع 
 على منتسبي المحكمة غير القضاة واعضاء الادعاء العام. 9990
  
 )11المادة (
وقواعد  1115) لسنة 0يلغى قانون المحكمة الجنائية العراقية المختصة بالجرائم ضد الانسانية رقم (
 ) منه وذلك من تاريخ نفاذ هذا القانون.90م المادة(الاجراءات الصادرة وفقا ًلاحكا
 )11المادة (
صحيحة  1115) لسنة 0تكون جميع القرارات واوامر الاجراءات التي صدرت في ظل القانون رقم (
 وموافقة للقانون.
  
 ) 91المادة (
 ون.يصدر مجلس الوزراء بالتنسيق مع رئيس المحكمة تعليمات لتسهيل تنفيذ احكام هذا القان
 )11المادة ( 
 ينفذ هذا القانون من تاريخ نشره في الجريدة الرسمية.
  
 الأسباب الموجبة
  
ضد الشعب العراقي  1115/2/0لغاية  1990/1/10لأجل أضهار الجرائم التي ارتكبت في العراق منذ 
ن وشعوب المنطقة, وما تمخضت عنه من مجازر وحشية, ولغرض وضع القواعد والعقوبات التي تدي
مرتكبي هذه الجرائم في محاكمة عادلة عن جرائمهم في شن الحروب والابادة الجماعية والجرائم المرتكبة 
ضد الانسانية ولغرض تشكيل محكمة وطنية جنائية عراقية عليا من قضاة عراقيين يتمتعون بكفاءة وخبرة 
 عالية ونزاهة, تختص بمحاكمة هؤلاء المجرمين.
  
وما سببه مرتكبو تلك الجرائم من عنت وظلم, وحماية لحقوق العديد من العراقيين  ومن اجل أظهار الحقيقة
 ورفع الحيف عنهم وابراز عدالة السماء كما ارادها الله سبحانه وتعالى.
  
 شـرع هـذا القانــون ...
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Appendix No. (2)  Sentence against Saddam Hussain 
Text of the sentence against Saddam Hussein for the Anfal campaigns. 
 
 
 
In The Name of God All Merciful All Compassionate 
Iraqi High Tribunal Second Court of 
Felonies Baghdad – Iraq 
Ref. No 1/C Second/2006 
Date: 2007 Jun 24 
 
 
The Verdict Convict Saddam Hussein Al-Majid: Head of the bygone 
Revolutionary Command Council and former Armed Forces’ General Commander, 
he issued Decree [160] for the year 1987, granting Convict ‘Ali Hasan Al-Majid 
full authorities of the president, Party commander, and Armed Forces General 
commander to execute command’s objectives in the Northern Area. 
 
The latter issued orders to carry on Al-Anfal operations, as per the aforementioned 
granted authority, especially the order to use “special ammunition” [meaning 
chemical weapons] which can not be used unless after an order from the president 
himself, as it had been mentioned on the voice record. Charges against him are: 
 
Genocide: as per Article [11/First – Clauses (A) and C] by virtue of Article [15] 
of the court’s law. 
Crimes against Humanity: as per Article [12/First – Clauses (A), C, and 5] by 
virtue of Article [15] of the court’s law. 
War Crimes: as per Article [13/Fourth – Clauses (A), (D), and (L) by virtue of 
Article [15] of the court’s law. (page 55 of 963  
Accusing the convicts on behalf of the court: 
We’ve already explained a detail in the previous article stating that Mr. Chief 
Investigative Justice had transferred 7 convicts to this court, as follow: 
1.  Sultan Hashim Ahmad 
2.  ‘Ali Hasan Al-Majid 
3.  Saddam Hussein Al-Majid 
4.  Sabir ‘Abd-al-’Aziz Husayn 
5.  Husayn Rashid Muhammad 
       6.  Tahir Tawﬁq Al-Haj Yusif 
7.  Farhan Mutlak Al-Juburi 
to prosecute them as per articles mentioned in the referral decision. 
Via trials’ result, after listening to the plaintiffs’ testimonies, prosecution and 
defense witnesses, and reviewing the huge number of documents, ﬁles, compact 
discs (CD’s) and audio tapes, and by acknowledging that the court is not bound 
to charges by which the Chief of Investigative Judges transferred the convicts, 
the same court, on 2007 February 20, directed to each convict a charge paper, 
excluding Convict Saddam Husayn Al-Majid who had been executed as per 
First Criminal Court’s verdict in Al-Dujayl case, approved to be irrevocable 
by cassation court.Chief of Judges  
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Appendix No. (3) RCC  Decree no. 244. 
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In the name of God, most Gracious, Most Merciful 
Republic of Iraq 
Revolutionary Command Counsel 
 
Decree No.244 
Date: 20 April 1987 
 
Subject: Decree 
 
 Based paragraph (a) of article 42 of the Iraqi Constitution, The 
Revolutionary Command Council decided during its meeting of 20th April 
1987 that: 
1- Ali Hassan Al Majid the Northern Bureau of Ba’ath Party has been 
appointed to assume total authority to carry out RCC decree no.160 of 29 
March 1987. 
2- This decree should be implemented officially from its publication... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed By 
Saddam Hussein 
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Appendixes Chapter 3 
Appendix No (1) Articles from the Treaty of Sèèvres  
Articles No. 62, 63 and 64 of the Treaty of Sèvres 10th August 1920  
Article 62 
A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members 
appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall 
draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a 
scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of 
the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be 
hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and 
Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27.II (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be 
secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the 
Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full 
safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or 
religious minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission 
composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives 
shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should 
be made in the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present 
Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia. 
Article 63 
The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions 
of both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from 
their communication to the said Government. 
Article 64 
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If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the 
Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority 
of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if 
the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such 
independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey 
hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights 
and title over these areas. 
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a 
separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. 
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the 
Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent 
Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto 
been included in the Mosul vilayet. 
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Appendix No (2) Peace Agreement of 11 March 1970 
 
[Extracts taken from the translation provided by the Ministry of Culture and 
Information of Iraq) 
The Revolutionary Council, in a statement issued on 11 March 1970, 
announced a complete and constitutional settlement of the Kurdish issue. 
The President of the Republic and Chairman of the RCC made the historic 
announcement over. Baghdad television and radio networks. The following 
are extracts from the statement: 
The Revolutionary Command Council affirms its determination to deepen and 
broaden all effective measures for achieving the full means of cultural and 
economic resurgence and general development in the Kurdish area, seeking 
in the first place to enable the Kurdish masses to exercise their legitimate 
rights and assure their actual participation in earnest endeavours to build a 
homeland and struggle for the fulfilment of its major nationalist goals. 
Thereupon, the Revolutionary Command council has resolved on the 
following: 
1. Kurdish language shall be alongside with the Arabic language, the official 
language in areas populated by a Kurdish majority. The Kurdish language 
shall be the language of instruction in these areas. Arabic language shall be 
taught in all schools, where Kurdish language is the language of instruction 
while the Kurdish language shall be taught in Schools throughout Iraq as a 
second language within the limits stipulated by law. 
2. The sharing of our Kurdish brothers in Government and non-discrimination 
between the Kurds and others in the assumption of public offices including 
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sensitive and important posts in the state such as cabinet portfolios, army 
command, etc., have been and still remain among the important objectives 
which the Revolutionary Government seeks to achieve. The Revolutionary 
Government, in approving this principle, stresses the necessity of working for 
its fulfilment in an equitable ratio with due regard to the principle of efficiency 
the proportionate distribution of inhabitants and the inequities which had 
befallen our Kurdish brothers in the past. 
3. In view of the state of backwardness, which in the past afflicted the 
Kurdish nationality from the cultural and educational standpoints, a plan shall 
be worked out to make good that backwardness.  
A- Speeding up the implementation of the resolution of the Revolutionary 
Command Council concerning the language and the cultural right of the 
Kurdish people and placing under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General 
of Kurdish Culture and Information the task of preparing and steering radio 
and television programs concerning Kurdish national issues. 
B- Reinstating all students who were dismissed or were compelled to leave 
the school on account of the circumstances of violence in the area regardless 
of their ages or producing a convenient remedy for their problem. 
C- Building more schools in the Kurdish area, elevating the standards of 
schooling and education and admitting in just proportions Kurdish students to 
universities, military colleges, educational missions and fellowship. 
4. In the administrative units, populated by a Kurdish majority, officials shall 
be from among Kurds or from among persons well versed in the Kurdish 
language provided the required number is available. Appointment shall be 
made of the principal officials - Governor, Qaimaqam, Police Commandant, 
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Security Director, etc. Work will promptly commence to develop state 
machineries in the area in consultation with the High Committee supervising 
the implementation of this statement in a manner assuring such 
implementation and cementing national unity and stability in the area. 
5. The Government concedes to the Kurdish people its right to set up student 
youth, women and teachers organization of its own such organizations to 
become affiliated in the corresponding national Iraqi organizations. 
A- The operative period of paras (I) and (2) of the RCC’s resolution. NO.59 
dated 5 August 1968, shall be extended right up to the date of the issuance 
of this statement and shall extend to all hose that took part in the acts ‘of 
violence in the Kurdish area. 
B- Workers, officials and employees both civilian and military, shall return to 
service without this being affected by cadre restrictions. The civilians among 
them shall be put to use in the Kurdish area within the limits of its 
requirements. 
    C-  A body of specialists shall be constituted to work for uplifting the 
Kurdish area in all spheres as quickly as possible and for compensating it for 
what has descended upon it in the past number of years. An adequate 
budget is to be set aside for this purpose. The body in question shall operate 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Northern Affairs. 
    D-  The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way as to assure 
equal development to various parts of Iraq with due attention to the Kurdish 
area. 
    E-  Pension salaries shall be made for the families of those who met with 
martyrdom in the regrettable circumstances of hostilities from among the 
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members of the Kurdish armed movement and others as well as to the 
persons who became disabled or deformed as a result of those conditions. 
This is to be enacted by a special legislation on the pattern of other 
legislations in force. 
    F-  Speedy efforts shall be made to provide relief to stricken and needy 
persons through the accomplishment of housing projects and others assuring 
work to the unemployed. Appropriate in kind and cash subsidies shall also be 
made available and reasonable compensation offered to those stricken 
persons who need help. This all is to be entrusted to the High Committee. 
Excluded from this shall be the persons covered by the above paras. 
6. The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall be restored to their 
former places of habitation. As to the villagers of areas where housing units 
cannot be set up and which are taken over by the Government for public 
utility purposes under law, they shall be resettled in neighbouring areas and 
duly compensated. 
7. Speedy measures shall be taken to implement the Agrarian Reform law in 
the Kurdish area and amending it in such a manner as guarantees the 
liquidation of feedlots relations and the acquisition of appropriate plots of land 
side by side with waiving for them agricultural taxes accumulating over the 
years of unfortunate hostilities. 
8. It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution as follows: 
  A. The people of Iraq is made up of two principal nationalities; the Arab 
nationality and the Kurdish nationality. This Constitution confirms the national 
rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of all minorities within the 
framework of Iraqi unity. 
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  B. The following para shall be added to Article (4) of the Constitution: the 
Kurdish language, alongside with the Arabic language, shall be an official 
language in the Kurdish area. 
  C. The above shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution. 
9. The broadcasting station and heavy weapons shall be returned to the 
Government - this being tied up to the implementation of the final stages of 
the agreement. 
10. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents. 
11. The Governorates Law shall be amended in a manner conforming to 
the substance of this statement. 
12. Following the announcement of the statement, necessary measures 
shall be taken, in consultation with the High Committee supervising its 
implementation to unify the governorates and administrative units populated 
by a Kurdish majority in accordance with official census operations yet to be 
made. The state shall endeavour to develop this administrative unity and 
deepen and broaden the exercising by the Kurdish people therein of the 
Sunni of its national rights as a guarantee to its enjoyment of self-rule. Until 
this administrative unity is achieved, the Kurdish national affairs shall be 
coordinated through periodical meetings between the High Committee and 
the governors of the northern area. As the self-rule is to be achieved within 
the framework of the Iraqi Republic, the exploitation of national riches in the 
area will naturally be under the jurisdiction of the authorities of this Republic. 
13. The Kurdish people shall shave iii the legislative power in a manner 
proportionate to its population ratio in Iraq. 
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Kurdish countrymen, these gains scored by the Revolution will be nothing 
more than a step for the full achievement of your national goals in the shade 
of this beloved homeland and the unity of its great people. History will bear 
witness that you did not have and never will have a sincere brother and 
dependable ally as the Arab people. Revolutionary Command Council   11 
March 1970 
Appendixes Chapter 5 
 
Appendix no. (1). A. Iraqi Council of Ministers Resolution no. 426 of 2010 
 
Resolutions No. 426 of 2010 
 
Resolution of the Council of Ministers 
No. 426 of 2010 
 
Pursuant to the urgent presentation of His Excellency the Prime Minister 
during the meeting of the Council of Ministers, and in accordance with Article 
11 of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended 
regarding crimes of Genocide; 
The Council of Ministers has resolved at its forty-eighth ordinary session, 
convened on 8/12/2010, to approve the issuance of the following statement: 
 
First: The Council of Ministers welcomes the decision of the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal, issued on 29/11/2010, ruling that the case of Extermination 
and Displacement of the Faylee Kurds shall be deemed a crime of Genocide 
by all measures, reiterating that which was resolved by the Council of 
Representatives and confirmed by the Presidency Council in its Resolution 
No. 26 of 2008, published in Al-Waqaea Al-Iraqia gazette, edition 4087 dated 
22/9/2008. 
 
Second: The Council of Ministers undertakes to eliminate all of the negative 
impacts resulting from the oppressive resolutions issued by the former 
regime against the Iraqi people from the Faylee Kurds (such as the 
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Deprivation of Iraqi Nationality and the Confiscation of Moveable and 
Immoveable Property, in addition to other violated rights.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Ali Mohsin Ismail 
Secretary General of the Council of Ministers 
9/12/2010 
 
Appendix no.(1) B. Resolutions No (6)of  2012 from the Presidency of Iraq  
In the Name of the People 
Presidency of the Republic 
 
Pursuant to the Council of Representatives’ Resolution, in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 61(I) and Article 73(III) of the Constitution: 
The President of the Republic resolved on 8/2/2012 
To issue the following resolution: 
 
Resolution 
No. 6 of 2012 
 
The sufferings of the Faylee Kurds, in pursuance of the decision of the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, shall be deemed a crime of Genocide, in all 
that this formation signifies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jalal Talabani 
President of the Republic 
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Appendix no. (2) Telegram No. 10492 of 18 October 1987 
 
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful 
 
Kanat Security Office Telegram no. 10492     18/10/1987 
To the General Security Directorate of Saddam City C-46 
  
Your telegram number 28909 dated 17/10/1987.  
Here is our information regarding the subject of your telegram. The criminal 
Samir Ali Gulam. Our information and sources confirmed that he has been 
captured with all members of his family by our security forces in 1980. Their 
names are: 
Noor Ali Gulam 
Amir Mir Ali 
Farid Mir Ali 
Faik Mir Ali 
Latifa Mir Ali 
Suham Mir Ali 
 
All of them have been executed for being members of Samir Ali Gulam’s 
family who committed the serious crime against the students gathered in 
Mustansiriya University by throwing grenades at them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed by Security Captain officer in charge of Kanat Security Office. 
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 بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم 
 معاونيىة أمن ألقناة
  59110العدد : 
  1190-10-10التاريخ:
 
 الى: مديرية أمن مدينة صدام – س 46
  . 1027-87-17في  28209برقيتكم 
 –موضوعي بحث برقيتكم أعلاه: المجرم المقبور سمير مير علي غلام أدناه المعلومات المتوفرة عن 
  و هم كل من : 8027معلوماتنا تشير بأنه القية  القبض على جميع افراد عائلته من قبل الجهات الأمنية عام 
 نور على غلام 
 أمير مير علي
 فريد مير على 
 فائق مير علي 
 لطيفة مير علي 
 سهام مير علي 
بشعة ضد طلبة جامعة و اعدموا جميعا كونهم عائلة المجرم  سمير مير علي غلام الذي قام باجريمة ال
  علي التجمع المستنصرية حيث قام بالقاء الرمانات اليدوية 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 نقب الامن
 ضابط أمن القناة 
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Appendix No.(3) Memo no. 4248 of 5th Februrary 1986 
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Republic of Iraq 
Presidency Diwan 
 
Top Secret and Personal 
No. 4248    
Date: 5th February 1986 
 
To: Ministry of Interior (Minister Office)  
Subject: Decree 
 We have decided to continue the deportation of Tabaeya to outside Iraq 
including who were not deported before and denationalize them if you convinced 
that: 
1-They are associated with any opposition group. 
2-They are trying to form a racist association. 
3-They are trying to spread rumours against the Ba’ath Party and its Revolution. 
 
The deportation should be the place where they are originally from or anywhere else, 
Please activate this decree ASAP with thanks. 
Ahmad Hussein  
President of Republic Diwan   
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 بسم الل الرحمن الرحيم
 
  مجلس   
   444قيادة الثورة                                                              رقم القرار: 
 
لسته المنعقدة أستنادا الى احكام الفقرة (أ) من المادة الثانية و الأربعين من الدستور المؤقت قرر مجلس قيادة الثورة بج
  -:8027-5-1بتاريخ 
للوطن و الشعب و الأهداف القومية و ن أصل اجنبي اذا تبين عدم ولائه ي متسقط الجنسية العراقي عن كل عراق -7
 الاجتماعية العليا للثورة.
) ما لم يقنع بناء على أسباب 7على وزير الداخلية ان يأمر بأبعاد كل من أسقطت عنه الجنسية العراقية بموجب الفقرة ( -9
 قانونية أو حفظ حقوق الغير الموثقة رسميا. كافية بأن بقاءه في العراق أمر تستدعيه ضرورة قضائية أو
 يتولى وزير الداخلية تنفيذ هذا القرار. -3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 صدام حسين       
 رئيس مجلس قيادة الثورة            
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In the name of God, the most merciful, the most gracious 
 
Revolutionary Command Counsel 
 
Decree No. 666 
Date: 7 May 1980 
 
Based on paragraph A of Article 42 of the temporary constitution, the RCC 
on its meeting of 7 May 1980 decided:  
 
1) Any Iraqi from foreign origin will be denationalized if it is proved that he is 
not faithful to the country, the people and the highest social and national 
goals of the revolution.  
2) The Minister of Interior should order the immediate deportation of  anyone 
who has been denationalized based on point one if he is not convinced 
his presence in Iraq is necessary for some judicial or legal or for 
protecting the rights of others to stay in Iraq.  
3) The Minister of Interior is in charge of the implementation of this decree. 
 
 
 
 
Signed by Saddam Hussein the President of the RCC. 
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Appendix No (5) Sadoon Shaker Mehmoud Verdict. 
 
The Defendant Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud 
Court Ruling 
The First Instance Criminal Court formed in the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal, presided over by Judge Sa’ad Yahiya Abdul Wahid and 
authorised to rule on behalf of the Iraqi people, announces its ruling as 
follows: 
1. The Court finds the defendant, Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud guilty of 
Genocide, in accordance with Articles 11(I)(1), Article 15(I)(II)(h)( III)(IV) of 
the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
provisions of Articles 406(1)(a),  33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 
47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 and by virtue of 
Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 1971 as 
amended.  This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant 
and subject to appeal.  It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
2. The Court finds the defendant Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud guilty of 
Forced Displacement of a Civilian Population which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(d), 15(I)(II)(III)(IV) of the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
provisions of Articles 421, 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 
48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and Article 
182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No. 23 of 1971 as amended. 
This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject 
to appeal. It was publically announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding 
to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
3. The Court finds the defendant, Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud guilty of 
Imprisonment and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty which is a Crime 
against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(e), 15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) of 
the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No.10 of 2005, Articles 322, 33(1) 
and  34(b) of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, the 
Appended Articles 47(1) ( 2), 48 and 49 of the same Penal Code, and the 
provisions of Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 
1971 as amended. This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the 
defendant and subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 
2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
4. The Court finds the defendant, Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud guilty of 
Torture, which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 12(I)(f(,  15(I )(II)(c )(III)(IV) of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal 
Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005, as amended, Articles 333, 33(1) and34(b), the 
Appended Articles 47(1) (2) 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 
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1969 as amended, and according to the provisions of Article 182(a) of the 
Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 1971. This ruling is unanimous, 
made in the presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. It was publicly 
announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-
Hijjah 1431). 
5. The Court finds the defendant, Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud guilty of 
Persecution against any specific community or specific group on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or other grounds that are 
impermissible under international law, which is Crime against Humanity, in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles 12(I) (h), Article 15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) 
of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, and 
Article 27 of the same Act. In addition, the provisions of the Articles 33(1) and 
34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1) (2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code 
No.111 of 1969 as amended, and the provisions of Article 182(a) of the Iraqi 
Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 1971 as amended. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. It 
was publicly announced on 29 November 2010(corresponding to the Hijri 
Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431).  
6. The Court finds the defendant Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud guilty of 
other Inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious physical or mental injury which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(j), Article 15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) of the 
Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, Articles 
451, 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and the provisions of Article 182(a) 
of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 1971 as amended. This 
ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject to 
appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to 
the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431. 
Judicial Sentence against the Convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud 
The First Instance Criminal Court formed in the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal on 29 November 2010, presided over by Judge Sa’ad Yahiya 
Abdul Wahid and authorised to rule on behalf of the Iraqi people, 
announces its ruling as follows: 
1- In the convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to death by hanging for the offence of Genocide, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 11(I)(a), Article 
15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 
2005 as amended and the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended, his sentence was 
determined according to Article 406(1)(a) of the same Act. This 
sentence is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and 
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subject to appeal.  It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
2- In the convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for the crime of Forced 
Displacement of a Civilian Population, which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Article 12(I)(d),  Article 15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) 
of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as 
amended and the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended, his sentence was determined 
according to Article 421 of the same Act. This sentence is unanimous, 
made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was 
publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri 
Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
3- In the convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to seven years in prison for the crime of Imprisonment 
or other Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law, which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Article 12(I)(e), Article 15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) 
of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No.10 of 2005 as 
amended, and the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended, his sentence was determined 
according to Article 322 of the same Act.  This sentence is unanimous, 
made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was 
publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri 
Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
4- In the convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to seven years in prison for the crime of Torture, which 
is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Article 12(I)(f (, 
Article 15(I)(II)(c )(III) (IV) of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal Law 
No. 10 of 2005, as amended, and the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 
49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended, his sentence 
was determined according to Article 322 of the same Act.  This 
sentence is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and 
subject to appeal.  It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
5- In the convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to six years in prison for the crime of Persecution, 
which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 12(I)(h), Article 15(I)(II)(c )(III)(IV) of the Iraqi Supreme 
Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, his sentence was 
determined according to Article 27 of the same Act, and the Appended 
Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as 
amended.  This sentence is unanimous, made in the presence of the 
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convicted and subject to appeal.  It was publicly announced on 29 
November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 
1431). 
6- In the convicted Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to ten years in prison for other Inhumane acts listed as 
Crimes against Humanity, in accordance with Article 12/(I)(j), Article 
15(I)(II)(c ) (III)(IV) of the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 
of 2005 as amended, and the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, his sentence was 
determined according to Article 451 of the same Act.  This sentence is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to 
appeal.  It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
7- The most severe penalty, the death penalty, shall be executed against 
the convicted, Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud, pursuant to Article 142 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended. 
8- The period of detention for the convicted, Sa'doon Shaker Mahmoud, 
was not considered, since he was awaiting the verdict in this case, 
and was in detention for another case.  
9- The convicted, Sa’doon Shaker Mahmoud, was informed that all the 
Court’s case records and its rulings will be sent to the Appellate Board 
of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal within 30 days, pursuant to 
Article 224 of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No. 23 of 1971, as 
amended. 
This sentence is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and 
subject to appeal.  It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
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Appendix No. (6) Mizban Khodr Hadi Verdict  
 
 
The Defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi 
Court Ruling 
The First Instance Criminal Court formed in the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal, presided over by Judge Sa’ad Yahiya Abdul Wahid and 
authorised to rule on behalf of the Iraqi people, announces its ruling as 
follows: 
1- The Court finds the defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi guilty of Genocide, in 
accordance with Articles 11(I)(1), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the provisions of Articles 
406(1)(a), 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 and by virtue of Article 182 (a) of the 
Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 1971 as amended. This ruling 
is unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject to 
appeal. It was publically announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431).  
2- The Court finds the defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi guilty of Forced 
Displacement of a Civilian Population, which is a Crime against Humanity, 
in accordance with Articles 12(I)(d), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the provisions of Articles 421, 
33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and Article 182(a) of the Iraqi 
Rules of Criminal Procedure No.(23) of 1971 as amended. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. 
It was publically announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the 
Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
3- The Court finds the defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi guilty of 
Imprisonment and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty which is a 
Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(e), 15(IV) of the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, Articles 
322, 33(1) and (34)(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended and the provisions of 
Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.(23) of 1971 as 
amended. This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the 
defendant and subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 
November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431. 
4- The Court finds the defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi guilty of Torture 
which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(f), 
15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as 
amended, the provisions of Articles 333, 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended 
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Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as 
amended, and according to the provisions of Article 182(a) of the Iraqi 
Rules of Criminal Procedure No.(23) of 1971, as amended. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. 
It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the 
Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
5- The Court finds the defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi guilty of 
Persecution against any specific community or specific group on political, 
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or other grounds that are 
impermissible under international law, which is Crime against Humanity, 
in accordance with the provisions of Articles 12(I)(h) , 15(IV) of the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, and 
sets the sentence in accordance with Article 27 of the same Law. In 
addition, the provisions of the Articles 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended 
Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as 
amended, and the provisions of Article 182 (a) of the Iraqi Rules of 
Criminal Procedure No.(23) of 1971 as amended. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. 
It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010(corresponding to the 
Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
6- The Court finds the defendant Mizban Khodr Hadi guilty of other 
Inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious physical or mental injury which is a Crime against Humanity, in 
accordance with Articles 12(I)(j), 15(I)(II)(III)(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi 
Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, Articles 451, 33(1) 
and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code No.111 of 1969, and Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal 
Procedure No.(23) of 1971 as amended. This ruling is unanimous, made 
in the presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. It was publicly 
announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 
Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
Judicial Sentence Against the Convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi 
 
The First Instance Criminal Court formed in the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal on 29 November 2010, presided over by Judge Sa’ad Yahiya 
Abdul Wahid and authorised to rule on behalf of the Iraqi people, 
announces its ruling as follows: 
1. In the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s presence, the Court has sentenced 
him to death by hanging for the crime of Genocide, in accordance with 
Articles 11(I)(a), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 
of 2005 as amended, the provisions of Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 
of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and sets the 
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sentence in accordance with Article 406(1)(a) of the same Act. This ruling 
is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to 
appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding 
to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
2. In the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s presence, the Court has sentenced 
him to fifteen years in prison for the crime of Forced Displacement of a 
Civilian Population which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with 
Articles 12(I)(d), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 
of 2005 as amended, the provisions of Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 
of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and sets the 
sentence in accordance with Article 421 of the same Act. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. 
It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the 
Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431).  
3. In the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s presence, the Court has sentenced 
him to seven years in prison for the crime of Imprisonment and Severe 
Deprivation of Physical Liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 
international law, which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with 
Articles 12(I)(e), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 
of 2005 as amended, the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and sets the sentence in 
accordance with Article 322 of the same Code. This ruling is unanimous, 
made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was 
publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri 
Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
4. In the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s presence, the Court has sentenced 
him to seven years in prison for the crime of Torture which is a Crime 
against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(f), 15(IV) of the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
provisions of Articles 333, 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47, 48 
and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended,  and sets 
the sentence in accordance with Article 333 of the same Act. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. 
It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the 
Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431).  
5. In the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s presence, the Court has sentenced 
him, to six years in prison for the crime of Persecution which is Crime 
against Humanity, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 12(I)(h), 
15(I)(II)(c)(III)(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 
2005 as amended and sets the sentence in accordance with Article 27 of 
the same Law and in terms of the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended. This ruling is unanimous, 
made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was 
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publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri 
Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
6. In the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s presence, the Court has sentenced 
him to ten years in prison for committing the crime of other Inhumane acts 
which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(j), 15 
(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as 
amended, the provisions of the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 as amended, and sets the sentence in 
accordance with Article 451 of the same Code. This ruling is unanimous, 
made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was 
publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri 
Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 143). 
7. The most severe penalty, the death penalty shall be executed against the 
convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi pursuant to Article 142 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code No.111 of 1969 as amended. 
8. The period of the convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi’s detention was not taken 
into consideration since he was awaiting the verdict in this case, and was 
in detention for another case 
9. The convicted Mizban Khodr Hadi shall be informed that all the records 
and Rulings issued in this case will be sent to the Appellate Board at the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal within a period of 30 days in compliance 
with Article 224 of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.23 of 1971 as 
amended. 
Appendix No. (7) Aziz Saleh Hassan.Verdict 
This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was publicly 
announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 2  
The Defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan 
Court Ruling 
The First Instance Criminal Court formed in the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal, presided over by Judge Sa’ad Yahiya Abdul Wahid and 
authorised to rule on behalf of the Iraqi people, announces its ruling as 
follows: 
1- The Court finds the defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan guilty of Genocide, 
in accordance with Article (11)(I)(1), Article 15(IV) of the Supreme 
Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
provisions of Articles 406(1)(a), 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended 
Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969 
and by virtue of Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure 
No.23 of 1971 as amended.  This ruling is unanimous, made in the 
presence of the defendant and subject to appeal.  It was publicly 
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announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 
Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
2- The Court finds the defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan guilty of Forced 
Displacement of a Civilian Population which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(d), Article 15(IV) of the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
provisions of Articles 421, 33)1( and 34)b(, the Appended Articles 
47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969, as 
amended, and Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure 
No.23 of 1971 as amended. This ruling is unanimous, made in the 
presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. It was publically 
announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 
Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
3- The Court finds the defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan guilty of 
Imprisonment and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty which is a 
Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(e), 15(IV) of 
the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, 
Articles 322, 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 
49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, as amended, and the 
provisions of Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure 
No.23 of 1971 as amended. This ruling is unanimous, made in the 
presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. It was publicly 
announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 
Dhu al-Hijjah 1431. 
4- The Court finds the defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan guilty of Torture 
which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 
12(I)(f), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 
2005 as amended, the provisions of Articles 333, 33(1) and 34(b), the 
Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No.111 
of 1969, as amended, and according to the provisions of Article 182(a) 
of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No.(23) of 1971, as amended. 
This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and 
subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
5- The Court finds the defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan guilty of Persecution 
against any specific community or specific group on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or other grounds that are 
impermissible under international law, which is Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 12(I)(h) , 
15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as 
amended and Article 27 of the same Act. In addition, the provisions of 
the Articles 33(1), 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 49 of 
the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, as amended, and the 
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provisions of Article 182(a) of the Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure 
No. (23) of 1971 as amended. This ruling is unanimous, made in the 
presence of the defendant and subject to appeal. It was publicly 
announced on 29 November 2010(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 
Dhu al-Hijjah 143). 
6- The Court finds the defendant Aziz Saleh Hassan guilty of other 
Inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious physical or mental injury which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(j), 15 (IV) of the 2005 of 
the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, 
Articles 451, 33(1) and 34(b), the Appended Articles 47(1)(2), 48 and 
49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 and Article 182(a) of the 
Iraqi Rules of Criminal Procedure No. (23) of 1971 as amended. This 
ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the defendant and 
subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431. 
 
Judicial Sentence against the Convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan 
The First Instance Criminal Court formed in the Supreme Iraqi Criminal 
Tribunal on 29 November 2010, presided over by Judge Sa’ad Yahiya 
Abdul Wahid and authorised to rule on behalf of the Iraqi people, 
announces its ruling as follows: 
In the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan’s presence, the Court has sentenced him 
to death by hanging for the crime of Genocide, in accordance with Articles 
11(I)(a), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as 
amended, the provisions of Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi 
Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 and Article 406(1)(a) of the same Act. This 
ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to 
appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to 
the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
1- In the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for the crime of Forced 
Displacement of a Civilian Population which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(d), 15(IV) of the Supreme 
Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 
1969 as amended and sets the sentence in accordance with Article 
421 of the same Act. This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence 
of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 
29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 
1431).  
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2- In the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to seven years in prison for the crime of Imprisonment 
and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty which is a Crime against 
Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(e), 15(IV) of the Supreme 
Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as amended, the 
Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 
1969 as amended, and sets the sentence in accordance with Article 
322 of the same Code. This ruling is unanimous, made in the 
presence of the convicted and subject to appeal. It was publicly 
announced on 29 November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 
Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
3- In the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to seven years in prison for the crime of Torture which 
is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with Articles 12(I)(f), 
15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 10 of 2005 as 
amended, the Appended Articles 47, 48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal 
Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended and sets the sentence in 
accordance with Article 333 of the same Code. This ruling is 
unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject to 
appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
4- In the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to six years in prison for the crime of Persecution 
which is Crime against Humanity, in accordance with the provisions of 
Articles 12(I)(h), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law 
No. 10 of 2005 as amended and sets the sentence in accordance with 
Article 27 of the same Law and in terms of Articles 47, 48 and 49 of 
the Appended Articles of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 as 
amended. This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the 
convicted and subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 
November 2010 (corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 
1431). 
5- In the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan’s presence, the Court has 
sentenced him to ten years in prison for committing the crime of other 
Inhumane acts which is a Crime against Humanity, in accordance with 
Articles 12(I)(j), 15(IV) of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Law No. 
10 of 2005 as amended, the provisions of the Appended Articles 47, 
48 and 49 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended, and 
sets the sentence in accordance with Article 451 of the same Act. This 
ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and 
subject to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November 2010 
(corresponding to the Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431). 
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6- The most severe penalty, the death penalty shall be carried out 
against the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan pursuant to Article 142 of the 
Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1969 as amended. 
7- The period of detention for the convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan was not 
considered, since he was awaiting the verdict in this case, and was in 
detention for another case.  
8- The convicted Aziz Saleh Hassan shall be informed that all the 
records and the Rulings issued in this case will be sent to the 
Appellate Board at the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal in a period of 
30 days by virtue of the provisions of Article 224 of the Iraqi Rules of 
Criminal Procedure No. 23 of 1971 as amended. 
This ruling is unanimous, made in the presence of the convicted and subject 
to appeal. It was publicly announced on 29 November (corresponding to the 
Hijri Date 23 Dhu al-Hijjah 1431).  
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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. 
Emblem of the Republic of Iraq 
Presidency of the Republic 
The Secretary 
Director of Public Security  
Number: 84 
Date: 29/03/1989, Hijra date: 22/08/1409 
Mr Secretary of the commander in chief, the respectable 
Salutations 
Upon your Excellency’s request below is the information at hand about the 
town of Harir in the governorate of Erbil… 
1- In July, 1983 during an Iranian, Zionist aggression on Haj Umran front and as 
substantiated the participation of the clique descendants of treason the 
fraction who are mostly from Barzani family an order from the former Director 
of Public security “Dr Fadhel Al-Barrak” to the Directorate of General Security 
in the autonomous region to assemble a big unit from members of the 
security from units and directorates of the autonomous region on a top secret 
mission to commence at down on the next day. The mission commenced on 
1/8/1983 with members of the Republican Guards to surround Al-Quds, Al-
Qadissiya, Qushtappa compounds, which were specifically built for Barzani 
families. All males from Barzani families over the age of 15 were arrested 
and transported using big vehicles prepared for this mission accompanied by 
military force. 
In the same manner more Barzanis from Harir complex in Shaqlawa front 
were arrested, those included 403 from Barzani, Sherwani and Mizori fraction 
who are also Barzani clan. More were arrested from Diyana complex in 
Rawandooz front and “Mergasor” in Erbil governorate. 
2- Further, by orders from the former Director of Public Security a workforce 
was assembled from members of the Directorate of Public Security and 
Baghdad Public Security office to receive the detainees from the previous 
complexes and others with similar profiles in Abu-Ghareib prison. Total 
number of detainees was 2,225; they were transferred to “Busaya” in the 
governorate of Al-Muthana. A special committee was assembled to execute 
the above
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Orders were followed from Director of General Security to fabricate charges for 
the above. Total of 667 charges were laid in 16 cases, these cases were 
referred to the Presidency of the Revolution Court, the verdict was death 
penalty, and their relatives were not sent death certificates. 
3- The sum of 194,648,440 dinars was received that was at the possession of 
these people and was deposited in the accounts of this directorate. 
4- Since the criminal Massud Barzani insists on this issue, the Presidency of the 
Republic – the Secretary has instructed in file number 2,651k on 24/8/1987 that 
the employees and members of the Public Security who are in charge of the 
Kurdish issue in case they were contacted by a third party that the response be 
one and specified that “nobody knows nothing about them except the country’s 
leadership and that the main issue is more important than these families”. This 
shall remain the only answer should anyone ask about the whereabouts of 
these families. 
5- Eight men have been arrested lately with relation to the outlaws from Harir 
residents; they were indicted and executed in accordance with the Regulatory 
Office for North of Iraq. 
Further, two families have been detained “three women and a child” that are 
related to the outlaws who conducted sabotage activities, they remain in 
detention. 
6- As for the current security situation in Harir; Harir is considered one of the 
closest areas to the outlaws’ centres because it connects Balsian basin east of 
Harir to the road towards Barzan which extends along Harir Mountain to the 
Great Zab River. Harir consists about 800 houses dwelt by Surchi, Khailani, 
and Mizori clans and some from Barzani clan. 
7- Harir complex was built in 1975 after the defeat of the clique of treason, 
Barzanis were relocated here after their return from south of Iraq. Groups 
whose villages near the border were destroyed were relocated here as well. 
The complex included Barzani clan and Sherwani (which is another fraction of 
Barzani), Balek and Hirooti, population of 7050. The other complex (Baserma) 
near Harir (4Km) was built in April, 1987 as per orders from the Regulatory 
Office of the North division after destroying the prohibited villages from the 
region. 
8- Deported Shabak families from Nineveh governorate were also relocated here; 
more families from the removed villages were relocated. Surchi, Harki and 
Balek as well as Shabak lived here, population of 7,400. 
9- Harir was a vulnerable area before the last Anfal operations, it was frequented 
by the outlaws despite the fact that a large number of National Guards in the 
town and suburbs. After the eternal Anfal the outlaws fled their headquarters. 
However, there were small cliques of treasons as well as communists that used 
to frequent the area. There were a couple of incidents such as the 
assassination of one of the police officers that was accompanying the Shabak 
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families, as well as the abduction and release of a member of Harir branch, 
comrade Baqi Saleem Isa. 
10- In general the security situation in the region is good especially if the main 
paths were sealed from being penetrated. 
11- The Barzani clan is known for their disloyalty to the Party, Revolution and 
Country for decades, they have persistently resisted the unity of the nation and 
they were the real traitors. They consider themselves the legitimate 
representatives of the Kurdish people; they are full of hatred and animosity. 
12- However, the security situation in the region is very good. 
For your reference with respect 
 
Director of General Security, his signature 
29/3/1989 
22/8/1409 
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Appendix no. (2) Document No.2651 dated 24 August 1987 
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Presidency of the Republic 
The Secretary 
10125/9115 (stamp) 
Stamp of Directorate of General Security 
5783 on 24/8/1987 
 
Number: 2651/K 
Date: 24/8/1987 
 
Top secret and personal 
Comrade Ali Hassan Al Majeed, the respectable 
Subject/ Barzani families 
Due to the persistence the criminal Masoud Al-Barzani holds on the issue of Bazani 
families from Erbil governorate in Qushteppa complex and upon the indirect 
communication with his entourage since 1983 until now due to this issue (Barzani 
families) being outlined as the main condition to start any serious negotiations with 
the Leadership of the Party and Revolution… his Excellency the Commander in 
Chief has instructed all General Security personnel and its apparatus that deals with 
the Kurdish issue - whom they may be contacted by third parties - that their response 
be one and unified that ( nobody except the country’s leadership knows anything 
about this matter and that the main issue is more crucial than those families). This 
should stand the response to any enquiry should anyone ask about the whereabouts 
of these families. 
Please take all the necessary… with regard 
 
 
Secretary of the President of the Republic / signature 
 
Advice M 64 in the Autonomous Region and the concerned to take all the 
necessary measures and act upon them 
Copies to 
9- Director General of intelligence / file 4439 in 23/8/1987 to take all the 
necessary measures. 
10- Director General of military intelligence.  
11- Director Of Public Security /  
All necessary measures to be taken when the issue concerns you. 
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Appendix No. (3) Document 3428 , dated  29 March 1989 
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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. 
Emblem of the Republic of Iraq 
Presidency of the Republic 
The Secretary 
Director of Public Security  
Number: 3428 
Date: 29/03/1989, Hijra date: 21/08/1409 
 Mr M. M. H. for Political Affairs, the respectable 
 Salutations 
As per the telephone conversation with the Manager of the Director’s Office; 
1- We attach a list which includes 403 Barzani men who were arrested on 
10/8/1983 by Directorate of General Security in Erbil governorate in 
cooperation with the Republican Guards brigade, they were sent to 
Directorate of General Security, and they are Harir residents. 
They include the clans below: Barzani, Sherwani, Mizori, please note that 
Barzanis include the groups below: Barzani, Sherwani, Khorshidi, Dolmeri, 
Mizori who are residents of Bla and Barzan. 
2- We attach a copy of your file 59547 on 30/8/1987 which includes orders 
from Mr President, the Commander (God protect him) regarding dealing 
with Barzani families. 
3- Attached is a list of outlaws who have connections with Harir residents, they 
were investigated with and proper indictments were manifested and they 
were executed in accordance with North Organisation Office, they were 8. 
4- Attached a list of two families who are detained, they are Harir residents; 3 
women and a child. They are relative of the outlaws who have committed 
crimes of sabotage after the defeat. They are detained in Erbil Directorate of 
General Security. 
5- Attached a report about the security situation in the town of Harir. 
For your reference, with regards 
 
 
Brigadier General of Security, his signature M. M. H. for the Autonomous 
Region 29/3/1989 
 
Attachments: 
a. Lists 
b. Security report 
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Appendix no.(4) Memo of 29 March 1989 from Deputy Director for political 
affairs. 
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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. 
Date: 29/03/1989 
Mr M. M. H. for Political Affairs, the respectable 
Greetings 
1- At the end of July 1983 I was informed along with other officers from 
Baghdad General Security Office as well as Directorate of General Security 
by the former Baghdad Director of General Security Colonel Ali Abdulla 
Barah I would receive some Barzani traitors who are have been sent from 
the Autonomous Region and Third Division, as well as some who were 
imprisoned in Abu-Greib prison. 
2- We received 2,225 traitors and they were transported by buses to (Buseya) 
to de detained. 
3. A team under the auspices of Baghdad Director of Public Security was 
assembled and the above traitors were executed. 
4. In the beginning of August 1983 the traitors above (2,225 persons) were 
executed in Al-Muthana governorate, Buseya region in coordination with 
Baghdad Director of General Security. 
5. By orders from the former Director of Public Security to fabricate charges for 
the important ones, total of 667 charges were laid for 16 cases. These 
cases were sent to the Presidency Revolution Court, the verdict was death 
penalty. No death certificates were sent out. 
6. No charges were laid for the rest of the group (1,558 persons). 
7. A committee from some officers was assembled to collect money the 
accused had on their possession; it was sent to Directorate of Public 
Security, Third Division as per file 47832 in 14/9/1983. 
8. According to orders from the former Director of Baghdad General Security 
not to answer any enquiries that orders were taken from high authority but 
rather say that orders were followed. 
 
Please acknowledge, with regards 
 
Lietenant Colonel 
Haqi Ismael / signature 
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Appendix no. (5) Memo from Deputy Director for political affairs at General 
security office, date 29 March 1989 Signed by Security Major Yasin Asat 
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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. 
Date:  /  / 
Mr M. M. H. for Political Affairs, the respectable 
Greetings 
Below is the information regarding the deportation of Barzanis in 1983: 
Following orders from the former Director of General Security ( Dr Fadhel Al-
Barak) a force comprising  officers and members of Erbil General Security and 
the Autonomous Region Centre and Emergency Regiment from governorates 
under the command of major general Abdul-Muhsen and Khairi Salih Daoud 
(Director of Erbil General Security and Director of the Autonomous Region 
General Security). A plan was set to have a force close to the complexes 
accompanied by siege by the Republican Guards. They stared to detain 
Barzanis in two stages; first from Quds, Qadisseya, Qushteppa complexes 
which were close to the centre of Erbil governorate, the force surrounded the 
complexes from the night before the actual arrest took place. The second stage 
Harir complex in Shaqlawa front, Diyana complex in Rawandooz front, and 
Mirgasur in Zebar town front, they were surrounded by Republican Guards and 
General Security forces in a top secret mission. In the morning they started 
arresting Barzanis from their houses as well as the surrounding areas. This was 
in early May, 1983. The Barzani traitors were transported in big vehicles 
specifically brought from Baghdad for this purpose by orders from officers from 
the Presidential Palace. The detainees were taken to Baghdad. 
Please acknowledge … with regards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major 
Yaseen Asaad / signature 
Third division 
29/3/989 
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Appendix no.(6) Memo from the Director of the 3th Branch,date 19 July 1990.  
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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. 
Memorandum 
 Sh 3, K 1 
Date: 15/7/1990 
Deputy of Director for General Security 
 
Salutations 
 
Subject / Barzanis 
 
There have been frequent enquiries from high end authorities especially from 
President’s Office that citizens are enquiring about the whereabouts of their 
husbands and specifically the Barzanis; whom have been punished and went to 
hell for treason.  
The attached was received from President’s Office without mentioning that they 
were Barzanis, we have explained that they were Barzanis and they were 
executed for betraying the nation in 1983 in accordance with our file 13654 in 
24/3/1990. The President’s Office has informed us in their file 2390 in 
13/5/1990 attached to inform the relatives of the concerned that they went 
missing during the war with the enemy Iran. 
 
 
 
Please acknowledge, …. with regards 
 
 
Head of the Third Division/ signature 
Acknowledged, signature  
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Appendixes Chapter 7 Appendix No. (1)  RCC Degree No. 160  
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In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate 
[Emblem of the Iraqi Republic] 
In the Name of the People 
Revolutionary Command Council 
Number of the Decree: RCC decree No. 160 
Date of the Decree: 29/3/1987 
In accordance with the provisions of Article 42, Paragraph (a), and Article 43, 
Paragraph (a), of the Constitution, and in order to execute what was decided in the 
joint meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Regional Command of 
the Ba`ath Party on 18/3/1987,The Revolutionary Command Council decided in its 
meeting on 29/3/1987 the following: 
First: The Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, member of the Regional Command of the 
Ba`ath Party, will represent the Regional Command of the Party and the 
Revolutionary Command Council in implementing their policies in all of the northern 
region, including the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan, in order to protect security 
and order and guarantee stability and the implementation of the Autonomy Law in 
the region. 
Second: The Comrade, member of the Regional Command, will have authority over 
all the state's civil, military and security apparatuses to carry out this decree, in 
particular the authorities of the National Security Council and the Northern Affairs 
Committee. 
Third: The following authorities in the northern region fall under the Comrade's 
authority and must implement all the decisions and directives issued by him, as by 
this order: 
1. The Executive Committee of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. 
2. The Governors and the heads of the administrative units under the Ministry of 
Local Government. 
3. The Foreign Intelligence apparatus, the Internal Security Force, and Military 
Intelligence. 
4. The Commands of the Popular Army. 
Fourth: The military commands in the region must respond to the Comrade, member 
of the Regional Command, concerning everything pertaining to the first paragraph of 
this decision. 
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Fifth: This Decree goes into effect on the date it is issued until further notice, and any 
regulations contradicting this Decree are suspended. 
 
 
 
[Signature] 
Saddam Hussein 
President of the Revolutionary Command Council 
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 قيادة مكتب تنظيم الشمال 
 مكتب السكرتارية
 0886/09العدد 
 1027/4/89التاريخ 
 من/ قيادة مكتب تنظيم الشمال
 الى/ قيادة الفيلق الأول/ قيادة الفيلق الثاني/ قيادة الفيلق الخامس
 محذورة أمنيام/ التعامل مع القرى ال
قررنا العملابتداًء من  1027/4/79بالنظر لانتهاء الفترة المعلنة رسميا لتجميع هذه القرى والتي سينتهي موعدها يوم 
 صعودا بما يلي  1027/4/99يوم 
نة ) تعتبر جميع القرى المحذورة امنيا والتي لم تزال لحد الآن أماكن لتواجد المخربين عملاء ايران وسليلي الخيا7(
 وأمثالهم من خونة العراق 
) يحرم التواجد البشري والحيواني فيها نهائيا وتعتبر منطقة عمليات محرمة ويكون الرمي فيها حرا ًغير مقيد بأية 9(
 تعليمات ما لم تصدر من مقرنا 
الأجهزة المختصة ) يحرم السفر منها واليها او الزراعة والاستثمار الزراعي أو الصناعي والحيواني وعلى جميع 3(
 متابعة هذا الموضوع بجدية كل ضمن اختصاصه
) تعد قيادات الفيالق ضربات خاصة بين فترة وأخرى بالمدفعية والسمتيات والطائرات لقتل أكبر عدد ممكن ممن 6(
 يتواجد ضمن هذه المحرمات وخلال جميع الأوقات ليلا ونهارا واعلامنا
تواجده ضمن قرى هذه المنطقة وتحقق معه الأجهزة الأمنية وينفذ حكم الاعدام ) يحجز جميع من يلقى عليه القبض ل5(
 ) سنة داخل بعد الاستفادة من معلوماته وإعلامنا.81) سنة داخل صعودا الى عمر (57بمن يتجاوز عمره (
ها ثلاثة أيام وإذا ) تقوم الأجهزة المختصة بالتحقيق مع من يسلم نفسه الى الأجهزة الحكومية أو الحزبية لمدة أقصا4(
تطلب الأمر لحد عشرة أيام لا بد من إعلامنا عن مثل هذه الحالات وإذا استوجب التحقيق أكثر من هذه المدة عليهم أخذ 
 موافقتنا هاتفيا أو برقيا وعن طريق الرفيق طاهر العاني 
هم مجانا ًما عدا الأسلحة الثقيلة ) يعتبر كل ما يحصل عليه مستشارو أفواج الدفاع الوطني أو مقاتلوهم يؤول إلي1(
والساندة والمتوسطة، أما الأسلحة الخفيفة فتبقى لديهم ويتم إعلامنا بأعداد هذه الأسلحة فقط وعلى قيادة الجحافل ان تنشط 
لتبليغ جميع المستشارين وأمراء السرايا والمفارز وإعلامنا بالتفصيل عن نشاطاتهم ضمن أفواج الدفاع الوطنيز مكرر 
ئاسة المجلس التشريعي, رئاسة المجلس التنفيذي ,جهاز المخابرات , رئاسة اركان الجيش, محافظو (رؤساء اللجان ر
الأمنية) نينوى، التأميم، ديالى، صلاح الدين، السليمانية، اربيل، دهوك, أمناء سر فروع المحافظات أعلاه,مديرية 
ومدير أمن منطقة الحكم الذاتي, منظومة استخبارات المنطقة الشمالية  الاستخبارات العسكرية العامة, مديرية الأمن العامة
منظومة استخبارات المنطقة الشرقية,مدراء أمن محافظات ـ نينوى، التأميم، ديالى، صلاح الدين، السليمانية، اربيل، 
 دهوك . 
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هصاصتخا نمض لك ذيفنتلاو علاطلاا ىجري  وانؤبنا. 
عيقوت 
 نسح يلع قيفرلاديجملا 
 
Northern Bureau Command 
The Secretariat 
Date [sic]: 28/4008 
Ref. [sic]: 20/6/1987 
[In handwriting:] 23/6/87 
From: Northern Bureau Command 
To: First Corps Command / Second Corps Command / Fifth Corps Command 
Re: Dealing With the Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons 
In view of the fact that the officially announced deadline for the amalgamation of 
these villages expires on 21 June 1987, we have decided that the following action 
should be taken effective 22 June 1987: 
(1) All the villages in which the saboteurs -- the agents of Iran [i.e. the PUK], the 
offspring of treason [i.e. the KDP], and similar traitors to Iraq -- are still to be found 
shall be regarded as prohibited for security reasons. 
(2) The presence of human beings and animals is completely prohibited in these 
areas, and [these] shall be regarded as operational zones in which [the troops] can 
open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our 
headquarters. 
(3) Travel to and from these zones, as well as all agricultural, animal and industrial 
activities shall be prohibited and carefully monitored by all the competent agencies 
within their respective fields of jurisdiction. 
(4) The Corps Commands shall carry out random bombardments using artillery, 
helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest 
number of persons present in those prohibited areas, keeping us informed of the 
results. 
(5) All persons captured in those villages shall be detained because of their 
presence there, and they shall be interrogated by the security services and those 
between the ages of 15 and 70 must be executed after any useful information has 
been obtained from them; keep us informed. 
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(6) Those who surrender to the government or Party authorities shall be interrogated 
by the competent agencies for a maximum period of three days, which may be 
extended to ten days if necessary, provided that we are notified of such cases. If the 
interrogation requires a longer period of time, approval must be obtained from us by 
telephone or telegraph or through comrade Taher al-Ani. 
(7) Everything seized by the advisers [mustashars] or fighters of the National 
Defense Battalions [i.e., the pro-government Kurdish militias] is considered theirs to 
keep, with the exception of heavy, mounted and medium weapons. They can keep 
the light weapons, notifying us only of the number of these weapons. The commands 
of the Battalions must promptly bring this to the attention of all the advisers and 
company and brigade commanders, and must provide us with detailed information 
concerning their activities in the National Defense Battalions. 
cc. Head of the Legislative Council; Head of the Executive Council; [Foreign] 
Intelligence Agency; Chief of the Army General Staff; Governors (Chairmen of the 
Security Committees) of Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Suleimaniyeh, 
Erbil and Dohuk; [Ba`ath Party] Branch Secretaries of the abovementioned 
Governorates; General Directorate of Military Intelligence; General Directorate of 
Security [Amn]; Directorate of Security of the Autonomous Region; Sub-directorate of 
Military Intelligence, Northern Sector; Sub-directorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern 
Sector; Security Directors of the Governorates of Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Diyala, Salah 
al-Din, Suleimaniyeh, Erbil and Dohuk. 
For your information and action within your respective fields of jurisdiction. Keep us 
informed. 
[Signature] 
The Comrade 
Ali Hassan al-Majid 
Member of the Regional Command, Secretary General of the Northern Bureau. 
Notice: This is the first important directive that indicates a genocidal intention. This 
Iraqi document reinforces the sanction on the areas regarded as prohibited. The 
decree permits the killing of residents inside the rural Kurdish areas. The annihilation 
of all life was permitted in those areas. This policy was practically in effect since 
1985. 
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Appendix no. (3) 
List of accused people for Anfal Case from IHT. 
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In the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate      
Republic of Iraq 
Iraqi High Tribunal 
Second Criminal Court 
Baghdad-Iraq 
Ref. List of People participated in Anfal Crimes 
No. Names of wanted perpetrators Notice 
1 Wafeeq Ejeel Al Samerria Assistant of manager of General 
Intelligent 
2 Wleed Neif Shabeeb North Branch Director 
3 Hamid Yousif Hammadi Secretary of Former regime President 
4 Ibrahim Nazrallah  
5 Ahmad Bejoo  
6 Ahmad Jabar Jabari  
7 Arshad  Ahmad Zebari Minister 
8 Esaad Jankeer Harki  
9 Esmael Aziz Agha Zenganna  
10 Esmael Mahmood Rasoul Agha Peshdari  
11 Major Armour Muhsin Kurgy Ragi 51 Tank Batalion 
12 Major Sabah Raqeeb Sourchi Commander of  2nd National Defense 
Platoon 
 
13 Major AbdulSattar Ata Al Kubaisi Erbil Baath Party Military Headquarter 
Secretary in Erbil 
14 Major Special Forces  Abdul Hamza Esmael 
Hamza 
Th Corps, 64 th Special Battery of 
Commando Brigade commander 
15 Major Mohammed Salim Hussain Taamim Baath Party Military Headquarter 
Secretary in Kirkuk 
16 Major armored Zaidan Khalifa  Lafta Commander of armored Battalion 957 
17 Major Field Artillery Ali Karmish  Hassan Commander of artillery Battalion 79 
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18 Major Artillery Noori Hamid Ahmad Commander of Artillery Battalion  956 
19 Major Staff Sadik Suba Alla Mohammed  
20 Major Pilot Idress Ibraheem Mohammed 2nd Special brigade 4th Corps 
21 Major Staff Officer Anwar Hamd Amin 4th Squadron 
22 Major Pilot Abduhamid Frhan Abdul Hamid 4th Squadron 
23 Major Pilot Emran Kadhim Hindi 2nd  Squadron 
24 Major Pilot Fareeq Mohammed Alwan 2nd Squadron 
25 Major Pilot Mahdi Ali Hassan 2nd Squadron 
26 Major Pilot Younis Salih Salman 30th  Squadron 
27 Major Transportation Gazi Mojbil Khalaf 1st Corp Transportaton 
28 Major Comrade Anwar Raheem Taha Secretary of Al Harith Baath Party 
Headquarter 
29 Colonel Ahmad Salim Jasim AL Samarai Secretary of Nazir Forces Baath Party 
Headquarter 
30 Colonel Badawi Hassan Salih Secretary of Al Rashid Branch of Baath Party 
Military Headquarter 
31 Colonel Hatim AbdulKareem Khamas Director of Sulaimaniya Security Office 
32 Colonel Khalaf Abdullah Amira Secretary of AL Faris military Branch of 
Baath Party Headquarter 
33 Armored Colonel  Farooq Mohammed Hassan Commander of 2nd Brigade , 4th Corp 
34 Colonel Rashid Ahmad Sadkhan Secretary of Al Moatasam military Branch of 
Baath Party Headquarter 
35 Colonel Abdul Hakeem  Tawfik Hasson Secretary of Al Shaibani Military Branch of 
Baath Party Headquarter 
36 Colonel Abdulrazak Hammed Mohammed Headquarter of National Defense forces 
37 Colonel Abdul Kadir Abdulrahman Qaddow Commander of 78th field artillery battalion 
38 Colonel Ali Abdul Gazal Commander of the 33rd field artillery division 
39 Artillery Colonel Hussain Mohammed Hassan 1st HQ  , field artillery border forces 
40 Artillery Colonel Fakhri Ahmad Mohammed 4th Division 
41 Infantry Colonel Shabib Ahmad Ali 4th corps , Commander of the 2nd  Brigade 
Commando 
42 Infantry Colonel Fawzi Jawad Hadi Commander of the 19th Brigade 
393 
 
43 Infantry Colonel Qaiz Ibrahim Midhat Commander of the 445th Brigade 
44 Infantry Colonel Mohammed Yaqoub Yousif Commander of the 428th Brigade 
45 Infantry Colonel Nizar Ahmad Shihab Commander of the 39th Brigade 
46 Special Force Colonel Khalid Bhlool Loaibi Commander of the 1st brigade Special forces , 
1st Corps 
47 Infantry Colonel Staff Ali Hassan Ali Chief of Staff for 4th Division 
48 Colonel Pilot Riyath Mohammed AbdulSadi 4th Division 
49 Colonel Pilot Najim Abdul riza Abdul Wahid 4th Division 
50 Staff Colonel Pilot Ismael Saeed Faris Commander of the 1st wing of Military 
Helicopters 
51 Infantry Colonel Salah Dawoud Abdullah  
52 Staff Brigade Ali Hussain Al Safar Chief of Staff for  the 1st Headquarter of 
National Forces 
53 Brigadier Intelligent Mohammed Mostafa 
Ismaeel 
Internal Security Dept. of 5th Corps 
54 General Khalaf Najim Jasem Secretary for Abi Ther Al Gafari military 
Branch of Baath Party 
55 Armored Brigade Kamel Zaida Khalaf 23th Division 
56 Brigadier  Rafia Hamdon Thanoon 1st Force Commander 
57 Brigadire Samir Tawfik Fathy Commander of the National Forces 
Transportation Branch 
58 Brigadire Ali Lafta Hussain Al Ekabi Secretary for  Khalid Baath Party Military 
Branch 
59 Brigadier Ganem Khalid Ismael Al Jamass Secretary of the Al Kaakak Baath Party 
Military Headquarter 
60 Special Force Brigadier  Ali Husain  Mozaal Commander of 72nd  infantry Brigade 
61 Special Force Brigadier Nasif  Jasim Hamodi Commander of the 2nd Brigade , 6th Corps 
62 Brigadie Mohammed Khairy Saeed Secretary of Sharhabil Branch Headquarter of 
Baath Party 
63 Brigadier artillery Habbeb Khudir Ibrahim Commander of the 4th Division artillery 
64 Brigadier armored  Matar Mohammed Salih Commander of the 23rd Artillery Division 
65 Infantry Brigadier Talat Sulaiman Wali Commander of Dukan Sector 
66 Infantry Brigadier Arif Hamid Hatem Commander of the 4th National Defense 
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67 Staff Brigadier Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim Commander of the 37th Division 
68 Staff Brigadier Amir Jassem  Hamoo Commander of the 7th Division 
69 Staff Brigadier Zuhair Younis All Commander of the 50th Forces 
70 Staff Brigadier Sabah Ismael Commander of the 5th Forces 
71 Staff Brigadier Sabah Nori Al Wan Commander of the 27th Division 
72 Staff Brigadier Abdul Illah Hamid Al Anazz Commander of the 21st Division 
73 Staff Brigadier  Abdul Amir Al Wan Hussain Commander of the 38th Division 
74 Staff Brigadier Abdul Jalil Abdul Hamed  
Mohsin 
Commander of the 38 Division 
75 Staff Brigadier Abdul Majid Abbas Wahaib Commandeer of the 2nd Division 
76 Staff Brigadier  Ali Ahmad Mohammed Salih Commander the 46th Division 
77 Staff Brigadier Ali Aziz  Al Fadham Internal Security/1st Corps 
78 Staff Brigadier Ganem  Salih Hassan Commander of 5th National Defense 
79 Armored Staff Brigadier Attalah Ayoub 
Khalaf 
Chief of Staff /32nd Division 
80 Staff Brigadier Mozhir Abdul Mahdi Chief of Staff 1st National Defense 
Leadership 
81 Satff Brigadier Nasir Saeed  Tawfik Commander of 5th Forces 
82 Special Force Staff Brigadier Diriad Mostafa 
Shakir 
Commander of the 40th Division 
83 Infantry Staff Brigadier Abid Un Niama 
Nisour 
Commander of the 24th Division 
84 Staff Brigadier Ali Salih Hamoudi Al Diri Secretary of the Al Mousa Bin Nasir Baath 
Party Headquarter 
85 Lieutenant General Hakam Hassan Ali Director of Iraqi Army Aviation 
86 Staff Lieutenant General  Niama Faris  
Hussain 
Deputy Chief of Staff for training 
87 General Hussain Hassan Director for Northern sector of Military 
Intelligent 
88 General Abid Salman Hamandi Secretary for Al Moriya Branch of Baath 
Party 
89 General Staff Ayad Khalil Zaki Commander of the Republican Guard 
90 General Staff Hamid Shakir Mahmoud Commander of 41 Division 
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91 General Staff Khalid Mohammed Abas Al 
Jabouri 
Director of the Eastern sector of Military 
Intelligent 
92 General Staff Ramzi Mahmoud Abdullah Commander of the 33rd Infantry Division 
93 General Staff Saad Shamsadin Khaliss Commander of the 1st National Defense 
leadership 
94 General  Asmat Sabir Omar Commander of the 4th Division 
95 Gerneral Staff Ali Mohammed Shalal Commander of the 38th Division 
96 General Staff Galib Hasson Gaieb Commander of Navy Forces 
97 General Mohammed Tahir Tawfik Commander of the 25th Division 
98 Special Forces General  Ayad Ramzi  Shaaban Commander of the 42 Division 
99 Advisor babaki Wasoo Mohammed National Defense Battalion112 
100 Advisor Jamal Khuthir Khalid Al Dobardani National Defense Battalion110 
101 Advisor jamal faki Hussain National Defense Battalion97 
102 Advisor Khalil Abdulah Ibrahim Al Sharafani National Defense Battalion109 
103 Advisor Salim Mohanad Rasoul Aga National Defense Battalion98 
104 Advisor Swara Fatah Mazah Al Jaff National Defense Battalion239 
105 Advisor Sharif Mahmoud Maarouf National Defense Battalion126 
106 Advisor Sheikh Majid Baiz Hassan National Defense Battalion61 
107 Advisor Sabir Ahmad Rakib Mohammed Al 
Surchi 
National Defense Battalion2 
108 Advisor Abbas Baiz Balo Aga National Defense Battalion91 
109 Advisor Abbas Haji Aga Sirsiyan National Defense Battalion66 
110 Advisor Othman Abdul Rahman faihallah National Defense Battalion165 
111 Advisor Omar Ahmad Ali National Defense Battalion171 
112 Advisor Omar Babakir Salim National Defense Battalion114 
113 Advisor Faikhri Ismael Abdul Kadir National Defense Battalion132 
114 Advisor Kadir Shafik Naaman NDB 62 
115 Advisor Kasim Faris Tahir Mostafa Aga NDB 85 
116 Advisor Latif Ahmad Mohammed Zebari NDB 1 
117 ADVISOR Mamand hamad Mawloud NDB 51 
396 
 
118 Advisor Mohammed Tahir Younis 
Mohammed Renkawi 
NDB 107 
119 Advisor Mohammed Ali Rasoul NDB 148 
120 ADVISOR Mahmoud Hama Rasoul Aga NDB 26 
121 Advisor Nawzad Anwar Betwata NDB 4 
122 Advisor Mam Yahya Koya NDB 86 
123 Advisor Mirza Ismael Sharaf Raza NDB 207 
124 Advisor Hussain Mohammed Othman NDB 175 
125 Advisor Mohammed Kanabi Bano Aga NDB 147 
126 ADVISOR Idris Saed Mohammed Secretary of Zakho Military Baath Party 
Branch 
127 Colonel Ismael Mahmod Abid Khalaf Secretary of Al Mansour Baath Party Branch 
128 Colonel hatim Motni Al Awad Secretary of Sulaimaniya Military Baath Party  
leadership 
129 Colonel Hassan Ahmad Abdullah Commander of the 1st NDB 
130 Staff Colonel Abdul Karim Abdul Mahdi Hadi 
Salim 
Commander of the 41 Armored Division 
131 Colonel Salah Sabri Mahmoud Secretary of the second Sulaimaniya Military 
Baath Party Branch 
132 Colonel Thari Abdul Karim Hadi Securety Office for the 1st Leadership of ND 
133 Colonel abdul Satar Jawad Hamza Al HAdithi Director of Amoriya Military Branch 
134 Colenel (armored) Hassan fathllah Abdul 
Kadir 
Commander of 22nd air defense Battallion 
135 Colonel Sahib Jadouh Ziyab Commander of 10th air defense Battallion 
136 Colonel Salahadin Mohammed Abdul Karim Commander of the 662 air defense Battallion 
137 Staff Colonel Hussain Ali Hamid Commander of 26 Brigade 
138 Colonel pilot Mohammed fawzi Hassan 
Mahmoud 
= 
139 Colonel Pilot Ahmad rashid fatna Al Maathidi = 
140 Colonel Pilot Khothair Essa Jawad = 
141 Colonel Pilot Abdul Razak Ibrahim Abdul 
Razak 
1st Sector of Military Aviation 
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142 Lieutenant Farhad Mamand Hamad NDB 51 
143 Lieutenant Pilot Hussam Ibrahim Abood 107th  Squadron 
144 Lieutenant Pilot Khalid Malla Lah Morad 2nd  Squadron 
145 Lieutenant Pilot Razwan Gazi Ahmad 4th Squadron 
146 Lieutenant Pilot  Imad Shobli Mohammed 2nd Squadron 
147 Lieutenant Pilot Imad Abbas Mohsin 2nd Squadron 
148 Lieutenant Pilot  Fazil Abbas Mohsin 2nd Squadron 
149 Captain (weapons)Waad Mohammed Ali 2nd Squadron 
150 Captain Abdul Karim Salih Jawad Representative of Military Intelligent 
151 Special Force Captain Hamza Khothir Hamza Commander of 17 division communication 
152 Special Force Captain  Abdula Hassan Salih Advisor for 151 NFR 
153 Captain Pilot Sabah Ali Hassan 2nd Squadron 
154 Captain Pilot Galib Shaia Ziyara 2nd Squadron 
155 Anwar Mohammed Riza Mahoud Al Jaff  
156 Burhan showani  
157 Bakir Ali Haji Moshir  
158 Bakir Karim Gafour  
159 Tawfik  Jabar Karaman  
160 Thamir Nazif Jaseem Governor of Kirkuk 
161 Jasem Mohammed Zebari  
162 Jabar Sheikh Hadi  
163 Jabar Mosa  Kara Henjiri ( Jihad)  
164 Jaafar Abdul Karim  AL barzenji Governor of Sulaimaniya 
165 Jamal Hussain Dozi  
166 Jawhar Mohyaden Harki  
167 Chiya Surchi  
168 Hajaj Abdul Gafour Khalid Dobardani  
169 Hassan Mahmoud Big Hawari  
170 Hasib Mohammed Najem Jabari  
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171 Hamad Amin Hamad Shaswari Mayor of Kani Mill Village 
172 Hamza Abbas Mand Akoo  
173 Hamay Hai Hussain  
174 Khalid Mahmoud Ahmad Ali Gowara  
175 Khuthair fatah Hussain Gamesh  
176 Khairallah Dozi Intelligent 
177 Rasoul Mamand Kirdolli  
178 Zaid Surchi  
179 Saeed Adnan Jabari  
180 Saeed Mohyadeen Ahmad Zangana  
181 Advisor Saed Riza Said Taha Said Manka  
182 Saed Jinoon  
183 Saed Darwish  
184 Sahrif hamad Sharif (Shafay Khato)  
185 Sharif Mohammed Kirdawodi  
186 Shihab Ahmad Wairman  
187 Shiekh Ahmad Barzanji  
188 Sheikh Burhan Directoer od Zirain Subdistrict 
189 Sheikh Jalal Salihi  
190 Sheikh Ronak  
191 Sheikh Suad Talabani  
192 Sheikh Salah Nakshbandi  
193 Sheikh Karim Sheikh Shahab  
194 Sherzad Ali Balaka  
195 Tarik Shafia Garfoush  
196 Tahir Othman Rostam NDB 52 
197 Assif Ahmad Zebari  
198 Assi Hama Deza Intelligent 
199 Tarik Assis Riza Aga  
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200 Abdul Jabar Mohsin Director of Military propaganda at General 
Command Office 
201 AbdulKarim Mohammed Salim Shoshi Zebari  
202 Abid Mohammed Abdulah Security Director in Shaklawa 
203 Abdulah Kak Amir  
204 Abdullah Mohsin Salih baban  
205 Abdul majid Hussain Ismael Shaikhki  
206 Adnan Abdullah najim Al Jaff  
207 Aziz Hassan Aziz  
208 Ali Hussain Aziz Mayor of Chamchmal 
209 Ali Lot Masi  
210 Omar Haji Badinan  
211 Omar Haji Salih  
212 Omar Hama Rostam  
213 Omar Khuthir Hma Sirchi  
214 Fuad Karim Baiz Hamawand  
215 Faris Mohammed Kadir Aziz Surchi  
216 Kasem rashid Draiy  
217 Kamaran Ahmad ( Kamaran Sur) Outside Iraq in Iran 
218 Kamel Shiekh Hadi  
219 Kamal Hama Mam Suratni  
220 Kamal Mohammed haydar  
221 Mohammed Jawhar Goran  
222 Mohammed Shiekh AbdulKarim barzanji  
223 Mohammed Kadir Aga Zebari  
224 Mohammed Karim Shoshi zebari  
225 Mohammed Kalhe Rekani  
226 Mohyadin Hama Rahim  
227 Midhat Tawfik dawoudi  
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228 Malla Hussain Rokhzabi Intelligent 
229 Malla Ozair  
230 Lieutenant Pilot  Ahmad Ibrahim Ahmad 1st Military Aviation 
231 1st Lieutenant Pilot Ahmad Salam Zanad 1st Squadron 
232 1st Lieutenant Pilot Ahmad Abid dawoud = 
233 1st Lieutenant Pilot Iskandar Ibrahim Jomaa = 
234 1st Lieutenant Pilot Ilham Awin  rafik Younis 1st Military Aviation 
235 1st Lieutenant Pilot Amanj Monazil Khither 21st Squadron 
236 1st Lieutenant Pilot Anmar Mohammed 
Ahmad 
1st Military Aviation 
237 1st Lieutenant Pilot Hussain Ali Abdullah 106 Squadron 
238 1st Lieutenant Pilot Hamid Mansour Khalil 4th Squadron 
239 1st Lieutenant Pilot Khalid Abdul Aziz 
Abdullah 
1st Military Aviation 
240 1st Lieutenant Pilot Khalf Hussain Allawi 1st Military Aviation 
241 1st Lieutenant Pilot Ramazan Motlak Ahmad = 
242 1st Lieutenant Pilot Salim Fathi Hassan = 
243 1st Lieutenant Pilot Saad Ahmad Kasem 30th Squadron 
244 1st Lieutenant Pilot Saad Abdul Rahman 
Saeed 
30th Squadron 
245 1st Lieutenant Pilot SHOJAA yass ROHANI 1st Military Aviation 
246 1st Lieutenant Pilot Shalal Rashid Attiya = 
247 1st Lieutenant Pilot  Thiya Jaafar Razi 4th Squadron 
248 1st Lieutenant Pilot Taha Fathi Salih 2nd Squadron 
249 1st Lieutenant Pilot Taha Mohammed Ahmad 2nd Squadron 
250 1st Lieutenant Pilot AbdulKarim Jadan Ali = 
251 1st Lieutenant Pilot Uday Hatim Lafta = 
252 1st Lieutenant Pilot Ali Hussain Salam 41th Squadron 
253 1st Lieutenant Pilot Faris Ibrahim Rashid = 
254 1st Lieutenant Pilot Qais Habib Mostafa = 
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255 1st Lieutenant Pilot Karim Yasin Zedan = 
256 1st Lieutenant Pilot Laith Abdul Aziz 
Abdullah 
61th Squadron 
257 1st Lieutenant Pilot Mohammed Khazaal 
faisal 
 
258 Namik Rakib La Surchi  
259 1st Military Aviation 1st Military Aviation 
260 AbdulKarim AbdulKarim  
261 Yahya Al Jaff Governor of Erbil 
262 Yaarib Al Robaie Director of Mosul security 
263 Aswad Al Naemi Secretary of Sulaimaniya Baath Party Branch 
264 Tarik Kafi Secretary of Dohuk Baath Party Branch 
265 Saiel Al Abdalli Secretary of Mosul Baath Party Branch 
266 Nazar Younis Secretary of Ninavah Baath Party Leadership 
267 Khuthir Al Dori Secretary of Kirkuk Baath Party Branch 
268 Tahir Jalil Haboush  
269 Amid fatah Beg Al Jaff Advisor for NDB 35 
270 Thahir Aga Koya Advisor 
271 Adnan Disko Advisor 
272 Tarik kakaye Advisor 
273 Saed Gadab ( Hama saeed) Advisor 
274 Majid Gadan Assistant for Advisor 
275 Shamal rafat Klli NDB 
276 Hama Karim Hama farj Mayor of Setilan Village 
277 Mostafa Sulaiman Wza NGR 
278 Omar Hama Ali Jarmika Advisor 
279 Jabar Dresh Special mission 
280 Sabir Surchi Advisor 
281 Mamand Kish ka Advisor 
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282 Ali Selma  Jowantaie Special Mission 
283 Haj Ali Nibyawa Special Missions 
284 Colonel Hamid Othman Advisor for NGR 300 
285 Anwar Hassou Special Mission 
286 Said Kodrat Fighter 
287 Mohammed Kawani Special Mission 
288 Hama Bokhji Advisor 
289 Ibrahim Balol Aga Advisor 
290 Omar Suffi Special Mission 
291 Omar Hussain (Omar Arab) Special Mission 
292 Kalay Hassan Nalband Special Mission 
293 Sala Shina = 
294 Mirza Hassan Advisor 
295 Mohammed Hussain Noori Special Mission 
296 Omar Aga Advisor 
297 Hussain Hama Sur Aga Advisor 
298 Awat Ahmad hassan Rash Advisor for NGR  266 
299 Ahmad Jamil Amin Advisor for NGR 240 
300 Ahmad Sufi Ismael Salih Advisor for NGR 256 
301 Ahmad Kowikha Rajab Advisor for NGR 356 
302 Asad Saed Haji Aga Advisor for NGR 90 
303 Anwar rashid Khuthir Miran Advisor for NGR 202 
304 Anwar Mirza Inrahin Kolli Advisor for NGR 52 
305 Ibrahim Ahmad  Ibrahim Mintek Advisor for NGR 209 
306 Abubaki Faki Salihi Advisor 
307 Baiz Aziz  Rashid Bawjan Advisor for NGR 213 
308 Bahram Mohammed Abdul Rahman bahram Advisor for NGR 11 
309 Burhan  Tawfik Babakir Hawrami Advisor for NGR 238 
310 Tawfik Hma faraj Hama rostam Nawroli Advisor for NGR 70 
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311 Tawfil Sulaiman yasin Barwari Advisor for NGR 113 
312 Tarik Saeed  Ibrahim Mizori Advisor of NGR 190 
313 Taib Mohammed Othman ( Sheikh taib0 Advisor for NGR 202 
314 Jasim Mohammed Faris  Mohammed Advisor for NGR 225 
315 Kurkis Hamid Haider Advisor for NGR 156 
316 Jalal Asad raza jermkaye Advisor for NGR 79 
317 Jalal Sheikh Najmadin Karim Advisor  for NGR 135 
318 Jalal Mohammed Abdul rhman Hilali Advisor  for NGR 198 
319 Jalal mahmod Salih Bradosti Advisor for NGR 232 
320 Jamal nasradin Aziz Advisor for NGR 357 
321 Jamil karim Majid Aga Kouri Advisor for NGR 29 
322 Jaafar Anwar Sulaiman Advisor for NGR 205 
323 Hussain Jankir  Jadir Mizori Advisor for NGR 9th 
324 Hussain Hama fatah Kadir Advisor for NGR 120 
325 Hussain Khider Hamad Advisor for NGR 6th 
326 Helmi Saed Mohammed Kadir Jaff Advisor for NGR 199 
327 Hamod Omar Salih tajadin Mirani Advisor for NGR 71 
328 Khalid Kasim Mohammed Amin Advisor for NGR 270 
329 Khalid Shexo Morad Advisor for NGR 226 
330 Khothir Abdullah Hussain Advisor for NGR 210 
331 Khorshid Asad rasoul Advisor for NGR 253 
332 Rahim Karim Kadir Advisor for NGR 244 
333 Dilsoz Khothir Mina Bilbas Advisor for NGR 235 
334 Rashid Salih Rashid Atroushi Advisor for NGR 227 
335 Zahir Tahir Tawfik Advisor for NGR 150 
336 Smko Abdi Hassan Zedki Advisor for NGR 54 
337 Shokir Jendi Antar Mizori Advisor for NGR 272 
338 Sadik Zero Amin Advisor for NGR 26 
339 Salih Ahmad Ismael Al Romi Advisor for NGR 355 
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340 Sabah Ismael Khothir Advisor for NGR 351 
341 Sadik Ali Mohammed Amin harouni Advisor for NGR 245 
342 Salahadin Khothir rasoul Advisor for NGR 241 
343 Adel Tawfik rashid Advisor for NGR 206 
344 Abdulrahman Asi Abdul Aziz Advisor 
345 AbdulKadir Mostafa Mohammed = 
346 AbdulKarim Hussain Khalid = 
347 Abdullah faisal Badullah Mawati = 
348 AbdulKarim Saedi Sulaiman Saedi Advisor for NGR 285 
349 Adnan Abdullah Ahmad jabara Advisor for NGR 221 
350 Arab Salih omar Kadir Advisor for NGR 208 
351 Alladin Mohammed Amin Issa Advisor for NGR 206 
352 Ali Ahmad haji Shaban Advisor for NGR 92 
353 Ali Sulaiman Hussain Advisor for NGR 214 
354 Ali Aboush Abdi Gazala Advisor for NGR 59 
355 Awni Haji Mostafa Jebraell Advisor 
356 Ali Ahmad Mohammed Haroni = 
357 Ali orjoman Hussain = 
358 Omar Mirkhan = 
359 Omar Mohammed Haider = 
360 Omar Bashar Salih = 
361 Omar Hussain Rasoul Kurdi = 
362 Usmat dino Beri = 
363 Gayath Tawfik sulaiman  Yassin = 
364 Fatah Tahir Mostafa  Abdukadir = 
365 Farouk Rashid  Ali Mohammed Noroli = 
366 Fadil Mostafa Hussain Barwari = 
367 Frhad Mamand  Hamd  Mawloud = 
368 Kadir  Mahmoud  Khalifa  Abdul Samad = 
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369 Kadir  Mohammed Rashid  Abdul kadir = 
370 Kasim  Karim Ahmad Mawlod Advisor for NGR237 
371 Karim Khan Mohmoud Khalifa Advisor for NGR 40 
372 Majid Sulaiman Ahmad Jaff Advisor for NGR 264 
373 Majid Sheikjh Baiz Hassa Advisor 
374 Majid jawhar Ismael = 
375 Mohammed Sheikh maarouf = 
376 Mohsin  Mohammed Yasin = 
377 Mohammed Tahir Rashid Hama Amin = 
378 Mohammed hama Amin Hussain Zorari = 
379 Mohammed Saed  Mahmod Shamirani = 
380 Mohammed Oma Amin Jamil Basaki = 
381 Mohammed Najib Sadik bahaadin = 
382 Mohammed Hamza  Zazlaei = 
383 Mahmod Ahmad Sharif Khowara = 
384 Mahmod Hussain Mahmod Ali = 
385 Mohyadin Aziz Mohammed Baba Ali = 
386 Moshir Ibrahim Ahmad = 
387 Moshir Hadi Hama Aga = 
388 Najmadin Salih Mohammed Barzanji = 
389 Nori Hassan Morad Barzanji = 
390 Halgor AbdulKarm Kaznazani = 
391 Hushyar Salim Ahmad Pasha = 
392 Wahab Rahman Hama Amin = 
393 Younis Ramazan Gowara = 
394 Hama Khan Dara rashid Get Honor Medal by RCC 808 
395 Hama Rashid AbdulRahman Abdul Rahim = 
396 Khuthair rashid bahri = 
397 Slar Nas Rallah  Kadir = 
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398 Saeed Ahmad Shita = 
399 Saed Kadir Mohammed Jaff = 
400 Sheikh mahmod Sead Gull = 
401 Salih Ahmad Hussain = 
402 Abas Haji Aga Rasoul = 
403 Fatah Karim Fatah = 
404 Karim Abdullah Mohammed = 
405 Kisre Mohammed Saed Mohammed Fatah = 
406 Mohammed hassan Ali Mirza = 
407 Mahmoud Hama Amin Hama Salih = 
408 Ibrahim Ali Maho Mizori = 
409 Tahsin Shawes Saed = 
410 Rashid hama Amin Aziz = 
411 Riza Taha Mohyadin = 
412 Rifat Mohammed Ali = 
413 Zirak Tahir Saed = 
414 Suad faizallah Mohammed = 
415 Tahir Ali Abdullah = 
416 Mohammed Salim Kadir Othman = 
417 Midhat Tawfik Mansour = 
418 Moatasim  BabdulKarim Hussain = 
419 Mohammed Sadik Mohammed Showani Get Honor Modal by RCC 809 
420 Omar Mahmoud  Mohammed Mamowi = 
421 Ibrahim Nasradin Aziz Barzanji Get Honor Modal By RCC 1014 
422 Mohammed Isaa Birouwiss Issa jaff = 
423 Mohammed Saed Ahmad Mohammed Al 
Harouni 
= 
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Appendix Chapter 8 
Appendix no. (1) Memo 7371  
Memo no. 7371, date 31 March 1978 for the use of special ammunitions from 
the Director of General Military Intelligence to Chief of Staff Leadership 
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In the Name of Allah, The most merciful, the most gracious 
Republic Presidency                        Ref. 7371 
Secretary                                                                                   Date: 31 March 1978 
Directorate of General Military Intelligent 
                                           Top Secret & Personal 
                                                                                      
 
Memo To: Chief of Staff Leadership 
Subject: Using Special ammunition 
1- Mr.President, Let the God protect him, has ordered our directorate to study 
the best way of surprise strike against bases of Haras Khomainis which are included 
with saboteurs of the first branch of Barzani Group with special ammunition like air 
forces, army flights and artillery. The Study should be done with specialists. 
2- Order of Mr. President, Let the God protect him, has been studied with 
specialist and we managed to have the following suggestions: 
a- To postpone carrying out  the strike against bases of Haras Khomaini( 
Khomaini Guards) and quarters of Barzani group till upcoming June  because the 
above mentioned area s are on the Iraq- Turkey border belt. It is better for to pick up 
targeted areas away from the border in order to not affect the Turkish villages. 
b- To direct our selective strikes against the agents of Iran. 
3- The above  two proposals have been approved and our  directorate begins to 
study locations of Iran agents and has selected targets due to those their influences 
on our interior security in northern area and due to the availability of special 
ammunition and methods of shooting: 
a. Bases of Iran agents in are of Balisan (Villages of Balisan, Sheikh Wasan,…..) 
which are near the main road  of Chuwarqurna and  Kalifan. 
b. Bases of the Iran agents in the town of  Qaradage. 
4- The above mentioned targets in (a-b) are important for iran agents and Iranian 
forces at the same time they had enough distance from our forces for the chemical 
effects thus we think it is better elected and their locations are in lower areas, it is 
better for air forces, launcher tube and helicopters to strike during night, the effect 
will be perfect.   
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5- Our directorate has suggested to use the special ammunition toward the the 
two mentioned targets with 1/3 of Zalin and 1/3 of Mustard gas and keep the rest for 
some urgent matters. 
6- Letter of the Presidency – Secretary – top secret and confidential No. 953, 
965 dated 19th March 1987 which includes the approval to direct the strike but we 
must get benefit from the result. What we have said is not just to harm saboteurs. 
Try to cooperate with the concerned corps and inform us before the result of the 
strike. 
Please be informed and carry out what has been mentioned in the letter of the 
Presidency – Secretary …… with thanks 
 
 
 
 
 
Major General Staff  
Director of Gen. Military Intelligent 
Signed  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Top Secret and Confidential 
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Appendix no.2 memo no. 2405 of 22 March 1988 
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Topt Secret 
Organization of Eastern Intelligence 
No. S1/Q1/2405 
Date: 22 March 1988  
Memo To: Directorate of General Military Intelligence (M5) 
Subject: Information 
Maps: Scale: 1/100 000 
Our Cooperative source (Othman Abdullah), authentic source, has informed us as 
follows: 
Persian Regime is evacuating the city of Halabja and moving all furniture and 
machines to inside Iran now. Some citizens of the city have gone to villages close to 
the city of Halabja. The enemy has built a special complex for people of the city 
inside Iran. 
The Persian enemy is drilling positions, trenches and putting barbed wire before city 
of Halabja now. At the same time they drilled numbers of positions on the main roads 
towards Halabja, Khormal, Beyara and Tweela. Moreover they have brought big 
forces of Haras Khomayni (Khomaini Guards) and Paciches from the mentioned 
areas. The Enemy has set up large anti-aircraft and weapons around Halabja, 
Beyara and Tweela areas too. 
All enemy reinforcement get there during the night. It goes through these roads as 
follows: 
Ahmad Awa towards Khormal road. 
Disly Nawsood 
Tweela Road 
Sazan and Chinara road after they set up four military bridges on the river of Sirwan. 
 4-The Enemy has brought his major forces by aircrafts and Helicopters. 
 5-As the result of raids, the city of Halabja by our aircrafts and artillery, the enemy 
has lost 3,000 Haras (Guards) and Pasiches, their bodies have been moved to the 
city of Bawa, in addition to that there were many wounded in addition to the killing of 
4,000 civilians most of them from Halabja and surrounding villages and residential 
complexes, most of the losses were the result of chemical attacks. 
6-Forces have participated in the attack of Halabja as follows: 
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Forces of Haras and Pesiches 
Big Force of Barzani Group 
Big force of Islamic Movement (Saboteurs) 
Forces of Iranian agents 
Forces of the Kurdistan Socialist Part (Saboteurs). 
7-The enemy is going to attack the area of Shamiran and will push himself toward 
Darbandi Khan Dam in order to destroy it. Forces of Haras and saboteurs in the city 
of Qaradag have been told to get ready to push toward the dam of Darbandi Khan. 
Task of the mentioned forces is to block the road darbandi Khan, Arbat and kalar. At 
the same time, the enemy has brought large forces from Haras and Pasiches and 
saboteurs to Panjowin area in order to attack (Qaya area and Harir) and push 
towards Said Sadik and Shandari. Also there is huge gathering of the enemy forces 
in Sheikh Mareen area and waiting for order in addition to that there were groups of 
saboteurs guiding Haras as well.  
8- The enemy has opened HQ for Haras in Ahmad Awa, Criminal Mohsin Razai has 
visited the area and a big force of 7,000 persons is there waiting to ressume the 
attack. 
9- There is an artillery unit in Ahmad Awa as well as another artillery unit behind 
Halabja towards Hawar. Also there are numbers of Tanks and personnel armoured 
carriers in Ahmad Awa and Khormal. 
10- Saboteurs losses were 80 as a result of raids by our aircrafts. Among those 
casualties 11 major elements like Shawkat Haji Moshir, from agents of Iran. 
11- There is a forces of enemy near the village of Dratoofi (9,933) and it is estimated 
that there were 1,500 armoured members of Haras (Guards) at that location. 
12- Still there were some Soldiers who have not been captured by the enemy, 
wearing Kurdish clothes and living with villagers and people of Halabja. 
Please be kind to inform about … with thanks. 
Colonel Staff   Director of eastern Intelligent Organization 
Signed  
Copy to: Directorate of General Army Intelligent (3rd Branch) Please be kind to inform 
about. 
Top Secret 
417 
 
Bibliography 
 
‘The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority from Bulgaria’, (1951) The World Today, 
pp. 30-36.   
‘Turkey and the Kurds: Ethnic Cleansing’, Economist (17 December 1994), pp. 
52-3. 
‘When Saddam is brought to court’, (1990) The Times, 3 September.  
3U 
Abdul Rith, Majed, (1975) Al Masala Al Kurdiya fi Iraq: 1958 -1975, Beirut: Dar 
AL Thakafa. 
Abu Gazala, Abdul Halin (1993) Al Harb Al Iraqiya - al irania 1980 -1988, Cairo: 
Al Ahram. 
Adams, Valerie (1990) Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Adelman, Howard (1998) ‘Why Refugee Warriors are Threats’, The Journal of 
Conflict Studies, vol. xviii, no. 1. 
Adelman, Howard and Astri Suhrke (eds.) (2000) The Path of a Genocide: The 
Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
Akbar, Ahmed S. (1995) 'Ethnic Cleansing: A Metaphor For Our time?, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 1-25.  
Akrawi, Rauff (2002) Al Hamla Al Badinan wa Awtha al lajieen, Erbil: Dar Aras. 
Al Barak, Fathel (1984) Al Madaris Al Irania wa al yahodiya fi al Iraq, Baghdad: 
Dar al Shounal Thakafiya. 
Al Barak, Fathel (1989) Mustafa al barzani baina al ostora wa al hakika, 
Baghdad:  Dar al Shounal Thakafiya.  
Al Damalogie, Sadik (1952) Emarat Bahdinan, Mosul: Matbaat Al Itihad.  
Al Musolli, Munthir (1992) Political Life in Kurdistan, London: Al Saqi. 
Al Saedi, Abbas Hasham (2002) Masoliyat al fard al jinaeya an al jarima ala 
dawliya, Cairo:  Dar al matboat aljamiaeya. 
Al Samarai, Wafik (1997) Hitam Al Bawaba Al Sharkiya, Kuwait: Kabas Press 
House. 
Al Thewaar newspaper, 16 February 1981, page 2-6. 
418 
 
Al-Far, Abdul-Wahid Mohammed (1996) Al Jaraem al Dawliya Wasultat al Ekab 
Alaiha, Cairo: Dar al-Nahdha al Arabiya. 
Al-Marashi, I., Salama Sammy (2008) Iraq’s Armed Forces: An Analytical 
History, London and New York: Routledge 
 
Al-Shukri, Ali Yousif (2009) International Criminal Law in a Changing World, 
Cairo: Dar Enzak. 
Albright, Madeline K., Cohen, William S., (2008), Preventing Genocide: A 
Blueprint for Policymakers, [Online], Available: http//www.ushmm.org.  
Aldeen, Aida Ali (2000) Al Masalla Al Kurdiya fi Malaf Al Siyasa Al Dawliya, 
Beirut: Dar Al Itifak Al Arabiya. 
Alexander, Edward (1991) A Crime of Vengeance: An Armenian Struggle for 
Justice, New York: Free Press. 
Alwardi Ali, (1969) Social Glimpses of Modern Iraqi History: The Ottomans, 
Safavids and Mamluks, Baghdad. 
Amel, Ahmed (1995) ‘Genocide Prevention’, in edited O. Igwara (ed.) Ethnic 
Hatred: Ethnic Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN Publications.  
Anderson, Benedict (1982) Imagined Communities: Reflection on The Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. 
 
Anderson, Perry (1992) ‘On Employment: Andreas Hillgruber’, in A Zone of 
Engagement, London: Verso. 
 
Anonymous (1934) The Assyrian Tragedy, Annemasse. 
Arzt, Donna (1997) Refugees into Citizens, New York: Council of Foreign 
Relations. 
Atlim, Shareef, Mahir M. and Wahid Abdul, (2002) The Encyclopedia of the 
International Humanitarian Law, Cairo: International Red Cross Committee 
Publication. 
Atwood, J.B. (1999) ‘Early Warning and Prevention of Genocide and Crimes 
Against Humanity’, Journal of Intergroup Relations, vol. 26, pp. 33-39. 
Australian Human Rights Commission (1997) Bringing them Home: A National 
Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island Children from 
their Families, [Online], Available: www.humanrights.gov.au.  
Baban, Taha (2008) Alam al Kurd al Morab, Erbil: Aras Publisher. 
419 
 
Baer, Yitzhak (1992) A History of the Jews in Christian Spain: From the 
Fourteenth Century to the Expulsion, Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society. 
Ball, Howard (1999) Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: the 20th Century 
Experience, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Barkai, Avraham (1989) From Boycott to Annihilation: The Economic Struggle 
of German Jews, 1933-1943, Hanover: Brandeis University Press. 
Barnett, Michael (2002) Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and 
Rwanda, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Baron, Salo (1960) Modern Nationalism and Religion, New York: Maridian 
Books. 
 
Baron, Salo (1967) A Social and Religious History of the Jews: Late Middle Ages 
and Era of European Expansion 1200-1650, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Bartov, Omer (2003) Germany's War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Barzani, Masud (1992) Barzani wa al haraka al taharuriya al Kurdiya, Kurdistan: 
Xabat. 
Bassiouni, Charif M. (1994) 'Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a Specialized 
Convention', 31 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 457, 477 (1994). 
Bassiouni, Cherif M. (1996) The Law of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: Commentaries on the Statute and Rules, NJ: Transnational Publishers. 
Bassiouni, Cherif M., (1994) ‘Crimes Against Humanity: The Need for a 
Specialized Convention’, 31 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 457, 477.  
Batatu, H. (1982) The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in 
Iraq, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Batatu, H. (1990) Social Structure and Revolutionary Movements During the 
Ottoman Empire, Beirut: Maktabat Al Bostan. 
Baudar, Mossa Shah (1993) A Memoir of Baghdad, Cyprus: Dar Al Rais. 
Bauer, Yehuda (1987) 'On the Place of the Holocaust in History', Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 2, pp. 211-15. 
 
Bauer, Yehuda (1989) ‘Remembering for the Future’, in Bauer, Eckardt and 
Little (ed.) The Impact of the Holocaust on the Contemporary World, Oxford: 
Pergamon Press. 
 
420 
 
Bauer, Yehuda (1990) ‘Is the Holocaust Explicable?’ Holocaust and Genocide 
Studies vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 145-55. 
Bauer, Yehuda (1994) Jews for Sale? Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Bauer, Yehuda (2001) Rethinking the Holocaust, New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Bauer, Yehuda (2006) ‘Letter to the Editors’, Journal of Genocide Research vol. 
8, no. 2, pp. 239-41. 
Bauer, Yehuda, (1987) 'On the Place of the Holocaust in History', Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 211-15. 
Bauman, Zygmunt (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust, Oxford: Polity Press. 
Bauman, Zygmunt (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Bax, Mart (2000) ‘Warlords, Priests and the Politics of Ethnic-Cleansing: A 
Case Study from Rural Bosnia-Hercegovina’, Ethnic and Racial Studies vol. 23, 
no. 1, pp. 16-36. 
 
Bedau, H.A., (1973) ‘Genocide in Vietnam’, Boston University Law Review, vol. 
8, pp. 574-622. 
 
Bedjaoui, Mohammad (1995) The New World Order and the Security Council: 
Testing the Legality of its Acts, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
 
Bednar, F. (1948) The Transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia from the 
Ideological and Ecclesiastical Standpoint, Prague: Kalich Protestant Publishing 
Company. 
 
Bedr Khan, Sureya (1928) The Case of Kurdistan against Turkey, Philadelphia: 
Hoyboon. 
 
Begin, Ze'ev (1993) A Zionist Stand, London: Frank Cass. 
 
Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew (1993) ‘A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing’, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 72, pp. 110-21. 
 
Benes, Eduard (1942) ‘The Organization of Post War Europe’, Foreign Affairs 
vol. 20, pp. 226-242. 
 
Bengio, Ofra (1998) Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
421 
 
Beran, Harry (1990) ‘Who should be entitled to Vote in Self-Determination 
Referenda?’, in Warner and Crisp (ed.) Terrorism, Protest and Power, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Beres, L.R. (1989) ‘Genocide, State and Self’, Denver Journal of International 
Law and Society, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 37-57. 
Besteney, Oded (1979) Mass Deportations and Deportees in the Neo-Assyrian 
Empire, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag. 
Birch, Julian (1995) ‘Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm’, Central Asian 
Survey, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 43-74. 
Birch, Julian (1995), ‘Ethnic Cleansing in the Caucasus’, Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 90-107. 
Birch, Julian (1996) ‘The Georgian/Souh Ossetian Territorial and Boundary 
Dispute’, in Transcaucasian Boundaries, Goldenberg, Wright and Schofield 
(ed.), New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Bloxham, Donald (2005) The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, 
Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bodley, John H. (1999), Victims of Progress, Mountain View, Mayfield: 
California. 
Borsody, Stephen (1982) Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority 
1945-1948, New York: Social Science Monographs, Columbia Univ. Press. 
Bouillon M., Malone D. and Rowswell (eds.) (2007) Iraq: Preventing a New 
Generation of Conflict, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.  
Bramwell, Anna C. (ed.) (1988) Refugees in the Age of Total War, London: 
Unwin Hyman. 
Brett, Judith (1997) ‘Every Morning as the Sun Came Up: The Enduring Pain of 
the "Stolen Generation"’, Times Literary Supplement,  
Bridgan, J. (1981) The Revolt of the Heros, New York: Berkley. 
Brifcani, Mostafa (1996) Barzani: The Leader of the Kurdish National 
Movement, Egypt: Al- Aharam Press. 
Browning, Christopher R. (1992) The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching 
the Final Solution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers (1996) Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National 
Question in the New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
422 
 
Bruinessen, Van, Aga, (1978) Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political 
Organization of Kurdistan, Utrecht: Utrecht University Press. 
 
Bryce, Toynbee (ed.) (2000) The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Reading: Taderon 
Press & Gomidas Institute.  
 
Bulloch, John, Morris, Henry (1991) No Friends But The Mountains, The Tragic 
History of the Kurds, London: Penguin Books. 
 
Burkhalter, Holly J. (1994-5), ‘The Question of Genocide: The Clinton 
Administration and Rwanda’, World Policy Journal, Winter, pp. 44-54. 
 
Cameron David, (2007) ‘Making Federalism Work’ in Iraq: Preventing a New 
Generation of Conflict, ed. Markus Bouillon, David Malone and Ben Roswell, 
Lynne Rienner: Boulder, Colorado. 
 
Campbell, Kenneth J. (2006) ‘Review of The Human Security Report 2005’, 
Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 236-238. 
 
Casey, Leo (2003) ‘Questioning Halabja: Genocide and the Expedient Political 
Lie’, Dissent, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 61-5. 
 
Chaliand, Gerard (1980) A People Without a Country, London: Zed Books. 
 
Chaliand, Gérard, and Yves Ternon (1981/83) The Armenians: From Genocide 
to Resistance, London: Zed Press. 
 
Chalk, Frank (1989) ‘Genocide in the Twentieth Century: Definitions of 
Genocide and Their Implications for Prediction and Prevention’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 149-60. 
 
Chalk, Frank, and Kurt Jonassohn (eds.) (1990) The History and Sociology of 
Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Tripp, Charles (2000) A Modern History of Iraq, London: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Charny, Israel W. (1982) How Can We Commit the Unthinkable? Genocide: 
The Human Cancer, Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Charny, Israel W. (ed.) (1984) Towards the Understanding and Prevention of 
Genocide, Boulder: Westview Press. 
 
Chazan, Robert (1973) Medieval Jewry in Northern France, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
423 
 
Chirot, Daniel and McCauley, Clark (2006) Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic of 
Mass Political Murder, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
CIA (1977) The Pike Report, Nottingham: Spokesman Books. 
Cigar, Norman (1995) Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing", 
College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 
Ciment, James (1996) The Kurds, State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, 
New York: Facts on File. 
 
Claude Jnr, Inis (1955) National Minorities: An international problem, New York: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
Cocker, Mark (1998) Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe's Contact with 
Tribal Peoples, London: Jonathan Cape. 
 
Cody, Edward (1989) '149 Nations Vow to Shun Poison Gas,' Washington Post, 
12 January, pp. A1, A32. 
 
Cody, Edward (1989) 'Talks Show Growing Arab Consensus That Chemical 
Arms Balance Nuclear,' Washington Post, 13 January, p. A24. 
 
Cohen, Roberta, Deng Francis (1998) “Appendix: Proposed Guiding Principles 
on Internal 
 
Cohn, Norman (1996) Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World 
Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, London: Serif. 
Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1988, Washington, 
DC: 1989, 510-11; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 28 April 1990, 
1281-82. 
Connor, Walker (1994) Ethnonationalism: The Quest For Understanding, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Dadrian, V.N., Viano, Emilio (1974) ‘The Common Features of the Armenian 
and Jewish cases of Genocide: A Comparative Victimological Perspective’ in 
Victimology: A New Focus, Onati: International Institute for the Sociology of 
Law. 
 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1972) The Methodological Components of the Study of 
Genocide as a Sociological Problem: the Armenian Case, Cambridge, Mass: 
Armenian Heritage Press. 
 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1975) ‘A Typology of Genocide’, International Review of 
Modern Sociology, vol. 5, pp. 201-212. 
424 
 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1986) ‘The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I 
Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 311-60. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1986) ‘The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I 
Genocide of Ottoman Armenians’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 1, no.  
2, pp. 169-92. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1988) ‘The Anticipation and Prevention of Genocide in 
International Conflicts. Some Lessons from History’, International Journal of 
Group Tensions, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 205-214. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1988) ‘The Convergent Aspects of the Armenian and 
Jewish Cases of Genocide: A Reinterpretation of the Concept of Holocaust’, 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 151-69. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1991) ‘Documentation of the Armenian Genocide in 
Turkish Sources’, in Charney I.W. (ed.) Genocide: A Critical Bibliographical 
Review, London: Mansell Publishing.  
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1992), ‘The Role of the Turkish Military in the Destruction 
of Ottoman Armenians: A Study in Historical Continuities’, Journal of Political 
and Military Sociology, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 257-88. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1993) ‘The Special Organisation in the Armenian 
Genocide during the First World War’, in Panayi, P. (ed.) Minorities in Wartime, 
Oxford: Berg. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1995), History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict 
from the Balkans to the Caucasus, Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. 
Dadrian, Vahakn N. 1992. Ottoman Archives and Denial of the Armenian 
Genocide. In The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, edited by R. G. 
Hovanissian. New York: St Martin's Press. 280-310. 
Dadrian, Vahakn, N. (1989) ‘Genocide as a Problem of National and 
International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal 
Ramifications’, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 221-334. 
Dadrian, Vahakn, N. (1991) ‘A Textual Analysis of the Key Indictment of the 
Turkish Military Tribunal Investigating the Armenian Genocide’, Armenian 
Review, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 1-136. 
Danner, Mark (1997) ‘America and the Bosnia Genocide’ The New York 
Review, 4 December. 
Davidowicz, Lucy S. (1975) The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945, New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
425 
 
De Zayas, Alfred-Maurice (1975) ‘International Law and Mass Population 
Transfers’, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 207-258. 
Deàk, Istvàn (1992) ‘Holocaust Heroes’ The New York Review, 5 November, 
pp. 22-26. 
Denich, Bette (1994) ‘Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist ideologies and the 
Symbolic Revival of Genocide’, American Ethnologist, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 367-
90. 
Destexhe, Alain (1994-5) ‘The Third Genocide’, Foreign Policy, vol. 97, pp. 3-
17. 
Destexhe, Alain (1995) Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 
London: Pluto Press. 
DeWaal, Alex, Rakiya, Omaar (1995) ‘The Genocide in Rwanda and the 
International Response’ Current History, April. 
Dikotter, F. (2012) ‘Mao’s Great Leap to Famine’, The New York Times, 15 
December.  
Dinsmore, Guy (2002) ‘The Enduring Pain of Halabja’, The Financial Times, 10 
July. 
Dobkowski, Michael N., Isidor Wallimann (ed.) (1984) Towards the Holocaust: 
The Social and Economic Collapse of the Weimar Republic, Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood. 
Dobkwoski, M., Walliman, I. (ed.) (1992) Genocide in Our Time Louisiana: 
Prierian Press. 
Edmonds C.J. (1957) Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travels and Research 
in North-Eastern Iraq, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Edmonds, C.J., (1976) A Pilgrimage to Lalesh, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Estman M. J. and Rabinoric (ed.) (1988) Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in 
the Middle East, Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornwell University Press. 
 
Evans, Richard J. (1989) In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the 
Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past, New York: Pantheon Books. 
Farhang, Rajaee (1997) Iranian Prospective on Iran-Iraqi War, Miami: 
University Press of Florida. 
426 
 
Fathallah, G. (2012) Iraq fi sama Abdul Karin Qasim, Beirut: Dar Aljamal. 
Faylee, Ahmed N. (2012) Al Failyon, Al Failiyon: Al Asala Al Tarikhiya wa al 
mowatana al mahdora, Erbil: Aras Publishers. 
Fein, Helen (1979) Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish 
Victimization, New York: Free Press. 
Fein, Helen (1993) Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, London: Sage. 
Fein, Helen. A Formula for Genocide: Comparison of the Turkish Genocide 
(1915) and the German Holocaust (1939-45). 
Feroz, Ahmad (1993) The Making of Modern Turkey, New York: Routledge. 
 
Field, Henry (1951) The Anthropology of Iraq: Kurdistan, Chicago: Field 
Museum of Natural History. 
 
Filed, H. Knowing Iranian Nations 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 
935, (1994). 
Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 780 (1992) S1994/674, 27 May 1994, Part I. 
Finkelstein, Norman G. (1995) Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine 
Conflict, London: Verso. 
Flapan, Simha (1987) ‘Myth Three: Palestinians Fled Voluntarily, Intending 
Reconquest’, in Flapan Simha (ed.) The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities, 
New York: Pantheon Books. 
Flapan, Simha (1987) The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 
Foss, Clive (1992) ‘The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation’, 
in The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, R. G. Hovanissian (ed.), 
New York: St Martin's Press.  
Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), [Online], Available: http://www.icrc.org 
 
Freeman, Michael (1991) ‘The Theory and Prevention of Genocide’, Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 185-99. 
Freemantle, Michael (2013) Gas! Gas! Quick, Boys! How Chemistry Changed 
the First World War, Stroud: The History Press. 
427 
 
Fuccaro, N. (1998) The Other Kurds: Yazidis under Colonial Rule. Tribe, Sect 
and State in Modern Iraq 1919-1932, London: St. Martin Press. 
Garner, Brian (2009) Black’s Law Dictionary, St. Paul: Thomson West Group. 
Gellately, Robert, Kiernan, Ben (2003) The Spectre of Genocide: Mass Murder 
in Historical Perspective, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nation and Nationalism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Gellner, Ernest (1997) ‘Nationalism’, Cambridge Anthropology, vol. 20, no. 3, 
pp. 94-5. 
Generating Process'. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 467 (May): 24-38 
Germans and the Holocaust, London: Abacus. 
 
Glaser, K., Possony, S. (1979) Victims of Politics: The State of Human Rights. 
 
Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah (1997) Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary  
 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy (1977) ‘The Limits of the Power of Expulsion in Public in 
International Law’, The British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 47, no. 55-
156. 
 
Gosden, Christine M. (2001) The 1988 Chemical Weapons attack on Halabja, 
Iraq, in Super Terrorism: Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear, New Orleans: 
Transnational Publishers. 
 
Gourevitch, Philip (1996) ‘Neighbourhood Bully: How Genocide Revived 
President Mobutu’, The New Yorker, 9 September, pp. 52-7. 
 
Graber, G.S. (1996) Caravans to Oblivion: The Armenian Genocide 1915, New 
York: John Wiley. 
 
Graefrath, Bernhard (1993) ‘Leave to the Court What Belongs to the Court: The 
Libyan Case’, European journal of International Law, vol. 4, pp. 184-5. 
 
Greenwalt, A. K.A. (1999) ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The case for a 
knowledge-based interpretation’ Columbia Law Review vol. 99, pp. 2259-2294. 
Grottee, H.  
Gunter, Michael (1999) The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq, A Political Analysis, 
London: Macmillan Press. 
 
Gunter, Michael (1992) The Kurds of Iraq, New York: St. Martin’s. 
Gunter, Michael, The Kurds of Iraq, Tragedy and Hope, London: Macmillan 
Press. 
428 
 
 
Guran, Khasro (1992) Kurdistan Fi Al Tairikh, Stockholm.  
Gurr, Ted Robert (1993) Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical 
Conflicts, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
 
Hall, J., Schroeder R. (ed.) (2006) An Anatomy of Power: Social Theory of 
Michael Mann, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hanf, Theodor (1993) Flight and Expulsion. In Coexistence in Wartime 
Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation, London: I.B. Tauris. 
 
Hann, Chris (1996) ‘Ethnic Cleansing in Eastern Europe: Poles and Ukrainians 
beside the Curzon Line’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 389-406. 
 
Harf, Barbara (2003) ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing 
Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political 
Science Review, pp. 57-73. 
 
Harff, Barbara (1986) ‘Genocide as State Terrorism’, in Stohl (ed.) Government 
Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research, Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
Harff, Barbara (1992) ‘Recognising Genocides and Politicides’, in H. Fein (ed.) 
Genocide Watch, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Hasan Arfa, (1966) The Kurds: A Historical and Political Study, London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hayden, Robert M. (1996) ‘Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-
Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia’, American Ethnologist, vol. 
23, pp. 783-801. 
 
Hayden, Robert M. (1996) ‘Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and 
Population Transfers’, Slavic Review, vol. 55, pp. 727-48. 
 
Hencckaerts, Jean-Marie (1995) Mass Expulsion in International Law and 
Practice, The Hague: Kluwer International Law. 
 
Hess, Andrew (1968) ‘The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth-
Century Spain’, The American Historical Review vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 1-25. 
 
Hilberg, Raul (2003) The Destruction of the European Jews, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Hiro, D. (1989) The Longest War: The Iraq-Iran Military Conflict, London: Taylor 
& Francis. 
 
Hirsch, Herbet (1995) Genocide and the Politics of Memory, Studying Death to 
Preserve Life, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
429 
 
 
Hirschon, Renee (ed.) (2003) Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 
Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey, Oxford: 
Berghan. 
 
Hobsbawn, E.J. (1991) Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hornik, Richard (1990) 'With A Little Help from Friends,' The Times, 11 June p. 
34. 
 
Horowitz, Irving Louis (1984) ‘Genocide and the Reconstruction of Social 
Theory: Observations on the Exclusivity of Collective Death’, Armenian Review, 
vol. 37, pp. 1-21. 
 
Horowitz, Irving Louis 1997 Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power, New 
Brunswick N.J.: Transaction Books. 
 
Hovanissian, R. G.  (ed.) Ethics, New York: St Martin's Press.  
 
Hovannisian, R.G. (ed.) (1993) Genocide in Perspective, New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books. 
 
Hovannisian, Richard G., (ed.) (1986) The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, 
Oxford: Transaction Books. 
 
Human Rights Watch (1993) Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the 
Kurds, New York: Middle East Watch Report. 
 
Human Rights Watch (2004) Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in 
Northern Iraq, New York: Human Rights Watch.  
 
Human Rights Watch (2004) Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in 
Northern Iraq, New York: Human Rights Watch.  
 
Human Rights Watch (2004) Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by 
Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, New York: Human Rights 
Watch.  
 
Human Rights Watch (2004) Iraq: State of The Evidence, New York: Human 
Rights Watch.  
 
Human Rights Watch (2006) Judging Dujail: The First Trial before the Iraqi High 
Tribunal, vol. 18, no. 9. 
 
Human Rights Watch, New York, August 18, 1999).  
 
430 
 
Husry, K.S. (1975) ‘The Assyrian Affair of 1933’, International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, No. 6, pp. 115-7. 
 
Ibarra Figueroa, Carlos. (2006) ‘The Culture of Terror and Cold War in 
Guatemala’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 191-208. 
 
ICC (2000) Statute, [Online], Available: http://www.icc-cpi 
 
ICJ Annual Report (1998) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 15 (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia), ICJ. 
 
ICTR Statute (2009), [Online], Available: http://www.icty.org/sid/135 
 
Igwara, Obi Patience (ed.) (1995) Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, London: 
ASEN Publications. 
 
Ihsan, Mohammed (1999) The Role of Anfal Campaign in the Construction of 
Kurdish Nationalism, Exeter: University of Exeter. 
 
Ihsan, Mohammed (2000) Kurdistan and War Dilemma, London: Dar Al Hikma. 
 
Ihsan Nouri, Pasha (1985) La Revolte de l”Agridage “Ararat” 1927 –1930, 
Geneva: Editions Kurdes. 
 
International Criminal Court (ICC) (2011) Elements of Crimes, [Online], 
Available: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff5dd7d2.html. 
 
Jackson Preece, Jennifer (1998) ‘Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-
State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 817-42. 
 
Jankowski James, Gershoni, Israel (1997) Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab 
Middle East, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Jaworski, Rudolf (1991) ‘The German Minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia 
in the Interwar Period’, in Paul S. (ed.) Ethnic Groups in International Relations, 
New York: New York University Press.  
 
Jennings, Francis (1975) The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and 
the Cant of Conquest, New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
Jonassohn, Kurt (1989) ‘The Consequences of Ideological Genocides and 
Their Role in Genocide Prevention’, Armenian Review, vol. 42, no. 4/168), pp. 
1-16. 
Jonassohn, Kurt (1993) ‘Prevention without Prediction’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1-13. 
431 
 
Jonassohn, Kurt (1993) ‘The Tragic Circle of Famine’, Genocide and Refugees 
Society, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 72-6. 
Jonassohn, Kurt (1998) Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations, New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. 
 
Jonathan Randal, (1998) Kurdistan After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness, 
London: Bloomsbury Publishing House. 
 
Jones, Adam (2006) Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Jordan, William Lester (1989) The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip 
Augustus to the last Capetians, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Kadri Cemil Pasha, Zinar Silopi, Daza (1991) Kurdistan: Kurt Milletinin 60 Yallik 
Esrethen Kurtuku; Savasi Hatiralam, Ankara: OZ-GE Publication. 
 
Kahane, Meir (1981) They Must Go, New York: Grosset and Dunlap. 
 
Kahane, Meir (1983) For a Jewish State, Annex and Expel, The New York 
Times. 
 
Kampe, Norbert (1987) ‘Normalizing the Holocaust? The Recent Historians' 
Debate in the Federal Republic of Germany’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 
vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 61-80. 
 
Karsh, Efraim (2000) Fabricating Israeli History: The New Historians, London: 
Frank Cass. 
 
Katz, David (1983-4) ‘English Redemption and Jewish Readmission in 1656’, 
Journal of Jewish Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 73-91. 
 
Katz, Steven T. (1994) The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and 
Mass Death before the Modern Age, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Katznelson, Ira (2003) Desolation and Enlightenment: Political Knowledge after 
Total War, Totalitarianism and the Holocaust, New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Kelly, Michael (2008) Ghosts of Halabja, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security 
International.  
 
Kerson, G., Iran wa al masala al irania (translation Ali Jawad Kalam, 2nd 
Edition), Tehran, Ibin Sinaa Publisher, 1999. P.329- 334. 
 
Khalidi, Walid (1959) ‘Why did the Palestinians Leave? An Examination of the 
Zionist Version of the Exodus of 1948’, Middle East Forum, July, pp. 21-25. 
432 
 
Khalidi, Walid (ed.) (1992) All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied 
and Depopulated by Israel in 1948, Washington: Institute of Palestine Studies. 
Khasro, Guran (1992) Kurdistan through History, Stockholm. 
Kinnane Derek, (1924) The Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kinnane, Derek (1924) The Kurds and Kurdistan London: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Kissinger, Henry (1999) Years of Renewal, London: Weidnfeld and Nicolson. 
 
Koehl, Robert (1957) RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 
1939-1945: A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of 
Germandom, Cambridge: Harvard University. Press. 
 
Kosinski, Leszek (1969) ‘Changes in the Ethnic Structure in East-Central 
Europe, 1930-1960’, Geographical Review, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 388- 402. 
 
Krain, Matthew (1997) ‘State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity 
of Genocides and Politicides’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 41, no. 3, 
pp. 331-360. 
 
Kreindler, Lee S.  Litigation Status in Lockerbie Case, New York Law Journal, 
Volume 219, Number 82. 
 
Kresock, David M. (1994) ‘Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: The Legal 
Foundations of Foreign Intervention’, Cornell Journal of International Law, vol. 
27, pp. 203-39. 
 
Kuper, Leo (1981) Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, 
Harmondsworth : Penguin. 
 
Kuper, Leo (1981) Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Kuper, Leo (1982) International Action against Genocide International Action 
against Genocide, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Kuper, Leo (1989) ‘The Prevention of Genocide: Cultural and Structural 
Indicators of Genocidal Threat’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 
157-74. 
 
Kuper, Leo (1990) ‘The Genocidal State: An Overview’, in P. Van den Berghe 
(ed.), State, Violence and Ethnicity, Colorado: University Press of Colorado. 
 
433 
 
Kuper, Leo (1992) ‘Reflections on the Prevention of Genocide’, in H. Fein (ed.) 
Genocide Watch, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Kuper, Leo (ed.) (1985) The Prevention of Genocide, New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
L. Lukits, Iraq (1990) The Search for National Identity, London: Franz Cass. 
Lagrou, Pieter (1997) ‘Victims of Genocide and National Memory: Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands 1945-1965’, Past and Present, vol.154, pp. 181-
222. 
Laitin, David (2006) ‘Mann's Dark Side: Linking Democracy and Genocide’. in 
John A Hall and Ralph Schroeder (ed.) An Anatomy of Power: The Social 
Theory of Michael Mann, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lea, Henry Charles (1968) The Moriscos of Spain: Their Conversion and 
Expulsion, New York: Greenwood Publishers. 
Lemarchand, René (1994) Burundi: Ethnocide as discourse and practice, New 
York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  
Lemarchand, René (1995) Rwanda: the Rationality of Genocide, in O. Igwara 
(ed.) Ethnic Hatred: Genocide in Rwanda, London: ASEN Publications.  
Lemarchand, Réné, Martin, David (1974) Selective Genocide in Burundi, , 
London: Minority Rights Group. 
Lemarchand, René. (1996) Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lemkin, Raphael (1933) Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger 
Considered as Offences Against the Law of Nations, [Online], Available:  
www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin.online 
Lemkin, Raphael (1944) Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, 
Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law.  
Lemkin, Raphael (1944) Key Writings of Raphael Lemkin on Genocide, [online] 
Available at: http:// www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin.online [Accessed 22 
March, 2013]. 
 
Lémonon, E. (1921) Le Droit des gens et la guerre de 1914-1918, Paris.   
 
Levon, Chorbajian (1999) Studies in Comparative Genocide, London: 
Macmillan Press. 
 
434 
 
Lieberman, Benjamin (2006) Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of 
Modern Europe, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 
Lippman Matthew (1985) 'The Drafting of the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide', BU Law Review, vol. 2, 
p. 602. 
Lippman, Matthew, (1948) ‘The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Forty-five Years Later’, Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 8, pp. 1-84. 
 
M. Sukru. Hanioglu, (1995) The Young Turks in Opposition, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Macdowall, David (1992) The Kurds, A Nation Denied, London: Minority Group 
Publication. 
 
Macdowall, David (2000) A Modern History of the Kurds, London: Tauris. 
Mace, James (1990) ‘Genocide by Famine: Ukraine in 1932-33’, in Van den 
Berghe (ed.) State Violence and Ethnicity, Colorado: University Press of 
Colorado. 
Madley, B., (2005) ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa 
Incubated Ideas and Methods adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern 
Europe’, European Historical Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3, p. 43. 
Mahdi Razak Allah Ahmad, Al Sira Al Nabawiyafi thaw al Masader, Riyad 2011 
Majad, Abdul Arif (1975) The Kurdish Question in Iraq: 1958-1975, Beirut: Al 
Mada. 
Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mann, Michael (1999) ‘The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of 
Ethnic and Political Cleansing’, New Left Review, no.235, pp. 18-45 
Mansousi Al-Sawi, Mohammed (2004) Makalatfi Al Kanon al dawli, Cairo: Al 
Ahram. 
Marrus, Michael (1987) The Holocaust in History, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. 
Marrus, Michael Robert (ed.) (1985) The Unwanted: European Refugees in the 
Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marshalian, Levon (1987) ‘Population Statistics on Ottoman Armenians in the 
Context of Turkish Historiography’, Armenian Review, vol. 40, pp. 1-59. 
435 
 
 
Marx, Anthony W. (2003) Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marx, Emmanuel (1992) ‘Palestinian Refugee Camps in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 281- 94. 
Masalha, Nur (1993) Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in 
Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948, London: I.B. Tauris. 
Max van der Stoel, Reports on the situation in Iraq, 1993/74"E/CN.4/1994/58, 
16; E/CN.4/1995/56, 15 February, 1995. P. 14; 4 March, 1996, 5; 14 November 
1997 (A/C.3/52/7),4; 23 November 1998; and the annual report. GENEVA, 
Press Release HR/CN/892, 31 March 1999. 
Mayer, Arno Joseph (1990) Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The 'Final 
Solution' in History, London: Verso. 
McDougall, Gay J, Special Rapporteur, CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, 22 June 1998. 
See also Commission of Experts Report (S/1994/674), para. 313. 
 
McDowall David, (1997) A Modern History of the Kurds, Minority Group 
International, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McDowall, David (2004) A Modern History of The Kurds, London: I.B. Tauris. 
Medecins Sans Frontieres (1995) ‘Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: 
Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill’, Special Report, 20 July 1995, [Online], 
Available: http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org.  
Melady, Thoma Patrick, Margaret Badum Melady (1976) Uganda: The Asian 
Exiles, New York: Orbis Books. 
Melson, Robert (1992) Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the 
Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Melson, Robert, Howard Wolpe (1970) ‘Modernization and the Politics of 
Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective’, American Political Science Review, 
vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 1112-30. 
Memorandum from the Amn (secret police) directorate in Erbil (Kurdish city in 
northern Iraq) to Amn sup-directorates, ref.S5/19299 of December 17, 1988, 
MEW 91/25-A). 
Merhad R. Izady (1992) The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, London: Taylor and 
Franeis. 
 
436 
 
Meron, Theodor, (1995) 'International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities,' 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 89, no. 3, pp. 554-577.  
 
Middle East Watch (1990) Human Rights in Iraq, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
 
Middle East Watch (1994) Bureaucracy of Repression-The Iraqi government in 
its Own Words, New York: Middle East Watch Publications. 
 
Middle East Watch, (1993) Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign against the 
Kurds, New York: Human Rights Watch Publications.  
 
Midlarsky, Manus I. 2005. The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Miller, Donald E., Touryan Miller (ed.) (1993) Survivors: An Oral History of the 
Armenian Genocide, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Minorsky, Kurds, Kurdistan, The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol.5, 1981. 
 
Mirkovic, D. (2012) 'Barbaric Civilisation:  A Critical Sociology of Genocide',  in 
Journal of Genocide Research,  vol.  14, no. 1, pp. 127-129. 
 
Morris, Benny (2004) The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Morrison, S.A. (1954) ‘The Palestinian Refugee Problem- its Political Aspects’, 
The East and West Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 49-55. 
 
Moses, A. Dirk (2000) ‘An Antipodean Genocide? The Origins of the Genocidal 
Moment in the Colonization of Australia’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 2, 
no. 1, pp. 89-106. 
 
Mosse. Jerusalem: Israel University Press. 315-334. 
 
Mozhir, Kamal (2001) Pages of Kurdish History, Erbil: Mokeryani Press. 
 
Muntasir, Saeed (2006) al mahkama al jinaeya al dawliya, Alexandria: Dar Al-
Jamiaa Al-Jadida. 
 
Nahimana et al v Prosecutor (Case No. ICTR-99-52-A) Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, 28 November 2007, para. 524. International Court of Ruwanda.  
 
Naimark, Norman M. (2001) Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Nairn, Tom (1993) ‘All Bosnians Now?’, Dissent, Fall, pp. 403-09. 
 
437 
 
Nassir, Ahmed, Al Failyon (2012) History and Destructive Citizenship, Erbil: 
Aras Publishers. 
Nazzal, Nafez (1978) The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee 1948, Beirut: 
Institute for Palestine Studies. 
Nekrich, Aleksandr M. (1978) The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate 
of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, New York: Norton. 
Netanyahu, Benzion (1995) The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth-Century 
Spain, New York: Random House. 
Newton, M., Scharf (2006) ‘The Iraqi High Tribunal’s Dujail Trial’, American 
Society of International Law vol. 10, no. 34) [Online], Available: www.asil.org  
Nickel, James W. (1995) ‘What's Wrong with Ethnic Cleansing?’, Journal of 
Social Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 5-15. 
Nickitine B. (1939) Les Kurds, New York: Etude Sociologique et histoire. 
O'Brien, Conor Cruise (1989) ‘A Lost Chance to Save the Jews?’, New York 
Review of Books, vol. 30, no. 7, pp. 27-35. 
O'Halloran, Patrick, J. (1995) Humanitarian Intervention and the Genocide in 
Rwanda, London: Royal Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. 
 
O’Balance, Edgar (1973) The Kurdish Revolt 1961-1970, London: Faber and 
Faber. 
 
O’Balance, Edgar (1973) The Kurdish Revolt 1961-1970, London: Faber and 
Faber. 
 
O’Balance, Edgar (1996) The Kurdish Struggle, New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Report of Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), US Agency For 
International Development (USAIS), Washington DC. 1991. 
 
Olberg, Aristide. R. 1983. 'The Formation of New States as a Refugee- 
 
Oliver-Smith, Anthony, Hansen Art (1982) ‘Involuntary Migration and 
Resettlement: Causes and contexts’, in Hansen A. (ed.) Involuntary Migration 
and Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People, 
Boulder: Westview Press.  
 
Olson, Robert (1989) The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh 
Said Rebellion 1880 –1925, Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 
Olson, Robert (1996) The Kurdish National Movement in the 1990s, Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press. 
438 
 
 
Olson, Robert (1998) The Kurdish Question and Turkish – Iranian Relation, 
California:  Mazda Publication. 
 
Omissi, David E. (1990) Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Forces, 
1919-1939, Manchester: Manchester Universirty Press. 
 
Palmer, Alison (1999) ‘Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and 
Categories’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 89-115. 
 
Palumbo, Michael (1989) The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of 
a People from Their Homeland, London: Faber & Faber. 
 
Pappé, Ilan (2006) The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford: One World. 
 
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's (1997) Modern Introduction to International Law, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Petrovic, Drazen (1994) ‘Ethnic Cleansing - An Attempt at a Methodology’, 
European Journal of International Law, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 342-60. 
 
Phillips, D., (2011) ‘Clarifying Genocidal Intent: A New Interpretive Doctrine’, 
[Online], Available:  http://works.bepress.com/david_phillips/1  
 
Pillourd, Claude (1987) ‘Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949’,Geneva: Norwell,Mass. 
 
Pohl, J. Otto (1999) Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949, Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press. 
 
Pottier, Johan (1995) ‘Representations of Ethnicity in Post-Genocide Writings 
on Rwanda’, in Igwara O. (ed.) Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Genocide in Rwanda, 
London: ASEN Publications.  
 
Powell, Christopher (2011) Barbaric Civilisation: A Critical Sociology of 
Genocide, Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. 
 
Power, Samantha (2002) A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Proudfoot, Malcolm (1956/57) European Refugees, 1939-52: A Study in Forced 
Population Movement, Evanston/London: Northwestern University Press/Faber 
& Faber. 
 
Prunier, Gérard (1995) The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, 
London: Hurst. 
 
439 
 
Prunier, Gerard (2013) From Genocide to Continental War: The Congo Conflict 
and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa, London: Hurst. 
Qasim, Abdul Karim, (1958) Iraqi constitution.  
Qu’ran in the translation by Arthur J. Droge 
Ramsour, E.E. Jr. (1957) The Young Turk, Princeton University Press. 
Randall, Kenneth C., (1988) ‘Universal Jurisdiction under International Law’, 
Texas Law Review, vol. 66, p. 131. 
Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muslih, M. and Reeva S. Simon (ed.) (1990) 
The Origins of Arab Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Reeva S. Simon (1986) Iraq between the World Wars: The Creation and 
Implementation of Nationalist Ideology, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Republic of Austria v Cvjetkovic, Landesgericht, Salzburg, 1994. 
Retrospective defense of the expulsion of the Germans see Evans (1989). 
Robinson, Nehemiah (1960) The Genocide Convention: A Commentary, New 
York: Institute of Jewish Affairs. 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1998) Article 7 
Ronayne, Peter (2001) Never Again? The United States and the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust, Lanham, Md: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
Rosenbaum, Alan S, (ed.) (2001) Is The Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on 
Comparative Genocide, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Rosenberg, Alan (1987) ‘Was the Holocaust Unique? : A Peculiar Question’, in 
Walliman, Dobkowski (ed.) Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case 
Studies of Mass Death, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Ruhashyankiko, Nicodheme (1978) Study of the Question of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, New York: United Nations 
Publications.  
Rulings of the permanent People’s Court in Paris, April 1984. 
Rummel, R. J. (1993) Genocide and Mass Murder, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii. 
Rummel, R. J. (1994) ‘Power, Genocide, and Mass Murder’, Journal of Peace 
Research, vol.31, no. 1, pp. 1-10. 
440 
 
Rummel, R.J. (1990) Lethal Politics: Soviet Genocides and Mass Murder 1900-
1987, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
 
Rummel, R.J. (1991) China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murders 
Since 1900, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
Rummel, R.J. (1991a) Democide: Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder, New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books. 
Rummel, Rudolph J. (1997) Death by Government, London and New York: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Salih, Khaled (1995) 'Anfal: The Kurdish Genocide in Iraq', Digest of Middle 
East Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 24-39.  
Sarafian, A. (1993) United States Official Documents on the Armenian 
Genocide, Watertown: Armenian Review. 
 
Sarvastain (1978) Kurds and Kurdistan, London: Harvill Press. 
 
Sassoon, Joseph (2012) Saddam Hussain's Ba'ath Party: Inside an 
Authoritarian Regime, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Saydam, Abdulah (1996) ‘In the cases of Crimea and Caucasus: Russian 
Colonialist Demographic Methods’, Eurasian Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 114-27. 
 
Schabas, W. (2000) Genocide in International Law, The Crimes of Crimes, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schechtman, Joseph (1962) Post War Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-
55, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Schleunes, Karl (1970) The Twisted Road to Auschwitz: Nazi Policy Towards 
German Jews 1933-39, Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), 1 July 1994.  
Sells, Michael (1995) The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Shack, William, Skinner Elliott (ed.) (1979) Strangers in African Societies, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Shahak, Israel (1989) ‘A History of the Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionism’, Journal 
of Palestine Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 22-37. 
Sharp, Bruce (2006) ‘Averaging Wrong Answers: Noam Chomsky and the 
Cambodia Controversy’ [Online],  
441 
 
Shavit, Ari (2004) Survival of the Fittest (Interview with Benny Morris). Haaretz 
(Haaretz.com), September 1. 
Sheikh Yazdin, Shawkat (2003) La Arasawa Bu Mahabat, Erbil: Aras 
Publishers. 
Sheri Laizer, Martys (1990) Traitors and Patriots, Kurdistan after the Gulf War, 
(London: Zed Books. 
 
Shuglall (1985) Britain in Iraq, London: Routledge. 
 
Simon, Thomas W. (1996) Defining Genocide’, Wisconsin International Law 
Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 243-256. 
 
Simpson, John (1991) From The House of War, London: Arrow Books. 
 
Smith, Anthony (1991) Nationalism in the 20th Century, London: Penguin 
Books. 
 
Smith, Anthony (1995) National Identity, London: Penguin Books. 
 
Smith, Roger (1987) ‘Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth 
Century as an Age of Genocide’, The Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 44. 
 
Smith, Roger W. (1989) ‘Genocide and Denial: The Armenian Case and Its 
Implications’, Armenian Review, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 1-38. 
 
Smith, Roger W. “The Armenian Genocide: Memory, Politics and the Future” in 
Hovannisian, Richard G. (Ed.), The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, 
Ethics, Houndmills: Macmillan(1991=2( 
 
Soane E. B. (1912) The Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise, London: John 
Murray. 
 
Spencer, Philip (2012) Genocide Since 1945, London and New York: 
Routledge.  
Spiers, Edward (1989) Chemical Weapon, Continuance Danger, New York. 
Spiers, Edward M. (1989) Chemical Weaponry: A Continuing Challenge, New 
York: St. Martine’s Press. 
Stanley, Haffman (1992) Duties Beyond Borders, New York: Syracuse 
University Press. 
 
Stannard, David E. (1992) American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of 
the New World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stansfield, Gareth (2003) Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent 
Democracy, London: Routledge. 
442 
 
 
Stanton, G. (2008) ‘Building an Anti-Genocide Regime’, in Totten, S. (ed) The 
Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review 
Rutgers: Transaction Publishers. 
Statute of the ICTR, annexed to Security Council Resolution 955, 8 November 
1994 (S/RES/955 (1994)) Articles 2, 3 and 4. 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Articles 
2, 3, 4, and 5. 
Stern, Brigitte, (1973) Le préjudice dans la théorie de la responsabilité 
internationale, Paris: Pedone. 
Stohl, M. (1987) ‘Outside a Small Circle of Friends: States, Genocide, Mass 
Killing and the Role of Bystanders, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 24, no. 2, 
pp. 151-66. 
Stola, Dariusz (1992) ‘Forced Migrations in Central European History’, 
International Migration Review, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 324-41. 
Stow, Kenneth (1988) ‘Expulsion Italian Style: The Case of Lucio Ferraris’, 
Jewish History, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 51-63. 
Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 31st Sess, 120, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (1978).  
Suhrke, Astri (1983) ‘Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response’, 
in Kritz, M. (ed.) U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic 
Issues, Lexington: Lexington Books.  
Suhrke, Astri (1993) ‘A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the Developing World’, 
International Journal, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 215-238. 
Tägil, Sven (1990) ‘From Nebuchadnezzar to Hitler: The Question of Mass 
Expulsion in History up to World War II’. in Rystad G. (ed.) The Uprooted: 
Forced Migration as an International Problem in the Post-War Era, Lund: Lund 
University Press.  
Talabani, J. (1971) Kurdistan wa al Hraka Al kawmiya, Beirut: Dar Al Talia. 
Tarzi, Shah, M. (1991) ‘The Nation-State, Victim Groups and Refugees’, Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, vol. 14, no. 4 pp. 441-452. 
Taylor, Christopher C. (1999) Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 
1994, Oxford and New York: Berg. 
443 
 
Taylor, Phil (1997) ‘Where the devil do these people get their moral authority?’, 
Reproduced from LM issue 103, September 1997.  
Taylor, Simon (1985) Prelude to Genocide: Nazi Ideology and the Struggle for 
Power, New York: St Martin's Press. 
Teitelbaum, Michael (1985) ‘Forced Migration: The Tragedy of Mass 
Expulsions’, in Glazer N. (ed.) Clamor at the Gates: The New American 
Immigration, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.  
Testimony of the deputy legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, in 1970 
Genocide Hearings 44. 
Thabit, Ahmad Jawanib al Siraa al arabi al Israeli wa majalatihi, Al Jazirah, 3 
October 2004. 
The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (2003), [Online], Available: 
Thompson Ruth (ed.) (1987) The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in International 
Law, Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Center.  
Thornberry, Patrick (1991) ‘Does the Prohibition of Genocide Bind All States?’, 
International Law and the Rights of Minorities, pp. 86-100. 
Thornberry, Patrick (1991) ‘The Convention on Genocide and the Protection of 
Minorities’, in Thornberry P. (ed.) International Law and the Rights of Minorities, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Tomaszewski, Jerzy (1991) ‘International Migrations Connected with the 
National Conflicts in East-Central Europe in the First Half of the 20th Century’, 
Acta Slavica Laponica, no. 9, pp. 1-31. 
Totten, Parsons (ed.) (2013) Samuel Century of Genocide: Essays and 
Eyewitness Accounts, New York: Routledge.  
Trahan, J. (2009) ‘A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgment: 
Genocide Against the Kurds’, Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 30 pp. 
305-412. 
Trinchero, Héctor Hugo (2006) ‘The Genocide of Indigenous Peoples in the 
Formation of the Argentine Nation-State’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 8, 
no. 2, pp. 121-35. 
Twaddle, Michael (ed.) (1975) Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan 
Asians, London: The Athlone Press. 
Ubaidi, S. (2007) Kiraaton Siyasia wa Nafsiya lil Iraq bahda al Takher, Beirut: 
Arab Scientific Publisher. 
444 
 
UN GAOR C.6 73rd mtg., (1948) 
UN Report No. S/19711 of 1986. 
UN Report S/16433 of 29 March 1984. 
United Nation General Assembly (1948) Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Resolution 260, [Online], Available: 
http://www.ohchr.org 
United Nations Charter (1945), [Online], Available: http://www.un.org 
 
United Nations International Law Commission, (1991) ILC Report, New York: 
UN Publications.  
 
United Nations International Law Commission, (1996) ILC Report A/51/10, New 
York: UN Publications.  
 
US Department of State Dispatch, 22 October 1990, Vol. I (8), 205.  
 
Van Esveld, B. (2009) ‘The Anfal Trial and the Iraqi High Tribunal’, Report of 
the International Centre for International Justice, [Online], Available 
www.ictj.org 
 
Vasileva, Darina (1992) ‘Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return’, 
International Migration Review, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 342-52. 
 
Wadie, Jwaideh (1960) The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origin and 
Development, Syracuse University Press. 
 
Wallimann, Isidor, Dobkowski, Michale (ed.) (1987) Genocide and the Modern 
Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death, London: Greenwood. 
 
Webb, J. (1993) 'Genocide Treaty- Ethnic cleansing: substantive and 
procedural hurdles in the application of the Genocide Convention to alleged 
crimes in the former Yugoslavia', Georgia Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, no. 377, p. 391.   
Webb, J., "Genocide Treaty - Ethnic cleansing: substantive and procedural 
hurdles in the application of the Genocide Convention to alleged crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia," Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law, no. 
377, 1993, 391. 
Weiner, Myron. 1993. Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia. 
In International Migration and Security, edited by M. Weiner. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 149-178. 
Weiner, Myron. 1996. Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the 
Causes of Refugee Flows. International Security 21 (1):5-42. 
445 
 
Weiss, John. 1996. Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in 
Germany. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 
Whitaker, Ben. 1985. (Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985:6. 2 
July. 
Willett, Edward (2004) The Iran-Iraq War, War and conflict in the Middle East, 
The Rosen Publishing Group. 
Williams, R. 1990. The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: the 
Discourses of Conquest. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, A Clash of Loyalties( London, 1930) 
 
Wilson, Lt. Col. Sir Arnold T.: Mesopotamia 1914-1917, London, 1930. 
 
Wilson, Lt. Col. Sir Arnold T.: Mesopotamia 1917-1920, London, 1930. 
Wilson: Loyalties 
Wolfrum, Rudiger, "The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences 
through National Courts," Israel YearBook International Human Rights199, 183. 
Wood, William (2001), 'Geographic aspects of genocide: a comparison of 
Bosnia and Rwanda', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol. 
26, no. 1, pp. 57-75. 
Yacoubian, George S. Jr. Injustice Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, November 1997 
Yahil, Leni. 1974. Madagascar: Phantom of a Solution for the Jewish Question. 
In Jews and Non-Jews in Eastern Europe 1918- 1945, edited by B. Vago and 
G.  
Ye'or, Bat. 1985. The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam. Translated by 
D. Maisel, P. Fenton and D. Littman. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University 
Press. 
Zaki, Mohammed Amin (1936) Tarikh al Kurd wa Kurdistan, Cairo: Matbaat Al 
Saada 
Zenner, Walter. 1987. Middlemen Minorities and Genocide. In Genocide and 
the Modern Age: Etiology and Cases of Mass Death, edited by I. Wallimann 
and M. N. Dobkowski. New York: Greenwood. 253-82. 
Zolberg, Aristide R, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayao. 1986. International 
Factors in the Formation of Refugee Movements. International Migration 
Review XX (2):151-170. 
446 
 
Zolberg, Aristide. R., Suhrke, Astri, and Aguayo, S. 1989. Escape from 
Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Web pages 
http:// www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin.online 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/genocide/ 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/cw/program.htm. Accessed 16-10-2013 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html,accesse
d 19 October 2013 , Amja Haykal , al masoliya al jinaeya al fardiya al dawliya 
amama al kazae al jinaee al am, Dar al Nahza, Cairo, 2008.  
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=380984 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=380986&contrassID
=2 
 http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/iraqitribunal.html. 
 
